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 Abstract  
This thesis explores the impact of two behavioural finance concepts, social psychology 
and psychology, on household financial decisions. Under social psychology, I 
investigate whether the variety and intensity of social engagement enhances stock 
market participation. With regard to psychology, I examine two behavioural biases. 
First, I investigate whether mental accounting influences portfolio choice in three asset 
classes and whether financial advice and housing tenure increase (decrease) the effects 
of mental accounts on portfolio choice. Second, I examine whether households’ self-
reported housing wealth are anchored on published house price indices and whether 
anchoring bias is mediated by market information, mortgage refinancing decisions and 
social factors.   
 
The main contributions and findings in the three studies are as follows. First, although 
there is an elaborate body of research concerning the relationship between social 
engagement mechanisms and portfolio choice, most studies investigate specific 
mechanisms in isolation. Using three waves in the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS), I bring together five social engagement measures in one model and show that 
socially engaged individuals are more likely to participate in the stock market. 
Consistent with Granovetter’s (1973) theory of social networks I find that a weak tie 
(measured by social group involvement) has a positive effect on stock market 
participation whereas a strong tie (measured by talking to neighbours) has no effect.  
More trusting individuals are more likely to participate in the stock market, as are those 
who identify with a political party. In contrast, the degree to which religion is important 
appears to have little impact. These results are robust using different specifications. 
Overall, the results of this study demonstrate that the likelihood of stock market 
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participation increases with the variety and intensity of social engagement.  
 
Second, despite the established theoretical underpinnings of mental accounting in 
behavioural portfolio theory (BPT) and recent extensions, not much is known about 
their implications in real life situations. I use a recent UK household survey, the Wealth 
and Assets Survey (WAS), which has comprehensive information about financial assets 
to investigate whether there are differences in the ownership and portfolio share of three 
asset classes among individuals who exhibit no mental account, a single mental account 
and multiple mental accounts, and the conditional influences of financial advice, 
housing, cognitive ability, time preference and risk tolerance. Overall I find that mental 
accounting together with financial advice and housing tenure explain variations in both 
the probability of ownership and portfolio share in the three asset classes. Households 
that exhibit a single mental account have low share of investments in, and are less likely 
to own, a risky asset when compared to those that exhibit no mental account or exhibit 
multiple mental accounts. I also find that, when compared to having no mental account, 
exhibiting a single mental account or multiple mental accounts increases both the 
probability and investment share in a fairly safe asset but decreases portfolio share in 
safe assets. In addition, among those that exhibit a single mental or multiple mental 
accounts, financial advice decreases portfolio share in risky assets and fairly safe assets 
and increases portfolio share in safe assets. Housing tenure increases both the 
probability and portfolio share in risky assets, decreases portfolio share in fairly safe 
assets and increases portfolio share in safe assets. These results are consistent using 
multi-equation regressions, sub-samples, reparametrised variables and poisson 
regressions.  
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Finally, as little is known about how households derive the self-reported house prices 
estimates that are commonly used to determine housing wealth, the third study 
examines whether households are anchored on published house price indices.  The key 
conjecture is that, while assessing the values of their homes, homeowners place more 
weight on house price news at the expense of property characteristics and other market 
information. I find support for this hypothesis using sixteen waves of the BHPS, 
multiple methods, and both regional and national house price indices. I conclude that 
changes in self-reported housing wealth are anchored on changes in published house 
price indices. Specifically, ownership through a mortgage and greater financial 
expectations increase anchoring effects while mortgage refinancing decreases the 
effects. Moreover, use of money raised from refinancing for home investment, as 
opposed to other consumption purposes, has a positive association with change in self-
reported house value and both uses reduce anchoring bias. In addition, I find that 
computer use increases anchoring bias and, among social engagement mechanisms, 
religiosity reduces anchoring while other measures have no effect. These results are 
robust to internal instrumental variables, national aggregate house prices, alternative 
indices and sub-samples. 
 
  
  
 
A
p
pen
dice
s 
iv 
Dedication 
 I dedicate this thesis to: 
My Mom, Mather Kabon Chebii 
Your unrelenting prayers, faithfulness to the family, hard work, love and humility saw 
us through the difficult times 
 
My late Dad, Charles Changwony Chebii (Kipkolomiy) 
You stirred-up my thirst for knowledge, intellectual curiosity and the quest for 
perfection 
 
My late Sister, Nancy Sogome Koimett 
Your candle burned out long before your legend ever did 
 
  
  
 
A
p
pen
dice
s 
v 
 
Acknowledgements  
This thesis would not have been possible without the contribution of a number of 
people. First, I do want to acknowledge my principal supervisor Dr Kevin Campbell for 
his guidance and motivation throughout my studies. I am grateful for his remarkable 
diligence and patience while wading through my writing and his encouragement during 
the difficult times. Many thanks go to my second supervisor, Dr Isaac Tabner, for 
introducing the seminal literature in household finance and for his commitment in this 
process.  Both of you have become true friends.  
I owe a debt to the external examiner, Dr Dimitris Georgarakos (Goethe University 
Frankfurt, Germany), and the internal examiner, Professor David McMillian (University 
of Stirling). Their comments and suggestions have greatly improved this thesis and the 
resulting papers. Chapter Two of this thesis and the published paper, thereof, entitled 
“social engagement and stock market participation”, which is co-authored with both 
supervisors, received invaluable comments from an anonymous reviewer, Dr Dimitris 
Georgarakos, Professor David Hillier (University of Strathclyde), Professor Chris Veld 
(Monash University) and participants during the International Accounting and Finance 
Doctoral Symposium in Strathclyde. This thesis has also benefited from participants 
during two Scottish Doctoral Colloquiums in Accounting and Finance in Edinburgh and 
Business and Management in Strathclyde.  
I would like to thank the Commonwealth Scholarship Commission (UK Government) 
for the award of a full scholarship to undertake this degree and additional funding to 
attend a course on Introduction to British Household Panel Survey using STATA. 
Professor Ian Fraser for facilitating divisional financial support to attend courses in 
  
 
A
p
pen
dice
s 
vi 
Panel Data Analysis of Microdata at the University of Essex and Data Management and 
Panel Data Models at the University of Salamanca (Spain). Many thanks go to 
Professor Samuel Gudu and Moi University Deans Committee for nominating me for 
the award and to Moi University Management for granting me study leave. I also wish 
to acknowledge the staff at the Divisional office for always being available to assist on 
administrative matters. To my colleagues in the Division of Accounting and Finance, 
thanks for listening to my often seemingly boring, but ultimately rewarding, discussions 
about panel data methods and Stata do-files. 
To my Scottish parents, Ruth and Islwyn Williams, thank you for your hospitality and 
your spiritual and moral support. 
Finally, I want to thank my family, the Kolomiys’, for their support, encouragement and 
prayers during this process. To my brothers, thank you for filling the gap and standing-
in for me during my long absence from home. I am sure it is all worth it. To my sisters, 
your hard work and determination has been a motivation. To my nieces and nephews, I 
did this for you – now you can take the challenge. To my love (FF), Betty Jebet, thank 
you for your unwavering support and endurance and for lending your ear to my worries 
and frustrations.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
A
p
pen
dice
s 
vii 
List of Contents 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................ i 
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................... iv 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................. ix 
List of Figures .................................................................................................................. x 
Chapter 1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Household financial decisions and behavioural finance .......................................... 1 
1.2 Motivation and objectives of the study .................................................................... 3 
1.3 Data and selection of samples .................................................................................. 7 
1.4 Research methods .................................................................................................... 8 
1.5 Major findings, contributions and implications ..................................................... 10 
1.6 Outline of the thesis ............................................................................................... 14 
Chapter 2 Social engagement and stock market participation ................................. 15 
2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 15 
2.2 Prior literature and hypotheses development ......................................................... 19 
2.2.1 Social engagement, social capital and stock market participation ................ 19 
2.2.2 Social interaction – weak ties and strong ties ............................................... 21 
2.2.3 Trust and stock market participation ............................................................ 22 
2.2.4 Religion and stock market participation ....................................................... 23 
2.2.5 Political party identification and stock market participation ........................ 25 
2.3 Data ........................................................................................................................ 27 
2.3.1 Variables description .................................................................................... 27 
2.3.2 Descriptive Statistics ..................................................................................... 34 
2.4 Econometric strategy ............................................................................................. 40 
2.5 Empirical results .................................................................................................... 43 
2.5.1 The role of social interaction, trust and religion ........................................... 43 
2.5.2 The role of political party identification ....................................................... 52 
2.5.3 The conditional marginal effects of social interaction, trust, religion and 
political party identification .......................................................................... 58 
2.5.4 The effect of a shift in political party identification ..................................... 61 
2.6 Robustness checks ................................................................................................. 66 
2.6.1 Lagged value of stock market participation .................................................. 67 
2.6.2 Alternative asset categories .......................................................................... 67 
2.7 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 71 
Chapter 3 Mental accounting and portfolio choice ................................................... 75 
3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 75 
3.2 Prior literature and hypotheses development ......................................................... 81 
3.2.1 Mental accounting ......................................................................................... 81 
3.2.2 Mental accounting and portfolio choice ....................................................... 82 
3.2.3 Mental accounting and financial advice ....................................................... 85 
3.2.4 Mental accounting and background assets .................................................... 87 
3.2.5 Other related literature on portfolio choice ................................................... 88 
3.3 The data .................................................................................................................. 90 
3.3.1 Variables description .................................................................................... 90 
3.3.2 Descriptive statistics ................................................................................... 100 
3.4 Empirical strategy ................................................................................................ 113 
  
 
A
p
pen
dice
s 
viii 
3.5 Empirical results .................................................................................................. 116 
3.5.1 Mental accounts, time preference, risk tolerance and cognitive ability ...... 117 
3.5.2 Financial advice, mental accounting and portfolio choice ......................... 132 
3.5.3 Housing tenure, mental accounts and portfolio choice ............................... 143 
3.5.4 Mental account types and sources of financial advice ................................ 155 
3.6 Robustness checks ............................................................................................... 160 
3.6.1 Multi-equation estimates ............................................................................. 160 
3.6.2 Estimates using sub-samples ...................................................................... 173 
3.6.3 Alternative classification of financial assets ............................................... 181 
3.6.4 Estimates from poisson regressions ............................................................ 187 
3.7 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 194 
Chapter 4 Anchoring bias, asymmetric information and house prices ................. 198 
4.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 198 
4.2 Prior literature and hypotheses development ....................................................... 203 
4.2.1 Anchoring bias ............................................................................................ 204 
4.2.2 Anchoring bias and financial forecasts ....................................................... 208 
4.2.3 Anchoring and social moderators ............................................................... 214 
4.3 Data ...................................................................................................................... 216 
4.3.1 Variables description .................................................................................. 216 
4.3.2 Descriptive statistics ................................................................................... 225 
4.4 Empirical strategy ................................................................................................ 234 
4.5 Empirical results .................................................................................................. 242 
4.5.1 Baseline anchoring estimates ...................................................................... 242 
4.5.2 Evidence using extended regression specifications and interaction terms . 246 
4.5.3 Effect of mortgage refinancing ................................................................... 252 
4.5.4 Estimates using sub-samples ...................................................................... 261 
4.5.5 Quantile regression estimates ..................................................................... 271 
4.5.6 Social Factors and anchoring ...................................................................... 276 
4.6 Robustness checks ............................................................................................... 279 
4.6.1 Estimates using two-way clustered standard errors .................................... 279 
4.6.2 Evidence using the Nationwide national house price index ....................... 283 
4.6.3 Evidence using the Halifax house price index ............................................ 289 
4.6.4 Instrumental variables regression estimates ............................................... 297 
4.7 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 302 
Chapter 5 Conclusion ................................................................................................. 306 
Bibliography ................................................................................................................ 312 
 
  
 
A
p
pen
dice
s 
ix 
List of Tables 
Table 2.1 Variable descriptions ................................................................................................... 29 
Table 2.2 Summary statistics ...................................................................................................... 35 
Table 2.3 Pairwise correlation matrix ......................................................................................... 37 
Table 2.4 Social engagement and stock market participation ..................................................... 45 
Table 2.5 Party identification, social engagement and stock market participation ..................... 53 
Table 2.6 Effects of shift in political party identification ........................................................... 63 
Table 2.7 Marginal effects calculated using a lagged and alternative dependent variables ........ 68 
Table 3.1: Variable descriptions ................................................................................................. 92 
Table 3.2 Summary statistics .................................................................................................... 101 
Table 3.3 Pairwise correlation matrix ....................................................................................... 106 
Table 3.4 Effects of mental accounting, time preference, risk tolerance and cognitive ability 118 
Table 3.5 Conditional effects of mental accounting, time preference, risk tolerance and 
cognitive ability ......................................................................................................................... 127 
Table 3.6 Effects of mental accounting and financial advice ................................................... 133 
Table 3.7 Conditional marginal effects of mental accounting and financial advice ................. 137 
Table 3.8 Effects of mental accounting, financial advice and housing tenure .......................... 144 
Table 3.9 Conditional marginal effects of mental accounting, financial advice, and housing 
tenure ......................................................................................................................................... 148 
Table 3.10 Mental account types, sources of financial advice and portfolio choice ................. 156 
Table 3.11 Bivariate and three-equation probit models estimates for asset ownership ............ 163 
Table 3.12 Bivariate marginal effects for different ownership combinations ........................... 166 
Table 3.13 Univariate and conditional marginal effects ........................................................... 168 
Table 3.14 Bivariate and three-equation tobit estimates for portfolio share ............................. 171 
Table 3.15 Estimates using sub-samples of mental accounts .................................................... 175 
Table 3.16 Estimates using alternative definitions of asset class .............................................. 183 
Table 3.17 Poisson regression estimates ................................................................................... 189 
Table 4.1 Variable definitions ................................................................................................... 218 
Table 4.2 Summary statistics .................................................................................................... 226 
Table 4.3 Pairwise correlation matrix ....................................................................................... 228 
Table 4.4 Baseline anchoring regressions - self-reported house value and regional house price
 ................................................................................................................................................... 245 
Table 4.5 Estimates using extended specifications and interaction terms ................................ 248 
Table 4.6 Effect of refinancing through home improvement and consumption........................ 254 
Table 4.7 Estimates using sub-samples of both home valuation relative to house price index and 
housing tenure ........................................................................................................................... 263 
Table 4.8 Estimates using sub-samples of both regional and housing tenure ........................... 268 
Table 4.9 Quantile regressions estimates .................................................................................. 273 
Table 4.10 Anchoring and social moderators............................................................................ 277 
Table 4.11 Estimates using two-way clustered standard errors ................................................ 281 
Table 4.12 Estimates using Nationwide UK aggregate house price data .................................. 285 
Table 4.13 Estimates using Halifax UK aggregate house price data ........................................ 290 
Table 4.14 Instrumental variables regression estimates ............................................................ 299 
 
  
  
 
A
p
pen
dice
s 
x 
List of Figures 
Figure 1.1 Theoretical framework ................................................................................................. 3 
Figure 2.1 Stock market participation rates by trust and political party identification ............... 39 
Figure 2.2  Conditional marginal effects with social engagement interaction terms .................. 59 
Figure 2.3 Conditional marginal effects by geographic region ................................................... 60 
Figure 2.4 Conditional marginal effects of shift in political preferences – base characteristics . 65 
Figure 2.5  Conditional marginal effects of shift in political preferences – varied representative 
values .......................................................................................................................................... 66 
Figure 3.1 Portfolio choice by mental accounts, time preference and risk tolerance ................ 110 
Figure 3.2 Portfolio choice by mental accounts and financial advice ....................................... 111 
Figure 3.3 Portfolio choice by mental accounts and housing ................................................... 112 
Figure 3.4 Conditional marginal effects of time preference, risk tolerance and cognitive ability
 ................................................................................................................................................... 131 
Figure 3.5 Conditional marginal effects of financial advice on ownership .............................. 142 
Figure 3.6 Conditional marginal effect of housing tenure on ownership .................................. 153 
Figure 4.1 Means self-reported house values and published house price indices ..................... 231 
Figure 4.2 Means of self-reported house values and published house price indices by UK 
regions ....................................................................................................................................... 232 
Figure 4.3 Means of self-reported house values and house price index by region and house type
 ................................................................................................................................................... 233 
Figure 4.4 Effect of financial expectations, mortgage holding and refinancing across change in 
house price index ...................................................................................................................... 261 
Figure 4.5 Quantile distribution plots ....................................................................................... 272 
Figure 4.6 Quantile plots of key variables ................................................................................ 275 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 1 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
“We do not need elegant models; we need models that describe real people in real 
markets” 
 (Statman, 2010) 
1.1 Household financial decisions and behavioural finance  
The branch of the finance literature known as household finance describes the different 
financial decisions which households make, such as consumption, saving, investment 
and portfolio choice, and the different tools that they use to achieve their goals.  
Households’ financial decision-making processes can be better understood in the 
context of two competing, albeit complementary, finance theories. In contrast to 
standard finance theory in which people are considered to be rational, behavioural 
finance theory is based on the view that some financial phenomena can be better 
understood using models in which some people are not fully rational, and so  depicts the 
behaviour of both ‘normal people’ and ‘normal markets’ (Shefrin and Statman, 2000; 
Barberis and Thaler, 2002). It challenges some of the basic foundations and 
assumptions of standard finance theory, for example, that portfolio choices are based on 
the rules in Markowitz’s (1952) mean-variance theory. Instead, behavioural finance 
acknowledges that people sometimes make irrational financial decisions and are subject 
to judgement and decision biases - largely attributed to cognitive constraints and 
dissonance - which include heuristic simplification, self-deception, and emotions and 
self-control (Hirshleifer, 2001).1  Hirshleifer also identifies social interaction as an 
important determinant of financial decisions. 
                                                 
1 Heuristic simplification includes behavioural biases such as attention effects, reference effects and the 
representativeness heuristic. Self-deception includes biases such as overconfidence, self-attribution, 
hindsight bias and confirmatory bias. Biases associated with emotions and self-control includes distaste 
for ambiguity, misattribution biases and time preference. Social interactions can lead to biases such as the 
conformity effect, the false consensus effect and the curse of knowledge. 
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From the early work by Slovic (1972) regarding the psychology of human judgement 
and Tversky and Kahneman (1974) concerning behavioural heuristics and biases, 
subsequent theoretical and empirical studies in household finance identify patterns of 
irrational investor behaviour and psychological biases, also referred to as behavioural 
biases.  They include psychological dispositions such as overconfidence (Barber and 
Odean, 2001; Gervais and Odean, 2001), overreaction (Bondt and Thaler, 1985), loss 
aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Odean, 1998), 
herding (Huberman and Regev, 2001), miscalibration of probabilities and hyperbolic 
discounting (Laibson, 1997) and regret (Bell, 1983; Clarke et al., 1994). Further, 
normal investors are influenced by other socioeconomic, technological and 
environmental factors that shape preferences, attitudes and values. Existing evidence 
documents the influence of social interaction (Hong et al., 2004; Brown and Taylor, 
2010), trust (Guiso et al., 2008), political values (Kaustia and Torstila, 2011), religion 
(Guiso et al., 2006), computer usage (Barber and Odean, 2002; Bogan, 2008), housing 
(Flavin and Yamashita, 2002; Cocco, 2005), human capital (Heaton and Lucas, 2000c; 
Ibbotson et al., 2007) and private ownership of businesses (Heaton and Lucas, 2000b; 
Faig and Shum, 2002).  
In this thesis, I focus on the relationships between household financial decisions and 
social engagement, which I derive from Putnam’s Social Capital Index (Putnam, 2000) 
and two behavioural biases: (1) mental accounting, which refers to the process of 
planning and separately managing wealth in layers, or goals (Thaler, 1980); and (2) 
anchoring bias, which refers to the influence of reference points when estimating the 
true value of a subject (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).   
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Figure 1.1 presents the theoretical framework that underpins the above three studies. 
Behavioural finance theory mainly emerges from two interrelated fields: psychology 
and social psychology (see for example Hirshleifer, 2001; Baker and Nofsinger, 2002). 
Psychology deals with the various mental processes that influence individual behaviour 
and decisions, in which I examine the roles of mental accounting and anchoring. Social 
psychology encompasses the influence of interactions among individuals or groups and 
how this affects an individual’s decisions; I examine the variety and intensity of social 
engagement.  
Figure 1.1 Theoretical framework 
 
1.2 Motivation and objectives of the study 
The last two decades have witnessed a global shift in pension plans from defined 
benefit plans to defined contribution plans, an increase in new types of financial 
products and services, and a substantial increase in homeownership that is typically 
associated with mortgage finance (Guiso et al., 2003; Campbell, 2006; Office of 
National Statistics, 2013a). Changes in pension plans have meant that households must 
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take on more responsibility for the manner in which they invest their money (Campbell, 
2006) whilst new financial products have led to an increase in ownership of financial 
assets (Guiso et al., 2003).2 These changes have occurred against the backdrop of 
evidence that most households are ill-equipped to make informed financial decisions or 
to understand complex financial products owing to financial illiteracy (Campbell, 2006; 
Van Rooij et al., 2011; Klapper et al., 2013) and that these decisions are subject to 
various judgement and decision biases (see for example, Hirshleifer, 2001; Baker and 
Nofsinger, 2002). Further, although owner occupied housing and home purchase 
through a mortgage declined over the decade to 2011, house prices grew steadily and 
thus housing wealth constitutes a substantial proportion of household total wealth 
(Office of National Statistics, 2013a). In response to stock market downturns, it is also 
argued that investors have tended to shift investment in stocks to housing because of the 
perception that housing is the “best investment” and that it cannot “lose money” (Case 
and Shiller, 2003).   
This thesis examines the role of social engagement, mental accounting and anchoring in 
households’ financial decisions. First, I examine the role of social engagement 
mechanisms on stock market participation. As previously mentioned, despite growth in 
the variety of financial products linked to the stock market, improved awareness about 
investment in stocks and a shift in the responsibility of managing retirement funds from 
both government and employers to households, low stock market participation persists 
across and within countries (Guiso et al., 2003). The literature attributes this to the 
fixed costs of acquiring information, amongst other factors. Previous studies investigate 
                                                 
2
 For example, in the UK direct stock market participation dropped to 17% in 2010 from 26% in 2002; in 
contrast, participation through new products such as Individual Savings Accounts (ISAs) increased from 
28% in 2002 to 40% in 2010. These data are collated from the Savings and Investments Series in the 
Family Resources Survey, which provides individual income details for women and men in Great Britain 
(Department for Social Development, 2013). 
Introduction 
 
 
 5 
how increased levels of social capital, arising from social engagement, could reduce 
information costs and so mitigate barriers to stock market participation. However, most 
studies investigate various social capital measures in isolation (e.g. Hong et al., 2004) 
or bring together a few measures in one model (e.g. Georgarakos and Pasini, 2011). 
Furthermore, studies that use popular proxies for social engagement such as frequency 
of talking to neighbours and involvement in social groups do not distinguish between 
these two channels of information diffusion, as suggested in social interaction theory 
(Granovetter, 1973).  In Chapter Two, I add to this literature by bringing together five 
social engagement measures in one model, to examine their independent and joint 
effects on stock market participation.   
Second, I investigate the connection between mental accounting and portfolio choice.  
Because most households have low levels of financial literacy, mental accounting 
enables them to more easily manage their wealth, to simplify complex financial 
decisions and to discipline themselves against impulsive consumption (Shefrin and 
Thaler, 1988). In their description of Behavioural Portfolio Theory (BPT) Shefrin and 
Statman (2000) suggest that, when compared to investors who exhibit BPT multiple 
mental accounts, known as “BPT-MA investors”, those who exhibit BPT single mental 
accounts, known as “BPT-SA investors”, are similar to “mean-variance investors” and 
hold portfolios that lie on Markowitz’s (1952) mean-variance efficient frontier. Das et 
al. (2010) use a BPT framework to argue that BPT-MA investors’ portfolios also lie on 
the efficient frontier; however, recent theories which incorporate background risk 
(Baptista, 2012) and financial advice (Alexander and Baptista, 2011) show that BPT-
MA portfolios are below the efficient frontier. Although BPT is now well-established, 
little is known about its application under real life circumstances. Previous studies use 
different mental frames and subsets of household portfolios (Benartzi and Thaler, 2007; 
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Choi et al., 2009) and do not examine both investment goals (as proxies for mental 
accounts) and the entire household portfolio. Further, the elaborate literature on the 
determinants of portfolio choice only dwells on the direct influence of factors such as 
financial literacy and cognitive ability (e.g. Christelis et al., 2010; Klapper et al., 2013), 
general health, physical health and mental health (e.g. Atella et al., 2012; Bogan and 
Fertig, 2013) and background risks (e.g. Guiso and Jappelli, 2000; Cocco, 2005). In 
Chapter Three, I examine whether investors who have no mental account and investors 
who exhibit a single mental account or multiple mental accounts make different 
portfolio choices and whether the effect of mental accounting is mediated by 
background risk and financial advice.  
Third, I examine whether changes in self-reported housing wealth are anchored on 
changes in published house price indices. Housing constitutes a significant share of 
total household portfolios and therefore influences households’ financial decisions 
regarding consumption and investment (Campbell and Cocco, 2007; Disney et al., 
2010b). Given that housing is the most talked about and watched investment 
(Himmelberg et al., 2005; Shiller, 2007) and that house price indices are closely 
monitored by homeowners, we might expect self-reported housing wealth to be 
anchored on house price indices. Anchoring biases are well documented in studies that 
investigate the determinants of asset pricing (e.g. Huberman and Regev, 2001; Coval 
and Shumway, 2005) and asset allocation (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Shefrin 
and Statman, 1985; Feng and Seasholes, 2005). However, apart from Northcraft and 
Neale (1987) who use an experiment to show that property prices are anchored on the 
initial price at which a property is listed, not much is known about the relationship 
between self-reported housing wealth and house price indices. In Chapter Four, I use 
household survey data to examine whether changes in self-reported housing wealth are 
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anchored on changes in published house price indices and whether information 
asymmetries arising from ownership tenure and mortgage refinancing reduce anchoring 
effects.  
1.3 Data and selection of samples  
To achieve the objectives of this thesis I use various sources of data. Typically, the 
main sources of panel and cross sectional data used in the household finance literature 
are drawn from household surveys that are carried out in most countries. Unlike cross 
sectional data, panel data are more efficient as they provide a better way of dealing with 
omitted variables bias and unobserved individual effects. However, data vary from one 
survey to another and in most surveys there is a dearth of detailed information about 
socio-economic characteristics and, in particular, household financial outcomes. This 
thesis uses two household survey datasets that provide data relevant to the issues 
investigated: the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and the Wealth and Assets 
Survey (WAS).  
The BHPS is an annual UK household survey that began in 1991 and has, since 2010, 
been replaced by, and incorporated into, the database known as Understanding Society. 
The surveys are based at the Institute for Social and Economic Research (ISER) at the 
University of Essex. The BHPS annual survey aims to provide individual and 
household information about social and economic changes. The BHPS data have been 
used in studies that investigate household consumption and saving behaviour (e.g. 
Campbell and Cocco, 2007; Disney et al., 2010b; Disney et al., 2010a). Whereas the 
BHPS contains comprehensive information about the characteristics of households and 
individuals, it lacks detailed information concerning financial assets. This gap has been 
addressed in the WAS, which contains household financial information such as the 
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level of assets, savings and debt, and factors that affect financial planning. The WAS is 
carried out by the Office of National Statistics (ONS). In the WAS, which began in 
2006, households are interviewed after every two years. The latest revised datasets 
became publicly available in July 2013, for the two waves covering 2006 to 2010.  The 
WAS data have been used in government reports and studies that examine wealth 
distribution in the UK (see summary in Office of National Statistics, 2013b).  
In the first study, which investigates the influence of social engagement on stock market 
participation, three waves of the BHPS are used: Wave 5 (1995), Wave 10 (2000) and 
Wave 15 (2005). These were the only waves during which questions regarding 
ownership of financial assets were asked. Despite this limitation, the BHPS provides 
comprehensive information regarding social factors that allow the examination of a 
wide range of social engagement mechanisms. In the second study, which examines the 
relationship between mental accounting and portfolio choice, the WAS is used as it 
contains detailed information about both ownership and the value of investments in 
various financial products and proxies for mental accounting. In the third study, which 
investigates anchoring on house price indices, sixteen waves of the BHPS (1993 to 
2008) and both the Nationwide and the Halifax house price index data, covering the 
same periods, are used.  Both the Nationwide and the Halifax provide quarterly house 
price data by house type and by region, which are used to match and merge with 
corresponding house types and regions in the BHPS.  
1.4 Research methods  
This thesis employs various quantitative research methods. Pooled probit and/or tobit 
regressions are used to test the main hypotheses in Chapters Two and Three while fixed 
effects ordinary least squares (OLS) and quantile regressions are used in Chapter Four. 
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In addition, Wald-type statistical tests of differences are used to test whether different 
levels in a categorical variable are not significantly different from zero while Chow-
type tests for composite models are used to test whether coefficient estimates are not 
significantly different from zero across sub-sets of the data. As part of the robustness 
checks, poisson regressions, multi-equation probit and tobit regressions, and generalised 
method of moments (GMM) estimators are used to test the consistency of the main 
results.  Standard errors are clustered either using one-way clustering at the individual 
level or two-way clustering at both the individual level and a combined identifier of 
region and house type or region and year. 
In Chapters Two and Three, pooled probit regressions are used for analysis of the 
probability of owning a financial asset in different asset classes. I use probit regressions 
mainly because there are only three and two waves available in the BHPS and the WAS 
samples, respectively, and variations between individuals appear to explain differences 
in portfolio choice rather than variations within individuals. Thus, although a fixed 
effects model would have facilitated the control of unobserved individual effects, 
identification would have been more difficult. Nevertheless, in all regressions, standard 
errors are clustered at the individual/household level. Given that straightforward 
interpretation of marginal effects in non-linear models are misleading, as suggested in 
the literature, I calculate and plot marginal effects at representative values (Ai and 
Norton, 2003; Greene, 2010; Williams, 2012). To check the consistency of the results, I 
use alternative definitions, reparametrised variables and poisson regressions. In 
addition, I use conditional mixed process maximum likelihood multi-equation models 
in Chapter Three to control for common unobserved effects across asset class 
regressions.  
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In Chapter Four, a long panel, consisting of sixteen BHPS waves, facilitates the use of 
fixed effects OLS regressions. Most importantly, instead of using level prices or their 
logarithmic transformations, commonly used in previous anchoring studies, changes in 
self-reported housing wealth are modelled as a function of changes in the house price 
index and their logarithmic transformations. The two strategies provide a better means 
of identifying anchoring and controlling for both omitted variable bias and unobserved 
effects that may arise from property characteristics, individual characteristics – or both. 
Furthermore, given that house values substantially vary and the results may be driven 
by outliers, I use quantile regressions to examine the consistency of the OLS 
regressions using the 25th, median, 75th and 95th quantiles. For robustness, I test the 
consistency of the results using an aggregate national house price index, an alternative 
house price index, and instrumental variables using GMM estimators.  I further test the 
consistency of my results using two-way clustered standard errors.   
1.5 Major findings, contributions and implications 
This thesis makes three main contributions to the literature concerning the influence of 
both social engagement and mental accounting on portfolio choice, and the influence of 
anchoring bias on self-reported housing wealth.  
First, Chapter Two contributes to the literature concerning factors that influence stock 
market participation by linking and bringing together social capital measures proposed 
in Putnam’s (2000) Social Capital Index under the theme of social engagement 
mechanisms. I examine whether frequency of talking to neighbours, involvement in 
social groups, trust, religion and political party identity are positively associated with 
stock market participation and are not subsumed when brought together in one model. 
In addition, I investigate their interactive influence and the effects of a shift in political 
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identity. The results provide evidence that the variety and intensity of social 
engagement mechanisms, through involvement in social groups, trust, and political 
party identity increase stock market participation. The effect of frequency of talking to 
neighbours’ is subsumed by other variables while the effect of religion is negative and 
dissipates when I use a more robust measure of social group involvement – the number 
of social groups.  Further, the evidence shows that social group involvement and trust 
compensate for political party identity, and a shift of political identity has a negative 
effect on joining a right-leaning political party. The results are robust across alternative 
definitions of stock market participation and different econometric models.  
Second, Chapter Three adds to the scant empirical literature concerning the role of 
mental accounting on portfolio choice. I begin by examining the relationships between 
three mental accounts (no mental account, a single mental account and multiple mental 
accounts) with time preference, risk tolerance and cognitive ability - and their influence 
on portfolio choice in three asset classes: risky asset, fairly safe assets and safe assets. I 
then investigate whether differences in portfolio choice can be explained by differences 
in mental accounts and whether the effect is mediated (increased) by housing tenure and 
financial advice, after controlling for the interactive effects of time preference, risk 
tolerance and cognitive ability. Taken together, the results show that mental accounting 
explains variations in portfolio choice and its effect is influenced by financial advice 
and housing tenure. For portfolio share in the three asset classes, I find significant 
differences among individuals who have no mental account, a single mental account 
and those who have multiple mental accounts. For ownership, having a single mental 
account has a negative and significant effect on ownership of a risky asset while mental 
accounting is irrelevant for ownership of a safe asset. Further, when conditioned on 
mental accounting, the evidence shows that financial advice and housing tenure 
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increase the probability of ownership of ,and portfolio share in, a risky asset; reduces 
the probability of ownership of, and portfolio share in, a fairly safe asset; and increases 
the portfolio share in a safe asset. These results are consistent using conditional mixed 
process maximum likelihood multi-equations, using mental accounting sub-samples and 
using alternative definitions of dependent variables and mental accounting. 
The third contribution, as discussed in Chapter Four, concerns anchoring bias and its 
influence on self-reported housing wealth. The objective in this chapter is to examine 
whether changes in self-reported housing wealth are anchored on published house price 
indices. Specifically, I investigate whether anchoring on a house price index varies 
between households that own their home outright and those that own through a 
mortgage and between households that use money raised from refinancing for home 
improvement or extension and those that use the money for other consumption 
purposes. In addition, I also examine whether social factors mediate the anchoring 
effects.  The evidence shows that changes in self-reported housing wealth are anchored 
on changes in both the Nationwide and the Halifax house price indices. Ownership 
through a mortgage increases anchoring while mortgage refinancing decreases the 
anchoring effect. Moreover, among households that refinance their mortgages, investing 
on home improvement or extensions is positively associated with changes in self-
reported home house values and further reduces anchoring on house price indices. 
Using the money raised for other consumption has no influence on changes in the self-
reported house value but reduces anchoring on the house price index. For robustness 
check, I use alternative two-way clustered standard errors, alternative house price 
indices and GMM estimators and these results remain virtually unchanged.   
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Taken together, this thesis provides evidence that improves our knowledge about the 
influences of judgement and decision biases on household financial decisions. The 
findings will be of interest to investors, financial institutions and policy makers. The 
roles of both social engagement and mental accounting on portfolio choice indicate that 
investors and financial advisors should be aware of the shortcomings and benefits of 
these biases so as to be able to relate these to portfolio management. It is also important 
that homeowners are made aware of the dangers of anchoring on house price indices 
and the possible consequences of illusionary increases in housing wealth on 
consumption. Government and regulatory bodies should endeavour to provide more 
information to investors, especially those who are socially disengaged.  
Furthermore, the findings have important implications for the operations of both 
financial markets and housing markets. Although I observe low stock market 
participation and minimal transitions in and out of the stock market among investors 
who invest directly, indirect stock market participation increased and the findings also 
suggest that investors shifted from direct to indirect stock market participation through 
mutual funds. This movement can have an impact on market volatility because fund 
managers are known to exhibit herding behaviour (Dennis and Strickland, 2002) and 
they may rebalance their indexed funds in line with market trends (Griffin et al., 2011). 
Anchoring on house price indices and positive future financial expectations could 
exacerbate booms and busts in the market because of the contagion effect of market 
psychology (Shiller, 1990; Case and Shiller, 2003).   
However, an important caveat in the interpretation of the results in Chapters Two and 
Three is that they do not suggest causality but rather associations. This is because the 
nature of the data and the methods used make it hard to appropriately address 
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endogeneity issues. In Chapters Two and Three, I use three panels of the BHPS and two 
panels of the WAS, respectively, which make it difficult to control for unobserved 
individual effects using a fixed effects model. Moreover, although the BHPS has 
comprehensive information about individual characteristics, it lacks detailed 
information about the values of various financial assets; the opposite applies to the 
WAS.  Thus, my results may be affected by omitted variable bias.  
1.6 Outline of the thesis 
Chapter Two examines the role of social engagement mechanisms on stock market 
participation. Chapter Three investigates the influence of mental accounting together 
with background risk and financial advice on ownership and portfolio share in three 
asset classes. Chapter Four examines whether self-reported house prices are anchored 
on house price indices and the mediating role of mortgage refinancing and social 
factors. Chapter Five presents the conclusions and provides suggestions for future 
research.   
 
Social engagement and stock market participation 
 
 
 15 
Chapter 2 Social engagement and stock market participation 
“You have to assume that you do not have rational consumers. Faced with complex 
decisions or too much information, they default…They hide behind credit rating 
agencies or behind the promises that are given to them by the salesperson.” 
(Martin Wheatley, Financial Times, January 2012) 
2.1 Introduction  
Most households underinvest in stocks despite the long-term risk premium and 
diversification gains that are available (Mehra and Prescott, 1985). Limited stock 
market participation (SMP) has persisted in spite of the growth of stocks held indirectly 
through vehicles such as mutual funds (Mankiw and Zeldes, 1991; Haliassos and 
Bertaut, 1995) and it afflicts European as well as US households, albeit to a lesser 
extent (Guiso et al., 2002).  Low stock market participation is evident in this study and 
the puzzle of persistent low participation is especially concerning at a time when 
individuals bear more responsibility for investing their money (Campbell et al., 2011); 
when new and complex financial products are continuously being introduced in 
financial markets (Guiso et al., 2008) ; and when evidence suggests that financial 
literacy levels are low among most individuals (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007; Lusardi 
and Mitchell, 2011; Van Rooij et al., 2011).  
In this Chapter, I assess the extent to which the variety and intensity of an individual’s 
social engagement affects stock market participation. Access to information on how to 
start investing in the stock market and how to manage a portfolio reduces the fixed 
costs of stock market participation. Guiso and Japelli (2005) find that greater awareness 
of stocks, mutual funds and investment accounts is positively correlated with social 
interaction, while Ivković and Weisbenner (2007) find evidence that local information 
diffusion leads to common portfolio choices among neighbouring households. Socially 
engaged households have more opportunities to learn about investment opportunities 
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from peers who are already informed. Over time, social engagement generates social 
capital, which reduces information cost barriers to stock market participation. Prior 
literature suggests that social engagement measures are important determinants of stock 
market participation (e.g. Hong et al., 2004; Georgarakos and Pasini, 2011; Kaustia and 
Torstila, 2011). However, most studies investigate these factors in isolation. 
In this study, I make four important contributions to the literature. First, I examine 
information diffusion through two channels of social interaction: frequency of talking to 
neighbours and involvement in social groups. Although regarded as distinct channels in 
social interaction theory (Granovetter, 1983) empirical studies assume that they capture 
the same information (e.g. Hong et al., 2004; Georgarakos and Pasini, 2011). Second, 
most studies investigate social engagement measures such as trust and religiosity and 
social group involvement in isolation whereas I bring them together in one model to 
determine their independent effects. I add to the findings of Georgarakos and Pasini 
(2011) who combine trust and social group involvement by bringing in religiosity and 
political identity. Third, I use an integrated measure of political party identification 
based upon responses to four questions to examine the role of political identity and 
shifts in political party preferences. Apart from Kaustia and Torstila (2011) and 
Bonaparte and Kumar (2013) political party identification has not been examined in the 
context of stock market participation. I extend their analyses by including political 
identity and shifts in political party preferences, along with other social engagement 
measures, within the same model. Finally, motivated by the findings in Ai and Norton 
(2003) and Williams (2012), the results are interpreted using marginal effects to show 
the separate and joint influences of social engagement.  
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A major factor limiting research on the determinants of stock market participation is a 
dearth of detailed data (Hong et al., 2004; Georgarakos and Pasini, 2011; Kaustia and 
Torstila, 2011). I take advantage of data on both individual characteristics and stock 
market participation available in the BHPS across a diverse range of age groups. I use 
individual level data rather than household level data as most of the social engagement 
variables in the BHPS are derived from individual observations.  
The evidence shows that both the variety and the intensity of social interaction 
influence stock market participation. Based on social network theory I measure strong 
ties using the binary variable talking to neighbours and weak ties using both a binary 
variable active in social groups and a categorical variable number of social groups. 
When the set of social engagement measures are analysed in separate equations, all 
apart from strong ties have significant effects on stock market participation in contrast 
to the findings of Hong et al. (2004). I conclude that strong ties and weak ties are 
distinct channels of social interaction. Further, I find that religion has little effect, 
contrary to the findings of (Renneboog and Spaenjers, 2012).  
The results also indicate that political identity has a separate positive influence on stock 
market participation. In a specification that includes these variables in one equation, I 
find that in addition to the independent effects of social group involvement and trust 
reported in Georgarakos and Pasini (2011) identification with both the Conservative 
and Liberal Democratic parties have positive effects whereas religion has a negative 
effect.3 The results thus indicate that social group involvement, trust, religion and 
political identity are distinct social engagement measures with independent effects on 
                                                 
3
 When social group involvement is a binary variable, as in prior studies, we find that the variable 
“religion makes a difference” has a negative and significant effect. When we use our, arguably more 
robust, categorical measure of social group involvement, “number of social groups”, religion ceases to be 
significant. 
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stock market participation. When I interact these variables, I find that social group 
involvement and trust compensate for political identity. Further, I find that individuals 
who have recently identified with the Conservative and Liberal Democratic parties are 
less likely to participate than those who identified with the same party throughout our 
study, thus indicating a differential effect for consumer voters relative to ideological 
supporters. The net effect of social engagement is that the probability of stock market 
participation increases by approximately one fifth for fully engaged individuals 
compared to those who either do not socially engage or who have few avenues of social 
engagement.  
A limitation of this study is the possible endogenous relationships that may arise from 
omitted variables and correlations among the social engagements measures, which may 
also be correlated with the error term.  It was not possible to address these issues owing 
to the short panel and a low rate of transition in stock market participation (non-
participation) states. Therefore, in the interpretations of the results I do not claim 
causality. Nonetheless, the findings in this study have important implications for 
various parties, including investors, fund managers and policy makers.  For policy 
makers and financial institutions, the findings suggest that they should pay more 
attention to individuals who are socially disengaged when providing information about 
financial markets.  Governments should develop policies that enhance trust in financial 
markets, thereby countering low rates of direct stock market participation. Further, 
policies that encourage the development of innovative financial products will increase 
indirect stock market participation and so increase ownership of diversified portfolios. 
Social engagement is also more likely to affect stock market participation where 
existing social networks are strong and individual investors are familiar with local 
companies and their directors (Tesar and Werner, 1995).  
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The rest of the Chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the empirical literature 
and identifies the social engagement measures. In Section 2.3, I discuss the structure 
and features of the data, describe the variables and present the descriptive statistics 
while Section 2.4 discusses the research approach. Section 2.5 presents the empirical 
results and robustness checks are presented in Section 2.6. Finally, I conclude and 
discuss the implications of the study in Section 2.7. 
2.2 Prior literature and hypotheses development 
2.2.1 Social engagement, social capital and stock market participation 
As individuals interact more with others and become more socially engaged there is 
reason to believe they will be more inclined to participate in the stock market. For 
example, those who talk more to their neighbours are more likely to find out about the 
stock market, as are those who are more involved in social groups. Individuals who are 
more trusting are more likely to take information they receive about stock market 
investing at face value and thus be more inclined to participate. Those for whom 
religious beliefs make more of a difference to their lives are more likely to be socially 
active in church activities and therefore to be more exposed to the possibility of stock 
market investing – though their views about the stock market may also be coloured by 
their interpretation of their religion’s perspective on investing. Finally, those who 
identify themselves with a political party are more likely to encounter information about 
stock market investing through related social activities and stock market participation is 
likely to be greater if their political beliefs accord with the view that market forces 
benefit society. In sum, social engagement mechanisms help to reduce information cost 
barriers that inhibit individuals from participating in the stock market. 
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Typically, the literature refers not to social engagement but to social capital, which I 
argue is simply the social capital built up over time by the process of social 
engagement. There is growing evidence that accumulated social capital influences 
financial well-being. Though there is no consensus on the definition of social capital, 
much research has been motivated by Putnam (1993) who defines social capital as a 
combination of trust, norms and networks. These become embedded in individual and 
group social interactions, enhancing personal and common goals in society (Narayan 
and Pritchett, 1997; Office of National Statistics, 2003). Although there is no general 
agreement regarding the best social capital metrics, the Social Capital Index composed 
by Putnam (2000) identifies five broad components: (1) community organizational life; 
(2) engagement in public affairs; (3) community voluntarism; (4) informal sociability; 
and (5) social trust.4 The first four of these components reflect different aspects of 
social interaction, some of which are fostered by adherence to religious beliefs, while 
trust arises from the process of repeated social interaction (Putnam, 1995). These 
dimensions of accumulated social capital - social interaction, trust, and religion – are 
used in prior studies of stock market participation.  
Some have argued that Putnam’s Social Capital Index overly simplifies the different 
dimensions of social capital. For example, Bjørnskov (2006) suggests investigating the 
different dimensions individually. In this study, I investigate five forms of social 
engagement: Talking to neighbours (informal sociability); both membership of Social 
Groups and Religion (community organisational life); Political Party Affiliation 
(engagement in public affairs); and Trust (social trust). 
                                                 
4
 Alternative measures of social capital have been suggested. For example, Woolcock (1998) proposes 
four dimensions: communitarian, network, institutional and synergy. 
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2.2.2 Social interaction – weak ties and strong ties 
In line with Granovetter’s theory of social networks, investigations of the role of social 
interaction typically identify two channels of information diffusion: weak ties, i.e. ties 
with formal and informal organisations, and strong ties, i.e. ties with family, 
neighbours, and close associates (Granovetter, 1973; 1983; 2005). Studies that use 
proxies for strong ties show that knowing and visiting neighbours (Hong et al., 2004), 
the likelihood of sharing consumption and investing information with neighbours 
(Brown et al., 2008) and living in regions with high participation rates in elections, 
voting, and blood donation (Guiso et al., 2004) increases the probability of stock market 
participation. Similarly, a weak tie such as involvement in social groups is positively 
associated with stock market participation (Brown et al., 2008; Christelis et al., 2010; 
Georgarakos and Pasini, 2011). Although these studies suggest a priori an association 
between the two channels of information diffusion and stock market participation, 
Granovetter (1983) argues that weak ties provide productive information and new ideas, 
which we conjecture are more relevant for stock market participation. In other words, 
social interaction through both weak ties and strong ties provide avenues for the 
transmission of costless information about the stock market through word-of-mouth or 
observational learning (Banerjee, 1992). Individuals can derive satisfaction from 
discussing market trends and patterns with friends (Becker, 1991) and talking to family 
members, neighbours, colleagues, and friends about investing (Nofsinger, 2005). 
However, weak ties play the role of “transmitting unique and non-redundant 
information across otherwise largely disconnected segments of social networks” 
compared to strong ties (Granovetter, 2005). This suggests that effective transmission 
of financial information regarding investment opportunities, performance, and trends 
potentially occurs through weak ties.  
Social engagement and stock market participation 
 
 
 22 
In this study, I underscore the distinction between the two channels of information 
diffusion.  The hypotheses to be tested are: 
Hypothesis 1: Individuals who talk more frequently with their neighbours are more 
likely to participate in the stock market.  
Hypothesis 2: Individuals who are active in social groups are more likely to participate 
in the stock market.  
2.2.3 Trust and stock market participation 
In the context of this study trust is the degree to which an individual believes that 
associates or institutions are likely to fulfil their part of a formal or informal contractual 
agreement (Guiso et al., 2008). For individuals to participate in the stock market they 
must trust the entire financial system, including the investment process and the actors 
involved. In a study using a variety of individual and generalised trust measures across 
countries, Guiso et al. (2008) find that trust has a positive and statistically significant 
effect upon direct share ownership, the percentage of risky assets owned, the average 
rate of stock market participation, and the proportion of wealth invested in stocks. 
However, the use of the “level of trust” as a measure of social capital is debateable as it 
may be linked with other factors such as religiosity or sociability, making causality hard 
to determine (Guiso et al., 2004).  
In a recent study, Georgarakos and Pasini (2011) include trust and sociability measures 
in one model and find that both have independent effects on stock market participation. 
They also find that where trust levels are low, sociability may compensate. El-Attar and 
Poschke (2011) show that households with low trust levels tend to invest in housing 
rather than risky financial assets. Investigating the role of religion on household 
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finance, Renneboog and Spaenjers (2012) also find a positive association between 
religiosity and trust. In related studies, Hong et al. (2004) use church attendance as a 
proxy for sociability, suggesting that both religious beliefs and social interaction are 
related. These findings underscore the links between trust, religion, and sociability. In 
this study, I further test the influence of trust on stock market participation while 
controlling for other social engagement measures. The hypothesis to be tested is 
Hypothesis 3: Individuals who are more trusting are more likely to participate in the 
stock market.  
2.2.4 Religion and stock market participation 
Religion can affect the stock market participation decision as a direct result of 
theological beliefs or indirectly through its effect on factors such as trust and social 
interaction.  The importance of thrift–being careful with money– is a common feature 
of religious doctrines (Keister, 2003). The long-term outperformance of stocks 
compared to other asset classes might therefore be expected to encourage stock market 
participation among those who have a religious affiliation.  Guiso et al. (2003) find that 
religiosity is associated with a greater emphasis on the importance of thrift across 
countries, and also with a greater sense of individual responsibility.  The latter may also 
incline households to invest in the stock market, given the higher rewards available 
from stocks in the longer term. Religious households are more likely to leave bequests 
and therefore to consider longer-term planning horizons, which favours stock market 
participation (Renneboog and Spaenjers, 2012).  
Guiso et al. (2003) find that religion has a positive effect on trust towards others, 
mainly through regular attendance at religious services. They also find that it is 
positively associated with attitudes that are conducive to free markets. Therefore, 
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religion may increase the likelihood of investing in stocks by raising both interpersonal 
trust and trust in market mechanisms.  Attendance at religious services is also likely to 
increase social networking, which could positively affect stock market participation 
through increased opportunities for learning about investment choices; Hong et al. 
(2004) use a general religiosity measure, “attend church”, to proxy for social interaction 
and find it to be positively associated with stock market participation.  
Evidence on the role of religion on financial outcomes is mixed and its effect varies 
across countries. Using Dutch survey data, Renneboog and Spaenjers (2012) find 
Catholics to be more risk-averse compared to Protestants and those of other religious 
beliefs and that they are less likely to participate in the stock market. However, the level 
of significance varies considerably depending on the controls used and the findings are 
not significant when they bring together all variables in one model. Using church 
membership and attendance data for a demographically representative sample of the 
Dutch population, Noussair et al. (2012) report that more religious people are more 
risk-averse but their result is driven more by social aspects of church membership than 
by the religious beliefs themselves.  León and Pfeifer (2013) use German survey data 
and also find religiously affiliated people to be more risk-averse, but they go a step 
further and consider a context-specific risk attitude, namely financial risk-taking. They 
discover that Christians are more willing to take financial risks compared to non-
religious individuals and that they are more likely to hold risky assets such as stocks. 
This is consistent with the finding of Halek and Eisenhauer (2001) that Catholics and 
Jews, although more averse to pure risk, are more tolerant of speculative risk-taking.  
The lack of consistency in findings across countries and studies about the impact of 
religion may be due to other characteristics of those holding religious beliefs, including 
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alternative aspects of social capital, as alluded to by Gruber (2005). I test the influence 
of religion using a general question regarding whether respondents think religion makes 
a difference in their lives. In line with the direct and indirect arguments suggesting a 
positive influence of religion on stock market participation, the hypothesis to be tested 
is  
Hypothesis 4: Religion is positively associated with stock market participation. 
2.2.5 Political party identification and stock market participation 
Existing evidence suggests that political preferences are associated with socio-
economic outcomes and more specifically with the portfolio decisions of investors.  In a 
Finnish study, Kaustia and Torstila (2011) find that both individual voters and members 
of parliament who have a more left-wing outlook are less likely to participate in the 
stock market.  They attribute this to “value expressive” considerations, namely the idea 
that personal values dictate decisions. Negative perceptions about the stock market, for 
example that it is a source of greed or speculation or unethical behaviour, may make 
individuals less inclined to participate, even in the face of evidence that the stock 
market outperforms alternative asset classes. This feeling of discomfort when 
simultaneously holding two or more conflicting ideas is known as “cognitive 
dissonance” (Festinger, 1957). This can be regarded as an additional participation cost 
and some investors may stay out of the stock market to avoid it. Along similar lines, 
Hong and Kostovetsky (2012) find that political preferences influence the asset 
allocation decisions of relatively sophisticated US investors: mutual and hedge fund 
managers who donate to the Democratic Party underweight socially contentious firms, 
with the reverse pattern evident for fund managers who donate to the Republican Party. 
Social engagement and stock market participation 
 
 
 26 
The expressions of political preferences in elections are determined, at least in part, on 
the ideological positions of political parties (Sanders, 1999). However, this factor has 
declined in importance with voters placing more weight on the competitiveness of party 
policies (Clarke et al., 2004). In the UK, evidence suggest that elections are generally 
determined by two competing sets of influences: “consumer voting” based on 
evaluations of political party competence (Clarke et al., 2004; Green and Hobolt, 2008) 
and political party identification based upon ideological differences, albeit against a 
background of ideological convergence (Sanders, 2003). Despite the evidence that 
consumer voting has increased in the UK, Sanders (2003) argues that party 
identification is still an important consideration. We might therefore expect some 
potential investors with left-wing political leanings to stay out of the stock market to 
avoid the participation cost associated with cognitive dissonance. 
Irrespective of political preferences, interest in politics generally may have a positive 
impact on stock market participation. Using US and European data, Bonaparte and 
Kumar (2013) find that politically active individuals, defined as those who say that they 
vote more often, are more likely to participate in the stock market. They attribute this to 
such individuals following political news more actively, thereby increasing their chance 
of being exposed to financial news. This lowers their information gathering costs and 
thus increases stock market participation. I extend my analysis to investigate the 
relationship between political party identification and stock market participation, and 
analyse how the relationship varies by political party allegiance and the impact of shifts 
in this allegiance over time. Based on the idea that information-gathering costs are 
lower for those who identify with a political party, the hypothesis that I test is 
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Hypothesis 5: Individuals who identify with political parties are more likely to 
participate in the stock market.   
2.3 Data 
2.3.1 Variables description  
This study uses data from the BHPS that provides annual individual and household 
information about social and economic variables. The original sample of the BHPS was 
approximately 5,500 households consisting of 13,500 individuals from across the UK, 
subsequently increased by additional samples from Scotland and Northern Ireland.5 The 
BHPS has three features that are relevant to this study. First, and most important, it 
provides data on both social engagement measures and stock market participation at the 
individual level. Second, it facilitates analysis of the impact of generational and age 
effects. This is important because levels of social engagement – the number of  social 
groups, participation during elections, the frequency of  reading newspapers, and social 
trust – have been found to be non-linear functions of age; they increase towards middle 
age, remain constant during middle age, and decline as individuals advance in age 
(Putnam, 1995). Further, it is arguable that social engagement is attributable to 
generational effects, so that belonging to a specific cohort is associated with 
increased/decreased levels of social engagement (Putnam, 1995). Most studies are 
restricted to specific cohorts (e.g. Hong et al., 2004; Bogan, 2008), limiting the extent 
to which inferences can be made about the general population. Therefore, I use BHPS 
cohorts and ages ranging from 1900 to 1979 and 19 to 98 respectively. Third, by its 
structure the BHPS minimises the problem of sample attrition – respondents who 
participate in a few waves or completely drop out of the sample – by  a process of re-
                                                 
5The BHPS consists of 18 waves to 2008. Since 2010 (Wave 19), the BHPS has been replaced by, and 
incorporated into, the United Kingdom Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS).   
Social engagement and stock market participation 
 
 
 28 
weighting the cases who gave full interviews at all waves (for a detailed explanation, 
see Taylor (2010)).  
My use of the BHPS is limited to the years 1995, 2000 and 2005 because, to date, these 
are the only years in which investment questions were asked. For variables not observed 
during these three waves, I impute responses using the observations in either 
succeeding or preceding waves6 and thus I assume that these imputed social 
engagement measures and controls do not vary in a manner that will materially affect 
my results.  
Table 2.1 shows how each variable is constructed. In the survey individuals are first 
asked whether they have money in investments and, if they answer “yes”, they select 
the financial instruments in which the money is invested – national savings certificates, 
premium bonds, unit trusts, personal equity plans, shares (UK or foreign), national 
savings/building society, insurance bonds and other investments. I define the dependent 
variable, stock market participation 1 (SMP1), as a dummy variable taking the value 
one if the individual holds either unit trusts or shares. This definition provides the 
minimum degree of stock market participation because individuals may also invest 
indirectly through retirement plans and other financial instruments that include stocks. 
 An alternative dependent variable (SMP2), which includes investments in PEPs, Tessas 
and ISAs and, along with two further alternates, investment in fixed interest assets and 
the number of investment products, described in Table 2.1, are used for robustness 
checks, which confirm our key results. 
                                                 
6
 Access to the Internet from home – wave 6 and 10 onwards; social interaction – wave 7 onwards; social 
group membership – skipped annually after wave 2; religion – wave 1, 7, 9, 11, 14 and 18; trust – wave 8, 
10, 13, 15 and 17; and life events – waves 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 11 and 14.  
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Table 2.1 Variable descriptions 
 
The table presents the variable descriptions used in the study. The sample is from three waves of the BHPS: 1995, 2000 and 2005. 
 
Variable Description Value 
Dependent Variables 
  Stock market participation first 
definition (SMP1) 
Do you currently have any money in any of the investments shown? Which 
one? 
shares and/or unit trust = 1; other or none = 0 
Stock market participation second 
definition (SMP2) 
Do you currently have any money in any of the investments shown? Which 
one? 
shares, unit trusts, personal equity plans and TESSA/ISA =1; other 
or none = 0  
Fixed interest assets (FIA) Do you currently have any money in any of the investments shown? Which 
one? 
National savings certificate, premium bonds, national savings 
bonds, savings account, national savings bank, and other 
(investment, government or company security = 1 ; other or none = 
0 
Number of investment products (NIP) Derived from the above categories Number of the above held 
Social engagement measures   
Talking to neighbours How often do you talk to any of your neighbours? Every day, once in a week, or once in month =1; rarely or never = 
0 
Active in social groups Do you join in the activities of any of these organisations on a regular basis  yes = 1; no = 0 
Trusts most people Generally speaking, would say that most people can be trusted, or that you 
can't be too careful in dealing with people? 
most people can be trusted = 1; can't be too careful = 0 
Religion makes a difference How much difference would you say religious beliefs make to your life? some  or a great difference = 1 ; a little  or no difference = 0 
Political party identification Derived variable that combines responses to four questions regarding: support 
of particular party, closeness to one particular party than other, party which 
would vote for tomorrow and which political party closest to   
none = 1 ; Scottish National, Plaid Cymru, Green Party or other 
party = 2 ; Liberal Democratic = 3; Labour Party = 4 ; 
Conservative Party = 5 
Control variables   
Good neighbourhood Is your neighbourhood a good place to live? Good = 1; moderate or bad = 0 
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Table 2.1 Continued   
Variable Description Value 
Concentrated housing What type of accommodation does the household live in? Purpose built flats, converted  flat, or other concentrated housing = 
1 ; Detached, semi-detached, or terraced = 0  
 
Housing  Derived variable: owned outright, owned with mortgage, local authority rent, 
housing association rented, rented from employer, rented private unfurnished, 
rented private furnished or other rented 
all rented accommodation = 1; owned with a mortgage = 2 ; owned 
outright = 3 
Received windfall income Since Sept. 1st 1994 have you received any payments, or payment in kind? If 
answered yes, the amount received - life insurance, pension, personal accident 
claim, redundancy, employment bonus, inheritance/bequest, pools/lottery win 
or something else  
yes = 1; no = 0 
Has no debt I would like to ask you now about any other financial commitments you may 
have apart from mortgages and housing related loans. Do you currently owe 
any money on the things listed on this card 
yes =0; no = 1 
Financial capability index  
  Saves from current income Do you save any amount of your income by putting away something in a bank, 
building society, or post office account other than to meet regular bills? 
yes = 1; no = 0 
Current financial situation How well would you say you yourself are managing financially these days: 
living comfortably; doing alright; just about getting by; finding it quite 
difficult; and finding it very difficult. 
living comfortably = 1 ;  doing alright = 2 ; just about getting by = 
3 ; finding it quite difficult = 4 ; or finding it very difficult = 5  
Change in financial situation  Would you say that you yourself are better off, worse off or about the same 
financially than you were a year ago? 
better off and about the same = 1 ; worse off = 0 
Has housing problems Many people these days are finding it difficult to keep up with their housing 
payments. In the last twelve months would you say you have had any 
difficulties paying for your accommodation? 
no = 1 ; yes = 0 
Problems required borrowing Did you have to borrow in order to meet housing payments no = 1 ; yes = 0 
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Table 2.1 Continued   
Variable Description Value 
Problems required cutbacks Did you have to cutback in order to meet housing payments no = 1 ; yes = 0 
 
       Been at least two months in  
       housing arrears in last 12   
       months 
In the last twelve months have you ever found yourself more than two months 
behind with your rent/mortgage? 
no = 1 ; yes = 0 
Computer user Which item do you have? Home computer yes = 1; no = 0 
Health    Please think back over the last 12 months about how your health has been 
compared to people of your own age, would you say that your health has on 
the whole been ... 
excellent and good = 1 ; fair, poor or very poor =0 
Sex Interviewer check sex of the respondent male = 1 ; female = 0 
Age Derived variable: uses date of birth variables on survey database age at date of interview 
Marital status Married, separated, divorced, widowed or never married married = 1 ; separated, divorced, widowed or never married = 0 
Has child(ren) Number of own children derived from a set of questions    one, two, three or more kids = 1 ; none = 0 
Education Derived variable - yearly updated qualification of new entrants and existing 
panel members 
no qualification = 1 ; commercial qualification, no o-levels, CSE 
grade 2-5 or Scotland grade 4-5 = 2 ; GCE A-levels, GCE o-levels 
or equivalent = 3; teaching , other higher or nursing qualifications 
= 4; and first or higher degree = 5 
Economic activity Please look at this card and tell me which best describes your current 
situation? Self-employed, in paid employment, unemployed, retired, family 
care, FT student, long term sick/disabled, on maternity leave, government 
training or other 
Unemployed, maternity leave, family care, full time student, sick, 
disabled, government training scheme,  or other = 1; retired = 2 ; 
self-employed = 3 ; and employed = 4 
Government office region Internally computed North East = 1; North West = 2; Yorkshire and Humber = 3; East 
Midlands = 4; West Midlands = 5; East of England = 6; London = 
7; South East = 8; South West = 9; Wales = 10; Scotland = 11; 
Northern Ireland = 12; and Channel Islands = 13 
Income Derived variable that sums up all sources of income indicated by the 
respondent including : labour income and non-labour income 
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I generate five social engagement variables. Of these, two represent strong and weak 
ties. The proxy for strong ties is the frequency of talking to neighbours and takes the 
value 1 if a respondent talks to neighbours “everyday”, “once in a week” or “once in a 
month” (92.8%) and the value 0 if “rarely”  or “never” (7.2%).7 The proxy for weak ties 
is based on social group activity. I define the variable active in social groups as a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a member is active and the value 0 otherwise. I 
also use four dummy variables derived from the number of organisations8 respondents 
are members of as an alternative proxy for weak ties. To control for neighbourhood 
effects, which may contaminate these variables, I include two dummy variables. The 
first is the variable good neighbourhood, which takes the value 1 if a respondent thinks 
that her/his neighbourhood is a “good” place to live in and the value 0 if the response is 
“moderate” or “bad”. The second is the variable concentrated housing, which takes the 
value 1 if the type of accommodation is “detached”, “semi-detached”, or “terraced” and 
the value 0 if it is a “converted flat”, “purpose built flat” or any other type of housing.   
Trust is a binary variable taking a value of 1 for positive responses to the question: 
“generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you cannot 
be too careful in dealing with people?” Religiosity is measured by the dummy variable 
religion makes a difference. This takes a value 1 if respondents answer: a little 
difference, some difference or a great difference to the question: “how much difference 
would you say religious beliefs make to your life?”  It takes the value 0 if the answer is 
no difference.  
                                                 
7
 Alternative definitions of the talking to neighbours variable are also generated using different (0, 1) 
combinations of the five categories defined in Table 2.1. Using Wald type test, comparable results 
obtained for these other definitions result in high P-values. 
8 The organisations listed include political party, trade union, environmental group, parents association, 
tenants or residents group, religious group, voluntary service group, other community group, social 
group, sports club, women’s institute, women’s group, other organisation, professional organisation, 
pensioners organisation and scout/guides organisation. 
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Political party identification is derived using answers to four questions about interest in 
politics. First, all respondents are asked whether they support a particular political party 
to which the response is either “yes” or “no”. Second, If the response is “no”, the 
respondent is asked whether she/he is “closer to one political party than another”. Third, 
respondents who do not support or feel closer to one political party than another are 
asked to identify the political party they would vote for tomorrow.  Finally, respondents 
who support a particular political party or feel closer to one political party than another 
are asked to identify the particular political party. By combining responses to these 
questions, a respondent is classified as having no political inclination if she/he does not 
support any political party; is not closer to one political party than another; or does not 
identify a political party he/she would vote for tomorrow. Otherwise, respondents are 
categorised as belonging to the Conservative Party, the Labour Party, the Liberal 
Democratic Party, or other parties9 based on the party they would vote for tomorrow or 
that they identified in the last question. The variable therefore captures both political 
ideology and consumer voting. I generate five dummy variables for each category. 
Finally, I use a comprehensive set of socio-economic and demographic control 
variables, described in Table 2.1.   
My proxy for the control variable Financial Capability uses the responses to seven 
BHPS questions about financial management, as reported in Table 2.1. It is similar to 
the approach of Hilgert et al. (2003) and Atkinson et al. (2007) and follows the method 
used by Taylor et al. (2009) in their construction of a financial incapability index. 
However, I invert my index so that positive values represent financial capability10.  
                                                 
9
 The “other parties” category includes regional parties such as the Scottish National party, Plaid Cymru 
and other smaller parties. 
10
 The response categories to the questions were recoded to remove missing values and standardized (to 
have a mean 0 and a variance of 1). The constructed index has a 0.7036 Cronbach’s alpha with a 0.2532 
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2.3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
2.3.2.1 Summary statistics 
Table 2.2 presents weighted summary statistics for the whole sample. The most popular 
investment vehicles among individuals in the sample are savings accounts (63%), 
premium bonds (22%) and ISAs (20%), and direct shareholding (18%). SMP1 and 
SMP2, respectively, represent 21% and 35% of money invested, while the proportion of 
those who invest in less risky assets is 28%. The figures for the type of investment do 
not add up to 100% since individuals may hold more than one instrument. On average, 
92.8% of the respondents acknowledge that they talk to their neighbours. The other 
social engagement measures have lower averages but their standard deviations indicate 
a higher variation relative to the mean than the talking to neighbours variable. The 
financial capability index takes negative and positive values, with increasingly negative 
values representing declining financial capability and increasingly positive values 
representing improving financial capability. The mean of 0 implies that on average 
respondents are financially capable. 
Table 2.3 presents weighted pairwise correlation coefficients for the variables used in 
the study across the whole sample. The reported levels of significance are derived using 
Bonferroni-adjusted p-values. From the outset, we see that stock market participation is 
positively correlated with the variables active in social groups, trusts most people, and 
memberships of the Liberal Democratic Party and the Conservative Party; however, it 
is negatively correlated with religion makes a difference, having no party affiliation, 
and memberships of other smaller parties and of the Labour Party.  
                                                                                                                                               
average inter-item correlation. These values provide a satisfactory level of internal consistency (for a 
detailed discussion see Taylor et al., 2009).  The higher the index value the higher the financial 
capability. 
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Table 2.2 Summary statistics 
Data are derived from three waves of the BHPS: 1995, 2000 and 2005. The reported statistics for the whole sample are weighted and are as defined in Table 2.1. Panel A presents the 
proportion of respondents who invest directly in the stock market; invest through unit trust; hold individual savings accounts; have personal equity plans; invest in national savings bank; and 
invest in premium bonds. Panel B presents proportion of respondents who: (1) invest directly in the stock market or through unit trusts (stock market participation definition 1(SMP1)); (2) 
invest directly in the stock market, through unit trusts, personal equity plans, or individual savings accounts (SMP2); (3) invest in national savings certificate, premium bonds, national savings 
bonds, savings account, national savings bank, or other investments; and number of these products; and (4)  the number of these products held by a respondent (NIP). Panel C presents the 
fraction of respondents who talk to neighbours, are active in social groups, trust most people, do not have political party affiliation, belong to various political parties, and have shifted their 
political affiliation during the panel period. Panel D presents the proportion of respondents who rent, have a mortgage, or own outright their current accommodation; own a computer; received 
windfall income; have no debts; have good health, are male; are  married; have child(ren); hold a first degree and above, other higher, GCE level, lower or no qualification; and who are 
employed, self-employed, retired or are unemployed. In addition, Panel D presents average income, age, cohort, and financial capability index. 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Observ.   Variable Mean Std. Dev. Observ. 
Panel A: Type of investment         Panel D: Control variables       
Direct shareholding 0.183 0.387 22407 
 
Rented 0.252 0.434 22492 
Unit trusts 0.066 0.248 22407 
 
Mortgaged 0.451 0.498 22492 
Individual Savings Account 0.195 0.396 22583 
 
Outright owner 0.297 0.457 22492 
Personal Equity Plans  0.111 0.314 22583 
 
Computer user 0.480 0.500 22515 
Savings account 0.630 0.483 14171 
 
Received windfall income 0.276 0.447 22515 
National savings bank 0.048 0.214 14171 
 
Has no debt 0.644 0.479 22507 
Premium bonds 0.221 0.415 22407 
 
Financial capability index 0.003 0.582 22583 
Panel B: Dependent variables 
    
Good health  0.684 0.465 22579 
SMP1 0.212 0.408 22583 
 
Male 0.447 0.497 22583 
SMP2 0.351 0.477 22583 
 
Cohort 1950 18.202 22583 
Fixed interest assets (FIA) 0.280 0.449 22583 
 
Age at date of interview 50 18.327 22583 
Number of investment products (NIP) 3.951 3.464 22583 
 
Married  0.582 0.493 22579 
Panel C: Social engagement measures 
    
Has child(ren) 0.270 0.444 22583 
Talking to neighbours 0.928 0.259 21384 
 
No qualification 0.262 0.440 22337 
Active in social groups 0.487 0.500 22142 
 
Lower qualification 0.088 0.283 22337 
Most people can be trusted 0.378 0.485 21264 
 
GCE level qualification 0.269 0.443 22337 
Religion makes a difference 0.434 0.496 20441 
 
Other higher qualification 0.262 0.440 22337 
No party affiliation 0.115 0.319 20377 
 
First degree and above 0.119 0.324 22337 
Other smaller parties 0.045 0.207 20377 
 
Unemployed 0.178 0.383 22579 
Liberal Democratic 0.137 0.344 20377 
 
Retired 0.258 0.438 22579 
The Labour Party 0.410 0.492 20377 
 
Self employed 0.072 0.258 22579 
Conservative Party 0.293 0.455 20377 
 
Employed 0.492 0.500 22579 
Political party shift 0.381 0.486 22583   Income 13296 13731.40 22286 
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The measures of social engagement – talking to neighbours, active in social groups, 
trusts most people, religion makes a difference and political party identification – have 
moderate correlations ranging from  -0.334 to 0.184. However, we see insignificant 
correlations between the variables talking to neighbours and active in social groups and 
between identification with other smaller parties and other social engagement 
measures. This suggests that the variables talking to neighbours and identification with 
other smaller parties may capture different effects or none at all.  
Surprisingly, the variable religion makes a difference is negatively correlated with 
social engagement variables including talking to neighbours, active in social groups 
and trusts most people. Similarly, having no party affiliation is also negatively 
correlated with these variables but is positively correlated with religion makes a 
difference. A detailed analysis of the correlations between political party affiliation and 
other social engagement measures indicates a negative correlation with other smaller 
parties and positive correlations with affiliation to the Liberal Democratic Party and 
the Conservative Party. Generally, the correlations are low between most of the control 
variables and the variables of interest. Therefore, I expect each variable to provide 
independent information in relation to SMP.   
2.3.2.2 Graphical analysis 
A further analysis of these relationships are presented in Figure 2.1, which show rates 
of stock market participation conditional upon political party identification and trust, 
and by frequency of talking to neighbours (Panel A), religion makes a difference (Panel 
B); involvement in social groups (Panel C); and housing tenure (Panel D). Individuals 
who are affiliated with the Labour Party and the Conservative Party have high rates of 
stock market participation regardless of their opinion about trust, sociability, or religion.
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Table 2.3 Pairwise correlation matrix 
Table presents weighted pairwise correlations for the whole sample.  Data are derived from three waves of the BHPS (1995, 2000 and 20050 and the variables are as defined in Table 2.1. For 
categorical variables the base levels used include political identity – no political affiliation; housing tenure – renter; education – has no education qualification; and occupation – unemployed. 
The reported levels of significance are based on Bonferroni-adjusted p-values and are given by * for significance levels of 0.05 or less. 
 
  Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) Stock market participation (dummy) 1 
           (2) Talking to neighbours 0.0283 1 
          (3) Active in social groups 0.1733* 0.0327 1 
         (4) Trusts most people 0.1289* 0.0469* 0.1541* 1 
        (5) Religion makes a difference -0.0660* -0.0371* -0.1844* -0.0663* 1 
       (6) No political affiliation -0.0858* -0.0515* -0.0960* -0.0957* 0.1291* 1 
      (7) Small parties -0.0272 -0.0242 -0.002 -0.0056 0.0149 -0.0768* 1 
     (8) Liberal Democratic Party 0.0388* 0.0175 0.0368 0.0494* -0.0448* -0.1429* -0.0872* 1 
    (9) Labour Party -0.1071* 0.0332* -0.0550* -0.0031 0.0255 -0.2945* -0.1797* -0.3343* 1 
   (10) The Conservative Party 0.1574* -0.0026 0.0962* 0.0344* -0.0881* -0.2301* -0.1404* -0.2611* -0.5381* 1 
  (11) Good neighbourhood 0.0791* 0.0754* 0.0774* 0.1381* -0.0199 -0.0538* -0.02 0.0182 -0.0536* 0.0897* 1 
 (12) Concentrated housing  -0.0686* -0.0459* -0.03 -0.0406* -0.014 0.0086 0.0396* -0.0209 0.0246 -0.0345* -0.1041* 1 
(13) Housing tenure 0.2193* 0.0573* 0.1240* 0.1064* -0.1213* -0.1249* -0.0491* 0.0396* -0.1138* 0.2010* 0.1411* -0.2434* 
(14) Received windfall income 0.0708* 0.0285 0.0478* 0.0127 0.0142 -0.0338* 0.0015 0.0003 -0.0368* 0.0620* 0.026 -0.028 
(15) Has no debt 0.0599* 0.0177 0.0047 0.0026 -0.0911* -0.0587* -0.02 -0.0052 -0.0174 0.0723* 0.0175 0.0330* 
(16) Financial capability 0.1653* 0.0181 0.0732* 0.0946* -0.0262 -0.0634* -0.0283 0.0241 -0.0554* 0.0979* 0.1195* -0.0795* 
(17) Computer user 0.0940* -0.0233 0.0761* 0.0952* 0.0424* 0.0135 0.0341* 0.0383* -0.0610* 0.0118 0.0584* -0.1354* 
(18) Has good health 0.0777* 0.016 0.0898* 0.1183* 0.0251 -0.0184 0.003 0.0073 -0.0598* 0.0702* 0.1314* -0.0800* 
(19) Male 0.0841* -0.0012 0.0108 0.0310* 0.1192* -0.0286 0.0101 -0.0340* 0.026 0.013 0.0148 -0.0165 
(20) Age 0.0841* 0.0780* 0.0617* 0.025 -0.2017* -0.1578* -0.1063* 0.0181 0.0007 0.1426* 0.029 0.0780* 
(21) Cohort -0.0810* -0.0841* -0.0686* -0.0298 0.2153* 0.1687* 0.1090* -0.0117 -0.0146 -0.1412* -0.0198 -0.0888* 
(22) Married 0.0901* 0.0684* 0.0726* 0.0781* -0.0495* -0.0630* -0.0563* 0.0025 0.0004 0.0667* 0.0749* -0.2455* 
(23) Has kids -0.0475* 0.0184 0.0154 -0.0079 0.0695* 0.1036* 0.0003 -0.0284 0.0228 -0.0746* -0.0129 -0.1320* 
(24) Education 0.1935* -0.0244 0.2020* 0.1964* -0.0387* -0.0427* 0.0401* 0.0802* -0.0824* 0.0392* 0.1023* -0.0727* 
(25) Occupation 0.0674* -0.011 0.0249 0.0735* 0.1028* 0.0335* -0.0246 0.0145 -0.0213 -0.0001 0.0787* -0.0905* 
(26) Region 0.0265 -0.0028 0.0500* 0.0504* -0.0283 -0.026 0.1339* 0.0388* -0.0907* 0.0255 0.0165 0.0821* 
(27) Income 0.2010* -0.0196 0.1040* 0.1226* 0.0740* -0.0187 -0.0165 0.0169 -0.0411* 0.0516* 0.0932* -0.0751* 
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Table 2.3 Continued 
 
 
  Variable (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) 
(13) Housing tenure 1 
            (14) Received windfall income 0.0277 1 
           (15) Has no debt 0.1749* -0.0726* 1 
          (16) Financial capability 0.2110* 0.0353* 0.1134* 1 
         (17) Computer user 0.0430* -0.0066 -0.1427* 0.0686* 1 
        (18) Has good health 0.0605* 0.0244 -0.0441* 0.1402* 0.1022* 1 
       (19) Male 0.0237 0.0637* -0.021 0.0267 0.0540* 0.0495* 1 
      (20) Age 0.2811* -0.0653* 0.3495* 0.0758* -0.2712* -0.1556* -0.0328* 1 
     (21) Cohort -0.2602* 0.0243 -0.3444* -0.0581* 0.3453* 0.1525* 0.0319* -0.9731* 1 
    (22) Married 0.1714* 0.0576* 0.0104 0.0748* 0.1482* 0.0339* 0.0771* 0.1108* -0.1037* 1 
   (23) Has kids -0.1837* -0.0089 -0.2024* -0.1054* 0.2399* 0.0845* -0.0310* -0.4147* 0.4185* 0.2151* 1 
  (24) Education 0.0648* 0.0320* -0.1771* 0.0912* 0.3510* 0.1902* 0.0935* -0.3536* 0.3860* 0.0266 0.1691* 1 
 (25) Occupation -0.0283 0.0820* -0.2434* 0.1226* 0.2087* 0.2157* 0.1446* -0.3284* 0.3441* 0.0818* 0.1306* 0.3070* 1 
(26) Region 0.0068 0.0011 -0.0111 -0.0293 0.0286 0.0396* -0.0138 0.0033 -0.001 -0.002 0.0022 0.0573* 0.0126 
(27) Income 0.0359* 0.0560* -0.1774* 0.1619* 0.2703* 0.1527* 0.3566* -0.1651* 0.2225* 0.0358* 0.1045* 0.4205* 0.5091* 
Social engagement and stock market participation 
 
 
 39 
Figure 2.1 Stock market participation rates by trust and political party identification 
The figure displays stock market participation rates by trust and by political identity for frequency of talking to 
neighbours (Panel A); involvement in social groups (Panel B); religion makes a difference (Panel C); and housing 
tenure (Panel D). Data are derived from three waves of the BHPS (1995, 2000 and 20050 and the variables are as 
defined in Table 2.1.  
 
 
In addition, Panel A shows small differences in the rates of stock market participation 
between individuals who frequently talk to their neighbours (social) and those who do 
not ( not social), especially among those who are also less trusting.  As expected, there 
is a negative relationship between religion and stock market participation, reported in 
Panel B, which cuts across political identity and trust. Panel C demonstrate the role of 
involvement in social groups and shows that the rates of stock market participation 
increase by trust and categories of political identity.  An indication of the relationship 
with the key control variable housing tenure is presented in Panel D. The rate of stock 
market participation increase across housing tenure categories (from rented to mortgage 
to outright ownership) and this pattern is consistent across the variables trust and 
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political identity. Notably, renters have very low rates of participation especially among 
individuals who do not identify with any political party or who identify themselves with 
smaller parties. Overall, there is a clear pattern of left-to-right increase in participation 
rates, which depicts the left-right political spectrum and suggests that political ideology 
plays an important role on stock market participation.       
2.4 Econometric strategy 
From the summary statistics reported in Table 2.2, I observe variations in the key 
independent variables. Further, respondents do not substantially change their stock 
market participation status from one period to the other11 and, across all the independent 
variables, the between variations are about double the within variations. This implies 
that if I were to use a fixed effects model, individuals who do not change participation 
status over the panel period will not contribute to the estimation, making the 
identification harder. This suggests that a pooled probit model is more appropriate for 
my data. I cluster standard errors at the individual level. I therefore estimate the general 
static binary response model given by 
 
   
                            
             
                                            (1) 
where    
  is a latent variable,     is the dummy for observed stock market participation, 
    are the time varying explanatory variables,    are the time invariant control 
variables,    is an error term, and      a transitory error term.  
                                                 
11
 For example, among respondents who were out of the stock market in one period, 88% remained out of 
the stock market in the next period compared to 57% for those who participated in the stock market. 
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First, I investigate whether strong and weak ties are distinct measures of social 
interaction. As discussed in Section 2.2, my proposition is that weak ties provide 
sources of new information. This has three implications: (1) non-participants are more 
likely to participate in the stock market upon joining a social group; (2) the more social 
groups an individual is involved with, the higher the effects on participation; and (3) 
most important, in an equation that includes both channels, measures of strong ties 
should have insignificant effects. I estimate the following equations: 
        
                         , (2) 
        
                                    (3) 
where       is a dummy for stock market participation for individual i in year t. The 
social interaction (SI) variable of interest in eq. (2) is either talking to neighbours (TTN) 
or active in social group (ASG) and both variables are combined in eq. (3). The control 
variables (CV) are housing tenure, financial capability index, has no debt, received 
windfall income, computer user, cohorts, good health, male, age, married, has 
child(ren), highest qualification, economic activity, government office region, and 
income quintiles. The error term     represents unobserved individual effects.  
Second, I investigate whether each of the social engagement measures have 
independent effects on stock market participation. I should expect to see significant 
effects if each social engagement measure is analysed in isolation, as in 
        
                                (4) 
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The social engagement measures (SEM) include the social interaction variables in eq. 
(3), trusts most people (TMP), and religion makes a difference (RMD). However, I 
contend that the measures may capture the same underlying information or affect the 
control variables, so I expect to see increased, diminished or insignificant effects in the 
equation that brings social engagement measures together, as in  
 
       
                                                
      (5) 
The variables are estimated in isolation in eq. (4) and are combined in eq. (5).  
Third, I examine the role of political party identification. Two implications emerge 
from the literature: (1) if party identification matters, those who identify with right-
wing parties are more likely to participate in the stock market; (2) otherwise, if policies 
are very similar and evaluation of political party competence is more important, party 
identification should have less influence on participation. The model is represented by 
        
                            (6) 
Where the dependent and control variables are as described in equations 1 – 4 and the 
additional variable of interest is party identification (PI).  
Finally, I pool all of these factors to estimate the determinants of stock market 
participation. Again, I contend that there may be correlations between social 
engagement measures and party identification, or with other variables such as housing 
(El-Attar and Poschke, 2011). The model is represented by: 
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                                       (7) 
The dependent variable and explanatory variables are as defined in equations 1 - 6.  
2.5 Empirical results 
Each of the results tables reports the effects of the independent variables on stock 
market participation separately and jointly. The results of the separate estimations 
broadly follow those for prior studies discussed in the literature review. In contrast, 
when all of the variables are brought together in a general specification the results 
provide the main contribution of this study by showing which independent variable 
associations remain significant. When the social engagement variables are combined 
together sequentially, the results suggest that more socially engaged respondents are 
more likely to participate in the stock market. 
2.5.1 The role of social interaction, trust and religion  
Table 2.4 presents the marginal effects from unbalanced panel probit estimates using 
seven specifications. Panel A shows the marginal effects at means (MEMs) whereas 
Panels B and C present the marginal effects at representative values (MERs). I calculate 
the joint effects of our social engagement measures in Panel D. In all the specifications 
I control for good neighbourhood, concentrated housing, housing tenure, received 
windfall income, has no debt, financial capability, computer use, good health, male, 
age, age square, cohort, married, has child(ren), highest qualification, economic 
activity, government office region and income, as defined in Table 2.1.  
Table 2.4, Panel A, reports MEMs for each of the social capital measures, first 
separately and then together. In column (1), the variable of interest is talking to 
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neighbours as used by Hong et al. (2004). In the second specification, column (2), I test 
the separate influence of the variable active in social groups as used by Georgarakos 
and Pasini (2011). In contrast to the findings of Hong et al. (2004) and hypothesis 1, 
when MEMs are estimated in isolation I do not find a correlation between talking to 
neighbours and stock market participation.12  Consistent with the prior literature and 
hypothesis 2, I find that when MEMs are estimated in isolation, individuals who are 
active in social groups appear more likely to participate in the stock market. Similarly, 
column (3) indicates that trusting individuals are more likely to participate in the stock 
market (in line with hypothesis 3), while those who say that religion makes a difference 
in their lives, column (4), are less likely to participate (contrary to hypothesis 4). 
Control variables have the expected signs, are significant at the 1% level, and are stable 
across the four specifications. 
In column (5) I use a single regression that includes both talking to neighbours and 
active in social groups. The effects remain insignificant for talking to neighbours but 
significant for active in social groups. When I combine all the social engagement 
measures in one regression, column (6), the variables active in social groups, trusts 
most people, and religion makes a difference have independent positive effects on stock 
market participation, but religion has a negative effect and talking to neighbours 
remains insignificant. This result suggests that the marginal utility of information 
provided by strong ties remains insignificant in the presence of other social engagement 
variables.  
 
                                                 
12
 When we run this regression and exclude the variables good neighbourhood, concentrated housing, 
housing tenure, received windfall income, computer use, has no debt, financial capability and cohort, the 
variable talking to neighbours becomes significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 2.4 Social engagement and stock market participation 
The table presents marginal effects from pooled probit regressions estimates. The dependent variable in all the regressions is the stock market participation dummy variable. The explanatory 
variables are as defined in Table 2.1. Talking to neighbours equals one if respondent talks to neighbours every day, once in a week, or once in a month and the value zero if rarely or never. 
Active in social groups equals one for respondents who are active and zero otherwise. Trusts most people equals one if the response is ‘most people can be trusted’ and zero otherwise. Religion 
makes a difference equals one if response is ‘some’ or ‘a great difference’ and zero otherwise. Number of social groups is a categorical variable equal to 1 if respondent does not belong to any 
social group (base level); equals to 2, if  respondent belongs to one number social groups; equals 3, if respondents belongs to two number social groups; and equals to 4, if respondent belongs to 
three number social groups or more. The control variables are good neighbourhood dummy; concentrated housing dummy; housing tenure indicators; received windfall income dummy; has no 
debt dummy; financial capability index; good health dummy; male dummy; age; age squared; cohort; married dummy; has children dummy; education qualification indicators; economic activity 
indicators; Government office region indicators; and income quintile indicators. Panel A presents marginal effects at means. Panel B presents marginal effects at base characteristics. Base 
characteristics represent an individual who: does not talk to neighbours; is not active in social groups; can’t be too careful – does not trust others; believes that religion makes little or no 
difference in life; has no political identification; rents current accommodation; has not received windfall income; has debt; has a financial capability index value equal to the mean; is not a 
computer user; has bad health; is a female; is not married; does not have children; has no educational qualification; is unemployed; lives in the North East of England; and is categorised in the 
1st income quintile. Panel C presents marginal effects using varied characteristics. Unlike base characteristics, varied characteristics take the maximum values of each variable, apart from 
region, which becomes East of England. Panel D shows the increasing/(decreasing) joint marginal effect on stock market participation as each social engagement measure is included in the 
calculation, keeping the remaining measures at their base levels. The reference person for our calculation of joint marginal effects exhibits the varied characteristics previously described for 
Panel C above and, in addition, cumulatively adds the four social engagement measures, beginning with talking to neighbours. For example, in specification (5) row (1), we first evaluate the 
effect of talking to neighbours and then evaluate the marginal effects of both talking to neighbours and active in social groups in row (2), holding the other social engagement measures at their 
base levels and using the reference person characteristics. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and are reported in parentheses. The levels of significance are given by * for 10%, 
** for 5% and *** for 1%. 
 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel A: Marginal effects at means        
        
Talking  to neighbours -0.0001    -0.0031 -0.0056 0.0082 
 (0.0104)    (0.0107) (0.0112) (0.0132) 
Active in social groups  0.0403***   0.0405*** 0.0377***  
  (0.0051)   (0.0051) (0.0053)  
Trusts most people    0.0313***   0.0280*** 0.0284*** 
   (0.0055)   (0.0057) (0.0064) 
Religion makes a difference    -0.0193***  -0.0132** -0.0126* 
    (0.0057)  (0.0057) (0.0064) 
No of social groups (Base=None)        
One       0.0291*** 
       (0.0068) 
Two       0.0546*** 
       (0.0097) 
Three       0.0889*** 
       (0.0134) 
 
  
Social engagement and stock market participation 
 
 
 46 
Table 2.4 Continued 
 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Good neighbourhood 0.0239*** 0.0203** 0.0203** 0.0239*** 0.0203** 0.0186** 0.0179* 
 (0.0084) (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0089) (0.0086) (0.0090) (0.0108) 
Concentrated housing -0.0032 -0.0051 -0.0033 -0.0017 -0.0053 -0.0031 -0.0066 
 (0.0091) (0.0092) (0.0091) (0.0096) (0.0092) (0.0096) (0.0110) 
Housing Tenure (Base=rented)        
Mortgaged 0.0878*** 0.0885*** 0.0879*** 0.0948*** 0.0888*** 0.0947*** 0.0751*** 
 (0.0070) (0.0072) (0.0070) (0.0074) (0.0071) (0.0074) (0.0083) 
Outright owner 0.1615*** 0.1625*** 0.1606*** 0.1686*** 0.1627*** 0.1670*** 0.1437*** 
 (0.0083) (0.0084) (0.0083) (0.0086) (0.0084) (0.0086) (0.0096) 
Received windfall income 0.0397*** 0.0366*** 0.0400*** 0.0390*** 0.0367*** 0.0382*** 0.0399*** 
 (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0061) (0.0058) (0.0061) (0.0073) 
Has no debt 0.0317*** 0.0324*** 0.0311*** 0.0346*** 0.0325*** 0.0344*** 0.0342*** 
 (0.0055) (0.0056) (0.0055) (0.0058) (0.0056) (0.0058) (0.0066) 
Financial capability index 0.0958*** 0.0961*** 0.0952*** 0.0988*** 0.0963*** 0.0977*** 0.0855*** 
 (0.0085) (0.0086) (0.0085) (0.0090) (0.0086) (0.0090) (0.0101) 
Computer user 0.0352*** 0.0329*** 0.0333*** 0.0368*** 0.0332*** 0.0343*** 0.0256*** 
 (0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0060) (0.0063) (0.0061) (0.0064) (0.0075) 
Good health 0.0171*** 0.0149** 0.0154*** 0.0182*** 0.0147** 0.0150** 0.0167** 
 (0.0058) (0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0061) (0.0059) (0.0061) (0.0070) 
Male 0.0166*** 0.0168*** 0.0169*** 0.0215*** 0.0169*** 0.0221*** 0.0270*** 
 (0.0061) (0.0062) (0.0061) (0.0065) (0.0062) (0.0065) (0.0070) 
Age  0.0047*** 0.0049*** 0.0045*** 0.0036*** 0.0050*** 0.0037*** 0.0049*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0015) 
Age square -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
cohort -0.0091*** -0.0088*** -0.0087*** -0.0095*** -0.0088*** -0.0090*** -0.0068*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Married 0.0161** 0.0155** 0.0150** 0.0133** 0.0155** 0.0118* 0.0049 
 (0.0063) (0.0064) (0.0063) (0.0067) (0.0064) (0.0067) (0.0073) 
Has child(ren) -0.0216*** -0.0216*** -0.0214*** -0.0238*** -0.0212*** -0.0240*** -0.0176** 
 (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0070) (0.0066) (0.0070) (0.0078) 
Education qualification (Base=None)        
Lower level 0.0486*** 0.0492*** 0.0482*** 0.0522*** 0.0489*** 0.0500*** 0.0479*** 
 (0.0100) (0.0103) (0.0101) (0.0106) (0.0103) (0.0108) (0.0120) 
GCE level  0.1023*** 0.0983*** 0.1007*** 0.1040*** 0.0981*** 0.0988*** 0.0823*** 
 (0.0077) (0.0079) (0.0078) (0.0082) (0.0079) (0.0083) (0.0090) 
Other higher  0.1179*** 0.1108*** 0.1147*** 0.1172*** 0.1107*** 0.1085*** 0.0870*** 
 (0.0081) (0.0083) (0.0082) (0.0085) (0.0083) (0.0086) (0.0093) 
First degree and above 0.1737*** 0.1640*** 0.1644*** 0.1733*** 0.1636*** 0.1558*** 0.1419*** 
 (0.0112) (0.0114) (0.0113) (0.0117) (0.0114) (0.0118) (0.0130) 
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Table 2.4 Continued  
 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Economic Activity (Base=Unemployed)       
Retired 0.0577*** 0.0589*** 0.0544*** 0.0613*** 0.0593*** 0.0589*** 0.0466*** 
 (0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0121) (0.0126) (0.0122) (0.0126) (0.0139) 
Self employed 0.0075 0.0087 0.0056 0.0071 0.0090 0.0071 0.0147 
 (0.0118) (0.0119) (0.0118) (0.0123) (0.0119) (0.0124) (0.0138) 
Employed -0.0019 -0.0010 -0.0037 -0.0022 -0.0005 -0.0023 0.0012 
 (0.0086) (0.0087) (0.0086) (0.0091) (0.0087) (0.0091) (0.0104) 
Region (Base=North East)        
North West 0.0499*** 0.0513*** 0.0498*** 0.0507*** 0.0511*** 0.0489*** 0.0524*** 
 (0.0175) (0.0176) (0.0175) (0.0182) (0.0177) (0.0184) (0.0199) 
Yorkshire & Humber 0.0490*** 0.0536*** 0.0509*** 0.0523*** 0.0526*** 0.0524*** 0.0413** 
 (0.0183) (0.0185) (0.0183) (0.0191) (0.0185) (0.0192) (0.0208) 
East Midlands 0.0498*** 0.0534*** 0.0507*** 0.0521*** 0.0533*** 0.0523*** 0.0575*** 
 (0.0189) (0.0190) (0.0189) (0.0197) (0.0191) (0.0199) (0.0214) 
West Midlands 0.0319* 0.0308* 0.0323* 0.0337* 0.0306* 0.0302 0.0442** 
 (0.0180) (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0188) (0.0181) (0.0189) (0.0207) 
East of England 0.1146*** 0.1170*** 0.1146*** 0.1159*** 0.1170*** 0.1156*** 0.1186*** 
 (0.0188) (0.0189) (0.0189) (0.0197) (0.0190) (0.0198) (0.0218) 
London 0.1007*** 0.1028*** 0.1024*** 0.1070*** 0.1021*** 0.1051*** 0.1106*** 
 (0.0191) (0.0193) (0.0192) (0.0200) (0.0193) (0.0202) (0.0219) 
South East 0.0758*** 0.0779*** 0.0747*** 0.0791*** 0.0777*** 0.0764*** 0.0814*** 
 (0.0172) (0.0173) (0.0171) (0.0180) (0.0173) (0.0181) (0.0198) 
South West 0.0480*** 0.0510*** 0.0479*** 0.0524*** 0.0505*** 0.0491** 0.0596*** 
 (0.0184) (0.0186) (0.0184) (0.0193) (0.0186) (0.0194) (0.0212) 
Wales 0.0369** 0.0389** 0.0365** 0.0390** 0.0386** 0.0361** 0.0316* 
 (0.0163) (0.0164) (0.0163) (0.0170) (0.0164) (0.0172) (0.0191) 
Scotland 0.0565*** 0.0596*** 0.0548*** 0.0596*** 0.0595*** 0.0556*** 0.0581*** 
 (0.0164) (0.0165) (0.0164) (0.0171) (0.0166) (0.0173) (0.0193) 
Northern Ireland -0.0401** -0.0389** -0.0397** -0.0430** -0.0391** -0.0437** -0.0094 
 (0.0169) (0.0170) (0.0169) (0.0176) (0.0170) (0.0177) (0.0192) 
Income quintile (Base=1st quintile)        
2nd .Income quintile 0.0142* 0.0164** 0.0144* 0.0148* 0.0168** 0.0166** 0.0203** 
 (0.0077) (0.0078) (0.0077) (0.0082) (0.0078) (0.0082) (0.0094) 
3rd Income quintile 0.0401*** 0.0436*** 0.0405*** 0.0410*** 0.0436*** 0.0422*** 0.0355*** 
 (0.0081) (0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0086) (0.0082) (0.0086) (0.0097) 
4th Income quintile 0.0690*** 0.0699*** 0.0691*** 0.0683*** 0.0700*** 0.0677*** 0.0606*** 
 (0.0090) (0.0091) (0.0090) (0.0095) (0.0091) (0.0095) (0.0106) 
5th Income quintile 0.1279*** 0.1277*** 0.1261*** 0.1278*** 0.1275*** 0.1243*** 0.1092*** 
 (0.0106) (0.0107) (0.0106) (0.0111) (0.0107) (0.0110) (0.0122) 
Pseudo R2 0.1557 0.1575 0.1573 0.1538 0.1577 0.1576 0.1604 
Observations 25810 25246 25676 24114 25235 23916 14993 
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Table 2.4 Continued 
 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel B: Marginal effects at base characteristics       
        
Talking  to neighbours -0.0000    -0.0002 -0.0004 0.0008 
 (0.0005)    (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0013) 
Active in social groups  0.0021***   0.0021*** 0.0024***  
  (0.0006)   (0.0006) (0.0007)  
Trusts most people    0.0018***   0.0019*** 0.0025** 
   (0.0006)   (0.0006) (0.0010) 
Religion makes a difference    -0.0009***  -0.0011** -0.0014* 
    (0.0004)  (0.0005) (0.0008) 
No of social groups (Base=None)        
One       0.0015** 
       (0.0006) 
Two       0.0030** 
       (0.0012) 
Three       0.0057*** 
       (0.0022) 
Panel C: Marginal effects at varied characteristics        
        
Talking  to neighbours -0.0002    -0.0046 -0.0081 0.0127 
 (0.0159)    (0.0159) (0.0161) (0.0209) 
Active in social groups  0.0623***   0.0625*** 0.0569***  
  (0.0081)   (0.0081) (0.0082)  
Trusts most people    0.0476***   0.0417*** 0.0438*** 
   (0.0084)   (0.0086) (0.0103) 
Religion makes a difference    -0.0290***  -0.0192** -0.0187* 
    (0.0086)  (0.0084) (0.0098) 
No of social groups (Base=None)        
One       0.0506*** 
       (0.0118) 
Two       0.0896*** 
       (0.0153) 
Three       0.1359*** 
       (0.0187) 
Observations 25810 25246 25676 24114 25235 23916 14993 
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Table 2.4 Continued 
 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel D: Joint Marginal effects at varied characteristics 
Talking  to neighbours     -0.0026 
(0.0090) 
-0.0045 
(0.0089) 
0.0069 
(0.0112) 
+ Active in social groups     0.0327*** 
(0.0103) 
0.0266*** 
(0.0102) 
 
+ Three or more social groups       0.0823*** 
(0.0173) 
+ Trusts most people      0.0507*** 
(0.0114) 
0.1103*** 
(0.0190) 
+ Religion makes a difference      0.0391*** 
(0.0124) 
0.0976*** 
(0.0197) 
        
Observations 25810 25246 25676 24114 25235 23916 14993 
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In column (7), I replace the binary social group dummy with a categorical variable 
representing the number of social groups with which an individual is involved. The idea 
is that involvement in many social groups exposes an individual to a variety of sources 
that enhance the chances of encountering financial market information. The results 
indicate that individuals who are involved in three or more social groups are more likely 
to participate in the stock market than those involved in only one group.   
Given that MEMs do not represent actual individual characteristics, these 
interpretations may be incorrect (Ai and Norton, 2003; Bartus, 2005; Williams, 2012). 
Therefore, I also use MERs to interpret the results in Panels B, C, and D. Panel B shows 
MERs calculated using base characteristics for all variables, apart from the social 
engagement variable of interest, in each specification. Base characteristics represent an 
individual who: does not talk to neighbours; is not active in social groups; cannot be too 
careful – does not trust others; believes that religion makes little or no difference in life; 
has no political identification; rents current accommodation; has not received windfall 
income; has debt; has a financial capability index value equal to the mean; is not a 
computer user; has bad health; is a female; is not married; does not have children; has 
no educational qualification; is unemployed; lives in the North East of England; and is 
categorised in the 1st income quintile. For example, in specification (1) I examine the 
marginal effect of talking to neighbours holding both the other social engagement 
measures and the control variables at their base levels. The results in panel B are 
consistent with those of panel A in that the effects for active in social groups, trusts 
most people, and religion makes a difference are significant at the 1% level in 
specifications (2) to (4), respectively, and at varying levels of significance when 
estimated in the combinations shown by specifications (5) - (7). Conversely, unlike base 
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characteristics, varied characteristics take the maximum values of each variable, apart 
from region, which becomes East of England. Therefore, in Panel C, I consider an 
individual with varied characteristics and I replicate the marginal effects calculated in 
Panel B and find consistent results. Comparing the MERs in Panels B and C, I clearly 
see that social engagement can distinguish stock market participants from non-
participants and that the measures have independent effects on stock market 
participation, thus confirming the results of our analysis using MEMs.  
In Panel D, I cumulatively add the effects of the social engagement measures in 
specification (5), (6) and (7). The marginal effects reported show the 
increasing/decreasing joint marginal effect on stock market participation as each social 
engagement measure is included in the calculation, keeping the remaining measures at 
their base levels. The reference person for our calculation of joint marginal effects 
exhibits the varied characteristics previously described for Panel C above and, in 
addition, cumulatively acquires the four social engagement measures, beginning with 
talking to neighbours. For example, in specification (5) row (1), I first evaluate the 
effect of talking to neighbours and then evaluate the marginal effects of both talking to 
neighbours and active in social groups in row (2), holding the other social engagement 
measures at their base levels and using the reference person characteristics. Consistent 
with the previous results, talking to neighbours has an insignificant effect in all the 
specifications. When I consider a reference person that talks to neighbours and is active 
in social groups, row (2), the marginal effects on stock market participation are 3.3% 
and 2.7% in specifications (5) and (6) respectively. In specification (6), if he or she also 
trusts most people, the effects increase to 5.1%, but reduce to 3.9% if he or she also 
believes that religion makes a difference.  Similarly, in specification (7), I see that the 
incremental marginal effect of talking to neighbours and involvement in three or more 
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social groups is 8.2%; and that the incremental marginal effect of talking to neighbours, 
involvement in three or more social groups and trusting most people, is 11.0%, but falls 
back to 9.8% if religion makes a difference. The results in Panel D suggest that 
intensity of social engagement generally increases the likelihood of stock market 
participation.                                       
2.5.2  The role of political party identification  
In this section, I extend the analysis to include political party identification and report 
both MEMs (Panel A) and MERs (Panels B, C, and D) in Table 2.5. In specification 
(1), I regress stock market participation against political party identification together 
with the standard controls and I include the other social engagement measures in 
specification (2) and the categorical variable number of social groups in specification 
(3). 
Panel A of Table 2.5, column (1) presents the estimates for the association between 
stock market participation and political party identification in isolation. The results 
show that individuals who identify themselves with a mainstream political party are 
more likely to participate in the stock market as compared to those who do not have a 
political affiliation, consistent with hypothesis 5. However, some party affiliations have 
a greater effect. For example, the effect of identification with the Conservative Party is 
about one and half times larger than that of Liberal Democratic Party membership and 
six times that of Labour Party identification.  
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Table 2.5 Party identification, social engagement and stock market participation 
 
The table presents marginal effects from pooled probit regressions estimates. Panel A presents marginal effects at 
means, Panel B marginal effects at base characteristics; Panel C marginal effects using varied characteristics; and 
Panel D joint marginal effects. The dependent variable in all the regressions is the stock market participation dummy 
variable. Explanatory variables are as defined in Table 2.1. Political identification is a categorical variable and is 
equal to 1 if respondent has no political affiliation (base level); equals 2 if affiliated with other smaller parties; equals 
3 if affiliated with the Liberal Democratic Party; equals 4 if affiliated with the Labour Party; and equal 5 if affiliated 
with the Conservative Party. Talking to neighbours equals one if respondent talks to neighbours every day, once in a 
week, or once in a month and the value zero if rarely or never. Active in social groups equals one for respondents 
who are active and zero otherwise. Trusts most people equals one if the response is ‘most people can be trusted’ and 
zero otherwise. Religion makes a difference equals one if the response is ‘some’ or ‘a great difference’ and zero 
otherwise. Number of social groups is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the respondent does not belong to any social 
group (base level); equal to 2, if the respondent belongs to one social group; equal to 3 if the respondent belongs to 
two social groups; and equal to 4 if the respondent belongs to three social groups or more. The control variables are 
good neighbourhood dummy; concentrated housing dummy; housing tenure indicators; received windfall income 
dummy; has no debt dummy; financial capability index; good health dummy; male dummy; age; age squared; cohort; 
married dummy; has children dummy; education qualification indicators; economic activity indicators; Government 
office region indicators; and income quintile indicators. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and are 
reported in parentheses. The base characteristics, varied characteristics and the reference person are defined in the 
legend of Table 2.4. The levels of significance are given by * for 10%, ** for 5% and *** for 1%.  
 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: Marginal effects at means    
Talking  to neighbours  -0.0079 0.0092 
  (0.0117) (0.0137) 
Active in social groups  0.0367***  
  (0.0055)  
Trusts most people   0.0279*** 0.0277*** 
  (0.0059) (0.0067) 
Religion makes a difference  -0.0103* -0.0100 
  (0.0060) (0.0067) 
No of social groups (Base=None)    
One   0.0295*** 
   (0.0071) 
Two   0.0531*** 
   (0.0101) 
Three or more   0.0892*** 
   (0.0137) 
Party identification (Base=None)    
Other smaller parties 0.0184 0.0159 0.0168 
 (0.0115) (0.0125) (0.0141) 
Liberal Democratic 0.0588*** 0.0491*** 0.0431*** 
 (0.0110) (0.0116) (0.0133) 
The Labour Party 0.0196** 0.0152 0.0105 
 (0.0089) (0.0095) (0.0112) 
Conservative Party 0.0888*** 0.0834*** 0.0803*** 
 (0.0100) (0.0106) (0.0124) 
Good neighbourhood 0.0165* 0.0111 0.0085 
 (0.0088) (0.0096) (0.0115) 
Concentrated housing 0.0004 0.0008 -0.0069 
 (0.0094) (0.0100) (0.0115) 
Housing Tenure (Base=rented)    
Mortgaged 0.0811*** 0.0884*** 0.0704*** 
 (0.0074) (0.0078) (0.0088) 
Outright owner 0.1501*** 0.1564*** 0.1355*** 
 (0.0086) (0.0090) (0.0101) 
Received windfall income 0.0361*** 0.0348*** 0.0350*** 
 (0.0061) (0.0063) (0.0075) 
Has no debt 0.0318*** 0.0333*** 0.0337*** 
 (0.0058) (0.0061) (0.0069) 
Financial capability index 0.0906*** 0.0924*** 0.0775*** 
 (0.0088) (0.0093) (0.0104) 
Computer user 0.0366*** 0.0350*** 0.0253*** 
 (0.0063) (0.0066) (0.0078) 
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Table 2.5 Continued 
 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) 
Good health 0.0164*** 0.0144** 0.0157** 
 (0.0061) (0.0064) (0.0073) 
Male 0.0217*** 0.0278*** 0.0314*** 
 (0.0063) (0.0067) (0.0073) 
Age  0.0050*** 0.0043*** 0.0055*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0016) 
Age square -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
cohort -0.0083*** -0.0084*** -0.0063*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) 
Married 0.0143** 0.0109 0.0046 
 (0.0065) (0.0069) (0.0076) 
Has child(ren) -0.0198*** -0.0220*** -0.0187** 
 (0.0069) (0.0073) (0.0082) 
Education qualification (Base=None)    
Lower level 0.0501*** 0.0513*** 0.0452*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0112) (0.0125) 
GCE level  0.0978*** 0.0933*** 0.0742*** 
 (0.0081) (0.0087) (0.0094) 
Other higher  0.1173*** 0.1084*** 0.0847*** 
 (0.0085) (0.0091) (0.0098) 
First degree and above 0.1687*** 0.1529*** 0.1368*** 
 (0.0116) (0.0123) (0.0136) 
Economic Activity (Base=Unemployed)    
Retired 0.0556*** 0.0581*** 0.0458*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0129) (0.0144) 
Self employed 0.0004 0.0017 0.0077 
 (0.0122) (0.0128) (0.0142) 
Employed -0.0044 -0.0038 -0.0003 
 (0.0090) (0.0095) (0.0108) 
Region (Base=North East)    
North West 0.0443** 0.0420** 0.0529** 
 (0.0184) (0.0194) (0.0207) 
Yorkshire & Humber 0.0530*** 0.0544*** 0.0480** 
 (0.0194) (0.0203) (0.0218) 
East Midlands 0.0382* 0.0400* 0.0523** 
 (0.0195) (0.0205) (0.0221) 
West Midlands 0.0241 0.0217 0.0387* 
 (0.0188) (0.0198) (0.0215) 
East of England 0.0998*** 0.1001*** 0.1071*** 
 (0.0196) (0.0207) (0.0224) 
London 0.0879*** 0.0905*** 0.1022*** 
 (0.0198) (0.0209) (0.0225) 
South East 0.0629*** 0.0639*** 0.0737*** 
 (0.0180) (0.0191) (0.0205) 
South West 0.0335* 0.0335* 0.0492** 
 (0.0191) (0.0202) (0.0218) 
Wales 0.0427** 0.0409** 0.0364* 
 (0.0172) (0.0182) (0.0200) 
Scotland 0.0643*** 0.0621*** 0.0687*** 
 (0.0174) (0.0184) (0.0204) 
Northern Ireland -0.0208 -0.0262 0.0091 
 (0.0192) (0.0203) (0.0223) 
Income quintile (Base=1st quintile)    
2nd .Income quintile 0.0133 0.0157* 0.0197** 
 (0.0082) (0.0087) (0.0098) 
3rd Income quintile 0.0384*** 0.0405*** 0.0375*** 
 (0.0085) (0.0091) (0.0102) 
4th Income quintile 0.0628*** 0.0614*** 0.0588*** 
 (0.0093) (0.0098) (0.0110) 
5th Income quintile 0.1215*** 0.1181*** 0.1065*** 
 (0.0111) (0.0115) (0.0127) 
Pseudo R2 0.1614 0.1637 0.1683 
Observations 23350 21655 13708 
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Table 2.5 Continued 
 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) 
Panel B: Marginal effects at base characteristics   
    
Talking  to neighbours  -0.0005 0.0003 
  (0.0008) (0.0005) 
Active in social groups  0.0020***  
  (0.0007)  
Trusts most people   0.0016*** 0.0008** 
  (0.0006) (0.0004) 
Religion makes a difference  -0.0007 -0.0004 
  (0.0005) (0.0003) 
No of social groups (Base=None)    
One   0.0013** 
   (0.0006) 
Two   0.0025** 
   (0.0011) 
Three or more   0.0049** 
   (0.0021) 
Party identification (Base=None)    
Other smaller parties 0.0009 0.0012 0.0007 
 (0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0007) 
Liberal Democratic 0.0034*** 0.0044*** 0.0020** 
 (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0010) 
The Labour Party 0.0009* 0.0012 0.0004 
 (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0005) 
Conservative Party 0.0057*** 0.0084*** 0.0045*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0024) (0.0017) 
Panel C: Marginal effects at varied characteristics   
    
Talking  to neighbours  -0.0108 0.0133 
  (0.0156) (0.0203) 
Active in social groups  0.0528***  
  (0.0083)  
Trusts most people   0.0394*** 0.0402*** 
  (0.0086) (0.0102) 
Religion makes a difference  -0.0141* -0.0139 
  (0.0082) (0.0095) 
No of social groups (Base=None)    
One   0.0496*** 
   (0.0120) 
Two   0.0843*** 
   (0.0155) 
Three or more   0.1302*** 
   (0.0187) 
Party identification (Base=None)    
Other smaller parties 0.0326 0.0268 0.0301 
 (0.0203) (0.0209) (0.0250) 
Liberal Democratic 0.0958*** 0.0771*** 0.0716*** 
 (0.0184) (0.0187) (0.0231) 
The Labour Party 0.0346** 0.0257 0.0192 
 (0.0161) (0.0164) (0.0208) 
Conservative Party 0.1364*** 0.1222*** 0.1213*** 
 (0.0169) (0.0173) (0.0219) 
Observations 23350 21655 13708 
 
  
Social engagement and stock market participation 
 
 
 56 
Table 2.5 Continued 
 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) 
Panel D: Joint marginal effects at varied characteristics   
    
Talking  to neighbours  -0.0078 
(0.0114) 
0.0097 
(0.0146) 
+ Active in social groups  0.0289** 
(0.0128) 
 
+ Three or more social groups    0.1003*** 
(0.0198) 
+ Trusts most people  0.0570*** 
(0.0138) 
0.1309*** 
(0.0207) 
+ Identification with the Conservative Party  0.1406*** 0.2173*** 
  (0.0171) (0.0237) 
+ Religion makes a difference  0.1299*** 
(0.0187) 
0.2063*** 
(0.0256) 
Observations  21655 13708 
 
In column (2), I combine other social engagement measures and party identification in a 
single equation. The results show that social group involvement, trust, religion, and 
identification with the Liberal Democratic Party and the Conservative Party have 
independent effects on stock market participation. The variables talking to neighbours 
and identification with the Labour Party are insignificant. Comparing these results with 
those in Table 2.4, column (6), the effects are comparable for the variables active in 
social groups and religion makes a difference, suggesting a minimal correlation with 
party identification. When I use the number of social groups, column (3), in place of the 
social group’s dummy variable, the effects of trusts most people, identification with the 
Liberal Democratic Party and identification with the Conservative Party remain 
significant. The variable religion makes a difference now becomes insignificant. The 
results for the variable number of social groups remains virtually unchanged from the 
results reported in Table 2.4. 
 In Panels B and C of Table 2.5, I calculate MERs using base and varied characteristics, 
respectively. In Panel B, I see that the marginal effects are consistent and significant for 
party identification, social group involvement and trust (at levels varying between 1% 
and 5%). Further, as seen in the previous section, the magnitudes are small, in contrast 
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to the results reported in Panel C where, across all specifications, the magnitudes are 
higher and significant at the 1% level for identification with the Liberal Democratic 
Party and the Conservative Party, involvement in social groups and trust.  
Panel D presents the joint marginal effects of social engagement, which are evaluated 
using the reference person characteristics and by cumulatively adding the effects of 
social engagement variables. The results show that identification with the Conservative 
Party has an 8% effect on stock market participation when other social engagement 
variables are held at their base levels. When I consider that the reference person also 
talks to neighbours, is active in social groups, trusts most people, and believes that 
religion makes a difference, the joint effects are 13% for specification (2) and 20.6% for 
specification (3). In both specifications the variable religion makes a difference has a 
negligible impact. The results are consistent with those reported in Table 2.4, Panel D, 
and confirm that the variables active in social groups, trusts most people, and political 
party identification jointly increase the likelihood of stock market participation. 
Furthermore, considering that the mean rate of stock market participation is only 21%, 
the reported joint effects of social engagements are influential. Overall, the results 
suggest that socially engaged respondents are more likely to participate in the stock 
market with statistically and economically significant effects.  
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2.5.3 The conditional marginal effects of social interaction, trust, religion and 
political party identification 
I now consider the conditional marginal effects of all of the social engagement 
measures. However, for limited dependent variable models in which marginal effects 
are calculated at means for an interaction term the sign, significance and magnitude 
may not reflect the true relationship between variables (Ai and Norton, 2003). In order 
to interpret the interaction term correctly, I calculate conditional marginal effects at 
representative values as suggested by Ai and Norton (2003). The marginal effects of the 
interaction term are then presented graphically, following Greene (2010).   
Figure 2.2 shows the marginal effects by political party identity and across age when I 
interact the variables trusts most people, active in social groups, religion makes a 
difference,  and political party identification. The effects and the levels of significance 
of these variables vary across party identification. For small parties, social group 
involvement is significant and positive; for the Labour party and the Conservative 
party, both social group involvement and trust are significant and positive; and for the 
Liberal Democratic Party, none of the variables is significant.  
It is interesting to note that the effects of all the variables are insignificant among 
respondents who have no party identity, which suggests that these individuals are also 
disengaged from other social mechanisms and are thus less likely to invest in the stock 
market. This is consistent with the information-gathering costs hypothesis of Bonaparte 
and Kumar (2013). For those who identify with the Labour party, its left-of-centre 
political ideology, which might in theory restrain stock market investment, is 
compensated for by trust and involvement in social groups.  
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Figure 2.2  Conditional marginal effects with social engagement interaction terms  
The figure displays the conditional marginal effects derived from a pooled probit regression using the specifications 
in Table 2.5, Column 2 and interaction terms for the variables active in social groups, trusts most people, and religion 
makes a difference. The marginal effects are calculated using varied characteristics as defined in the legend to Table 
2.4. Other variables are evaluated at their average values: age square, cohort and financial capability. The plotted 
marginal effects for the variable active in social group are significant at the 5% level for identification with the 
Labour Party and at the 10% level for identification with both the Conservative Party and Small Parties, among 
individuals aged below the age of 86. For the variable trusts most people, the plotted marginal effects are significant 
at the 1% level for identification with the Labour Party and at the 5% level for identification with the Conservative 
party, among respondents aged 76 and below, and at 5% and 10% respectively among respondents above age 76. 
Religion is not significant.  
 
These same variables increase stock market participation for those who identify with 
the Conservative party. Religion has no impact on stock market participation for those 
who identify with both the Labour party and the right-of-centre Conservative party. 
Figure 2.3 presents marginal effects by region, when region dummies are interacted 
with the variables trusts most people, active in social groups, and religion makes a 
difference. For the North East, these variables are all negatively associated with stock 
market participation. In particular, active in social groups is significant suggesting that 
social interaction increases stock market participation costs.  
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Figure 2.3 Conditional marginal effects by geographic region 
The figure displays the conditional marginal effects, by geographic region, derived from a pooled probit regression 
using the specifications in Table 2.5, Column (2) and interaction terms for the variables geographic region, active in 
social groups, trusts most people, and religion makes a difference. The marginal effects are calculated using varied 
characteristics as defined in the legend to Table 2.4. Other variables are evaluated at their average values: age square, 
cohort and financial capability. Across all age groups, the plotted marginal effect for the variable active in social 
group is negative and significant at the 5% level for the North East; it is positive and significant at the 5% for the 
East Midlands and Scotland; and it is positive and significant at the 10% level for the West Midlands. For the 
variable trusts most people, the plotted marginal effects are positive and significant at the 5% level for the West 
Midlands, East of England, and South East whereas it is positive and significant at the 10% level for London.  Across 
all regions, religion is not significant.  
 
This is hardly unexpected given that the North East England is historically associated 
with the trade union movement and more left-wing political ideology, given the greater 
concentration of heavy industry in this part of the country. In contrast, social group 
involvement is positive and significant for the regions East Midlands, West Midlands 
and Scotland. Among regions that are considered to be affluent – including the West 
Midlands, the East of England, London and South East – the variable trusts most people 
is positive and significant. These findings underscore the presence of regional 
differences in the impact of social engagement variables. 
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2.5.4 The effect of a shift in political party identification  
 
In this section, I investigate transitions in political party identification and their impact 
on stock market participation. Intuitively, if political parties’ ideological and policy 
positions converge, individuals become indifferent in their party choices on these 
grounds and instead shift political affiliation in line with perceived party competence, 
principally in economic management. Thus, transitions from one party to the other may 
be correlated with stock market participation. Our findings partially support this 
hypothesis.   
As discussed in section 2.2, if “consumer voters” are driven by the desire to protect 
their investments, I would expect them to penalize their own parties by voting for 
another party that they believe is more competent in economic management. Thus, I 
should expect to see a positive relationship between change in political party 
identification and stock market participation if economic management is a signal of pro-
market policies. Alternatively, where “consumer voters” change party preferences in 
reaction to policy positions taken by a political party, not necessarily because of their 
views about competence in economic management, then I should expect a negative 
association. To explore this, I examine shifts in political party identification. From the 
data, the transitional probabilities for political party identification reveal substantial 
transitions between political parties during the three waves. In order to capture these 
shifts, I generate a dummy variable (political party shift) that takes the value 1 for those 
who change parties during the three waves and 0 otherwise. I find that 35% of the 
respondents changed their preferred political party during the three waves.  
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I first replace political party identification with the indicator of political party shift in 
the complete model. The results in Table 2.6, column (1) show that the variable has an 
insignificant effect on stock market participation. In column (2), I run a regression that 
includes the two variables to examine their independent effects on stock market 
participation. The negative political party shift coefficient becomes significant, but only 
at the 10% level, while the effects of political party identification retain the same levels 
of significance as seen before.  
In column (3), I interact the two variables using the specifications in our complete 
model. The effect of political party shift is still significant at the 10% level. The 
interaction terms are positive and significant for the Conservative Party and the Liberal 
Democratic Party and insignificant for Small Parties and the Labour Party. When 
presented graphically, in line with Greene (2010), the true marginal effects of the 
interaction between political party shift and political identity have different signs to the 
MEMs reported in Table 2.6. The marginal effects of political party shift differ across 
both political party identification and age. Figure 2.4 presents MERs using base 
characteristics whereas Figure 2.5 is derived using varied characteristics. Political party 
shift has a negative and significant effect on stock market participation among those 
who identify with the Conservative Party. In contrast, the marginal effect of political 
party shift is not significant for those who identify with the Liberal Democratic Party, 
the Labour Party and for respondents with no party affiliations. In summary, those who 
identify with the Conservative or the Liberal Democratic Party and have not shifted 
allegiance from another party (Table 2.4 and Table 2.5) are more likely to participate in 
the stock market than an individual identifying with another party or no party.  
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Table 2.6 Effects of shift in political party identification 
The table presents marginal effects from pooled probit regressions estimates. The dependent variable in all the 
regressions is the stock market participation dummy variable. The explanatory variables are as defined in Table 2.1. 
Talking to neighbours equals 1 if the respondent talks to neighbours every day, once in a week, or once in a month 
and the value 0 if rarely or never. Active in social groups equals 1 for respondents who are active and 0 otherwise. 
Trusts most people equals 1 if the response is ‘most people can be trusted’ and 0 otherwise. Religion makes a 
difference equals 1 if response is ‘some’ or ‘a great difference’ and 0 otherwise. Political party shift equals 1 if 
respondent changed party affiliation during the panel period and 0 otherwise. Political identification after the shift is 
a categorical variable equal to 1 if the respondent has no political affiliation (base level); equals 2 if affiliated with 
other smaller parties; equals 3 if affiliated with the Liberal Democratic Party; equals 4 if affiliated with the Labour 
Party; and equals 5 if affiliated with the Conservative Party. The interaction term is between political shift and 
political party identification. The control variables are good neighbourhood dummy; concentrated housing dummy; 
housing tenure indicators; received windfall income dummy; has no debt dummy; financial capability index; good 
health dummy; male dummy; age; age squared; cohort; married dummy; has children dummy; education 
qualification indicators; economic activity indicators; Government office region indicators; and income quintile 
indicators. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and are reported in parentheses. The levels of 
significance are given by * for 10%, ** for 5% and *** for 1%.  
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) 
Talking to neighbours -0.0056 -0.0081 -0.0079 
 (0.0112) (0.0117) (0.0116) 
Active in social groups 0.0377*** 0.0367*** 0.0363*** 
 (0.0053) (0.0055) (0.0055) 
Trusts most people  0.0280*** 0.0277*** 0.0277*** 
 (0.0057) (0.0059) (0.0059) 
Religion makes a difference -0.0132** -0.0102* -0.0099* 
 (0.0057) (0.0060) (0.0060) 
Political party shift -0.0005 -0.0116* -0.0121* 
 (0.0064) (0.0067) (0.0068) 
Party identification (Base=None)    
Other smaller parties  0.0154 0.0206 
  (0.0125) (0.0131) 
Liberal Democratic  0.0486*** 0.0559*** 
  (0.0117) (0.0131) 
The Labour Party  0.0122 0.0180* 
  (0.0097) (0.0106) 
Conservative Party  0.0802*** 0.0847*** 
  (0.0107) (0.0117) 
Party identification * political party shift    
Other smaller parties   -0.0054 
   (0.0173) 
Liberal Democratic   0.0308** 
   (0.0149) 
The Labour Party   0.0122 
   (0.0129) 
Conservative Party   0.0569*** 
   (0.0141) 
Good neighbourhood 0.0186** 0.0107 0.0107 
 (0.0090) (0.0096) (0.0096) 
Concentrated housing -0.0031 0.0009 0.0009 
 (0.0096) (0.0100) (0.0100) 
Housing Tenure (Base=rented)    
Mortgaged 0.0947*** 0.0881*** 0.0882*** 
 (0.0074) (0.0078) (0.0078) 
Outright owner 0.1670*** 0.1560*** 0.1557*** 
 (0.0086) (0.0090) (0.0090) 
Received windfall income 0.0382*** 0.0347*** 0.0346*** 
 (0.0061) (0.0063) (0.0063) 
Has no debt 0.0345*** 0.0335*** 0.0334*** 
 (0.0058) (0.0061) (0.0061) 
Financial capability index 0.0977*** 0.0922*** 0.0923*** 
 (0.0090) (0.0093) (0.0093) 
Computer user 0.0343*** 0.0352*** 0.0349*** 
 (0.0064) (0.0066) (0.0066) 
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Table 2.6 Continued 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) 
Good health 0.0150** 0.0144** 0.0145** 
 (0.0061) (0.0064) (0.0064) 
Male 0.0221*** 0.0277*** 0.0279*** 
 (0.0065) (0.0067) (0.0067) 
Age  0.0037*** 0.0043*** 0.0043*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0015) 
Age square -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
cohort -0.0090*** -0.0084*** -0.0083*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Married 0.0118* 0.0110 0.0111 
 (0.0067) (0.0069) (0.0069) 
Has child(ren) -0.0240*** -0.0217*** -0.0215*** 
 (0.0070) (0.0073) (0.0073) 
Education qualification (Base=None)    
Lower level 0.0500*** 0.0514*** 0.0513*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0112) (0.0112) 
GCE level  0.0988*** 0.0933*** 0.0931*** 
 (0.0083) (0.0087) (0.0087) 
Other higher  0.1085*** 0.1084*** 0.1080*** 
 (0.0086) (0.0091) (0.0091) 
First degree and above 0.1558*** 0.1525*** 0.1520*** 
 (0.0118) (0.0123) (0.0123) 
Economic Activity (Base=Unemployed)    
Retired 0.0589*** 0.0580*** 0.0580*** 
 (0.0126) (0.0129) (0.0129) 
Self employed 0.0071 0.0012 0.0006 
 (0.0124) (0.0128) (0.0128) 
Employed -0.0023 -0.0040 -0.0041 
 (0.0091) (0.0095) (0.0095) 
Region (Base=North East)    
North West 0.0489*** 0.0421** 0.0420** 
 (0.0184) (0.0194) (0.0194) 
Yorkshire & Humber 0.0524*** 0.0542*** 0.0545*** 
 (0.0192) (0.0204) (0.0203) 
East Midlands 0.0523*** 0.0401* 0.0399* 
 (0.0199) (0.0206) (0.0206) 
West Midlands 0.0302 0.0219 0.0218 
 (0.0189) (0.0199) (0.0199) 
East of England 0.1157*** 0.1007*** 0.0999*** 
 (0.0198) (0.0207) (0.0207) 
London 0.1051*** 0.0905*** 0.0905*** 
 (0.0202) (0.0209) (0.0209) 
South East 0.0764*** 0.0641*** 0.0637*** 
 (0.0181) (0.0191) (0.0191) 
South West 0.0491** 0.0338* 0.0336* 
 (0.0194) (0.0203) (0.0203) 
Wales 0.0361** 0.0398** 0.0401** 
 (0.0172) (0.0182) (0.0182) 
Scotland 0.0555*** 0.0612*** 0.0610*** 
 (0.0173) (0.0185) (0.0185) 
Northern Ireland -0.0438** -0.0309 -0.0329 
 (0.0178) (0.0204) (0.0215) 
Income quintile (Base=1st quintile)    
2nd .Income quintile 0.0166** 0.0159* 0.0159* 
 (0.0082) (0.0087) (0.0087) 
3rd Income quintile 0.0422*** 0.0404*** 0.0404*** 
 (0.0086) (0.0091) (0.0091) 
4th Income quintile 0.0677*** 0.0614*** 0.0613*** 
 (0.0095) (0.0098) (0.0098) 
5th Income quintile 0.1243*** 0.1181*** 0.1177*** 
 (0.0110) (0.0115) (0.0115) 
Pseudo R2 0.1576 0.1638 0.1642 
Observations 23916 21655 21655 
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Figure 2.4 Conditional marginal effects of shift in political preferences – 
base characteristics  
The figure displays the conditional marginal effects derived from a pooled probit regression using the specifications 
in Table 2.5, Column 4 and an interaction term between the variables political party shift and political party 
identification after the shift. The marginal effects are evaluated at base characteristics (see Table 2.4 legend) for each 
variable, apart from age square, cohort, and financial capability that take average values. The marginal effects are 
significant at the 10% level for identification with the Conservative Party among individuals aged between 46 and 
86.  
 
However, those who have recently shifted allegiance to the Conservative Party are less 
likely to participate in the stock market than those who have a longer-term allegiance to 
the Conservatives. As hypothesised in section 2.3, this suggests that both political party 
identification and consumer voting behaviour are associated with stock market 
participation.   
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Figure 2.5  Conditional marginal effects of shift in political preferences – varied 
representative values 
The figure displays the conditional marginal effects of a shift in political identity. The marginal effects are evaluated 
using varied characteristics as defined in the legend to Table 2.4. Other variables are evaluated at their average 
values: age square, cohort and financial capability. For identification with the Conservative Party, the plotted 
marginal effects are significant at the 5% level among individuals aged 76 or below and at the 10% level for those 
aged above 76.  
 
 
 
2.6 Robustness checks 
I consider alternative specifications and definitions of stock market participation to 
examine whether my results are consistent. Table 2.7 presents marginal effects using 
the following four dependent variables: SMP1 with a lagged SMP1 as an additional 
independent variable (column (1)); the alternative stock market participation definition, 
SMP2 (column (2)); fixed income assets (column 3); and number of investment 
products (column (4)) using the specifications in Table 2.5, column (2)13. 
                                                 
13
 In columns (1)–(3) we use pooled probit regressions but in column (4) we use a Poisson regression 
because (NIP) is not a binary variable. 
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2.6.1 Lagged value of stock market participation 
In section 2.3 I note that transitions in (out) of the stock market are minimal, while most 
respondents tend to remain in the same state within the panel. This suggests that SMP1 
in 2005 is likely to be influenced by participation in 2000 or 1995. To isolate the effects 
of state dependence I include a one period lag of the principal dependent variable as a 
control in Table 2.7, column (1). The lagged dependent variable enters with a value of 
35% and is significant at the 1% level. Moreover, this specification appears to capture a 
lot of variation in the data as indicated by the pseudo R2, which increases to 27% from 
the 16% value reported in Table 2.5 (Column (2)). Nevertheless, the social engagement 
variables–active in social group, trusts most people, and identification with the Liberal 
Democratic Party and the Conservative Party–remain significant at the 1% level. The 
variable religion makes a difference becomes insignificant.     
2.6.2 Alternative asset categories 
Saving money in personal equity plans, Individual Savings Accounts, and other forms 
of equity investments (SMP2) provides opportunities for both portfolio diversification 
and efficient tax management. Plausibly, individuals who are more informed about 
financial market operations and are aware of changes in government policy are more 
likely to take advantage of the opportunities such knowledge provides. Based on my 
propositions regarding social interaction, trust, and party identification, I should 
observe increased effects on the variables of interest when I use this broader definition 
of stock market participation as the dependent variable. The marginal effects presented 
in Table 2.7, column (2), show that the variables active in social groups, trust most 
people, and party identification increase by more than 50%.   
  
Social engagement and stock market participation 
 
 
 68 
 
Table 2.7 Marginal effects calculated using a lagged and alternative dependent variables  
The table presents marginal effects from pooled probit regressions (column (1), (2), and (3)) and a pooled poisson 
regression in column (4). The dependent variables are stock market participation dummy (SMP1) (Column 1); 
dummy for the broadened definition of stock market participation (SMP2) (column 2); dummy for investment in 
fixed interest asset (FIA) (column 3); and number of investment products (NIP) (column 4). The samples consist of 
individuals in the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) for the 1995, 2000 and 2005 waves. The explanatory 
variables are as defined in Table 2.1. Talking to neighbours equals 1 if the respondent talks to neighbours every day, 
once in a week, or once in a month and the value 0 if rarely or never. Active in social groups equals 1 for respondents 
who are active and 0 otherwise. Trusts most people equals 1 if the response is ‘most people can be trusted’ and 0 
otherwise. Religion makes a difference equals 1 if response is ‘some’ or ‘a great difference’ and 0 otherwise. 
Political identification is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the respondent has no political affiliation (base level); 
equals 2 if affiliated with other smaller parties; equals 3 if affiliated with the Liberal Democratic Party; equals 4 if 
affiliated with the Labour Party; and equals 5 if affiliated with the Conservative Party. The control variables are good 
neighbourhood dummy; concentrated housing dummy; housing tenure indicators; received windfall income dummy; 
has no debt dummy; financial capability index; good health dummy; male dummy; age; age squared; cohort; married 
dummy; has children dummy; education qualification indicators; economic activity indicators; Government office 
region indicators; and income quintile indicators. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and are reported 
in parentheses. The levels of significance are given by * for 10%, ** for 5% and *** for 1%. 
Independent variable SMP1 SMP2 FIA NIP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Stock market participation lagged 0.3489***    
 (0.0114)    
Talking  to neighbours 0.0101 -0.0055 0.0001 -0.0043 
 (0.0137) (0.0131) (0.0132) (0.0266) 
Active in social groups 0.0275*** 0.0447*** 0.0268*** 0.0817*** 
 (0.0068) (0.0062) (0.0065) (0.0122) 
Trusts most people  0.0212*** 0.0284*** 0.0169** 0.0554*** 
 (0.0072) (0.0066) (0.0068) (0.0134) 
Religion makes a difference -0.0048 -0.0160** -0.0197*** -0.0328*** 
 (0.0068) (0.0063) (0.0065) (0.0127) 
Party identification (Base=None) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Other smaller parties 0.0095 0.0264* 0.0206 0.0338 
 (0.0165) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0298) 
Liberal Democratic 0.0408*** 0.0661*** 0.0336** 0.1084*** 
 (0.0134) (0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0268) 
The Labour Party 0.0151 0.0235** -0.0233** 0.0308 
 (0.0115) (0.0107) (0.0108) (0.0226) 
Conservative Party 0.0634*** 0.0995*** 0.0581*** 0.1733*** 
 (0.0122) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0246) 
Good neighbourhood -0.0080 0.0306*** 0.0334*** 0.0366 
 (0.0124) (0.0104) (0.0102) (0.0231) 
Concentrated housing 0.0103 -0.0066 0.0195* 0.0026 
 (0.0120) (0.0110) (0.0103) (0.0257) 
Housing Tenure (Base=rented)     
Mortgaged 0.0761*** 0.1172*** 0.0620*** 0.2144*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0097) (0.0099) (0.0173) 
Outright owner 0.1236*** 0.2260*** 0.1188*** 0.3400*** 
 (0.0117) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0204) 
Received windfall income 0.0176** 0.0502*** 0.0754*** 0.0726*** 
 (0.0081) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0129) 
Has no debt 0.0154** 0.0517*** -0.0003 0.0744*** 
 (0.0076) (0.0069) (0.0070) (0.0136) 
Financial capability index 0.0760*** 0.1386*** 0.1264*** 0.2538*** 
 (0.0118) (0.0101) (0.0075) (0.0237) 
Computer user 0.0209** 0.0363*** 0.0262*** 0.0624*** 
 (0.0084) (0.0075) (0.0076) (0.0147) 
Good health 0.0009 0.0321*** 0.0224*** 0.0237 
 (0.0080) (0.0071) (0.0072) (0.0147) 
Male 0.0136* -0.0107 -0.0476*** 0.0528*** 
 (0.0076) (0.0073) (0.0072) (0.0162) 
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Table 2.7 Continued 
Independent variable SMP1 SMP2 FIA NIP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age  -0.0158*** 0.0277*** 0.0260*** 0.0182*** 
 (0.0022) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0036) 
Age square -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0000 -0.0003*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
cohort -0.0242*** 0.0115*** 0.0225*** -0.0148*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0013) 
Married -0.0113 0.0333*** 0.0262*** 0.0104 
 (0.0082) (0.0076) (0.0077) (0.0167) 
Has child(ren) 0.0060 -0.0674*** -0.0197** -0.0174 
 (0.0090) (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0175) 
Education qualification (Base=None)     
Lower level 0.0319** 0.0733*** 0.0578*** 0.1007*** 
 (0.0140) (0.0129) (0.0131) (0.0276) 
GCE level  0.0735*** 0.1296*** 0.0987*** 0.1976*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0102) (0.0105) (0.0203) 
Other higher  0.0732*** 0.1463*** 0.1186*** 0.2398*** 
 (0.0107) (0.0105) (0.0107) (0.0211) 
First degree and above 0.0923*** 0.2262*** 0.1674*** 0.3193*** 
 (0.0135) (0.0137) (0.0134) (0.0281) 
Economic Activity (Base=Unemployed)     
Retired 0.0317* 0.0888*** 0.0714*** 0.1142*** 
 (0.0164) (0.0136) (0.0138) (0.0312) 
Self employed 0.0122 0.0421*** 0.0201 -0.0175 
 (0.0163) (0.0145) (0.0150) (0.0296) 
Employed -0.0055 0.0203* 0.0326*** -0.0319 
 (0.0124) (0.0106) (0.0105) (0.0242) 
Region (Base=North East)     
North West 0.0105 0.0501** 0.0292 0.1061** 
 (0.0188) (0.0217) (0.0199) (0.0517) 
Yorkshire & Humber 0.0403** 0.0593*** 0.0419** 0.1191** 
 (0.0196) (0.0222) (0.0205) (0.0548) 
East Midlands 0.0194 0.0232 0.0280 0.1158** 
 (0.0196) (0.0227) (0.0210) (0.0543) 
West Midlands 0.0090 0.0195 0.0339 0.0512 
 (0.0192) (0.0227) (0.0209) (0.0526) 
East of England 0.0480** 0.0770*** 0.0381* 0.2423*** 
 (0.0192) (0.0230) (0.0210) (0.0538) 
London 0.0667*** 0.0545** 0.0556*** 0.2341*** 
 (0.0206) (0.0226) (0.0207) (0.0553) 
South East 0.0394** 0.0624*** 0.0526*** 0.1465*** 
 (0.0183) (0.0212) (0.0194) (0.0499) 
South West 0.0297 0.0500** 0.0562*** 0.1043* 
 (0.0194) (0.0224) (0.0208) (0.0537) 
Wales 0.0142 0.0490** 0.0135 0.0141 
 (0.0183) (0.0203) (0.0187) (0.0470) 
Scotland 0.0292 0.0537*** 0.0392** 0.0600 
 (0.0183) (0.0204) (0.0186) (0.0480) 
Northern Ireland  -0.0955*** -0.2029*** -0.1808*** 
  (0.0225) (0.0223) (0.0465) 
Income quintile (Base=1st quintile)     
2nd .Income quintile -0.0016 0.0284*** 0.0190* 0.0261 
 (0.0123) (0.0102) (0.0105) (0.0186) 
3rd Income quintile 0.0126 0.0597*** 0.0427*** 0.0928*** 
 (0.0122) (0.0107) (0.0109) (0.0198) 
4th Income quintile 0.0267** 0.0963*** 0.0594*** 0.1288*** 
 (0.0127) (0.0115) (0.0118) (0.0212) 
5th Income quintile 0.0700*** 0.1562*** 0.0855*** 0.2335*** 
 (0.0140) (0.0130) (0.0129) (0.0254) 
Pseudo R2 0.2665 0.2017 0.1358 0.1723 
Observations 11111 21655 21655 21655 
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The variable religion makes a difference becomes significant at the 5% level. The 
effects of identification with smaller parties and the Labour Party are still lower than 
identification with the Liberal Democratic Party and the Conservative Party, but 
become significant at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively.14   
Fixed Interest Assets (FIA) are both relatively safer and less information intensive than 
stocks, which make them attractive to less sophisticated investors as well as providing 
diversification opportunities to stock market participants. Characteristically, non-stock 
market participants in our model are less social, less trusting, and do not identify 
themselves with any political party and are therefore more likely to hold FIA. Thus, I 
should expect these factors to have a lesser, or negligible, effect on the decision to hold 
FIA. Table 2.7, column (3), presents marginal effects where the dependent variable is 
an indicator of ownership of Fixed Interest Assets (FIA) and the explanatory variables 
are as described in our final model. When compared to the results in column (2), the 
effect of trust declines in significance and the negative effect of religious beliefs 
increases in significance. For those who identify with other smaller parties the effect 
becomes insignificant, whereas for those who identify with the Liberal Democratic 
party the positive effect declines in significance from 1% to 5% and for the Labour 
Party the previously positive effect remains significant at the 1% level but the sign 
reverses. However, the effects of some of the control variables change substantially. 
The variable has no debt becomes insignificant whereas the variable male becomes 
negative and is significant at the 1% level. The effect of the variable received windfall 
income is more than double that reported in Table 2.5 and 50% more than that in Table 
2.7, Column (2). 
                                                 
14 A similar pattern is observed for most of the control variables though the effects of holding other 
higher qualification, a first degree or above qualification, and financial capability almost doubles.  
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Finally, I use the Number of Investment Products (NIP) owned by respondents as an 
alternative dependent variable. Here, the intuition is that individuals who are informed 
about financial market operations, investment products and government policy changes 
are more likely to hold a higher number of investment products.  In Table 2.7, column 
(4), I report marginal effects from poisson estimates using the specifications in our final 
model. The findings confirm our previous results: individuals who are active in social 
groups, trust most people, and identify themselves with the Liberal Democratic Party 
and the Conservative Party are more likely to hold a higher number of investment 
products.  Overall, our robustness tests confirm our conclusions derived from section 
2.5. 
2.7 Conclusion 
Most previous studies report a positive association between stock market participation 
and social engagement measures when analysing each of these variables separately. 
Although some recent studies consider the presence of possible correlations between 
these factors, to the best of my knowledge none carry out a holistic analysis. The rich 
BHPS dataset enables me to address this gap. Using three waves in the BHPS I tackle 
four unresolved issues. First, recognising that social engagement can give rise to two 
distinct channels of social interaction, I disaggregate channels of social interaction 
using the categories talking to neighbours (strong ties) and active in social groups 
(weak ties). Second, I test the independent effects of all of my social engagement 
measures in the same model. Third, I use an integrated measure of political party 
identification to examine the role of political identity and shifts in political party 
preferences. I disaggregate the influence of social engagement, political ideology and 
shifts in political party preferences within the same model using interaction terms. 
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Finally, I calculate marginal effects at representative values for the independent and 
joint influences of social engagement.  
I conclude that weak ties are more effective and productive channels of social 
interaction than strong ties. My measure of strong ties, frequency of talking to 
neighbours, seems only to capture the information in other social engagement and 
control variables. In addition, I show that, when modelled in isolation from other 
variables, individuals who have more weak ties, i.e. are involved in more social groups, 
are more trusting, and are members of either the Conservative or the Liberal 
Democratic parties are more likely to participate in the stock market. Contrary to prior 
literature, religiosity has a negative effect on stock market participation. When 
estimated together in one model, the effects of strong ties remain insignificant, whereas 
the effects of weak ties, trust, religion and alignment to the Conservative Party or the 
Liberal Democratic Party have independent effects on stock market participation. 
When I interact my social engagement measures, for those who do not identify with a 
political party or who identify with the Liberal Democratic Party, social group 
involvement and trust have no impact on stock market participation. In contrast, these 
two variables influence stock market participation among those who identify with either 
the Labour Party or the Conservative Party, suggesting that their influence is 
independent of political ideology. Social group involvement influences stock market 
participation among those who identify with small parties. When I consider shift in 
political affiliation, I find that those who shift to the Conservative Party are less likely 
to participate in the stock market than those who consistently identify with the 
Conservatives. The net cumulative effect of my social engagement measures is that the 
probability of stock market participation increases by 21%.   
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An important consideration in interpreting these results is that the significant 
associations do not necessarily imply causality. The various social engagement 
measures analysed may be endogenous and thus my results may be driven more by 
correlated effects rather than by independent effects. Moreover, the short panel period 
and sample size limits the ability to examine endogeneity issues. Nevertheless, this 
study has potential policy implications. The findings suggest that policy makers and 
financial institutions wishing to enhance stock market participation should focus their 
attention on the provision of information to those who are least socially engaged. Of the 
low social engagement groups, particular emphasis should be placed upon those who 
have the fewest weak ties because they are likely to have the least access to productive 
information. Given our finding that individuals who are more trusting are more likely to 
participate in the stock market, policies that enhance trust in stock market investments 
and the investment process generally are likely to enhance participation. This will also 
lower the participation cost associated with the cognitive dissonance experienced by 
those whose political or religious leanings are inclined against stock market 
participation.  
These results also have potential implications for the operations of financial markets 
and the wider economy. Although the finding that stock market participants (non-
participants) remained in (out of) the market suggests that these participants have a 
minimal impact on  stock market volatility, the stronger influence of social engagement 
on indirect stock market participation suggests that most individuals hold diversified 
portfolios which may impact market volatility. Heaton and Lucas (2000a) suggest that 
stock run-up,  – i.e. periods when stock market prices are increasing, and thus expected 
returns are falling– may be partly explained by an increase in diversification arising 
from growth in indirect vehicles for stock market participation (such as mutual funds) 
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which lower the risk premium demanded by investors. Furthermore, because 
individuals are more likely to be attracted to companies that they are familiar with, for 
example through employee share ownership schemes, or those whose directors are 
known to them through their social networks, as suggested by studies which examine 
the influence of home bias (Tesar and Werner, 1995), social engagement is likely to 
have a greater influence on ownership of small stocks and thereby have more influence 
on the performance of less liquid stock. In sum, social engagement could lead to an 
increase in wealth accumulation and thereby increase both household consumption and 
the development of financial markets.     
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Chapter 3 Mental accounting and portfolio choice  
“People will always prefer black-and-white over shades of grey, and so there will 
always be the temptation to hold overly-simplified beliefs and to hold them with 
excessive confidence” 
(Gilovich, 1991) 
3.1 Introduction 
A growing body of theoretical literature in behavioural finance documents the influence 
of mental accounting–the tendency of people to divide and manage their wealth in 
layers –on portfolio choice and its linkages with background risk and financial advice.15 
An important reason for the interest in this relationship is the finding that risk, as 
measured by both the probability of not meeting aspirations and risk attitudes, appear to 
vary by mental account categories and that asset allocation decisions are also segregated 
by mental accounts, which could lead investors to hold sub-optimal portfolios (Shefrin 
and Statman, 2000; Das et al., 2010). Furthermore, recent theoretical models that 
examine the roles of delegated asset management (Alexander and Baptista, 2011) and 
background risk (Baptista, 2012), conditional on mental accounting, show that these 
factors can increase portfolio inefficiency. These new theoretical insights enrich 
existing knowledge concerning household behaviour and observed differences in 
portfolio choice. So far, the literature concerning mental accounting and portfolio 
choice mainly focuses on theoretical modelling and experimental evidence with little 
attention paid to the examination of real life circumstances. Whereas, an elaborate 
empirical literature addresses other determinants of portfolio choice, few studies 
examine mental accounting behaviour.16 
                                                 
15 See, for example, Thaler (1980; 1985), Shefrin and Thaler (1988) Shefrin and Statman (2000), 
Alexandre and Baptista (2011), and Baptista (2012). 
16 The literature documents various additional factors that determine portfolio choice: financial literacy 
and cognitive ability (e.g. Christelis et al., 2010; Van Rooij et al., 2011; Klapper et al., 2013); general 
health, physical health and mental health (e.g. Rosen and Wu, 2004; Fan and Zhao, 2009; Love and Smith, 
2010; Atella et al., 2012; Bogan and Fertig, 2013); background risks (e.g. Guiso and Jappelli, 2000; 
Cocco, 2005); and entrepreneurial risk (e.g. Bertaut and Starr-McCluer, 2000; Heaton and Lucas, 2000c). 
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Motivated by behavioural portfolio theory (BPT), which refers to the tendency of 
investors to design their portfolios based upon personal aims and goals, and its 
extensions, this Chapter focuses on the effect of mental accounting behaviour 
(measured using self-reported reasons for saving money) on portfolio choice. I 
contribute to the literature in several ways. First, I investigate whether differences in 
mental accounting behaviour can explain differences in portfolio choice. This is the first 
study to document this relationship using self-reported investment goals and the entire 
household portfolio. Previous studies use different mental frames and subsets of 
household portfolios (Benartzi and Thaler, 2007; Choi et al., 2009). Specifically, I 
distinguish between households that have a single mental account and those that have 
multiple mental accounts–in line with Shefrin and Statman (2000)–and examine their 
portfolio choices across three asset classes (risky asset, fairly safe asset and safe asset). 
In addition, I introduce the case of households that do not readily identify a reason for 
saving and compare their portfolio choices with those who have a single mental account 
or multiple mental accounts. Second, unlike previous studies, I investigate whether risk 
tolerance, time preference and cognitive ability influence portfolio choice and whether 
these variables have an indirect influence through mental accounting. Third, I examine 
whether, conditional on mental accounting behaviour, differences in portfolio choice 
can be explained by background risk/assets and financial advice. Fourth, I examine the 
effect of specific mental accounts (such as saving for a holiday, a home purchase, home 
improvements, a bequest, and education) on the probability of owning, and the portfolio 
share in, the three asset classes.  
A number of reasons have been advanced to explain why mental accounting might 
influence portfolio choice.  First, mental accounting distorts risk attitudes so that an 
individual may be willing to take risk in one mental account and be risk-averse in 
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another (Pan and Statman, 2012). Pan and Statman (2012) suggest that, for an investor 
who exhibits mental accounting behaviour, assessing her/his level of risk-tolerance 
using a single dimension could be misleading. Indeed, Zhou and Pham (2004) show that 
risk attitudes vary across financial products implying that investor goals may be 
determined a priori by financial products availability. Second, mental accounting may 
be associated with time preferences– choice between current consumption and future 
consumption (discount rates)–which are connected with portfolio choice. Becker and 
Mulligan (1997) and Uzawa (2006) link time preferences with financial planning and 
asset holdings, suggesting a connection with mental accounting. For example, by 
splitting income into different mental accounts (such as salary income, asset income, 
and future income) households can easily plan for consumption and investment (Shefrin 
and Thaler, 1988).  
Third, mental accounting is linked with cognitive ability, which implies that people who 
have low cognitive ability are more likely to exhibit mental accounting behaviour 
(Thaler, 1999b). The basic idea is that those of lower IQ can carry less information and 
so are more likely to segregate decision-making into mental accounts. Thaler (1999a) 
argues that mental accounting enables households to organize, evaluate, and keep track 
of their financial activities. Therefore, mental accounting provides an easy and 
convenient way of managing wealth, simplifies financial decisions and instils self-
control (Thaler, 2004). Fourth, mental accounting may be associated with financial 
advice and its influence may be determined by the nature of the service provided, 
information asymmetries, and the characteristics of the financial products available. Put 
differently, asset management delegated to financial advisors may result in investor-
agent-advisor conflicts of interest (Georgarakos and Inderst, 2011; Inderst and 
Ottaviani, 2012)  while different financial products may be assigned to different mental 
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accounts (Zhou and Pham, 2004). Finally, mental accounting behaviour is connected to 
background risks that are associated with assets such as housing and self-owned 
enterprises (Baptista, 2012).17   
To investigate these issues, I use two waves from a new, comprehensive UK dataset, 
the Wealth and Assets Survey (WAS). The survey consists of detailed information 
about household and individual characteristics. In particular, the data includes 
comprehensive information about financial wealth, pension wealth, physical wealth, 
property wealth and a proxy for mental accounting behaviour. I use detailed 
information about financial wealth to classify financial assets into three asset classes: 
risky, fairly safe and safe assets. I find that average ownership in the three asset classes 
are 16%, 53% and 88%, respectively, which are similar to the estimates reported in 
other surveys. This provides reassurance that the WAS provides a representative sample 
of the UK population.  
Taken together, the results show that mental accounting behaviour explains variations 
in ownership of and portfolio share in risky assets, fairly safe assets and safe assets. I 
find that households that have a single mental account are less likely to own and have a 
low share of investments in, risky assets, when compared to those that have no mental 
account or have multiple mental accounts. In addition, having a single mental account 
or multiple mental accounts, when compared to having no mental account, increases 
both ownership of and investment share in fairly safe assets but decreases portfolio 
share in safe assets. Portfolio share in the three asset classes are statistically different 
among households that have no mental account, have a single mental account and those 
that have multiple mental accounts. Regarding financial advice, households that have 
                                                 
17
 Mental accounting is also associated with, and increases the net effects of, other behavioural biases 
such as the disposition effect and loss aversion (Barberis and Huang, 2001). 
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multiple sources of advice are more likely to own and have a high share of investment 
in risky assets, when compared to those who have a single source or those who do not 
seek financial advice.  Households that have a single source or multiple sources of 
advice are more likely to own and have a high share of investments in fairly safe assets, 
and a low share in safe assets. Surprisingly, I find that housing tenure has no direct 
relationship with both ownership of and portfolio share in risky assets, as suggested in 
the literature. This result suggests that housing only influences portfolio choice through 
mental accounting. Nonetheless, homeownership through a mortgage increases 
portfolio share in fairly safe assets but decreases the share in safe assets, while outright 
homeowners are more likely to own and have a high share in fairly safe assets and a 
low share in safe assets. Further, risk tolerance increases the probability of owning and 
the portfolio share in risky assets while time preference has a weak influence on 
ownership of a fairly safe asset. However, cognitive ability influences ownership of and 
portfolio share in both risky assets and fairly safe assets and decreases the portfolio 
share in safe assets.  
Most importantly, I find that the influence of mental accounting is magnified, reduced, 
eliminated or the direction of its influence (sign) is reversed when it is interacted 
together with the other variables. For example, I find that financial advice reduces the 
share of fairly safe assets among households that exhibit no mental account or multiple 
mental accounts but increases their share of safe assets. The effects are higher among 
households that exhibit multiple mental accounts regardless of whether they seek a 
single source or multiple sources of financial advice. Similarly, outright 
homeownership reduces the influence of mental accounting especially among 
households that exhibit multiple mental accounts. Among households that exhibit a 
single mental account, risk tolerance reduces the share of risky assets and the effects are 
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higher than for individuals with multiple mental accounts.   
Because the WAS data consists of only two panels and I observe low transitions in asset 
ownership, it is hard to control for unobserved individual effects and the problem of 
endogenous variables. Hence, the direction of the links between both asset ownership 
and the proportion of money invested, and mental accounting behaviour, background 
risk and financial advice are unclear. This notwithstanding, the findings in this study 
have important implications for investors, fund managers and policy makers. Investors 
should be aware of the potential impact of assigning different financial products to 
different investment goals as this could lead to them holding sub-optimal portfolios. 
Regarding financial advisors, they should be aware of the benefits and pitfalls of mental 
accounting so as to be able to design optimal portfolios for their clients. The finding 
that mental accounting has a substantial association with ownership and the proportion 
of money invested in fairly safe assets is of interest to governments in their efforts to 
encourage savings and the development of innovative financial products which will 
deepen financial markets.       
The rest of the Chapter is organised as follows. In Section 3.2, I discuss the theoretical 
literature and review the empirical literature. Section 3.3 describes the data and the key 
variables, while the empirical strategy employed is discussed in Section 3.4. In Section 
3.5, I present the findings for the main analysis and the robustness checks employed are 
presented in Section 3.6. I conclude in Section 3.7 with a brief discussion of the 
implications of the study.  
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3.2 Prior literature and hypotheses development  
3.2.1 Mental accounting  
In their development of BPT, Shefrin and Statman (2000) compare “mean-variance 
investors” with investors who have BPT single mental accounts (BPT-SA) and those 
who have BPT multiple mental accounts (BPT-MA). They argue that portfolios 
constructed by mean-variance investors, in line with the rules of portfolio theory, are 
similar to BPT-SA investors’ portfolios. Further, they show that BPT-SA investors hold 
optimal portfolios that lie on Markowitz’s (1952) mean variance efficient frontier while 
BPT-MA investors’ portfolios do not lie on the efficient frontier. For BPT-MA 
investors, risk aversion varies by mental account and investors ignore covariance 
between accounts. In other words, mental accounting contradicts the basic assumption 
in standard portfolio theory that people have one aggregate portfolio and a single 
measure of risk – overall portfolio risk. Recognising the important features of mean-
variance theory and BPT, Das et al. (2010) combine the features of the two theories and 
introduce ‘mental accounting portfolio theory’ in which investors weight their wealth 
across mental accounts using BPT and derive optimal portfolios using mean-variance 
theory. In this framework, they argue that both mental accounting sub-portfolios and the 
aggregate portfolio can lie on the Markowitz mean-variance efficient frontier.  
However, recent extensions to BPT show that, under certain conditions, mental 
accounting sub-portfolios and aggregate portfolios lie below the mean-variance 
efficient frontier. Alexandre and Baptista (2011) show that, when individuals delegate 
asset allocation decisions to a financial adviser, mental accounting sub-portfolios are 
mean-variance efficient but aggregate portfolios are not. The authors argue that, 
although investors are able to construct mean-variance efficient sub-portfolios through 
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mental accounting, financial advisers seek to beat their set benchmarks and thus an 
investor’s aggregate portfolio will not be efficient. Similarly, Baptista (2012) points out 
that in addition to portfolio risk, as assumed in Das et al. (2010), investors also face 
background risks (from human capital and real estate). In their model, the presence of 
background risk shifts the aggregate portfolio away from the mean-variance efficient 
frontier. Most importantly, they argue that, portfolio compositions will vary depending 
on probability of achieving goals and background risks within each mental account. In a 
related study, Jiang et al. (2013) demonstrate the impact of exchange rate risk (another 
form of background risk) on international portfolio selection based on BPT. They show 
that both the optimal BPT portfolio for a local investor and the aggregate BPT portfolio 
for multiple markets are not mean-variance efficient. 
Although the theoretical literature that underpins the relationship between mental 
accounting and portfolio choice is now well established, not much is known about its 
application in real life situations. As discussed below, a few studies use different mental 
accounting frames to examine their influence on sub-sets of household portfolios. These 
studies do not examine investment goals per se or the entire household portfolio. 
Below, I review this group of studies, other related mental accounting empirical 
literature and the well-established literature concerning the determinants of portfolio 
choice.  
3.2.2 Mental accounting and portfolio choice  
A number of studies directly link mental accounting with asset allocation and asset 
pricing decisions. Shefrin and Thaler (1988) who propose a Behavioral Life-Cycle 
(BLC) model suggest that, by splitting income into different mental accounts (such as 
salary income, asset income, and future income) households can plan consumption and 
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investment. They argue that the probability of spending from salary income is higher 
compared to future income and that households’ use mental accounting as a self-control 
mechanism. In support of this finding, Benartzi and Thaler (2007) show that 
participants in US retirement plans tend to separate funds into two mental accounts: 
funds already invested, “old money”; and future funds available for investment, “new 
money”. They find that participants were more likely to vary asset allocation for new 
money rather than old money and they attribute this to regret avoidance and reference 
dependence.18 In a related study, Choi et al., (2009) find that most employees in a large 
US firm failed to re-balance their portfolios after a change in the firm’s 401(k) 
matching rules, thus overweighting their investment in equities.19,20 They associate this 
with mental accounting because individuals view the two regimes (before and after the 
change in matching rules) as separate mental accounts. Although these studies suggest a 
possible relationship between mental accounting and portfolio choice, they only 
examine specific assets and not the entire individuals’ portfolios. Moreover, these 
studies do not consider investment goals, which I investigate in this Chapter.   
Existing evidence also suggests that mental accounting is associated with asset pricing. 
Rockenbach (2004) examines the relationship between mental accounting and the 
pricing of financial options using a laboratory experiment. She finds that subjects do not 
take advantage of arbitrage opportunities because they are unable to link different 
mental accounting investments: namely, financial options and stock, financial options 
and bonds, and financial options alone. This inability to take advantage of arbitrage 
                                                 
18
 In addition, they find that employees consider company stock to be a special type of investment – a 
different mental account – as they tended to overweight equity investment in their aggregate portfolios, 
when compared to portfolio compositions of employees who do not have access to company stock. 
19 401 (k) is a US retirement savings plan, which is funded by employee contributions which may be 
matched by employer contributions. 
20 Employees who enrolled before the regime change had 56% allocation to the firm’s stock compared to 
23% for those who enrolled after the change. 
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opportunities can be associated with mental accounting as a means of self-control, as 
discussed earlier. In a study of life insurance contracts with a lending option, 
Warshawsky (1987) finds that households do not take advantage of arbitrage 
opportunities that arise from discrepancies between policy loan rates and the treasury 
bills yield rate. In other fields, experimental and empirical studies, for example, 
demonstrate how mental accounting explains variations in consumer choices. Ranyard 
et al. (2006) show how individuals elicit different sets of information regarding credit in 
two mental accounting frames: total account or recurrent budget period account. They 
find that for total account, people seek information about duration and total cost while 
for the recurrent budget period account they seek information regarding the repayment 
amount and the flexibility of the credit terms. Milkman and Beshears (2009) 
demonstrate how a $10 online grocery discount coupon increases spending, in general, 
and on goods that are usually not purchased.  
In line with BPT, I posit that investors simplify financial management tasks by splitting 
their investment decisions into goals (mental accounts) such as going on holiday, 
buying a house, buying a car, saving for education and bequest motives. I use a general 
question in the WAS concerning reasons for saving money to generate a categorical 
variable, mental accounting, with three dummies. Following Shefrin and Statman 
(2000), I assume that those who identify one reason have a single mental account 
(“BPT-SA investors”) while those who identify more than one reason have multiple 
mental accounts (“BPT-MA investors”). Although, Shefrin and Statman (2000) do not 
consider the case of an individual who does not readily identify a reason for saving 
money, I posit that such individuals might behave differently from the other two 
categories. Thus the third category, no mental account, includes these individuals.  As 
pointed out earlier, because mental accounting may be correlated with risk tolerance, 
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time preferences and cognitive ability, I control for the effects of all of these variables. 
The hypotheses to be tested are: 
Hypothesis 1a: Households that exhibit mental accounting behaviour will make 
different portfolio choices from similar households that do not exhibit mental 
accounting behaviour i.e. ownership and portfolio share in different asset classes will 
be statistically different across mental accounts.  
Hypothesis 1b: Households that exhibit similar mental accounting behaviour and have 
different time preferences, risk tolerance or cognitive ability will make different 
portfolio choices i.e. conditional on mental accounting behaviour, ownership and 
portfolio share in different asset classes will be statistically different across time 
preferences, risk tolerance and cognitive ability.    
3.2.3 Mental accounting and financial advice 
BPT theory predicts that investors who delegate asset allocation hold inefficient 
aggregate portfolios (Alexander and Baptista, 2011). The question as to whether 
financial advisers act in the interest of investors or their own interests remains a subject 
of debate in the literature.  Inderst and Ottaviani (2012) use various theoretical models 
to show how provider–adviser–consumer relationships could lead to biased 
recommendations owing to the nature of advisers’ compensation and information 
asymmetries between the provider and consumer. Empirical studies have also found 
evidence that support this prediction. Bhattacharya et al. (2012) find that among 
investors who seek financial advice, without any inducement to do so, a majority do not 
follow the recommendations given and so their portfolios do not perform any better 
than portfolios for individuals who do not seek financial advice. The authors note that 
those who sought financial advice were typically, male, older, wealthier, more 
Mental accounting and portfolio choice 
 
 
 86 
financially capable, and had longer connections with the adviser. Georgarakos and 
Inderst (2011) suggest that financial advice matters more among households that have 
low levels of financial capability and trust in advice. Hackethal et al. (2012) find a 
negative effect on net returns for investors who choose either an independent financial 
adviser or a bank advisor. This effect was more pronounced among investors who were 
guided by a bank advisor. Overall, previous studies report similar findings.21 However, 
these studies do not examine the relationship between financial advice and mental 
accounting.  
In this study, I assume that financial advice can be proxied by either the source from 
which an individual received financial advice or the institutions or individuals whom 
investors trust for financial advice regarding saving for retirement. This variable 
represents the variety of sources of financial information which might influence 
investment decisions. In line with the findings in Alexander and Baptista (2011),  
Bhattacharya et al. (2012), Zhou and Pham (2004), I use the WAS question regarding 
financial advice to generate the categorical variable, financial advice, with three 
dummies; no advice, single advice and multiple advisors. The hypotheses to be tested 
are: 
Hypothesis 2a: Households that have a single source or multiple sources of financial 
advice will make different portfolio choices from those households that do not receive 
financial advice i.e. ownership and portfolio share in different asset classes will be 
statistically different across financial advice categories.   
Hypothesis 2b: Households that exhibit similar mental accounting behaviour, and that 
                                                 
21For example, Bergstresser et al. (2009) compare broker-sold with direct -sold funds and find an 
insignificant difference in performance while Chen et al. (2013), compare the performance of outsourced 
funds with internally-run funds and find that the former underperform other funds.  
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either have a single source or have multiple sources of financial advice, will make 
different portfolio choices i.e. conditional on mental accounting behaviour, ownership 
and portfolio share in different asset classes will be statistically different across  
financial advice categories. 
3.2.4 Mental accounting and background assets 
A number of studies explore the role of background assets, which are considered to be 
important sources of background risks and have been associated with portfolio choice. 
These include housing, self-owned enterprises and human capital; I focus on housing, 
which could be owned outright or through a mortgage.  Heaton and Lucas (2000b) find 
a positive relationship between mortgage refinancing and risky asset investment, as a 
proportion of both financial assets and total assets. They attribute this to the use of 
money raised from mortgage refinancing for investment in risky assets, which is, in 
turn, associated with higher human capital. This could explain why younger and poorer 
homeowners are less likely to invest in risky assets, as suggested by Cocco (2005). 
Similarly, Hu (2005) demonstrates the crowding effect of homeownership on stock 
market participation using a partial equilibrium model. Concurring with Cocco (2005), 
he argues that young and middle aged homeowners (including potential homeowners) 
tend to invest more in less risky assets such as bonds to mitigate income shocks and 
thus guarantee mortgage payments. Examining different risk profiles and risk-return 
expectations, Flavin and Yamashita (2002) use a mean-variance efficiency framework 
and find that, despite households having identical risk and return characteristics, their 
portfolios differ considerably due to housing constraints.  I might therefore expect 
mental accounting to explain differences in the way people respond to housing as a 
source of background risk and its influence on asset allocation.  
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Using the WAS variable, housing tenure, I examine households that rent their current 
accommodation, own outright or own through a mortgage. The hypotheses to be tested 
are: 
Hypothesis 3a: Households that are exposed to different background risks will make 
different portfolio choices i.e. ownership and portfolio share in different asset classes 
will be statistically different among renters, mortgage holders and outright home 
owners.  
Hypothesis 3b: Households that exhibit similar mental accounting behaviour and are 
exposed to different background risks will make different portfolio choices i.e. 
conditional on mental accounting behaviour, ownership and portfolio share in different 
asset classes will be statistically different across housing tenure categories. 
3.2.5 Other related literature on portfolio choice 
A series of studies investigate the correlation between different forms of ill-health and 
asset allocation. Love and Smith (2010) use a comprehensive set of techniques to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity and find a weak relationship between health and 
portfolio choice for married households and an insignificant relationship for single 
households. Bogan and Fertig (2013) analyse the effects of various forms of mental 
health including depression, anxiety, phobias, and alcoholism, and show that they result 
in a reduction of risky asset investment. In a European cross country study, Atella et al. 
(2012) find that future health conditions has an independent influence on portfolio 
choice, over and above current health status, and they find marked differences between 
countries with and without a national health service. These findings are consistent with 
mental accounting because people who face health risk are more likely to segregate a 
health account from other investment goals. Moreover, as pointed out by Atella et al. 
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(2012), different aspects of health may represent separate sources of background risk. I 
control for health using a general question regarding health well-being and also 
examine specific health conditions.   
An emerging strand of literature is devoted to investigating the impact of financial 
crises on attitudes and household financial decisions. It is estimated that during the 
global financial crisis that started in 2008 households’ net financial wealth in the UK 
dropped by 12% (financial assets declined by 9% while debt rose by 5%) and that the 
market value of residential property fell by 9%.22 The effects of these shocks, however, 
appear to vary across households depending on, for example, income distribution, the 
proportion of wealth tied up in housing, and demographic factors (Bricker et al., 2012; 
2012). Further, the relationship between households and financial advisers has also 
come into focus after the global financial crisis. Financial crises negatively impact on 
investors’ trust in financial institutions (Gärling et al., 2009) and have drawn attention 
to the need for more consumer protection initiatives (Weber et al., 2013). However, 
financial advisers are also in a better position to help investors navigate through the 
impact of financial crises. Therefore, individuals respond differently to financial crises 
and this could affect mental accounting behaviour and portfolio choices. For example, 
people who are forced to retire earlier than they had anticipated may reconsider their 
growth or speculative goals and instead focus on retirement goals, thereby altering asset 
allocations. Second, financial shocks may alter risk attitudes. Weber et al. (2013) find 
that changes in risk tolerance are correlated with subjective risk and return expectations 
and suggest that the changes are driven by psychological judgements. Third, financial 
shocks may exacerbate background risks, which will influence risk attitudes. In this 
                                                 
22 In the US, median households’ net wealth shrunk by 26%, the value of directly held stock dropped by 
35%, and that of primary residence declined by 1.5% while at the same time the ratio of total debt to 
assets rose by 3% (Bricker et al., 2011). 
Mental accounting and portfolio choice 
 
 
 90 
study, I use time dummies to control for, and examine the impact of, the global 
economic crisis on household portfolios. 
3.3 The data  
3.3.1 Variables description  
I use two waves of the WAS, which surveys private households23 and individuals aged 
16 and above, and excludes those in full-time education aged 16-18. The WAS is a 
representative survey using randomly selected quarterly and monthly samples24 
covering the period July 2006 to June 2008 for wave 1 (32,000 households and 55,000 
individuals) and July 2008 to June 2010 for wave 2 (20,000 households and 37,000 
individuals). The first part of the questionnaire is completed by the head of the 
household and consists of household level information including: number of occupants, 
relationships, details of property and mortgages, and household assets. Each adult in the 
household then completes the second part of the questionnaire, which collects 
comprehensive economic well-being information such as the level of savings and debt, 
financial and non-financial assets, and attitudes regarding financial planning. The 
dataset provides two unique opportunities for this study. First, it contains 
comprehensive information about ownership of and the values of different financial 
assets held by respondents as well as proxies for mental accounting, financial advice, 
background risk, cognitive ability, time preference and risk attitudes. Further, the two 
waves coincide with the period immediately surrounding the 2008 global financial 
crisis; wave 1 being pre-crisis period and wave 2 being post-crisis. This enables me to 
                                                 
23 The sample does not include homeless people or those living in communal establishments like 
retirement homes, prisons, barracks, halls of residence and hotels.  
24 The sample was drawn from the Royal Mail’s database of addresses, the Postcode Address File, 
leaving out Scotland north of the Caledonian Canal, the Scottish Islands and the Isles of Scilly. A 
stratified sample was first drawn for each year in wave 1 and randomly allocated to quarters and months 
(Economic and Social Data Service, 2010).    
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examine the influence of the crisis on portfolio choices. However, the data set does not 
contain information about social engagement measures, which have been found to 
influence portfolio choice.  
I begin by describing how each variable is constructed, as summarized in Table 3.1.  
For the dependent variables, I use responses to several questions regarding the type of 
financial asset an investor has invested in and the estimated value of each. In this study, 
I use three asset categories: (1) safe asset, includes savings and current accounts, or 
national savings products; (2) fairly safe asset, includes fixed-term investment bonds, 
unit or investment trusts, employee share options and shares, overseas and UK gilts, 
endowment or regular premium policy, single premium policy, lump sum insurance 
policy, Individual Savings Accounts (ISAs), or other financial assets; and (3) risky 
asset,  includes shares or stocks in listed or unlisted companies, located overseas  or in 
the UK (Atella et al., 2012).25,26 
These definitions allow for robustness checks, given that financial assets such as mutual 
funds, unit trusts, and individual savings accounts are increasingly considered to be 
relatively risky assets. For each asset class, I generate a binary variable for ownership 
which equals 1 if a household owns at least one type of asset and 0 otherwise, while for 
portfolio share I calculate the fraction of wealth invested in each asset class as a 
proportion of total financial assets.  
                                                 
25 Atella et al. (2012) use three categories: bank, transactions or savings accounts (SAFE); stocks or 
shares (listed or unlisted) (RISKY); government or corporate bonds; individual retirement accounts; 
contractual savings for housing; and term or whole life insurance policies (FAIRLY SAFE). 
26 Guiso et al., (2000) use the categories Clearly safe financial assets – transaction accounts and 
certificate of deposit; Fairly safe financial assets – treasury bills and cash value of life insurance; Risky 
financial assets – stocks, long-term government bonds, other bonds, mutual funds, managed investment 
accounts, and defined contribution pension plans; non-financial assets – primary residence, investment in 
real estate, business, stock of durable goods, and other non-financial assets; and total risky assets – risky 
real estate and risky financial assets. A similar asset description is used by Bertocchi et al. (2011)  
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Table 3.1: Variable descriptions 
The table presents the variable descriptions used in the study. The sample is from the Great Britain Wealth and Assets Survey (WAS) covering the period June 2006 to July 
2010. 
 
Variable Description Value 
Dependent Variables 
  Safe asset Various questions regarding holding and amount saved or invested in financial 
instrument 
individual savings and current accounts, or national savings 
products = 1 ; and none = 0 
Fairly safe asset Various questions regarding holding and amount saved or invested in financial 
instrument 
fixed-term investment bonds, unit or investment trust, employee 
share options and shares, overseas and UK gilts, endowment or 
regular premium policy, single premium policy, lump sum 
insurance policy,  Individual Savings Accounts (ISAs), or other 
financial assets =1 ; none = 0 
Risky asset Various questions regarding holding and amount saved or invested in financial 
instrument 
shares or stocks in listed or unlisted companies (overseas  or UK) = 
1 ; none = 0 
Key independent variables   
Mental accounts What are the main reasons why you have saved this particular money? 
Respondents who identify a reason may choose one main reason and also list other 
reasons for saving money. I generate a categorical variable with three dummies.  
no mental account = 1 and zero otherwise; one reason identified = 
1 and zero otherwise; more than one reason =1 and zero otherwise  
Mental account type I generate dummies for each reason for saving money identified regardless of its 
ranking. For example, if reason for saving money is for family members the 
variable equals one if this is identified as either the main reason, the second reason 
and so on, and zero otherwise.  
Dummies include  unexpected expenditures;  for family members 
(gifts or inheritance); to provide regular income; to provide income 
for retirement; to cover planned expense in the future; for deposit 
to buy property; for holidays or other leisure; as speculation; and to 
see my money grow. 
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Table 2.1 Continued 
Variable Description Value 
Financial advice I use three questions (1) asks respondents whether they had received financial 
advice; (2) asks of respondents to identify who they have received advice from? 
This question was asked for interviews carried out between July 2006 and June 
2007; and (3) which of these would you trust for advice about saving for 
retirement? is asked after July 2007. I combine these questions and generate a 
categorical variable with three dummies.  
No financial advice = 1 and zero otherwise; single source of 
financial advice - 1 and zero otherwise; and multiple sources of 
financial advice =1 and zero otherwise. 
Financial advice source  I generate five dummies that distinguish the various sources of financial advice 
identified by respondents. I generate five dummy variables: (1) trust close 
associates equals one if respondent identifies a partner, spouse, friends, family, or 
work colleagues and zero otherwise; (2) trusts print and social media; (3) trust 
professional agents equals one if bank or building society, insurance company, 
accountant, solicitor, insurance broker, mortgage adviser or stockbroker, and zero 
otherwise; (4) trusts independent financial advisors; and (5) trusts other 
independent advisor equals one if employer, trade union, the pension service, 
financial services authority (FSA), other consumer bodies e.g. citizens advice 
bureau (CAB).  
 
Independent financial advice 
(dummy variable) 
In the last five years, have you received any professional advice about planning 
your personal finances 
yes = 1; no = 0 
Housing tenure In which of these ways do you occupy this accommodation? renting = 1 ; under a mortgage = 2 ; own outright =3  
Control variables   
Time preference If you had a choice of receiving a thousand pounds today or one thousand one 
hundred pounds in a year's time, which would you choose? 
£1,000 today = 0; £1,100 next year = 1 
Risk tolerance  If you had a choice between a guaranteed payment of one thousand pounds and a 
one in five chance of winning ten thousand pounds, which would you choose? 
Guaranteed payment of £1K =0; One in five chance of £10K = 1 
Cognitive ability If you were to rate your mathematical skills for daily life, would you say they are excellent or good = 1; moderate, poor, or no opinion = 0 
Age Derived variable: uses date of birth variables on survey database age at date of interview 
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Table 2.1 Continued 
Variable Description Value 
Male Interviewer check sex of the respondent male = 1 ; female = 0 
Couple Marital status is represented by married, separated, divorced, widowed or never 
married from which I generate categorical and dummy variables 
married or cohabiting = 1 ; single , widowed, divorced, or 
separated =0 
Degree level or above Derived variable - yearly updated qualification of new entrants and existing panel 
members 
no qualification, commercial qualification, no o-levels, CSE grade 
2-5 or Scotland grade 4-5, GCE A-levels, GCE o-levels or 
equivalent, teaching , other higher or nursing qualifications = 0; 
and first or higher degree = 1 
Employed or self-employed Please look at this card and tell me which best describes your current situation? 
Self-employed, in paid employ, unemployed, retired, family care, FT student, long 
term sick/disability, on maternity leave, government training or other 
unemployed, maternity leave, family care, full time student, sick, 
disabled, government training scheme,  or other, retired =0 ;  self-
employed or employed = 1 
Has child(ren) Number of own children derived from a set of questions    one, two, three or more kids = 1 ; none = 0 
Lives in urban area An indicator that shows whether the households lives in a rural area or urban area urban = 1 ; rural = 0 
Christian I generate a categorical variable and dummy variables from the question asking of 
respondents about their religious identity to which the response could be Christian, 
Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, Sikh, any other religion, and no religion.  
no religion or other religious identity = 0 ; Christian = 1 
Has good health How is your health in general would you say it was  fair, bad, or very bad = 0 ; very good or good = 1 
White British Ethnicity of household representative African, Asian and others = 0 ; White British = 1 
Government office region Internally computed north east = 1 ; north west = 2 ; Yorkshire and Humber = 3 ; east 
midlands = 4 ; west midlands = 5 ; east of England = 6 ; London = 
7 ; south east = 8 ; south west = 9 ; wales = 10 ; Scotland = 11  
Net financial wealth Represents the net value of all financial assets excluding endowments   
Net household wealth Represents the net household wealth including both financial and non-financial 
wealth 
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Table 2.1 continued 
Variable Description Value 
long-standing ill-health Do you have any long-standing illness, disability or infirmity  yes = 1; no = 0 
physical health  I group physical health if response is mobility (moving about); lifting, carrying or 
moving objects; manual dexterity (using your hands to carry out everyday tasks); 
Continence (bladder and bowel control); and physical co-ordination (e.g. balance).  
Physical health = 1 ; otherwise = 0 
Mental health I group mental health if health difficulties include communication (speech, hearing 
or eyesight); memory or ability to concentrate, learn or understand; recognising 
when you are in physical danger; other health problem or disability; and for 
spontaneous responses.  
mental health = 1 ; otherwise = 0 
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The key independent variables are mental accounts, background risk, and financial 
advice.  Mental accounts are constructed from the question – people save money for 
different reasons. Looking at this card, what are the main reasons why you have saved 
money in the last two years? – out of which respondents  rank the reasons based upon a 
list that includes: “for unexpected expenditures”, “for family members (gifts or 
inheritance)”, “to provide regular income”, “to provide income for retirement”, “to 
cover planned expense in the future”, “for deposit to buy property”, “for holidays or 
other leisure”, “as speculation, or to see my money grow”. I generate a categorical 
variable, mental accounts, with three dummies: no mental account equals 1 if no reason 
is identified and 0 otherwise; single mental account equals 1 if one reason is identified 
and 0 otherwise; and multiple mental accounts equals 1 if more than one reason is 
identified and 0 otherwise.   I also generate dummies for each reason for saving money 
regardless of its ranking. For example, if the reason for saving money is for family 
members the variable equals 1 if this is identified as either the main reason, the second 
reason and so on and 0 otherwise.  
Financial advice variables are generated from three questions. First, I use the question – 
in the last five years, have you received any professional advice about planning your 
personal finances
27
 – to generate a dummy variable that equals 1 if the response is yes 
and the value 0 otherwise. Second, a subsequent question – who have you received 
advice from – is asked if the response to the previous question is “yes” and respondents 
rank the different sources of financial advice.28 The two questions were asked of 
                                                 
27 In this question, respondents are reminded that advice could include planning for retirement, tax 
planning, or investing money and not advice relating to running a business or mortgages. 
28 These include independent financial adviser (IFA), partner/ spouse/ friends/ family/ work colleagues, 
bank or building society, insurance company, accountant, solicitor, insurance broker, mortgage adviser, 
stockbroker, employer, trade union, the pension service, financial services authority (FSA), other 
consumer bodies e.g. citizens advice bureau (CAB), internet, newspapers/ other media, other sources. 
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respondents interviewed between July 2006 and June 2007. From July 2007 and 
onwards, the question – which of these would you trust for advice about saving for 
retirement – is asked of respondents and they identify from a similar list (previous 
question) the advisor that they trust most. I combine the three questions to generate a 
categorical variable, financial advice, with three dummies: no advice equals 1 if 
respondent does not identify any source of advice and 0 otherwise; single source, equals 
1 if respondent identifies a single source of financial advice and 0 otherwise; and 
multiple sources, equals 1 if respondent identifies more than one source and 0 
otherwise.  
Further, motivated by the finding in Bhattacharya et al. (2012) that, among bank 
financial advisors, financial advice had a higher negative effect on portfolio returns 
compared to independent financial advisors, I generate five dummies that distinguish 
the various sources of financial advice identified by respondents. For each category, I 
assign the source identified regardless of its ranking: (1) trust close associates equals 1 
if respondents identify a partner, spouse, friends, family, or work colleagues and 0 
otherwise; (2) trusts print and social media equals 1 if this source is selected and 0 
otherwise; (3) trust professional agents equals 1 if bank or building society, insurance 
company, accountant, solicitor, insurance broker, mortgage adviser or stockbroker, and 
0 otherwise; (4) trusts independent financial advisors equals 1 if this option is selected 
and 0 otherwise; and (5) trusts other independent advisor equals 1 if employer, trade 
union, the pension service, financial services authority (FSA), and other consumer 
bodies e.g. citizens advice bureau (CAB), and 0 otherwise.  
For background risk, I focus on housing wealth because housing is considered as the 
most significant asset among households (Black et al., 2006) and, as previously 
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mentioned, most households experienced housing wealth shocks following the global 
financial crisis. I use the question – in which of these ways do you occupy this 
accommodation? – to generate a categorical with three dummy variables: rents if 
response is “rent it”, “live here rent-free” or “squatting”; under a mortgage if response 
is “buying it with the help of a mortgage or loan” or “pay part rent and part mortgage” 
and own outright if response is “own outright”.  
Previous studies document a number of factors that determine asset allocation decisions 
among individuals and households, which I control for in my analysis. First, I include a 
proxy for cognitive ability, which represents respondents’ self-assessed mathematical 
ability.29 This is a crucial control in this study because, apart from the direct influence 
of cognitive ability on portfolio choice, I might expect cognitive ability to be correlated 
with mental accounting. Intuitively, people with low cognitive ability may tend to 
simplify financial management using mental accounting. From the question – “if you 
were to rate your mathematical skills for daily life, would you say they are…” – I 
generate a dummy variable that equals 1 if the response is “excellent” or “good” and 
equal to 0 if the response is “moderate”, “poor”, or “no opinion”.  Second, I take 
account of self-reported attitudes towards both risk and the time value of money as 
these might influence portfolio choice and could also vary by mental accounts. I 
generate two dummy variables from two questions: (1) from the question – If you had a 
choice between a guaranteed payment of one thousand pounds and a one in five chance 
of winning ten thousand pounds, which would you choose? –  the variable risk tolerance 
equals 1 if respondent chooses the option “one in five chance of £10K” and 0 if 
response is “guaranteed payment of £1K”; and (2) from the question – If you had a 
                                                 
29 Christelis et al. (2010) using self-reported ability to perform numerical operations, planning and 
executive functions, and memory, show that these variables determine portfolio choice across eleven 
European countries. 
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choice of receiving a thousand pounds today or one thousand one hundred pounds in a 
year's time, which would you choose? – I generate the variable time preference equals 1 
if respondent chooses “£1,100 next year” and 0 if respondent selects “£1,000 today”. 
Third, the various dimensions of health which influence portfolio choice, as 
documented in the literature, include both physical health (e.g. Love and Smith, 2010) 
and mental health (e.g. Bogan and Fertig, 2013).  Although the WAS dataset does not 
contain comprehensive information about health, I nevertheless use three general 
questions to generate proxies for health. The variable general health is generated from 
the question – how is your health in general would you say it was – and I generate a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the response is very good or good and the 
value 0 if the response is fair, bad, or very bad. To capture possible long term health 
problems, I use the question – do you have any long-standing illness, disability or 
infirmity – to generate a dummy variable, long-standing ill-health, which equals to 1 for 
“yes” responses and 0 otherwise. Finally, to distinguish physical health and mental 
health, I generate two variables from a subsequent question – does this health 
problem(s) or disability(ies) mean that you have substantial difficulties with any of 
these areas of your life. The variable physical health equals 1 if the area of difficulty 
impairs mobility, dexterity or continence and 0 otherwise; mental health equals 1 if the 
area of difficulty includes memory, concentration and communication and 0 
otherwise.30   
                                                 
30
 We group under the physical health category if the response is mobility (moving about); lifting, 
carrying or moving objects; manual dexterity (using your hands to carry out everyday tasks); continence 
(bladder and bowel control); and physical co-ordination (e.g. balance). The response is coded as mental 
health if health difficulties include communication (speech, hearing or eyesight); memory or ability to  
concentrate, learn or understand; recognising when you are in physical danger; other health problem or 
disability; and for spontaneous responses.  
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Finally, I control for a number of socio-economic and demographic factors that are 
considered to be correlated with mental accounting and financial advice but also 
associated with portfolio choice. These include age, education, gender, marital status, 
wealth, having children, occupation and geographic region.  
3.3.2 Descriptive statistics 
3.3.2.1 Summary statistics 
Table 3.2 presents weighted summary statistics for the whole sample of the WAS 
households for the variables described in Table 3.1. Panel A presents summary statistics 
for the different asset classes; Panel B presents statistics for the key variables; Panel C 
presents statistics for the control variables; and Panel D presents transitional 
probabilities for ownership of the three asset classes by mental accounts.  The 
participation rates for the three asset classes are risky asset (16%), fairly safe asset 
(53%), and safe asset (88%). These estimates are similar to the rates of participation 
across these asset classes reported in other UK surveys.31 However, the share of wealth 
invested in a risky asset as a proportion of net financial assets is 3% while the 
proportion of money invested in fairly safe assets is 32% and for safe assets it is 64%.  
When evaluated as a proportion of net total household wealth, the share of wealth 
invested in the three asset classes are substantially lower; risky asset (0.5%), fairly safe 
asset (5%), and safe asset (8%). This indicates that housing wealth, as previously 
mentioned, takes up a high proportion of total wealth and is thus an important 
background asset.  
                                                 
31 For example, the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) average investment in risky asset is 15%; 
fairly safe asset, 52%; safe assets, 68% (as discussed in Chapter Two). Similar estimates are reported 
from the Family Resources Survey (FRS)  
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Table 3.2 Summary statistics 
Data are derived from two waves of the WAS covering the period June 2006 to July 2010. The reported statistics are weighted and are as defined in Table 3.1. Panel A 
presents summary statistics for the total value of financial wealth, household wealth and the value of different asset classes; the participation rates; proportion of amount 
invested by asset class to total financial assets; the proportion of amount invested by asset class to total household wealth; and proportion of amount invested by asset class to 
total financial assets by mental account. Panel B present the summary statistics for the key variables including mental accounts, financial advice and housing tenure. Panel c 
presents statistics for the control variables while Panel D presents transitional probabilities for ownership of the three asset classes over the panel period.  
 
Variable description Mean Std. Dev. Observ.     Mean Std. Dev. Observ. 
Panel A: Asset, ownership and portfolio share         Panel B. Key explanatory variables       
Asset class 
    
Mental account behaviour 
   Total financial wealth  (GB £)       58,936      186,104  40345 
 
No mental account 0.544 0.498 50765 
Total household wealth  (GB £)     394,842      781,410  49250 
 
Single mental account 0.189 0.392 50765 
Risky asset  (GB £)         4,216        48,664  50765 
 
Multiple mental accounts 0.267 0.442 50765 
Fairly safe asset  (GB £)       22,479      104,579  50765 
 
Mental accounting type 
   Safe asset  (GB £)       17,051        55,872  46859 
 
For unexpected expenditure 0.273 0.446 50765 
Participation rates 
    
For other family members 0.086 0.280 50765 
Risky asset 0.158 0.365 50765 
 
Provide regular income during year 0.027 0.163 50765 
Fairly safe asset 0.533 0.499 50765 
 
Provide income for retirement 0.094 0.292 50765 
Safe asset  0.967 0.179 50765 
 
Planned future expense 0.147 0.354 50765 
Proportion to financial wealth 
    
Deposit for property 0.028 0.164 50765 
Risky asset  0.030 0.115 48086 
 
Holiday or recreation 0.213 0.410 50765 
Fairly safe asset 0.315 0.358 48086 
 
Speculation and sport recreation 0.028 0.164 50765 
Safe asset 0.641 0.365 45365 
 
See money grow or good interest 0.076 0.265 50765 
Proportion to total wealth 
    
Financial advice  
   Risky asset  0.005 0.030 49092 
 
No advisor 0.353 0.478 50765 
Fairly safe asset 0.047 0.183 49092 
 
Single advisor 0.284 0.451 50765 
Safe asset 0.077 0.508 45657 
 
Multiple advisors 0.364 0.481 50765 
Proportion to financial wealth by mental account 
    
Financial advice source 
   Multiple mental accounts:      Risky asset  0.040 0.121 14355 
 
Spouse, relative, friends or colleagues  0.214 0.410 50765 
Fairly safe asset 0.424 0.339 14355 
 
Internet, newspapers or media 0.071 0.257 50765 
Safe asset 0.530 0.342 14030 
 
Service providers 0.306 0.461 50765 
Single mental account:           Risky asset  0.031 0.115 9787 
 
Other independent advisors 0.273 0.446 50765 
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Table 2.2 Continued 
Variable description Mean Std. Dev. Observ.     Mean Std. Dev. Observ. 
Panel A: Asset, ownership and portfolio share         Panel B. Key explanatory variables       
Fairly safe asset 0.339 0.354 9787 
 
Independent financial advisors 0.310 0.463 50765 
Safe asset 0.622 0.360 9453 
 
Housing tenure 
   No mental account:                Risky asset  0.024 0.111 23944 
 
Rents 0.316 0.465 50762 
Fairly safe asset 0.247 0.353 23944 
 
Under mortgage 0.379 0.485 50762 
Safe asset 0.713 0.363 21882 
 
Outright owner 0.305 0.46 50762 
         Panel C: Control variables                 
Time preference 0.210 0.408 45839 
 
Couple 0.578 0.494 50765 
Risk taker 0.207 0.405 45839 
 
Degree and above qualif. 0.237 0.425 50765 
Cognitive ability 0.707 0.455 44904 
 
Employed or self-employed 0.609 0.488 50687 
Good health 0.699 0.459 46040 
 
Has child(ren) 0.302 0.459 50765 
Age 52 17 50765 
 
Lives in urban area 0.804 0.397 50746 
Cohort 1956 17 50765 
 
Christian 0.778 0.415 50737 
Male 0.613 0.487 50765 
 
White British 0.878 0.328 50732 
 
Panel D: Transitional probabilities 
              Probability of ownership during wave 2 
   
No mental account 
 
Single mental account 
 
Multiple mental accounts 
 
Asset Class  No (%)  Yes (%)   No (%)  Yes (%)   No (%)  Yes (%) 
P
ro
ba
bi
li
ty
 o
f 
ow
ne
rs
hi
p 
du
ri
ng
 w
av
e 
1 
Risky asset No  96.00 4.00 
 
92.05 7.95 
 
87.87 12.13 
 
Yes 32.00 68.00 
 
19.11 80.89 
 
17.76 82.24 
 
Total 89.76 10.24 
 
75.08 24.92 
 
61.67 38.33 
Fairly safe asset No  82.67 17.33 
 
60.29 39.71 
 
50.38 49.62 
 
Yes 15.32 84.68 
 
6.00 94 
 
3.07 96.93 
 
Total 58.89 41.11 
 
25.65 74.35 
 
10.17 89.83 
safe asset  No  31.54 68.46 
 
0.00 100.00 
 
0.00 100.00 
 
Yes 2.13 97.87 
 
0.42 99.58 
 
0.12 99.88 
 
Total 4.36 95.64 
 
0.41 99.59 
 
0.12 99.88 
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An early indicator of the role of mental accounting behaviour is perhaps seen in the 
calculation, by mental account, of the proportions of total financial assets invested in 
the three asset classes. The proportion of money invested in both risky assets and fairly 
safe assets increases across mental accounts, with households that exhibit no mental 
account having a low proportion of wealth invested in the two risky asset classes and a 
high proportion invested in safe assets.  
For the key independent variables presented in Panel B, I note that 54% of households 
exhibit no mental accounting behaviour while 19% have a single mental account and 
27% have multiple mental accounts. Regardless of whether a household has a single 
mental account or multiple mental accounts, I find that the reasons for saving money 
which households mainly identify are to meet unexpected expenditure (27%), for 
planned future expenses (15%), and for a holiday or for recreation (21%).  These goals 
represent short-term investment horizons and I should expect such households to invest 
money in relatively secure assets, for these purposes. Although a lower fraction of 
households identify saving money for retirement (9%), to see it grow or for good 
interest (8%), and for speculation or sport recreation (2%), I could expect such 
households to be more inclined to invest in risky assets. For households who save 
money for other family members (9%), to provide regular income (9%), or for deposit 
for purchase of property (3%), I might expect these goals to be connected with 
investment in safe assets.  
The proxies for financial advice include a categorical variable and dummies for 
households that do not seek such advice (35%), that have a single source of advice 
(28%) and those that have multiple sources of advice (36%). Among household that 
seek financial advice, 21% trust close associates (such as their spouses, relatives and 
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friends); 7% trust the Internet, newspapers, or media; 31% trust providers of 
professional services (such as accountants, banks, insurers and solicitors); 27% trust 
other independent advisors (such as the FSA, trade unions and pensions services); and 
31% trust independent financial advisors. These statistics suggest that most households 
trust financial intermediaries (independent financial advisors) as well as their agents 
(professional service providers) and this could induce them to invest (or increase the 
proportion of money invested) in risky assets and/or fairly safe assets. Perhaps most 
important, as previously discussed, is the question as to whether households delegate 
asset allocation decisions to financial advisors, in which case the proportion of money 
invested in different asset classes could vary for such households compared to those 
that do not, as argued in Alexandre and Baptista (2011) and Bhattacharya et al. (2012).  
Regarding the nature of current accommodation, I find that 32% of the respondents 
rent, 38% own through a mortgage, and 30% own outright their current 
accommodation.  This implies that housing could be an important source of background 
risk in our sample, as suggested in the literature (e.g. Cocco, 2005). Another source of 
background risk, health, appears not to be so influential given that about 70% of 
respondents believe that their general health condition is either good or very good. This 
finding is consistent with two alternative health measures, physical and mental health 
problems, which show that only about 20% and 5% of individuals, respectively, 
identify a health-related problem. Attitudes toward risk and the time value of money, as 
proxied by the variables risk tolerance and time preference, respectively, indicate that 
for both variables a small fraction of households, 21%, say that they are willing to take 
a one to five chance of getting £ 10,000 in a years’ time rather than a guaranteed 
payment of £ 1,000 now and/or choose to receive £ 1,100 next year rather than to 
receive £ 1,000 today. About 71% of the households consider themselves to have 
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excellent or good mathematical ability. Overall, the sample consists mainly of males 
(61%), married or cohabiting couples (58%) and individuals who are either employed 
or self-employed (61%).  
Further evidence of the role of mental accounting can be seen in Panel D, which 
presents transitional probabilities; that is, the probability of transiting from ownership 
(non-ownership) in one period to non-ownership (ownership) in the next period. For 
example, households that exhibit no mental accounting have low levels of ownership 
(10%) and tended to opt out of risky assets (32%) in the next period while those that 
exhibit multiple mental accounts have high levels of ownership (38%) and few opt out 
of risky assets (18%) in the following period. This pattern is also replicated for 
ownership of a fairly safe asset and I see more households owning fairly safe assets 
across mental accounts.  
Table 3.3 presents weighted pairwise correlations for the key variables and control 
variables. The proportions of financial wealth invested in risky assets and fairly risky 
assets are both negatively correlated with exhibiting no mental account and are 
positively correlated with single and multiple mental accounts. In contrast, the 
proportion of financial wealth invested in safe assets is negatively correlated with both 
a single mental account and multiple mental accounts but is positively correlated with 
exhibiting no mental account. In addition, having no financial advisor, a single financial 
advisor and renting a home are all negatively correlated with the proportion of financial 
wealth invested in both risky assets and fairly safe assets but are positively correlated 
with the proportion of wealth in safe assets.  
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Table 3.3 Pairwise correlation matrix 
Table presents weighted pairwise correlations among variables from the two waves of the WAS. The variables are as defined in Table 3.1. The reported levels of significance are 
based on Bonferroni-adjusted p-values and are given by * for significance levels of 0.05 or less. 
 
  Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
(1) Risky asset (proportion) 1 
             (2) Fairly safe asset (proportion) -0.0426* 1 
            (3) Safe asset  (proportion) -0.2643* -0.9266* 1 
           (4) No mental account -0.0546* -0.1987* 0.1988* 1 
          (5) Single mental account 0.0043 0.0336* -0.0256* -0.5276* 1 
         (6) Multiple mental accounts 0.0568* 0.1910* -0.1958* -0.6591* -0.2911* 1 
        (7) No financial advisor -0.0191* -0.0840* 0.0897* 0.1947* -0.0649* -0.1618* 1 
       (8) Single financial advisor -0.0154* -0.0062 0.0172* -0.0129* 0.0665* -0.0444* -0.4645* 1 
      (9) Multiple financial advisors 0.0332* 0.0885* -0.1047* -0.1813* 0.0021 0.2023* -0.5581* -0.4755* 1 
     (10) Rents -0.1077* -0.2862* 0.3170* 0.2034* -0.0568* -0.1787* 0.0511* 0.0094 -0.0595* 1 
    (11) Under mortgage 0.0210* 0.0680* -0.0852* -0.0651* -0.0047 0.0774* -0.0267* -0.0834* 0.1046* -0.5311* 1 
   (12) Outright owner 0.0831* 0.2080* -0.2149* -0.1369* 0.0623* 0.0990* -0.0234* 0.0783* -0.0501* -0.4506* -0.5171* 1 
  (13) Time preference 0.0389* 0.0982* -0.1004* -0.1355* 0.0233* 0.1279* -0.0417* -0.0307* 0.0678* -0.0760* 0.0358* 0.0397* 1 
 (14) Risk taker 0.0406* 0.0458* -0.0578* -0.0647* 0.0132* 0.0593* -0.0039 -0.0283* 0.0303* -0.0646* 0.0745* -0.0116 0.0615* 1 
(15) Good numerical ability 0.0620* 0.1043* -0.1252* -0.1219* 0.0155* 0.1209* -0.0379* -0.0435* 0.0773* -0.1473* 0.1260* 0.0185* 0.0757* 0.0411* 
(16) Age 0.0540* 0.0960* -0.0879* -0.0498* 0.0704* -0.0063 0.0188* 0.1543* -0.1632* -0.1464* -0.3749* 0.5428* -0.0573* -0.0663* 
(17) Sex 0.0387* 0.0660* -0.0780* -0.0399* 0.0064 0.0392* 0.0390* -0.0518* 0.0098 -0.1578* 0.1338* 0.0184* 0.0755* 0.0956* 
(18) Couple 0.0395* 0.1251* -0.1513* -0.0393* -0.0237* 0.0652* 0.0383* -0.0628* 0.0208* -0.2886* 0.2631* 0.0144* 0.0470* 0.0675* 
(19) Degree and above qualification 0.0923* 0.1236* -0.1507* -0.1625* 0.0192* 0.1660* -0.0684* -0.0777* 0.1408* -0.1578* 0.1904* -0.0412* 0.1474* 0.0645* 
(20) Employed or self-employed 0.0113 0.0450* -0.0647* -0.1021* -0.0096 0.1234* -0.0366* -0.1290* 0.1572* -0.1861* 0.5003* -0.3392* 0.0860* 0.0844* 
(21) Has child(ren) -0.0305* -0.0762* 0.0690* 0.1280* -0.0785* -0.0747* 0.0384* -0.0639* 0.0217* 0.0406* 0.2666* -0.3219* -0.0132* 0.0127* 
(22) Lives in urban area -0.0376* -0.0628* 0.0718* 0.0285* -0.007 -0.0260* 0.0034 -0.0088 0.0049 0.0781* 0.0059 -0.0851* -0.0238* -0.0242* 
(23) Christian 0.0189* 0.0549* -0.0537* -0.0359* 0.0178* 0.0247* 0.0052 0.0338* -0.0368* -0.0751* -0.0502* 0.1287* -0.0400* -0.0366* 
(24) Good health 0.0508* 0.0934* -0.1183* -0.1656* 0.0390* 0.1470* -0.0853* -0.0600* 0.1358* -0.1671* 0.2246* -0.0626* 0.0804* 0.0586* 
(25) White British 0.0280* 0.1130* -0.1201* -0.0580* 0.0197* 0.0479* -0.0332* 0.0083 0.0252* -0.1388* 0.0276* 0.1112* 0.0139* 0.0171* 
(26) Total wealth 0.1634* 0.3532* -0.3963* -0.2537* 0.0534* 0.2362* -0.0834* -0.0123* 0.0940* -0.6836* 0.2340* 0.4188* 0.1168* 0.0800* 
(27) Financial wealth 0.1965* 0.4591* -0.5083* -0.2792* 0.0482* 0.2571* -0.0986* -0.0288* 0.1250* -0.4558* 0.0899* 0.3137* 0.1615* 0.1007* 
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Table 3.3 Continued 
  Variables (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) 
(15) Good numerical ability 1 
            (16) Age -0.0700* 1 
           (17) Sex 0.1546* -0.0410* 1 
          (18) Couple 0.1486* -0.1371* 0.3995* 1 
         (19) Degree and above qualification 0.1917* -0.1819* 0.0520* 0.1076* 1 
        (20) Employed or self-employed 0.1545* -0.5857* 0.1514* 0.2714* 0.2268* 1 
       (21) Has child(ren) 0.0166* -0.4547* 0.0092 0.2390* 0.0432* 0.2873* 1 
      (22) Lives in urban area -0.0193* -0.0826* -0.0323* -0.0734* -0.0189* -0.0021 0.0193* 1 
     (23) Christian -0.007 0.2514* -0.0438* 0.0006 -0.1110* -0.1095* -0.0917* -0.0459* 1 
    (24) Good health 0.1483* -0.2839* 0.0525* 0.1341* 0.1808* 0.3753* 0.1438* -0.0220* -0.0548* 1 
   (25) White British -0.0054 0.1498* 0.0038 0.0048 -0.1003* -0.0604* -0.1286* -0.1345* 0.1057* -0.0056 1 
  (26) Total wealth 0.1944* 0.2296* 0.1754* 0.3143* 0.2319* 0.1482* -0.0776* -0.1319* 0.0936* 0.1603* 0.1509* 1 
 (27) Financial wealth 0.1927* 0.1295* 0.1573* 0.2522* 0.2485* 0.1065* -0.0626* -0.1144* 0.0533* 0.1694* 0.1228* 0.6800* 1 
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As expected I see a high negative correlation among the categories of mental 
accounting behaviour, especially between having no mental account and both single 
mental account (0.52) and multiple mental accounts (0.66). Similarly, I find a high 
negative correlation between having no financial advisor and both single advisor (0.46) 
and multiple advisors (0.56). To avoid possible multicollinearity issues in my analysis, I 
use a categorical variable for these variables, with the categories having no mental 
account and no financial advisor as the base levels because, as observed in the 
summary statistics, the two categories have high fractions of households.  The 
correlation between mental accounting behaviour and financial advice shows that 
having no mental account and no financial advice or multiple mental accounts and 
multiple financial advice are positively correlated, with both sets being approximately 
0.20. These relationships suggest that the combined effects of either set could affect 
portfolio choice.  
Examining the correlation between risk tolerance and time preference, I find that both 
are negatively correlated with no mental account and with both no financial advice and 
single financial advice. Both variables are also positively correlated with a single 
mental account and multiple mental accounts, multiple financial advisors, and the 
control variables apart from age. These findings suggest that the variables might have 
conditional and unconditional influences on the probability of ownership of, and the 
proportion of assets invested in, the different asset classes.  
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3.3.2.2 Graphical analysis 
In this section, I present graphical evidence concerning the relationship between 
ownership and portfolio share in the three asset classes by mental accounts and by time 
preference, risk tolerance, cognitive ability, financial advice, and housing tenure. Figure 
3.1 presents ownership rates and share invested by mental account and by time 
preference, risk tolerance and cognitive ability. Panel (a), (c) and (e) show that 
ownership rates increase in accordance with both the number of mental accounts and 
the degrees of time preference, risk tolerance and cognitive ability. Interestingly, apart 
from the pattern displayed across cognitive ability, mental accounting appears to 
dominate both time preference and risk tolerance. For example, ownership rates among 
households that exhibit a single mental account and have short-run time preference (or 
are risk-averse) are higher than the rates for household who exhibit no mental account 
and have long-run time preference (or are risk-tolerant).  
Panels (b), (d) and (f) present portfolio share by mental account and by time preference, 
risk tolerance and cognitive ability. A similar pattern is observed, although for the share 
invested in a safe asset ownership rates decrease. Again I see a similar pattern for share 
of money invested in fairly safe assets and risky assets. These findings suggest that, 
while mental accounting and risk attitudes are important determinants of portfolio 
choice in the three assets, mental accounts dominate the effect of time preference, risk 
tolerance and cognitive ability. Furthermore, among respondents who exhibit multiple 
mental accounts and have long-run time preference, are risk tolerant or have good 
cognitive ability, they invest approximately the same share of wealth in both fairly safe 
assets and safe assets.  
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Figure 3.1 Portfolio choice by mental accounts, time preference and risk tolerance 
The figures display ownership rates (Panel (a) and (c)) and portfolio share (Panel (b) and (d)) in three 
asset classes (risky asset, fairly safe asset and safe asset) for households in two waves of the WAS by 
mental accounts, time preference and risk tolerance. The variables are as defined in Table 3.1.  
 
 
Figure 3.2 Panel (a), (c) and (d) present ownership rates of different asset classes by 
mental accounts and financial advice. Across mental accounts and financial advice, I 
observe that ownership rates increase and households that exhibit multiple mental 
accounts and those with multiple sources of financial advice have higher rates of 
participation. However, ownership of a safe asset, though low among households that 
exhibit no mental account, appears to be approximately the same across the different 
categories of financial advice.  
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Figure 3.2 Portfolio choice by mental accounts and financial advice 
The figures display ownership rates (Panel a) and proportion of financial wealth invested (Panel b) in 
three asset classes (risky asset, fairly safe asset and safe asset) for households in two waves of the WAS 
by mental accounts and financial advice. The variables are as defined in Table 3.1: Variable description.  
 
 
 
For the share invested in different asset classes, Panel (b), (d) and (e), I observe a 
reversal of the pattern for share invested in a safe asset.  Further, although the pattern 
for the share invested in risky assets and fairly safe assets increases across mental 
accounts and financial advice categories, the differences are smaller when compared to 
ownership rates. For example, the share invested in risky assets is constant for those 
who exhibit multiple mental accounts regardless of financial advice category.  
Mental accounting and portfolio choice 
 
 
 112 
Figure 3.3 Portfolio choice by mental accounts and housing  
The figures display ownership rates (Panel a) and proportion of financial wealth invested (Panel b) in 
three asset classes (risky asset, fairly safe asset and safe asset) for households in two waves of the WAS 
by mental accounts and housing tenure. The variables are as defined in Table 3.1  
 
 
 
In addition, I also examine portfolio choice in the different asset classes by housing 
tenure. From Panel (a) of Figure 3.3 I observe that ownership rates for all asset classes 
increase across categories of mental accounts and housing tenure. Within mental 
accounts, I find that ownership rates for a safe asset are stable among households that 
exhibit a single mental account and multiple mental accounts. With regard to the share 
invested in each asset class, Panel (b) again I see a reversal of the pattern for safe assets, 
which decreases across mental accounts and housing tenure. Unlike our observations in 
Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2, the ownership rates and share invested do not increase 
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uniformly across both mental accounts and housing tenure; mental accounting thus does 
not appear to dominate housing tenure.  
In summary, the summary statistics and graphical analysis suggest that mental 
accounting can explain variations in portfolio choice in the WAS data. 
3.4 Empirical strategy  
This study focuses on the effect of mental accounting on asset allocation decisions and 
the embedded effect of background risk and financial advice. I posit that, holding other 
determinants of portfolio choice constant, mental accounting behaviour can explain 
additional variations in asset allocation decisions among individuals and households. 
Previous studies only consider the direct influence of factors such as background assets, 
financial advice, health, and cognitive ability, which I conjecture might be capturing the 
effects of mental accounting.   Furthermore, I suspect that the impact of these factors on 
portfolio choice could be exacerbated by mental accounting. For example, if low 
cognitive ability is negatively associated with investment in a risky asset and is also 
associated with mental accounting, then I might expect to see increased effects if the 
two variables are interacted together. Otherwise, the two factors may have independent 
effects on portfolio choice and not related to each other; or one factor may subsume the 
effect of the other.     
In the empirical analysis, I examine both the probability of holding and the share of net 
financial wealth invested in three asset classes. For the probability of holding a specific 
asset class, I use the general static probit model discussed in Chapter Two Section 2.4. I 
estimate various specifications of my key independent variables using a pooled probit 
model and I cluster standard errors at the individual level. These regressions, also allow 
me to examine whether there are any year effects that are peculiar to the global 
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financial crisis. For each asset class, I first investigate the role of mental accounting, 
risk tolerance, time preference, cognitive ability and their interactions using the 
following equations:  
       
                          (1)  
       
                                                (2)  
       
                                                
      
(3)  
The dependent variable,     , asset class, is a binary variable that represents ownership 
of a specific asset class for household   in year  . In Equation (1), the key independent 
variable is     , a categorical variable representing three mental accounting dummies 
with no mental account as the base level.      is a set of control variables and 
represents other behavioural attitudes, and socioeconomic and demographic 
characteristics of a household. Unobserved effects are captured by the error term,     
and     is a transitory error. Equation (2) includes three additional variables: 
      representing risk tolerance;         representing time preference; and     , 
representing cognitive ability. Equation (3) includes interaction terms,       which 
consist of different combinations of mental accounting interacted with the measures of 
risk tolerance, time preference and cognitive ability. 
To examine the role of financial advice and background risk, I extend Equation (2) and 
separately include these variables and their interactions with mental accounts using the 
following equations:  
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      (4) 
 
      
                                                  
          (5) 
 
      
                                                 
      (6) 
 
      
                                      
                             (7) 
where the additional variables are financial advice,     ; background risk,     ,; and 
interaction terms between mental accounts and financial advice or background risk, 
    . All other variables are as earlier defined.  
Beyond the choice to invest or divest in a specific asset class, however, I might expect 
that individuals could instead increase (reduce) the amount of funds invested in a 
specific asset category in response to exogenous factors such as wealth shocks, which 
force them to revise their mental accounts, change their attitudes towards financial 
advisors, or their willingness to take risk.  Thus, for portfolio share invested in a 
specific asset class, I run pooled tobit regressions, censored at zero and one, and with 
standard errors clustered at the individual level. I replicate our analysis in Equation (1) 
to (7) using portfolio share as the dependent variable in place of the asset ownership 
binary variable. For example, Equation (1) is transformed as follows:  
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                          (8) 
Where the dependent variable,     , represents the proportion of total assets invested in 
a specific type of asset by individual    in year   and the explanatory variables are as 
described before.  
3.5 Empirical results 
I estimate pooled probit and tobit regressions where the dependent variables are 
ownership and portfolio share, respectively, of either risky assets, fairly safe assets or 
safe assets. Marginal effects are reported from all regression estimates apart from 
conditional probit regressions estimates, for which I report raw coefficients. As 
previously discussed in Chapter Two, conditional probit estimates are not automatically 
generated for interaction terms because the interpretation of marginal effects could be 
misleading (Ai and Norton, 2003). Therefore, I use probit raw coefficients for 
comparison with marginal effects from tobit estimates and I present graphical analysis 
for meaningful interpretation of the probit marginal effects. Standard errors are 
clustered at the individual level. For categorical variables and their interactions terms, I 
carry out Wald-type tests which test the hypothesis that the levels are not significantly 
different.  The key independent variables are mental accounts, financial advice and 
housing tenure. The control variables in all regressions are time preference, risk 
tolerance, cognitive ability, age, age square, male, couple, degree level or above, 
employed or self-employed, has children, lives in urban area, Christian, has good 
health, White British, log of net financial wealth, log of net household wealth, regional, 
and year dummies.  
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3.5.1 Mental accounts, time preference, risk tolerance and cognitive ability 
I begin by examining the role of mental accounts together with time preference, risk 
tolerance and cognitive ability on portfolio choice.  Table 3.4 reports marginal effects 
from pooled probit regressions for probability of ownership (Panel A) and marginal 
effects from tobit regressions for portfolio share (Panel B).  
Table 3.4 Panel A reports the results for probability of ownership in which I first enter 
mental accounts as the only independent variable in Columns (1), (4), and (7); I then 
include the variables risk tolerance, time preference and cognitive ability in Columns 
(2), (5), and (8); and the set of control variables are added in Columns (3), (6), and (9). 
When mental accounting is the only explanatory variable, I find that mental accounting 
behaviour enhances the probability of holding each of the three types of assets and 
captures variations in data with a pseudo R2 ranging from 5% to 9%. When I include 
the variables, risk tolerance, time preference and cognitive ability the variables are 
highly significant for ownership of the three asset classes apart from risk tolerance 
which is significant at the 10% level for ownership of a safe asset. Mental accounting 
remains virtually unchanged across the asset types. In the regressions that include 
mental accounting, risk tolerance, time preference, cognitive ability and control 
variables, I find that having a single mental account has an insignificant effect on 
ownership of a risky asset and a weak effect on ownership of a safe asset when 
compared to having multiple mental accounts. However, for ownership of fairly safe 
assets, a single mental account and multiple mental accounts remain highly significant, 
albeit with lower magnitudes.  
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Table 3.4 Effects of mental accounting, time preference, risk tolerance and cognitive ability 
The table presents marginal effects from both pooled probit regressions in Panel A and from pooled tobit regressions in Panel B. The dependent variables are risky asset, 
fairly safe asset and safe asset; ownership equals one if households owns at least one asset in each asset class or zero otherwise and portfolio share is the proportion of 
financial assets invested in each asset class to total financial assets. Risky assets include shares or stocks in listed or unlisted companies (overseas or UK), Column (1) to (3). 
Fairly safe assets include investments in fixed-term investment bonds, unit or investment trust, employee share options and shares, overseas and UK gilts, endowment or 
regular premium policy, single premium policy, lump sum insurance policy, individual retirement accounts, or other financial assets, Column (4) to (6). Safe asset include 
investments in individual savings and current accounts, friendly society saving plan, informal savings, or national savings products, Column (7) to (9). Mental accounts is a 
categorical variable with three dummies: no mental account equals one if a household has no specific reason for saving money and zero otherwise (base level); single mental 
account equals one if a household identifies only one reason for saving money and zero otherwise; and multiple mental accounts equals one if a household identifies more 
than one reason for saving money and zero otherwise. Time preference equals one if respondent would prefer GBP £ 1,100 next year and zero if GBP £ 1,000 today. Risk 
tolerance equals one if respondent would prefer a one in five chance of winning GBP £ 10,000 and zero if response is guaranteed GBP £ 1,000. Cognitive ability equals one if 
response is excellent or good and zero if response is moderate or poor. The control variables as described in Table 1 are age, age square, male, couple, degree level or above, 
has children, lives in urban area, Christian, has good health, expects good financial situation, understands pensions, shops for competitive interest, white British, outright 
home owner, log of net financial wealth, log of net household wealth, region dummies, and year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and are 
reported in parentheses. The levels of significance are given by * for 10%, ** for 5%, and *** for 1%.  
 
Independent variable Risky asset  Fairly safe asset  Safe asset 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Panel A: Probability of ownership            
Mental accounts (Base=none) 
           
Single mental account 0.091*** 0.093*** 0.002  0.227*** 0.245*** 0.034***  0.045*** 0.048*** 0.002* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Multiple mental account 0.200*** 0.186*** 0.033***  0.385*** 0.390*** 0.087***  0.053*** 0.057*** 0.007*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Time preference  0.081*** 0.016***   0.109*** 0.021***   0.006*** -0.001 
  (0.005) (0.005)   (0.006) (0.005)   (0.002) (0.001) 
Risk tolerance  0.054*** 0.015***   0.047*** 0.000   0.004* 0.002* 
  (0.005) (0.005)   (0.006) (0.005)   (0.002) (0.001) 
Cognitive ability   0.088*** 0.026***   0.114*** 0.011**   0.024*** 0.001 
  (0.005) (0.006)   (0.006) (0.005)   (0.002) (0.001) 
Age   -0.001    -0.001    0.000** 
   (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.000) 
Age square   0.000    -0.000    -0.000 
   (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000) 
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Table 3.4 Continued 
Independent variable Risky asset  Fairly safe asset  Safe asset 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Panel A: Probability of ownership            
Male   0.009    -0.046***    0.001 
   (0.006)    (0.005)    (0.001) 
Couple   0.002    0.034***    0.003*** 
   (0.006)    (0.005)    (0.001) 
Degree level or above qualification   0.034***    0.021***    0.000 
   (0.006)    (0.006)    (0.001) 
Employed or self-employed   0.008    -0.010    0.003** 
   (0.007)    (0.006)    (0.001) 
Has children   -0.022***    -0.068***    -0.010*** 
   (0.007)    (0.007)    (0.002) 
Lives in urban area   -0.005    0.012**    -0.001 
   (0.006)    (0.006)    (0.001) 
Christian   0.023***    0.020***    0.002* 
   (0.006)    (0.006)    (0.001) 
Has good health   0.020***    0.011**    -0.002 
   (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.001) 
White British   0.018*    0.064***    -0.000 
   (0.009)    (0.009)    (0.002) 
Log of net household wealth   0.042***    0.022***    0.000* 
   (0.003)    (0.002)    (0.000) 
Log of net financial wealth   0.069***    0.094***    0.001*** 
   (0.002)    (0.001)    (0.000) 
Region dummies (Base = North East)            
North West   0.011    0.018    -0.003 
   (0.014)    (0.012)    (0.003) 
Yorkshire & Humber   0.026*    0.034***    -0.003 
   (0.014)    (0.013)    (0.003) 
East Midlands   0.031**    0.041***    0.001 
   (0.014)    (0.013)    (0.003) 
West Midlands   -0.008    0.030**    -0.001 
   (0.014)    (0.013)    (0.003) 
East of England   0.033**    0.027**    -0.003 
   (0.014)    (0.012)    (0.003) 
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Table 3.4 Continued 
            
Independent variable Risky asset  Fairly safe asset  Safe asset 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Panel A: Probability of ownership            
London   0.044***    -0.007    0.003 
   (0.014)    (0.013)    (0.003) 
South East   0.060***    0.021*    0.001 
   (0.013)    (0.012)    (0.003) 
South West   0.039***    0.037***    0.002 
   (0.014)    (0.013)    (0.003) 
Wales   -0.011    0.007    -0.002 
   (0.016)    (0.014)    (0.003) 
Scotland   0.011    0.010    -0.001 
   (0.014)    (0.012)    (0.003) 
Year dummies (Base = 2006)            
2007   -0.014**    -0.010*    0.001 
   (0.006)    (0.006)    (0.001) 
2008   -0.016***    0.027***    0.002 
   (0.006)    (0.006)    (0.001) 
2009   -0.002    0.059***    0.007*** 
   (0.007)    (0.007)    (0.002) 
2010   -0.015*    0.062***    0.006*** 
   (0.008)    (0.008)    (0.002) 
Pseudo R 2  0.048 0.081 0.241  0.088 0.127 0.370  0.078 0.110 0.143 
Observations 50765 43842 34207  50765 43842 34207  50765 43842 34207 
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Table 3.4 Continued 
Independent variable Risky asset  Fairly safe asset  Safe asset 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Panel B: Portfolio share            
Mental accounts (Base=none) 
           
Single mental account 0.104*** 0.107*** -0.014*  0.195*** 0.219*** 0.022***  -0.175*** -0.199*** -0.010 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)  (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)  (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
Multiple mental account 0.202*** 0.192*** 0.007  0.338*** 0.346*** 0.058***  -0.317*** -0.324*** -0.044*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Time preference  0.084*** 0.004   0.098*** -0.004   -0.091*** 0.009 
  (0.006) (0.006)   (0.007) (0.006)   (0.006) (0.006) 
Risk tolerance  0.072*** 0.020***   0.038*** -0.019***   -0.054*** 0.009 
  (0.007) (0.006)   (0.007) (0.006)   (0.007) (0.006) 
Cognitive ability   0.119*** 0.024***   0.123*** 0.009   -0.136*** -0.014** 
  (0.008) (0.008)   (0.008) (0.007)   (0.008) (0.007) 
Age   -0.005***    0.001    0.000 
   (0.002)    (0.001)    (0.001) 
Age square   0.000***    -0.000***    0.000* 
   (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000) 
Male   0.014**    -0.058***    0.047*** 
   (0.007)    (0.007)    (0.006) 
Couple   -0.018**    0.038***    -0.029*** 
   (0.007)    (0.007)    (0.007) 
Degree level or above qualification   0.039***    -0.017**    0.002 
   (0.007)    (0.007)    (0.006) 
Employed or self-employed   0.023***    0.001    -0.002 
   (0.008)    (0.008)    (0.008) 
Has children   -0.021**    -0.058***    0.048*** 
   (0.009)    (0.008)    (0.008) 
Lives in urban area   -0.009    0.035***    -0.026*** 
   (0.007)    (0.007)    (0.006) 
Christian   0.026***    0.036***    -0.032*** 
   (0.008)    (0.008)    (0.008) 
Has good health   0.029***    0.015**    -0.025*** 
   (0.007)    (0.007)    (0.006) 
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Table 3.4 Continued 
            
Independent variable Risky asset  Fairly safe asset  Safe asset 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Panel B: Portfolio share            
White British   0.010    0.082***    -0.073*** 
   (0.012)    (0.012)    (0.011) 
Log of net household wealth   0.057***    0.024***    -0.033*** 
   (0.004)    (0.003)    (0.003) 
Log of net financial wealth   0.078***    0.121***    -0.123*** 
   (0.003)    (0.002)    (0.002) 
Region (Base = North East)            
North West   0.008    0.014    -0.019 
   (0.018)    (0.017)    (0.016) 
Yorkshire & Humber   0.017    0.036**    -0.032* 
   (0.019)    (0.018)    (0.017) 
East Midlands   0.008    0.037**    -0.031* 
   (0.018)    (0.018)    (0.017) 
West Midlands   -0.036*    0.019    -0.011 
   (0.019)    (0.018)    (0.017) 
East of England   0.031*    0.012    -0.018 
   (0.018)    (0.018)    (0.016) 
London   0.032*    -0.075***    0.055*** 
   (0.019)    (0.018)    (0.017) 
South East   0.055***    -0.026    0.008 
   (0.017)    (0.017)    (0.016) 
South West   0.038**    0.017    -0.027* 
   (0.018)    (0.018)    (0.016) 
Wales   -0.019    0.000    0.002 
   (0.021)    (0.020)    (0.018) 
Scotland   0.023    0.026    -0.034** 
   (0.019)    (0.018)    (0.017) 
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Table 3.4 Continued 
            
Independent variable Risky asset  Fairly safe asset  Safe asset 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Panel B: Portfolio share            
Year (Base = 2006)            
2007   -0.013    -0.010    0.008 
   (0.008)    (0.008)    (0.008) 
2008   -0.036***    0.042***    -0.026*** 
   (0.007)    (0.007)    (0.007) 
2009   -0.033***    0.072***    -0.048*** 
   (0.009)    (0.009)    (0.008) 
2010   -0.044***    0.094***    -0.069*** 
   (0.010)    (0.010)    (0.010) 
Constant -0.425*** -0.554*** -1.732***  0.033*** -0.110*** -1.334***  0.869*** 1.025*** 2.369*** 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.053)  (0.005) (0.008) (0.042)  (0.005) (0.008) (0.039) 
sigma            
Constant 0.385*** 0.382*** 0.326***  0.542*** 0.534*** 0.434***  0.513*** 0.506*** 0.408*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Pseudo R 2  0.036 0.066 0.265  0.040 0.059 0.227  0.040 0.063 0.278 
Observations 48086 41454 33990  48086 41454 33990  45365 39205 33455 
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The variables risk tolerance, time preference, and cognitive ability are all highly 
significant for ownership of a risky asset; time preference and cognitive ability are 
significant for ownership of a fairly safe asset; and risk tolerance has a weak and 
significant effect at the 10% level for ownership of a safe asset. These extended 
specifications increase the variations captured by the data. 
The control variables have the expected signs. For example, the variables degree level 
or above qualification, has good health, and Christian are positively associated with 
ownership of both risky and fairly safe assets while the variable has children is 
negatively correlated with the two asset classes. Further, as seen in the descriptive 
statistics section, the year dummies show opposite and significant effects for ownership 
of risky assets and fairly safe assets, which demonstrates the impact of the global 
financial crisis on households. The results clearly show that there was a significant 
negative impact on ownership of risky assets in 2008 and 2010 in contrast to the 
significant positive effect on ownership of fairly safe assets in 2009 and 2010. This 
result suggests that, owing to the persistent global economic crisis, households may 
have shifted their investment in risky assets to fairly safe assets. As expected, year 
dummies have no effect on ownership of a safe asset.  
Panel B of Table 3.4 presents estimates where portfolio share in the three asset classes 
is the dependent variable. As observed in Panel A, when mental accounting is the only 
explanatory variable (Columns (1), (4), and (7)) or is analysed together with risk 
tolerance, time preference and cognitive ability (Columns (2), (5) and (8)), I find a 
significant association with the portfolio share in the three asset classes. However, the 
effects of these variables are negative for portfolio share in safe assets. When mental 
accounting, risk tolerance, time preference and cognitive ability are analysed together 
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with the control variables (Columns (3), (6) and (9)) I find that, for portfolio share in 
risky assets, single mental account has a weak negative effect while risk tolerance and 
cognitive ability are both highly significant. For portfolio share in fairly safe assets, 
single mental account and multiple mental accounts are positive and significant at the 
1% level; risk tolerance has a negative and significant effect at the 1% level; and both 
time preference and cognitive ability are insignificant. While for portfolio share in safe 
assets, multiple mental accounts and cognitive ability both have negative and significant 
effects.  
The results for control variables are generally comparable with the results in Panel A. 
However, the levels of significance and signs change for some variables. For example, 
households that are led by males, when compared to female-led households, have high 
proportions of financial assets invested in both risky and safe assets, and a low 
proportion in fairly safe assets. On the other hand, households that live as couples, 
when compared to households with singles, have a low proportion of financial assets 
invested in both risky and safe assets, and a high proportion of fairly safe assets.  
Further, I also see a consistent pattern for the impact of the global economic crisis on 
households between 2008 and 2010 which, unlike the results in Panel B, spills over to 
safe assets.  During this period, the results show that the crisis had a negative impact on 
the proportion of money invested in risky assets and safe assets while it had a positive 
effect on the proportion of money invested in fairly safe assets.  
Finally, I examine whether the effects of mental accounts vary with time preference, 
risk tolerance and cognitive ability by including interaction terms in our analysis. Table 
3.5 reports raw coefficient estimates for ownership using pooled probit regressions and 
marginal effects from tobit estimates for portfolio share. In all the regressions I include 
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control variables. I find that the main effects of mental accounting are consistent with 
the results in Table 3.4 and in fact the effects become significant for portfolio share in a 
risky asset and a safe asset for households that exhibit multiple mental accounts and a 
single mental account, respectively. The results for the variables time preference, risk 
tolerance and cognitive ability are also consistent with the results in Table 3.4, with two 
exceptions: time preference becomes insignificant for ownership of risky assets; and 
cognitive ability becomes significant for portfolio share in fairly safe assets but 
becomes insignificant for the probability of ownership of fairly safe assets and risky 
assets. This result indicates that the choice to invest in a fairly safe or a safe asset may 
not require exceptional ability; instead, the amount to invest in a specific asset class 
involves a more technical balancing process which is associated with numerical skills.  
With regard to the interactive effects, I see a differential impact of the variables time 
preference, risk tolerance, and cognitive ability on mental accounting across ownership 
and portfolio share in the three asset classes. Time preference reduces portfolio share of 
a fairly safe asset and its effect is not statistically different between households that 
exhibit a single mental account and multiple mental accounts; however it increases 
portfolio share in a safe asset among households that exhibit multiple mental accounts. 
The combinations of risk tolerance and mental accounting have negative effects on 
portfolio share in a risky asset and positive effects on portfolio share in a safe asset. 
These effects are statistically different between households that exhibit a single mental 
account and those that exhibit multiple mental accounts. The interaction term between 
cognitive ability and multiple mental accounts is negative and significant for portfolio 
share in both a risky asset and a fairly safe asset but the effect is positive for portfolio 
share in a safe asset.  
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Table 3.5 Conditional effects of mental accounting, time preference, risk tolerance and cognitive ability 
The table presents raw coefficient estimates from pooled probit regressions, Column (1), (3) and (5), and marginal effects from pooled tobit regressions, Column (2), (4) and 
(6). The dependent variables are, risky asset, fairly safe asset, and, safe asset: ownership equals one if households owns at least one asset in each asset class or zero otherwise 
and portfolio share is the proportion of financial assets invested in each asset class to total financial assets. Risky assets include shares or stocks in listed or unlisted 
companies (overseas or UK), Column (1) to (3). Fairly safe assets include investments in fixed-term investment bonds, unit or investment trust, employee share options and 
shares, overseas and UK gilts, endowment or regular premium policy, single premium policy, lump sum insurance policy, individual retirement accounts, or other financial 
assets, Column (4) to (6). Safe asset include investments in individual savings and current accounts, friendly society saving plan, informal savings, or national savings 
products, Column (7) to (9). Mental accounts is a categorical variable with three dummies: no mental account equals one if a household has no specific reason for saving 
money and zero otherwise (base level); single mental account equals one if a household identifies only one reason for saving money and zero otherwise; and multiple mental 
accounts equals one if a household identifies more than one reason for saving money and zero otherwise. Time preference equals one if respondent would prefer GBP £ 1,100 
next year and zero if GBP £ 1,000 today. Risk tolerance equals one if respondent would prefer a one in five chance of winning GBP £ 10,000 and zero if response is 
guaranteed GBP £ 1,000. Cognitive ability equals one if response is excellent or good and zero if response is moderate or poor. The interaction terms are for mental 
accounting with time preference, risk tolerance and cognitive ability. The control variables as described in Table 1 are age, age square, male, couple, degree level or above, 
has children, lives in urban area, Christian, has good health, white British, log of net financial wealth, log of net household wealth, region dummies, and year dummies. 
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and are reported in parentheses. The levels of significance are given by * for 10%, ** for 5%, and *** for 1%. 
 
Independent variables  Risky asset  Fairly safe asset  Safe asset 
 Ownership Portfolio share  Ownership Portfolio share  Ownership Portfolio share 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Mental account (Base=none)         
Single mental account -0.029 -0.013  0.148*** 0.050***  0.032 -0.038*** 
 (0.054) (0.018)  (0.042) (0.015)  (0.109) (0.014) 
Multiple mental account 0.166*** 0.037**  0.353*** 0.100***  0.443*** -0.090*** 
 (0.049) (0.016)  (0.043) (0.014)  (0.149) (0.013) 
Time preference 0.043 0.000  0.082** 0.021*  -0.011 -0.009 
 (0.038) (0.012)  (0.035) (0.012)  (0.084) (0.011) 
Risk tolerance 0.094** 0.046***  0.023 -0.010  0.030 -0.009 
 (0.038) (0.012)  (0.035) (0.012)  (0.082) (0.011) 
Cognitive ability 0.114*** 0.033**  0.042 0.029**  0.039 -0.035*** 
 (0.041) (0.014)  (0.031) (0.012)  (0.064) (0.011) 
Single mental account * time preference 0.051 0.014  -0.003 -0.035**  0.008 0.022 
 (0.054) (0.016)  (0.054) (0.016)  (0.151) (0.015) 
Multiple mental account * time preference 0.028 0.000  0.036 -0.036**  -0.121 0.026** 
 (0.047) (0.014)  (0.050) (0.014)  (0.159) (0.013) 
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Table 3.5 Continued 
Independent variables  Risky asset  Fairly safe asset  Safe asset 
 Ownership Portfolio share  Ownership Portfolio share  Ownership Portfolio share 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Single mental account * risk tolerance  -0.087 -0.059***  -0.021 -0.005  0.479** 0.034** 
 (0.055) (0.017)  (0.055) (0.017)  (0.212) (0.016) 
Multiple mental account * risk tolerance -0.020 -0.026*  -0.045 -0.020  -0.063 0.024* 
 (0.048) (0.015)  (0.051) (0.015)  (0.167) (0.013) 
Single mental account * cognitive ability  0.059 0.011  -0.002 -0.028*  0.022 0.023 
 (0.059) (0.019)  (0.048) (0.017)  (0.125) (0.016) 
Multiple mental account * cognitive ability -0.037 -0.029*  0.028 -0.038**  0.030 0.046*** 
 (0.053) (0.017)  (0.048) (0.015)  (0.163) (0.014) 
Age -0.006 -0.005***  -0.006 0.001  0.018** -0.000 
 (0.005) (0.002)  (0.004) (0.001)  (0.008) (0.001) 
Age square 0.000 0.000***  -0.000 -0.000***  -0.000 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.037 0.014**  -0.207*** -0.058***  0.056 0.047*** 
 (0.024) (0.007)  (0.023) (0.007)  (0.052) (0.006) 
Couple 0.009 -0.018**  0.146*** 0.038***  0.185*** -0.028*** 
 (0.024) (0.007)  (0.023) (0.007)  (0.058) (0.007) 
Degree level or above qualification 0.141*** 0.039***  0.090*** -0.016**  0.023 0.001 
 (0.024) (0.007)  (0.026) (0.007)  (0.070) (0.006) 
Employed or self-employed 0.036 0.022***  -0.043 0.001  0.173** -0.002 
 (0.028) (0.008)  (0.028) (0.008)  (0.068) (0.008) 
Has children -0.095*** -0.021**  -0.289*** -0.057***  -0.415*** 0.048*** 
 (0.029) (0.009)  (0.027) (0.008)  (0.059) (0.008) 
Lives in urban area -0.019 -0.009  0.050** 0.035***  -0.064 -0.027*** 
 (0.024) (0.007)  (0.024) (0.007)  (0.068) (0.006) 
Christian 0.101*** 0.026***  0.086*** 0.036***  0.116* -0.032*** 
 (0.028) (0.008)  (0.027) (0.008)  (0.060) (0.008) 
Has good health 0.087*** 0.028***  0.047** 0.015**  -0.098 -0.024*** 
 (0.023) (0.007)  (0.021) (0.007)  (0.061) (0.006) 
White British 0.076* 0.011  0.269*** 0.083***  -0.019 -0.073*** 
 (0.040) (0.012)  (0.035) (0.012)  (0.082) (0.011) 
Log of net household wealth 0.178*** 0.057***  0.097*** 0.024***  0.026* -0.033*** 
 (0.014) (0.004)  (0.009) (0.003)  (0.014) (0.003) 
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Table 3.5 Continued 
Independent variables  Risky asset  Fairly safe asset  Safe asset 
 Ownership Portfolio share  Ownership Portfolio share  Ownership Portfolio share 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Log of net financial wealth 0.294*** 0.078***  0.412*** 0.121***  0.055*** -0.123*** 
 (0.008) (0.003)  (0.008) (0.002)  (0.014) (0.002) 
Region (Base = North East)         
North West 0.045 0.008  0.079 0.013  -0.138 -0.019 
 (0.059) (0.018)  (0.053) (0.017)  (0.137) (0.016) 
Yorkshire & Humber 0.112* 0.018  0.149*** 0.036**  -0.148 -0.032* 
 (0.061) (0.019)  (0.056) (0.018)  (0.140) (0.017) 
East Midlands 0.132** 0.009  0.180*** 0.037**  0.038 -0.032* 
 (0.061) (0.018)  (0.057) (0.018)  (0.153) (0.017) 
West Midlands -0.033 -0.036*  0.130** 0.018  -0.063 -0.011 
 (0.061) (0.019)  (0.055) (0.018)  (0.141) (0.017) 
East of England 0.141** 0.031*  0.117** 0.012  -0.170 -0.018 
 (0.059) (0.018)  (0.055) (0.018)  (0.139) (0.016) 
London 0.189*** 0.033*  -0.030 -0.074***  0.135 0.055*** 
 (0.061) (0.019)  (0.057) (0.018)  (0.153) (0.017) 
South East 0.256*** 0.056***  0.093* -0.026  0.036 0.007 
 (0.056) (0.017)  (0.053) (0.017)  (0.144) (0.016) 
South West 0.168*** 0.039**  0.164*** 0.017  0.102 -0.028* 
 (0.060) (0.018)  (0.056) (0.018)  (0.162) (0.016) 
Wales -0.047 -0.018  0.032 0.001  -0.115 0.001 
 (0.067) (0.021)  (0.059) (0.020)  (0.154) (0.018) 
Scotland 0.047 0.023  0.045 0.026  -0.040 -0.035** 
 (0.060) (0.019)  (0.055) (0.018)  (0.140) (0.017) 
Year (Base = 2006)         
2007 -0.057** -0.013  -0.044* -0.009  0.043 0.007 
 (0.026) (0.008)  (0.026) (0.008)  (0.068) (0.008) 
2008 -0.068*** -0.036***  0.117*** 0.042***  0.091 -0.027*** 
 (0.024) (0.007)  (0.025) (0.007)  (0.072) (0.007) 
2009 -0.007 -0.033***  0.260*** 0.073***  0.349*** -0.049*** 
 (0.029) (0.009)  (0.030) (0.009)  (0.092) (0.008) 
2010 -0.065* -0.044***  0.273*** 0.095***  0.305*** -0.070*** 
 (0.035) (0.010)  (0.036) (0.010)  (0.115) (0.010) 
Constant -6.348*** -1.743***  -4.836*** -1.354***  0.812*** 2.390*** 
 (0.173) (0.054)  (0.132) (0.042)  (0.264) (0.039) 
Pseudo R2  0.241 0.266  0.370 0.228  0.146 0.279 
Observations 34207 33990  34207 33990  34207 33455 
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In line with the literature (Ai and Norton, 2003; Greene, 2010), Figure 3.4 displays the 
marginal effects of the interaction terms derived from the probit estimates in Table 3.5 
by mental accounts and across age. For ownership of a risky asset (Panel (a)), I find that 
the marginal effect of time preference has a significant effect at the 5% level for 
households that exhibit a single mental account and multiple mental accounts; risk 
tolerance has a significant effect among households that exhibit no mental account (5% 
level) and those that exhibit multiple mental accounts (1% level); and cognitive ability 
has a significant effect at the 1% level for both no mental account and a single mental 
account, and at the 5% level for multiple mental accounts.  
For ownership of a fairly safe asset (Panel (b)), time preference has a significant effect 
among households that exhibit no mental account (5% level), those that exhibit a single 
mental account (10% level) and for those that exhibit multiple mental accounts (1% 
level). Cognitive ability has a significant effect, but only at the 10% level, among 
households that exhibit multiple mental accounts while risk tolerance has no effect 
across all mental accounts.  As expected, time preference, risk tolerance and cognitive 
ability have no significant effects across mental accounts for ownership of a safe asset, 
Panel (c).  
Taken together, these results show that mental accounting, time preference, risk 
tolerance and cognitive ability are associated with both the probability of owning and 
the portfolio share in the three asset classes. Remarkably, for the conditional 
regressions, the estimates for mental accounting are about two times larger than those 
for the unconditional regressions. However, comparisons between the conditional and 
unconditional regressions, using a likelihood ratio test, result in statistically significant 
improvements of model fit for portfolio share regressions and the result for ownership 
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Figure 3.4 Conditional marginal effects of time preference, risk tolerance and 
cognitive ability 
The figure displays conditional marginal effects of time preference, risk tolerance and cognitive ability on 
the probability of owning a risky asset, a fairly safe asset and a safe asset. The marginal effects are 
calculated using estimates derived from pooled probit regressions in Table 3.5: that is, column (3) 
specification for Panel (a); column (6) specification for Panel (b); and column (9) specification for Panel 
(c). The marginal effects are evaluated at highest value of all explanatory variables apart from age, total 
household wealth and total financial wealth which are evaluated using their average values. 
 
 
 
are insignificant. Nonetheless, these results are consistent with hypotheses 1a and 1b in 
that similar households with different mental accounts make varying portfolio choices 
and that, conditional on mental accounting, portfolio choice also varies with time 
preference, risk tolerance and cognitive ability.  The regressions in Columns (3), (6) 
and (9) of Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 are henceforth referred to as the baseline regressions.   
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3.5.2  Financial advice, mental accounting and portfolio choice 
Table 3.6 extends the analysis and includes financial advice as an additional 
explanatory variable to the baseline regressions in Table 3.4. For each asset class, I run 
two regressions using both pooled probit and tobit regressions for ownership and 
portfolio share, respectively, using specifications that include mental accounts, time 
preference, risk tolerance, cognitive ability and the control variables. Overall, the 
results show that financial advice has a positive influence on ownership and share of 
risky assets and fairly safe assets but has a negative effect on share of safe assets. 
However, when interacted with mental accounting, financial advice reduces share of 
fairly safe assets and increases share of safe assets. 
The results for the variables mental accounts, time preference, risk tolerance and 
cognitive ability are consistent with the results in Table 3.4 for both ownership and 
portfolio share. For ownership and portfolio share in a risky asset, the entering variable, 
financial advice, has a weak and negative effect among households that exhibit a single 
source of advice and it has a weak and positive effect for those that exhibit multiple 
sources. Concerning ownership and portfolio share in a fairly safe asset, financial 
advice is positive and highly significant for both single source and multiple sources of 
financial advice. However, for safe assets financial advice is insignificant for ownership 
and is negative and significant for portfolio share. Although most of the control 
variables remain unchanged, I see a change in the magnitude, sign and levels of 
significance for the year dummies. For example, with regard to portfolio share, the 
effects across the three asset classes become significant for 2007; the effects are 
positive for portfolio share in a safe asset and are negative for portfolio share in both a 
risky and a fairly safe asset.  
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Table 3.6 Effects of mental accounting and financial advice 
The table presents marginal effects from both pooled probit regressions, (Column (1), (3) and (5), and from pooled tobit regressions, (Column (2), (4) and (6)). The dependent 
variables are risky asset, fairly safe asset and safe asset; ownership equals one if households owns at least one asset in each asset class or zero otherwise and portfolio share is 
the proportion of financial assets invested in each asset class to total financial assets. Risky assets include shares or stocks in listed or unlisted companies (overseas or UK). 
Fairly safe assets include investments in fixed-term investment bonds, unit or investment trust, employee share options and shares, overseas and UK gilts, endowment or 
regular premium policy, single premium policy, lump sum insurance policy, individual retirement accounts, or other financial assets. Safe assets include investments in 
individual savings and current accounts, friendly society saving plan, informal savings, or national savings products. Mental accounts is a categorical variable with three 
dummies: no mental account equals one if a household has no specific reason for saving money and zero otherwise (base level); single mental account equals one if a 
household identifies only one reason for saving money and zero otherwise; and multiple mental accounts equals one if a household identifies more than one reason for saving 
money and zero otherwise. Financial advice is a categorical variable with three dummies: no advice equals one if a respondent does not identify any source of advice (base 
level); single advice equals one if respondent identifies only one source of advice and zero otherwise; and multiple sources of advice equals one if respondent identifies more 
than one source of advice and zero otherwise. Time preference equals one if respondent would prefer GBP £ 1,100 next year and zero if GBP £ 1,000 today. Risk tolerance 
equals one if respondent would prefer a one in five chance of winning GBP £ 10,000 and zero if response is guaranteed GBP £ 1,000. Cognitive ability equals one if response 
is excellent or good and zero if response is moderate or poor. The control variables as described in Table 1 are age, age square, male, couple, degree level or above, has 
children, lives in urban area, Christian, has good health, expects good financial situation, white British, log of net financial wealth, log of net household wealth, region 
dummies, and year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and are reported in parentheses. The levels of significance are given by * for 10%, ** for 
5%, and *** for 1%.  
Independent variable Risky asset  Fairly safe asset  Safe asset 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 Ownership portfolio share   Ownership portfolio share   Ownership portfolio share  
Mental account (Base=none)         
Single mental account 0.003 -0.014*  0.034*** 0.021***  0.002* -0.009 
 (0.006) (0.008)  (0.005) (0.007)  (0.001) (0.007) 
Multiple mental account 0.031*** 0.005  0.084*** 0.055***  0.006*** -0.040*** 
 (0.005) (0.007)  (0.005) (0.007)  (0.001) (0.006) 
Financial advice (Base=none)         
Single source -0.009* -0.014*  0.017*** 0.042***  -0.001 -0.037*** 
 (0.006) (0.007)  (0.005) (0.007)  (0.001) (0.007) 
Multiple sources 0.010* 0.016**  0.041*** 0.056***  -0.001 -0.062*** 
 (0.006) (0.007)  (0.006) (0.007)  (0.001) (0.007) 
Time preference 0.016*** 0.004  0.021*** -0.004  -0.001 0.009 
 (0.005) (0.006)  (0.005) (0.006)  (0.001) (0.006) 
Risk tolerance 0.015*** 0.019***  0.000 -0.019***  0.002 0.009 
 (0.005) (0.006)  (0.005) (0.006)  (0.001) (0.006) 
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Table 3.6 Continued 
Independent variable Risky asset  Fairly safe asset  Safe asset 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 Ownership portfolio share   Ownership portfolio share   Ownership portfolio share  
Cognitive ability  0.026*** 0.024***  0.011** 0.010  0.001 -0.015** 
 (0.006) (0.008)  (0.005) (0.007)  (0.001) (0.007) 
Age -0.001 -0.005***  -0.001 0.001  0.000** -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.001) 
Age square 0.000 0.000***  -0.000 -0.000***  -0.000 0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.009 0.014**  -0.046*** -0.057***  0.001 0.046*** 
 (0.006) (0.007)  (0.005) (0.007)  (0.001) (0.006) 
Couple 0.002 -0.018**  0.034*** 0.038***  0.003*** -0.029*** 
 (0.006) (0.007)  (0.005) (0.007)  (0.001) (0.007) 
Degree level or above qualification 0.033*** 0.038***  0.019*** -0.019***  0.000 0.004 
 (0.006) (0.007)  (0.006) (0.007)  (0.001) (0.006) 
Employed or self-employed 0.008 0.022***  -0.011* 0.000  0.003** -0.002 
 (0.007) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.008)  (0.001) (0.008) 
Has children -0.022*** -0.021**  -0.068*** -0.057***  -0.010*** 0.048*** 
 (0.007) (0.008)  (0.007) (0.008)  (0.002) (0.008) 
Lives in urban area -0.005 -0.009  0.012** 0.035***  -0.001 -0.027*** 
 (0.006) (0.007)  (0.006) (0.007)  (0.001) (0.006) 
Christian 0.023*** 0.025***  0.019*** 0.034***  0.002* -0.030*** 
 (0.006) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.008)  (0.001) (0.007) 
Has good health 0.020*** 0.028***  0.010** 0.014**  -0.002 -0.024*** 
 (0.005) (0.007)  (0.005) (0.007)  (0.001) (0.006) 
White British 0.017* 0.009  0.061*** 0.080***  -0.000 -0.070*** 
 (0.009) (0.012)  (0.009) (0.012)  (0.002) (0.011) 
Log of net household wealth 0.042*** 0.056***  0.021*** 0.023***  0.001* -0.032*** 
 (0.003) (0.004)  (0.002) (0.003)  (0.000) (0.003) 
Log of net financial wealth 0.069*** 0.077***  0.093*** 0.120***  0.001*** -0.122*** 
 (0.002) (0.003)  (0.001) (0.002)  (0.000) (0.002) 
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Table 3.6 Continued 
Independent variable Risky asset  Fairly safe asset  Safe asset 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 Ownership portfolio share   Ownership portfolio share   Ownership portfolio share  
Region (Base = North East)         
North West 0.010 0.006  0.016 0.012  -0.003 -0.017 
 (0.014) (0.018)  (0.012) (0.017)  (0.003) (0.016) 
Yorkshire & Humber 0.025* 0.016  0.032** 0.034*  -0.003 -0.029* 
 (0.014) (0.019)  (0.013) (0.018)  (0.003) (0.017) 
East Midlands 0.030** 0.007  0.039*** 0.034*  0.001 -0.028* 
 (0.014) (0.018)  (0.013) (0.018)  (0.003) (0.017) 
West Midlands -0.008 -0.037**  0.028** 0.017  -0.001 -0.009 
 (0.014) (0.019)  (0.012) (0.018)  (0.003) (0.017) 
East of England 0.032** 0.029  0.024* 0.010  -0.003 -0.015 
 (0.014) (0.018)  (0.012) (0.017)  (0.003) (0.016) 
London 0.043*** 0.030  -0.009 -0.077***  0.003 0.058*** 
 (0.014) (0.019)  (0.013) (0.018)  (0.003) (0.017) 
South East 0.059*** 0.053***  0.019 -0.028*  0.001 0.010 
 (0.013) (0.017)  (0.012) (0.017)  (0.003) (0.016) 
South West 0.038*** 0.036*  0.034*** 0.014  0.002 -0.023 
 (0.014) (0.018)  (0.013) (0.018)  (0.003) (0.016) 
Wales -0.011 -0.018  0.008 0.001  -0.002 0.001 
 (0.016) (0.021)  (0.014) (0.020)  (0.003) (0.018) 
Scotland 0.012 0.024  0.010 0.024  -0.001 -0.033** 
 (0.014) (0.019)  (0.012) (0.018)  (0.003) (0.017) 
Year (Base = 2006)         
2007 -0.016** -0.016**  -0.020*** -0.023***  0.001 0.022*** 
 (0.006) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.008)  (0.001) (0.008) 
2008 -0.020*** -0.042***  0.007 0.016**  0.002 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.008)  (0.002) (0.008) 
2009 -0.005 -0.039***  0.041*** 0.048***  0.007*** -0.022** 
 (0.007) (0.009)  (0.007) (0.009)  (0.002) (0.008) 
2010 -0.019** -0.050***  0.044*** 0.069***  0.006*** -0.042*** 
 (0.008) (0.011)  (0.009) (0.011)  (0.002) (0.010) 
Constant  -1.725***   -1.330***   2.364*** 
  (0.053)   (0.041)   (0.039) 
Pseudo R 2  0.242 0.266  0.371 0.229  0.143 0.280 
Observations 34207 33990  34207 33990  34207 33455 
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After 2007, the signs are reversed and become positive for portfolio share in a fairly 
safe asset and negative for portfolio share in a safe asset. These findings supports our 
conjecture that most households reduced their investment in risky assets and safe assets 
after the global economic crisis and instead increased their investment in fairly safe 
assets. In addition, when I test for the fitness of the model using a likelihood ratio test, 
inclusion of financial advice leads to a statistically significant improvement of the 
models in Table 3.5, apart from ownership of risky assets which is insignificant.  
To investigate the effects of financial advice, conditional on mental accounting, I 
interact mental accounting with financial advice using the specifications in Table 3.5.  
Table 3.7 presents raw coefficient estimates for ownership and marginal effects for 
portfolio share. Beginning with the main effects of the key variables, the result for 
financial advice is similar to the unconditional analysis result in Table 3.6; however, the 
effects of a single source of advice become insignificant. In addition, for mental 
accounting and the variables time preference, risk tolerance and cognitive ability the 
findings are consistent with the results in Table 3.5 apart from the effect of mental 
accounting on ownership of a safe asset, which declines in significance.  The interaction 
terms show that exhibiting a single mental account or multiple mental accounts and 
having a single advisor or multiple advisors differentially influence portfolio choice 
over and above the influence captured by interactions between mental accounting and 
time preference, risk tolerance and cognitive ability in Table 3.5. 
For example, the interaction term between multiple mental accounts and single source 
of financial advice has a negative influence on both the ownership and portfolio share in 
fairly safe assets, and it has a positive effect on the ownership of and portfolio share in a 
safe asset.  
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Table 3.7 Conditional marginal effects of mental accounting and financial advice 
The table presents raw coefficient estimates from pooled probit regressions, Column (1), (3) and (5), and marginal effects from pooled tobit regressions, Column (2), (4) and 
(6). The dependent variables are risky asset, fairly safe asset and safe asset; ownership equals one if households owns at least one asset in each asset class or zero otherwise 
and portfolio share is the proportion of financial assets invested in each asset class to total financial assets. Risky assets include shares or stocks in listed or unlisted 
companies (overseas or UK). Fairly safe assets include investments in fixed-term investment bonds, unit or investment trust, employee share options and shares, overseas and 
UK gilts, endowment or regular premium policy, single premium policy, lump sum insurance policy, individual retirement accounts, or other financial assets. Safe assets 
include investments in individual savings and current accounts, friendly society saving plan, informal savings, or national savings products. Mental accounts is a categorical 
variable with three dummies: no mental account equals one if a household has no specific reason for saving money and zero otherwise (base level); single mental account 
equals one if a household identifies only one reason for saving money and zero otherwise; and multiple mental accounts equals one if a household identifies more than one 
reason for saving money and zero otherwise. Financial advice is a categorical variable with three dummies: no advice equals one if a respondent does not identify any source 
of advice (base level); single advice equals one if respondent identifies only one source of advice and zero otherwise; and multiple sources of advice equals one if respondent 
identifies more than one source of advice and zero otherwise. Time preference equals one if respondent would prefer GBP £ 1,100 next year and zero if GBP £ 1,000 today. 
Risk tolerance equals one if respondent would prefer a one in five chance of winning GBP £ 10,000 and zero if response is guaranteed GBP £ 1,000. The interaction terms are 
for mental accounts interacted with financial advice, risk tolerance, risk perceptions and cognitive ability. The control variables as described in Table 1 are age, age square, 
male, couple, degree level or above, has children, lives in urban area, Christian, white British, log of net financial wealth, log of net household wealth, region dummies, and 
year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and are reported in parentheses. The levels of significance are given by * for 10%, ** for 5%, and *** for 
1%. 
 
Independent variable Risky asset  Fairly safe asset  Safe asset 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 ownership  portfolio share   ownership  portfolio share   ownership  portfolio share  
Mental account (Base=none)         
Single mental account -0.059 -0.018  0.127** 0.068***  0.098 -0.058*** 
 (0.065) (0.021)  (0.051) (0.019)  (0.137) (0.017) 
Multiple mental account 0.211*** 0.055***  0.371*** 0.130***  0.317* -0.124*** 
 (0.059) (0.019)  (0.052) (0.017)  (0.175) (0.016) 
Financial advice (Base=none)         
Single source -0.033 -0.010  0.094*** 0.063***  -0.119 -0.061*** 
 (0.040) (0.013)  (0.032) (0.012)  (0.075) (0.011) 
Multiple sources 0.069* 0.033**  0.158*** 0.084***  0.021 -0.096*** 
 (0.039) (0.013)  (0.034) (0.012)  (0.088) (0.011) 
Time preference 0.042 0.000  0.082** 0.021*  -0.009 -0.008 
 (0.038) (0.012)  (0.035) (0.012)  (0.084) (0.011) 
Risk tolerance 0.093** 0.045***  0.025 -0.009  0.028 -0.010 
 (0.038) (0.012)  (0.035) (0.012)  (0.082) (0.011) 
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Table 3.7 Continued 
         
Independent variable Risky asset  Fairly safe asset  Safe asset 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 ownership  portfolio share   ownership  portfolio share   ownership  portfolio share  
Cognitive ability  0.113*** 0.033**  0.045 0.029**  0.032 -0.035*** 
 (0.041) (0.014)  (0.031) (0.012)  (0.064) (0.011) 
Single mental account * single source 0.041 0.012  0.007 -0.024  -0.031 0.027* 
 (0.058) (0.018)  (0.051) (0.018)  (0.145) (0.016) 
Single mental account * multiple sources 0.053 0.004  0.068 -0.033*  -0.219 0.036** 
 (0.057) (0.018)  (0.054) (0.017)  (0.151) (0.016) 
Multiple mental account * single source -0.046 -0.017  -0.092* -0.044***  0.436** 0.048*** 
 (0.053) (0.016)  (0.051) (0.016)  (0.218) (0.015) 
Multiple mental account * multiple sources -0.084* -0.038**  0.010 -0.051***  0.024 0.062*** 
 (0.049) (0.015)  (0.049) (0.015)  (0.161) (0.014) 
Single mental account * time preference 0.049 0.014  -0.004 -0.035**  0.015 0.022 
 (0.054) (0.016)  (0.054) (0.016)  (0.151) (0.015) 
Multiple mental account * time preference 0.030 0.001  0.033 -0.034**  -0.113 0.025* 
 (0.047) (0.014)  (0.050) (0.014)  (0.159) (0.013) 
Single mental account * risk tolerance  -0.088 -0.059***  -0.020 -0.005  0.483** 0.034** 
 (0.055) (0.017)  (0.055) (0.017)  (0.212) (0.016) 
Multiple mental account * risk tolerance -0.021 -0.026*  -0.052 -0.021  -0.052 0.025* 
 (0.048) (0.015)  (0.051) (0.014)  (0.167) (0.013) 
Single mental account * cognitive ability  0.055 0.010  -0.007 -0.027  0.040 0.023 
 (0.059) (0.019)  (0.048) (0.017)  (0.124) (0.016) 
Multiple mental account * cognitive ability -0.036 -0.028*  0.025 -0.037**  0.040 0.045*** 
 (0.053) (0.017)  (0.048) (0.015)  (0.164) (0.014) 
Age -0.005 -0.005***  -0.005 0.001  0.018** -0.000 
 (0.005) (0.002)  (0.004) (0.001)  (0.008) (0.001) 
Age square 0.000 0.000***  -0.000 -0.000***  -0.000 0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.037 0.014**  -0.205*** -0.056***  0.056 0.046*** 
 (0.024) (0.007)  (0.023) (0.007)  (0.052) (0.006) 
Couple 0.009 -0.018**  0.146*** 0.038***  0.189*** -0.028*** 
 (0.024) (0.007)  (0.023) (0.007)  (0.058) (0.007) 
Degree level or above qualification 0.138*** 0.038***  0.082*** -0.018***  0.022 0.003 
 (0.024) (0.007)  (0.027) (0.007)  (0.071) (0.006) 
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Table 3.7 Continued 
         
Independent variable Risky asset  Fairly safe asset  Safe asset 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 ownership  portfolio share   ownership  portfolio share   ownership  portfolio share  
Employed or self-employed 0.034 0.022***  -0.049* 0.000  0.174** -0.001 
 (0.028) (0.008)  (0.028) (0.008)  (0.068) (0.008) 
Has children -0.095*** -0.021**  -0.288*** -0.057***  -0.417*** 0.048*** 
 (0.029) (0.008)  (0.028) (0.008)  (0.059) (0.008) 
Lives in urban area -0.019 -0.009  0.051** 0.035***  -0.066 -0.027*** 
 (0.024) (0.007)  (0.024) (0.007)  (0.068) (0.006) 
Christian 0.100*** 0.025***  0.081*** 0.034***  0.118** -0.030*** 
 (0.028) (0.008)  (0.027) (0.008)  (0.060) (0.007) 
Has good health 0.086*** 0.028***  0.045** 0.013**  -0.098 -0.023*** 
 (0.023) (0.007)  (0.021) (0.007)  (0.061) (0.006) 
White British 0.072* 0.009  0.260*** 0.080***  -0.019 -0.070*** 
 (0.040) (0.012)  (0.035) (0.012)  (0.083) (0.011) 
Log of net household wealth 0.177*** 0.056***  0.094*** 0.023***  0.027* -0.032*** 
 (0.014) (0.004)  (0.009) (0.003)  (0.014) (0.003) 
Log of net financial wealth 0.294*** 0.077***  0.410*** 0.120***  0.055*** -0.122*** 
 (0.008) (0.003)  (0.008) (0.002)  (0.014) (0.002) 
Region (Base = North East)         
North West 0.040 0.005  0.068 0.011  -0.126 -0.016 
 (0.059) (0.018)  (0.053) (0.017)  (0.137) (0.016) 
Yorkshire & Humber 0.106* 0.015  0.138** 0.034*  -0.136 -0.029* 
 (0.061) (0.019)  (0.056) (0.018)  (0.141) (0.017) 
East Midlands 0.130** 0.008  0.170*** 0.035*  0.047 -0.029* 
 (0.061) (0.018)  (0.057) (0.018)  (0.153) (0.017) 
West Midlands -0.036 -0.037**  0.123** 0.017  -0.053 -0.009 
 (0.061) (0.019)  (0.055) (0.018)  (0.142) (0.017) 
East of England 0.135** 0.029  0.103* 0.010  -0.158 -0.015 
 (0.059) (0.018)  (0.055) (0.017)  (0.139) (0.016) 
London 0.184*** 0.031  -0.043 -0.076***  0.147 0.058*** 
 (0.061) (0.019)  (0.058) (0.018)  (0.154) (0.017) 
South East 0.250*** 0.054***  0.082 -0.028*  0.048 0.010 
 (0.056) (0.017)  (0.053) (0.017)  (0.144) (0.016) 
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Table 3.7 Continued 
         
Independent variable Risky asset  Fairly safe asset  Safe asset 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 ownership  portfolio share   ownership  portfolio share   ownership  portfolio share  
South West 0.162*** 0.036*  0.149*** 0.013  0.113 -0.023 
 (0.060) (0.018)  (0.056) (0.018)  (0.163) (0.016) 
Wales -0.046 -0.018  0.033 0.001  -0.102 0.001 
 (0.067) (0.021)  (0.059) (0.020)  (0.154) (0.018) 
Scotland 0.050 0.024  0.041 0.025  -0.026 -0.033** 
 (0.060) (0.019)  (0.055) (0.018)  (0.140) (0.017) 
Year (Base = 2006)         
2007 -0.066** -0.016**  -0.089*** -0.023***  0.065 0.022*** 
 (0.027) (0.008)  (0.027) (0.008)  (0.071) (0.008) 
2008 -0.084*** -0.042***  0.031 0.016**  0.127 0.002 
 (0.026) (0.008)  (0.028) (0.008)  (0.084) (0.008) 
2009 -0.021 -0.038***  0.179*** 0.047***  0.388*** -0.022** 
 (0.031) (0.009)  (0.032) (0.009)  (0.101) (0.009) 
2010 -0.080** -0.050***  0.191*** 0.069***  0.346*** -0.042*** 
 (0.036) (0.011)  (0.038) (0.011)  (0.119) (0.010) 
Constant -6.339*** -1.740***  -4.827*** -1.363***  0.800*** 2.400*** 
 (0.174) (0.054)  (0.132) (0.042)  (0.265) (0.039) 
Pseudo R 2  0.242 0.267  0.372 0.229  0.148 0.281 
Observations 34207 33990  34207 33990  34207 33455 
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Further, the interaction term between multiple mental accounts and multiple sources of 
financial advice is negative for both ownership of and portfolio share in a risky asset; is 
negative for portfolio share in a fairly safe asset; and is positive for portfolio share in a 
safe asset.    
 Figure 3.5 displays the conditional marginal effects of financial advice on mental 
accounts calculated using the probit regressions in Table 3.7. For ownership of a risky 
asset, Figure (a), a single source of advice has a negative and significant effect at the 
5% level among households that exhibit multiple mental accounts while multiple 
sources of financial advice has a positive and significant effect at the 10% level among 
households that exhibit no mental account and a positive and significant effect at the 
1% level among those households that exhibit a single mental account. Panel (b) shows 
the conditional effects of financial advice on ownership of a fairly safe asset. The 
effects of a single of source of financial advice is significant at the 1% level among 
household that exhibit no mental account and is positive and significant at the 5% level 
for those that exhibit a single mental account. Across all mental accounts, multiple 
sources of financial advice has a positive and highly significant effect on ownership of 
a fairly safe asset. For ownership of safe assets, Panel (c), the effect of financial advice 
is insignificant.   
 In summary, these results are in line with hypotheses 2(a) and 2(b) and support both 
the extended BPT theory of Alexandre and Baptista (2011), which incorporates 
financial advice, and the findings in Bhattacharya et al. (2012). However, the 
interactive effect of financial advice appears to be relevant only for portfolio share in 
the three asset classes and not for ownership; a likelihood ratio test
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Figure 3.5 Conditional marginal effects of financial advice on ownership 
The figure displays conditional marginal effects of financial advice on the probability of owning a risky 
asset, a fairly safe asset and a safe asset. The marginal effects are calculated using estimates derived from 
pooled probit regressions in Table 3.7: that is, column (1) specification for Panel (a); column (3) 
specification for Panel (b); and column (5) specification for Panel (c). The marginal effects are evaluated 
at highest value of all explanatory variables apart from age, total household wealth and total financial 
wealth which are evaluated at their average values. 
 
comparing the unconditional regressions (in Table 3.6) and conditional regressions (in 
Table 3.7) does not improve the model fit for ownership but yields statistically 
significant improvement for portfolio share.   The finding that, when compared with 
households that have no mental account and do not seek financial advice, households 
that exhibit a single mental account or multiple mental accounts and have a single 
source or multiple sources of financial advice have low proportions of fairly safe assets 
and high proportions of safe asset, indicates that these households may be holding sub-
optimal portfolios. This result is consistent with findings in other studies, which suggest 
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that investors do not follow the recommendations made by financial advisors 
(Bhattacharya et al., 2012; Hackethal et al., 2012). 
3.5.3 Housing tenure, mental accounts and portfolio choice 
In this section I extend the analysis further and include housing tenure to examine the 
influence of both background risk/asset. Table 3.8 reports the results, in which I add 
housing tenure to the specifications in Table 3.6 and I include interaction terms in Table 
3.9 using the specifications in Table 3.7. For each asset class, I run two regressions 
using pooled probit and tobit regressions for ownership and portfolio share, 
respectively, and I report marginal effects. In summary, the results show that the 
influence of housing tenure is subsumed by mental accounting for ownership and 
portfolio share in risky assets. When interacted with mental accounting, housing tenure 
increases ownership and portfolio share in risky assets. 
The results show that housing tenure influences portfolio choice. For ownership of and 
portfolio share in a risky asset, I find a significant effect of homeownership through a 
mortgage. However, for ownership of a risky asset, there is no significant difference 
between households that own their home through a mortgage and those that own 
outright. Regarding fairly safe assets, both ownership and portfolio share are influenced 
by housing tenure; the effect of homeownership through a mortgage is higher than that 
of outright ownership and this difference is significant at the 5% level. For portfolio 
share in a safe asset, the effect is negative and significant for homeownership through a 
mortgage and outright homeownership; the effects are significantly different at the 1% 
level, suggesting that households that own their home through a mortgage have a low 
proportion of safe assets compared to those that own their homes outright. 
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Table 3.8 Effects of mental accounting, financial advice and housing tenure 
The table presents marginal effects from both pooled probit regressions (Column (1), (3) and (5)) and from pooled tobit regressions (Column (2), (4) and (6)). The dependent 
variables are risky asset, fairly safe asset and safe asset; ownership equals one if households owns at least one asset in each asset class or zero otherwise and portfolio share is 
the proportion of financial assets invested in each asset class to total financial assets. Risky assets include shares or stocks in listed or unlisted companies (overseas or UK). 
Fairly safe assets include investments in fixed-term investment bonds, unit or investment trust, employee share options and shares, overseas and UK gilts, endowment or 
regular premium policy, single premium policy, lump sum insurance policy, individual retirement accounts, or other financial assets. Safe assets include investments in 
individual savings and current accounts, friendly society saving plan, informal savings, or national savings products. Mental accounts is a categorical variable with three 
dummies: no mental account equals one if a household has no specific reason for saving money and zero otherwise (base level); single mental account equals one if a 
household identifies only one reason for saving money and zero otherwise; and multiple mental accounts equals one if a household identifies more than one reason for saving 
money and zero otherwise. Financial advice is a categorical variable with three dummies: no advice equals one if a respondent does not identify any source of advice (base 
level); single advice equals one if respondent identifies only one source of advice and zero otherwise; and multiple sources of advice equals one if respondent identifies more 
than one source of advice and zero otherwise. Housing tenure is a categorical variable with three dummies: rents current accommodation (base level); owns through a 
mortgage; and owns outright. The control variables as described in Table 3.1are time preference, risk tolerance, cognitive ability, age, age square, male, couple, degree level 
or above, has children, lives in urban area, Christian, has good health, white British, log of net financial wealth, log of net household wealth, region dummies, and year 
dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and are reported in parentheses. The levels of significance are given by * for 10%, ** for 5%, and *** for 1%.  
Independent variable Risky asset  Fairly safe asset  Safe asset 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 Ownership portfolio share   Ownership portfolio share   Ownership portfolio share  
Mental account (Base=none)         
Single mental account 0.002 -0.014*  0.034*** 0.021***  0.002* -0.009 
 (0.006) (0.008)  (0.005) (0.007)  (0.001) (0.007) 
Multiple mental account 0.032*** 0.005  0.084*** 0.055***  0.006*** -0.040*** 
 (0.005) (0.007)  (0.005) (0.007)  (0.001) (0.006) 
Financial advice (Base=none)         
Single source -0.009* -0.014*  0.017*** 0.042***  -0.001 -0.038*** 
 (0.006) (0.007)  (0.005) (0.007)  (0.001) (0.007) 
Multiple sources 0.011* 0.017**  0.043*** 0.057***  -0.001 -0.064*** 
 (0.006) (0.007)  (0.006) (0.007)  (0.001) (0.007) 
Housing tenure (Base=rents)         
Under a mortgage 0.024** 0.031**  0.020** 0.141***  0.001 -0.123*** 
 (0.009) (0.013)  (0.009) (0.012)  (0.002) (0.011) 
Own outright  0.024** 0.014  0.071*** 0.132***  0.002 -0.109*** 
 (0.010) (0.013)  (0.009) (0.012)  (0.002) (0.011) 
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Table 3.8 Continued  
         
Independent variable Risky asset  Fairly safe asset  Safe asset 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 Ownership portfolio share   Ownership portfolio share   Ownership portfolio share  
Time preference 0.016*** 0.005  0.020*** -0.002  -0.001 0.007 
 (0.005) (0.006)  (0.005) (0.006)  (0.001) (0.006) 
Risk tolerance 0.015*** 0.019***  0.001 -0.019***  0.002* 0.009 
 (0.005) (0.006)  (0.005) (0.006)  (0.001) (0.006) 
Cognitive ability  0.026*** 0.023***  0.013** 0.011  0.001 -0.016** 
 (0.006) (0.008)  (0.005) (0.007)  (0.001) (0.007) 
Age -0.001 -0.004***  -0.001 0.003**  0.000** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.001) 
Age square 0.000 0.000***  -0.000* -0.000***  -0.000 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.009 0.014**  -0.044*** -0.055***  0.001 0.045*** 
 (0.006) (0.007)  (0.005) (0.007)  (0.001) (0.006) 
Couple 0.002 -0.018**  0.033*** 0.036***  0.003*** -0.027*** 
 (0.006) (0.007)  (0.005) (0.007)  (0.001) (0.007) 
Degree level or above qualification 0.034*** 0.038***  0.022*** -0.014**  0.000 -0.000 
 (0.006) (0.007)  (0.006) (0.007)  (0.001) (0.006) 
Employed or self-employed 0.007 0.018**  -0.001 -0.007  0.003** 0.006 
 (0.007) (0.008)  (0.007) (0.008)  (0.001) (0.008) 
Has children -0.022*** -0.024***  -0.060*** -0.059***  -0.009*** 0.051*** 
 (0.007) (0.009)  (0.007) (0.008)  (0.002) (0.008) 
Lives in urban area -0.006 -0.010  0.011** 0.030***  -0.001 -0.022*** 
 (0.006) (0.007)  (0.006) (0.007)  (0.001) (0.006) 
Christian 0.023*** 0.025***  0.020*** 0.034***  0.002* -0.030*** 
 (0.006) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.008)  (0.001) (0.007) 
Has good health 0.020*** 0.028***  0.008 0.011*  -0.002* -0.021*** 
 (0.005) (0.007)  (0.005) (0.007)  (0.001) (0.006) 
White British 0.016* 0.008  0.064*** 0.076***  -0.000 -0.066*** 
 (0.009) (0.012)  (0.009) (0.012)  (0.002) (0.011) 
Log of net household wealth 0.037*** 0.053***  0.010*** -0.003  0.000 -0.010*** 
 (0.004) (0.005)  (0.003) (0.004)  (0.000) (0.003) 
Log of net financial wealth 0.070*** 0.078***  0.093*** 0.122***  0.001*** -0.124*** 
 (0.002) (0.003)  (0.001) (0.002)  (0.000) (0.002) 
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Table 3.8 Continued 
Independent variable Risky asset  Fairly safe asset  Safe asset 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 Ownership portfolio share   Ownership portfolio share   Ownership portfolio share  
Region (Base = North East)         
North West 0.009 0.006  0.014 0.010  -0.003 -0.015 
 (0.014) (0.018)  (0.012) (0.017)  (0.003) (0.016) 
Yorkshire & Humber 0.025* 0.016  0.032** 0.034*  -0.003 -0.030* 
 (0.014) (0.019)  (0.013) (0.018)  (0.003) (0.017) 
East Midlands 0.030** 0.007  0.036*** 0.031*  0.001 -0.026 
 (0.014) (0.018)  (0.013) (0.018)  (0.003) (0.017) 
West Midlands -0.009 -0.037**  0.026** 0.015  -0.001 -0.008 
 (0.014) (0.019)  (0.012) (0.018)  (0.003) (0.017) 
East of England 0.032** 0.029  0.024* 0.010  -0.003 -0.016 
 (0.014) (0.018)  (0.012) (0.017)  (0.003) (0.016) 
London 0.045*** 0.031*  -0.004 -0.067***  0.003 0.049*** 
 (0.014) (0.019)  (0.013) (0.018)  (0.003) (0.017) 
South East 0.060*** 0.054***  0.021* -0.023  0.001 0.006 
 (0.013) (0.017)  (0.012) (0.017)  (0.003) (0.016) 
South West 0.038*** 0.036*  0.034*** 0.015  0.002 -0.025 
 (0.014) (0.018)  (0.013) (0.018)  (0.003) (0.016) 
Wales -0.012 -0.018  0.004 -0.005  -0.002 0.005 
 (0.016) (0.021)  (0.013) (0.020)  (0.003) (0.018) 
Scotland 0.012 0.024  0.010 0.025  -0.001 -0.033** 
 (0.014) (0.019)  (0.012) (0.018)  (0.003) (0.017) 
Year (Base = 2006)         
2007 -0.015** -0.016*  -0.020*** -0.021**  0.001 0.020*** 
 (0.006) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.008)  (0.001) (0.008) 
2008 -0.020*** -0.042***  0.008 0.019**  0.002 -0.001 
 (0.006) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.008)  (0.002) (0.008) 
2009 -0.004 -0.038***  0.043*** 0.054***  0.007*** -0.027*** 
 (0.007) (0.009)  (0.007) (0.009)  (0.002) (0.009) 
2010 -0.018** -0.049***  0.046*** 0.075***  0.006*** -0.047*** 
 (0.008) (0.011)  (0.009) (0.011)  (0.002) (0.010) 
Constant  -1.725***   -1.169***   2.231*** 
  (0.056)   (0.044)   (0.041) 
Pseudo R 2  0.242 0.266  0.374 0.233  0.144 0.283 
Observations 34205 33988  34205 33988  34205 33453 
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When compared to the results in Table 3.6, the effects of mental accounting, financial 
advice and the variables, time preference, risk tolerance and cognitive ability remain 
unchanged. In addition, the control variables remain unchanged apart from total 
household wealth, which reduces in magnitude or becomes insignificant. This is 
expected since, as discussed earlier, housing wealth constitutes a higher proportion of 
household wealth, which is now captured by housing tenure.  
 Table 3.9 reports raw coefficient estimates for ownership and marginal effects for 
portfolio share for the conditional effects of housing tenure using the specifications in 
Table 3.7. The analysis includes interaction terms and combines mental accounting with 
housing tenure, financial advice, time preference, risk tolerance and cognitive ability. 
When compared to the analysis in Table 3.7, I find that the results for the main effects 
of the variables financial advice, time preference, risk tolerance and cognitive ability 
are generally consistent for both ownership and portfolio share in the three asset 
categories. However, for risky asset, the effect of mental accounting on ownership and 
portfolio share are reversed and become negative and significant among households that 
exhibit a single mental account. Furthermore, for portfolio share in fairly safe assets 
and safe assets the magnitudes of the effects of housing tenure increase substantially, 
especially among households’ that have multiple mental accounts. The main effect of 
housing tenure, when compared to the results in Table 3.8, becomes insignificant for 
both ownership of and portfolio share in a risky asset; the effect becomes insignificant 
for ownership of a fairly safe asset among households that own their homes through a 
mortgage; and remain unchanged for portfolio share in a fairly safe asset and a safe 
asset.   
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Table 3.9 Conditional marginal effects of mental accounting, financial advice, and housing tenure 
The table presents raw coefficient estimates from pooled probit regressions, Column (1), (3) and (5), and marginal effects from pooled tobit regressions, Column (2), (4) and 
(6). The dependent variables are risky asset, fairly safe asset and safe asset; ownership equals one if households owns at least one asset in each asset class or zero otherwise 
and portfolio share is the proportion of financial assets invested in each asset class to total financial assets. Risky assets include shares or stocks in listed or unlisted 
companies (overseas or UK). Fairly safe assets include investments in fixed-term investment bonds, unit or investment trust, employee share options and shares, overseas and 
UK gilts, endowment or regular premium policy, single premium policy, lump sum insurance policy, individual retirement accounts, or other financial assets. Safe assets 
include investments in individual savings and current accounts, friendly society saving plan, informal savings, or national savings products. Mental accounts is a categorical 
variable with three dummies: no mental account equals one if a household has no specific reason for saving money and zero otherwise (base level); single mental account 
equals one if a household identifies only one reason for saving money and zero otherwise; and multiple mental accounts equals one if a household identifies more than one 
reason for saving money and zero otherwise. Financial advice is a categorical variable with three dummies: no advice equals one if a respondent does not identify any source 
of advice (base level); single advice equals one if one source of advice is identified and zero otherwise; and multiple sources of advice equals one if respondent identifies 
more than one source of advice and zero otherwise. Housing tenure is a categorical variable with three dummies: rents current accommodation (base level); owns through a 
mortgage; and owns outright.  The control variables as described in Table 3.1 are time preference, risk tolerance, cognitive ability, age, age square, male, couple, degree level 
or above, has children, lives in urban area, Christian, has good health, white British, log of net financial wealth, log of net household wealth, region dummies, and year 
dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and are reported in parentheses. The levels of significance are given by * for 10%, ** for 5%, and *** for 1%.  
 
Independent variable Risky asset  Fairly safe asset  Safe asset 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 ownership  portfolio share   ownership  portfolio share   ownership  portfolio share  
Mental account (Base=none)         
Single mental account -0.305*** -0.072**  0.130** 0.100***  0.248 -0.082*** 
 (0.101) (0.032)  (0.062) (0.024)  (0.173) (0.023) 
Multiple mental account 0.110 0.046*  0.350*** 0.219***  0.284 -0.197*** 
 (0.086) (0.028)  (0.064) (0.023)  (0.182) (0.022) 
Financial advice (Base=none)         
Single source -0.031 -0.010  0.096*** 0.060***  -0.122 -0.059*** 
 (0.040) (0.013)  (0.032) (0.012)  (0.075) (0.011) 
Multiple sources 0.076* 0.034***  0.176*** 0.086***  0.012 -0.097*** 
 (0.039) (0.013)  (0.034) (0.012)  (0.088) (0.011) 
Home tenure (Base=rents)         
Under a mortgage -0.040 0.011  -0.029 0.142***  0.123 -0.127*** 
 (0.061) (0.020)  (0.045) (0.018)  (0.099) (0.016) 
Own outright  0.006 -0.004  0.342*** 0.203***  0.123 -0.163*** 
 (0.058) (0.019)  (0.042) (0.017)  (0.098) (0.015) 
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Table 3.9 Continued 
         
Independent variable Risky asset  Fairly safe asset  Safe asset 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 ownership  portfolio share   ownership  portfolio share   ownership  portfolio share  
Time preference 0.043 0.001  0.080** 0.019  -0.013 -0.008 
 (0.038) (0.012)  (0.035) (0.012)  (0.084) (0.011) 
Risk tolerance 0.098** 0.046***  0.036 -0.009  0.021 -0.009 
 (0.038) (0.012)  (0.035) (0.012)  (0.083) (0.011) 
Cognitive ability  0.121*** 0.033**  0.063** 0.029**  0.024 -0.035*** 
 (0.041) (0.014)  (0.031) (0.012)  (0.064) (0.011) 
Single mental account * single source 0.041 0.011  0.010 -0.020  -0.001 0.025 
 (0.058) (0.018)  (0.051) (0.018)  (0.145) (0.016) 
Single mental account * multiple sources 0.041 0.001  0.048 -0.035**  -0.164 0.038** 
 (0.057) (0.018)  (0.054) (0.017)  (0.151) (0.016) 
Multiple mental account * single source -0.048 -0.017  -0.093* -0.037**  0.446** 0.042*** 
 (0.053) (0.016)  (0.051) (0.016)  (0.215) (0.015) 
Multiple mental account * multiple sources -0.089* -0.038**  -0.012 -0.051***  0.017 0.061*** 
 (0.049) (0.015)  (0.050) (0.015)  (0.163) (0.014) 
Single mental account * under a mortgage 0.359*** 0.075**  0.171*** 0.016  -0.424*** -0.012 
 (0.093) (0.030)  (0.062) (0.024)  (0.151) (0.022) 
Single mental account * own outright 0.255*** 0.059**  -0.070 -0.076***  -0.211 0.057*** 
 (0.088) (0.028)  (0.056) (0.021)  (0.153) (0.020) 
Multiple mental account * under a mortgage 0.151** 0.010  0.198*** -0.046**  0.125 0.047** 
 (0.077) (0.025)  (0.060) (0.022)  (0.187) (0.020) 
Multiple mental account * own outright 0.110 0.014  -0.056 -0.154***  -0.061 0.122*** 
 (0.073) (0.023)  (0.057) (0.020)  (0.180) (0.019) 
Single mental account * time preference 0.048 0.013  -0.011 -0.032*  0.025 0.019 
 (0.054) (0.016)  (0.054) (0.016)  (0.151) (0.015) 
Multiple mental account * time preference 0.030 0.001  0.028 -0.030**  -0.112 0.021 
 (0.046) (0.014)  (0.050) (0.014)  (0.159) (0.013) 
Single mental account * risk tolerance  -0.097* -0.060***  -0.037 -0.004  0.496** 0.033** 
 (0.056) (0.017)  (0.055) (0.017)  (0.215) (0.016) 
Multiple mental account * risk tolerance -0.025 -0.026*  -0.066 -0.019  -0.055 0.022* 
 (0.048) (0.015)  (0.051) (0.015)  (0.166) (0.013) 
Single mental account * cognitive ability  0.039 0.007  -0.032 -0.028*  0.102 0.023 
 (0.059) (0.019)  (0.048) (0.017)  (0.122) (0.016) 
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Table 3.9 Continued 
         
Independent variable Risky asset  Fairly safe asset  Safe asset 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 ownership  portfolio share   ownership  portfolio share   ownership  portfolio share  
Multiple mental account * cognitive ability -0.044 -0.029*  0.004 -0.033**  0.031 0.040*** 
 (0.053) (0.017)  (0.048) (0.015)  (0.164) (0.014) 
Age -0.005 -0.004***  -0.003 0.004***  0.019** -0.002* 
 (0.005) (0.002)  (0.004) (0.001)  (0.008) (0.001) 
Age square 0.000 0.000***  -0.000* -0.000***  -0.000* 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.040* 0.014**  -0.198*** -0.055***  0.056 0.045*** 
 (0.024) (0.007)  (0.023) (0.007)  (0.052) (0.006) 
Couple 0.007 -0.019**  0.143*** 0.036***  0.184*** -0.027*** 
 (0.024) (0.007)  (0.023) (0.007)  (0.058) (0.007) 
Degree level or above qualification 0.142*** 0.038***  0.098*** -0.012*  0.027 -0.002 
 (0.024) (0.007)  (0.027) (0.007)  (0.070) (0.006) 
Employed or self-employed 0.034 0.018**  0.001 -0.007  0.174** 0.006 
 (0.029) (0.008)  (0.029) (0.008)  (0.074) (0.008) 
Has children -0.096*** -0.024***  -0.253*** -0.055***  -0.417*** 0.047*** 
 (0.029) (0.009)  (0.028) (0.008)  (0.058) (0.008) 
Lives in urban area -0.024 -0.010  0.048** 0.030***  -0.067 -0.022*** 
 (0.024) (0.007)  (0.024) (0.007)  (0.068) (0.006) 
Christian 0.100*** 0.026***  0.084*** 0.033***  0.118** -0.029*** 
 (0.028) (0.008)  (0.027) (0.008)  (0.060) (0.007) 
Has good health 0.085*** 0.028***  0.034 0.011  -0.099 -0.021*** 
 (0.023) (0.007)  (0.022) (0.007)  (0.061) (0.006) 
White British 0.066* 0.007  0.271*** 0.078***  -0.011 -0.067*** 
 (0.040) (0.012)  (0.035) (0.012)  (0.083) (0.011) 
Log of net household wealth 0.160*** 0.053***  0.045*** -0.005  0.019 -0.008** 
 (0.015) (0.005)  (0.011) (0.004)  (0.017) (0.004) 
Log of net financial wealth 0.296*** 0.078***  0.412*** 0.123***  0.053*** -0.124*** 
 (0.008) (0.003)  (0.008) (0.002)  (0.014) (0.002) 
  
Mental accounting and portfolio choice 
 
 
 151 
Table 3.9 Continued 
Independent variable Risky asset  Fairly safe asset  Safe asset 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 ownership  portfolio share   ownership  portfolio share   ownership  portfolio share  
Region (Base = North East)         
North West 0.036 0.005  0.056 0.007  -0.128 -0.014 
 (0.060) (0.018)  (0.053) (0.017)  (0.137) (0.016) 
Yorkshire & Humber 0.104* 0.015  0.138** 0.033*  -0.139 -0.029* 
 (0.061) (0.019)  (0.056) (0.018)  (0.140) (0.017) 
East Midlands 0.125** 0.007  0.155*** 0.030*  0.043 -0.026 
 (0.061) (0.018)  (0.057) (0.018)  (0.153) (0.017) 
West Midlands -0.040 -0.037**  0.111** 0.013  -0.057 -0.006 
 (0.061) (0.019)  (0.055) (0.018)  (0.141) (0.017) 
East of England 0.135** 0.029  0.103* 0.009  -0.159 -0.015 
 (0.059) (0.018)  (0.055) (0.017)  (0.139) (0.016) 
London 0.189*** 0.031*  -0.025 -0.068***  0.152 0.050*** 
 (0.061) (0.019)  (0.058) (0.018)  (0.154) (0.017) 
South East 0.251*** 0.054***  0.088* -0.024  0.053 0.006 
 (0.056) (0.017)  (0.053) (0.017)  (0.144) (0.016) 
South West 0.161*** 0.036*  0.148*** 0.014  0.105 -0.024 
 (0.060) (0.018)  (0.056) (0.018)  (0.162) (0.016) 
Wales -0.052 -0.018  0.013 -0.006  -0.105 0.006 
 (0.067) (0.021)  (0.060) (0.020)  (0.154) (0.018) 
Scotland 0.048 0.024  0.042 0.024  -0.029 -0.033** 
 (0.060) (0.019)  (0.055) (0.018)  (0.141) (0.017) 
Year (Base = 2006)         
2007 -0.064** -0.016*  -0.086*** -0.021**  0.067 0.020*** 
 (0.027) (0.008)  (0.027) (0.008)  (0.071) (0.008) 
2008 -0.083*** -0.042***  0.035 0.019**  0.128 -0.001 
 (0.026) (0.008)  (0.028) (0.008)  (0.084) (0.008) 
2009 -0.018 -0.037***  0.190*** 0.054***  0.394*** -0.027*** 
 (0.031) (0.009)  (0.032) (0.009)  (0.102) (0.009) 
2010 -0.078** -0.049***  0.203*** 0.076***  0.353*** -0.048*** 
 (0.036) (0.011)  (0.038) (0.011)  (0.119) (0.010) 
Constant -6.151*** -1.722***  -4.463*** -1.244***  0.848*** 2.301*** 
 (0.183) (0.058)  (0.141) (0.045)  (0.272) (0.042) 
Pseudo R 2  0.243 0.268  0.375 0.235  0.152 0.286 
Observations 34205 33988  34205 33988  34205 33453 
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Moreover, again the magnitudes for outright ownership sharply increase for portfolio 
share in fairly safe assets and safe assets. These results indicate that there is a strong 
interactive effect between mental accounting and housing tenure. A clearer picture of 
the combined influence of mental accounting and housing tenure is demonstrated by the 
interaction terms. The interactions between mental accounting and housing tenure have 
differential effects on ownership and portfolio share in the three asset classes.  
For ownership and portfolio share in risky assets, the effects are positive and significant 
among households that exhibit a single mental account and either own their home 
through a mortgage or own outright. Among households that exhibit multiple mental 
accounts and own their homes outright, the effects are significant for ownership of a 
risky asset.  With regard to ownership of a fairly safe asset, I find positive and 
significant effects for interactions between mental accounting (single mental account 
and multiple accounts) and homeownership through a mortgage. For portfolio share, all 
the interaction terms are negative and significant apart from the interaction between 
single mental account and under mortgage, which is insignificant. Finally, for safe 
assets, although I find that the interaction term between single mental account and 
under a mortgage is negative and significant for ownership, the interaction terms for 
portfolio share are positive and significant for all sets of interactions apart from that 
between single mental account and under a mortgage. Furthermore, across these 
interactions I find that the separate combinations of mental accounting and housing 
tenure are significantly different at the 5% level.  
Mental accounting and portfolio choice 
 
 
 153 
Figure 3.6 Conditional marginal effect of housing tenure on ownership 
The figure displays conditional marginal effects of housing tenure on the probability of owning a risky 
asset, a fairly safe asset and a safe asset. The marginal effects are calculated using estimates derived from 
pooled probit regressions in Table 3.9: that is, column (1) specification for Panel (a); column (3) 
specification for Panel (b); and column (5) specification for Panel (c). The marginal effects are evaluated 
at highest value of all explanatory variables apart from age, total household wealth and total financial 
wealth which are evaluated at their average values.  
 
 
A graphical analysis of the conditional effects of housing tenure calculated from the 
probit regression estimates in Table 3.9 is displayed in Figure 3.6. For ownership of a 
risky asset, Panel (a), the effects of both homeownership through a mortgage and 
outright homeownership are significant at the 1% level among households that exhibit a 
single mental account and at the 5% level among those that exhibit multiple mental 
accounts. For ownership of a fairly safe asset, the effect of outright homeownership is 
significant at the 1% level across mental accounts while the effect of ownership through 
a mortgage is significant at the 1% level for households that have a single mental 
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account or multiple mental accounts. These findings further support the analysis in 
Table 3.9. In addition, the effects of outright homeownership are significant across all 
mental accounts. For ownership of a safe asset, Figure (c), the conditional effects are 
insignificant.  
In sum, these results are consistent with Hypotheses 3(a) and 3(b) as I find that mental 
accounting and housing tenure both directly and interactively explain differences in 
portfolio choice. However, for ownership of risky assets, the direct effect of housing is 
subsumed by mental accounting. Furthermore, comparisons between the conditional 
and unconditional regressions, using likelihood ratio test, result in statistically 
significant improvement of model fit across all asset classes and confirms the 
correlation between mental accounting and housing tenure. This finding is also 
consistent with the extended BPT theory of Baptista (2012), which incorporates 
background risk. However, although it is not possible to establish whether households 
in this study hold mean-variance efficient portfolios, the findings contrasts with 
Baptista’s (2012) suggestion that the presence of a background risk reduces portfolio 
share in risky assets. Instead, the evidence shows that among households that exhibit 
multiple mental accounts there is no significant difference in portfolio share of risky 
assets between those who own their home outright and those who own through a 
mortgage. In fact, outright homeowners have low investment shares in fairly safe assets 
and high investment shares in safe assets, when compared to homeownership through a 
mortgage.  
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3.5.4 Mental account types and sources of financial advice 
Thus far, our analysis has focused on the influence of mental accounting and financial 
advice using broad definitions of the two variables.  Here, I examine the effects of 
specific mental account types and sources of financial advice on portfolio choice. Table 
3.10 reports marginal effects for both ownership and portfolio share using pooled probit 
and tobit regressions, respectively. Mental account types include investment goals such 
as “for unexpected expenditure”, “for family members”, “to provide regular income”, 
“for retirement”, “for planned expenditure”, “deposit for property”, “for holiday”, “for 
speculation”, and “to earn good interest and see money grow”. Sources of financial 
advice include “close associates”, “print, media and Internet”, “professional agents”, 
“other independent advisors”, and “independent financial advisors”. Along with the 
control variables, I include the variables housing tenure, time preference, risk tolerance 
and cognitive ability. 
The results show that mental account types vary across the different categories of asset 
class ownership and investment. For example, saving money for “unexpected 
expenditure” is negatively associated with portfolio share in risky assets and is 
positively associated with ownership of and portfolio share in fairly safe assets. Saving 
money for “family members” is positively associated with both ownership and portfolio 
share in risky assets but is negatively associated with portfolio share in fairly safe 
assets.  Saving money for “planned expenditure” and for “holiday” are both positively 
associated with ownership and portfolio share in fairly safe assets but are negatively 
associated with portfolio share in safe assets. 
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Table 3.10 Mental account types, sources of financial advice and portfolio choice 
The table presents marginal effects from both pooled probit regressions (Column (1), (3) and (5)) and from pooled tobit regressions (Column (2), (4) and (6)). The dependent 
variables are risky asset, fairly safe asset and safe asset; ownership equals one if households owns at least one asset in each asset class or zero otherwise and portfolio share is 
the proportion of financial assets invested in each asset class to total financial assets. Risky assets include shares or stocks in listed or unlisted companies (overseas or UK). 
Fairly safe assets include investments in fixed-term investment bonds, unit or investment trust, employee share options and shares, overseas and UK gilts, endowment or 
regular premium policy, single premium policy, lump sum insurance policy, individual retirement accounts, or other financial assets. Safe assets include investments in 
individual savings and current accounts, friendly society saving plan, informal savings, or national savings products. Mental account types represent binary variables  for each 
investment goal, which equals one if identified by a respondent regardless of its ranking, and include saving money for ‘unexpected expenditure’, ‘ family members’, ‘to 
provide regular income’, ‘retirement’, ‘planned expenditure’, ‘deposit for property’, ‘ holiday’, ‘speculation’, and ‘to earn good interest and see money grow’. Sources of 
financial advice represent binary variables for each source trusted regardless of ranking and include ‘close associates’, ‘print, media and internet’, ‘professional agents’, 
‘other independent advisors’, and ‘independent financial advisors’. Housing tenure is a categorical variable with three dummies: rents current accommodation (base level); 
owns through a mortgage; and owns outright. The control variables as described in Table 3.1 are time preference, risk tolerance, cognitive ability, age, age square, male, 
couple, degree level or above, has children, lives in urban area, Christian, has good health, white British, log of net financial wealth, log of net household wealth, region 
dummies, and year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and are reported in parentheses. The levels of significance are given by * for 10%, ** for 
5%, and *** for 1%. 
 
Independent variables Risky asset  Fairly safe asset  Safe asset 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 Ownership Portfolio share   Ownership Portfolio share   Ownership Portfolio share  
Mental account types (Dummies)         
Unexpected expenditure -0.006 -0.015***  0.010** 0.018***  0.004*** -0.005 
 (0.005) (0.006)  (0.005) (0.006)  (0.001) (0.005) 
Family members 0.017*** 0.026***  -0.006 -0.025***  0.001 0.008 
 (0.006) (0.007)  (0.007) (0.008)  (0.002) (0.007) 
Regular income -0.008 -0.014  -0.008 -0.042***  0.003 0.043*** 
 (0.009) (0.010)  (0.012) (0.011)  (0.003) (0.010) 
Retirement 0.012** -0.011*  0.042*** -0.006  -0.004 0.014** 
 (0.006) (0.007)  (0.007) (0.007)  (0.002) (0.006) 
Planned expenditure 0.003 0.004  0.028*** 0.018***  0.002* -0.013** 
 (0.005) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.006)  (0.001) (0.006) 
Deposit for property 0.006 -0.014  0.016 0.010  0.006*** 0.013 
 (0.013) (0.014)  (0.014) (0.016)  (0.002) (0.015) 
Holiday 0.010** 0.001  0.047*** 0.058***  0.001 -0.050*** 
 (0.005) (0.006)  (0.005) (0.006)  (0.001) (0.006) 
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Table 3.10 Continued 
         
Independent variables Risky asset  Fairly safe asset  Safe asset 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 Ownership Portfolio share   Ownership Portfolio share   Ownership Portfolio share  
Speculation & recreation 0.039*** 0.042***  -0.001 -0.034***  0.003 0.013 
 (0.010) (0.011)  (0.014) (0.012)  (0.003) (0.011) 
Good interest & to see money grow 0.046*** 0.032***  0.065*** -0.003  0.002 -0.005 
 (0.007) (0.007)  (0.008) (0.007)  (0.002) (0.007) 
Trusted financial advisors (Dummies)         
Close associates 0.008 0.007  0.001 0.001  -0.000 -0.005 
 (0.005) (0.007)  (0.005) (0.007)  (0.001) (0.006) 
Print, media & internet 0.029*** 0.029***  0.017** 0.002  0.003* -0.010 
 (0.008) (0.008)  (0.008) (0.009)  (0.002) (0.008) 
Professional agents -0.007* -0.006  0.010** 0.013**  0.000 -0.016*** 
 (0.004) (0.006)  (0.004) (0.006)  (0.001) (0.005) 
Other independent advisors 0.009* 0.014**  0.014*** 0.018***  -0.002 -0.023*** 
 (0.005) (0.006)  (0.005) (0.006)  (0.001) (0.006) 
Independent financial advisors 0.013*** 0.017***  0.036*** 0.048***  0.001 -0.048*** 
 (0.005) (0.006)  (0.005) (0.006)  (0.001) (0.005) 
Housing tenure (Base=rents)         
Under a mortgage 0.026*** 0.031**  0.020** 0.135***  0.001 -0.117*** 
 (0.009) (0.013)  (0.009) (0.012)  (0.002) (0.011) 
Own outright  0.024*** 0.015  0.070*** 0.130***  0.002 -0.107*** 
 (0.009) (0.013)  (0.008) (0.012)  (0.002) (0.011) 
Time preference 0.015*** 0.004  0.019*** 0.000  -0.000 0.005 
 (0.005) (0.006)  (0.005) (0.006)  (0.001) (0.006) 
Risk tolerance 0.014*** 0.018***  -0.001 -0.019***  0.002* 0.009 
 (0.005) (0.006)  (0.005) (0.006)  (0.001) (0.006) 
Cognitive ability  0.025*** 0.023***  0.012** 0.010  0.001 -0.014** 
 (0.006) (0.008)  (0.005) (0.007)  (0.001) (0.007) 
Age -0.001 -0.004**  -0.002* 0.002*  0.000** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.001) 
Age square 0.000 0.000***  -0.000 -0.000***  -0.000* 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.008 0.013*  -0.046*** -0.054***  0.001 0.045*** 
 (0.006) (0.007)  (0.005) (0.007)  (0.001) (0.006) 
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Table 3.10 Continued 
         
Independent variables Risky asset  Fairly safe asset  Safe asset 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 Ownership Portfolio share   Ownership Portfolio share   Ownership Portfolio share  
Couple 0.003 -0.017**  0.032*** 0.032***  0.003*** -0.024*** 
 (0.006) (0.007)  (0.005) (0.007)  (0.001) (0.007) 
Degree level or above qualification 0.031*** 0.035***  0.020*** -0.013*  0.000 -0.001 
 (0.006) (0.007)  (0.006) (0.007)  (0.001) (0.006) 
Employed or self-employed 0.007 0.020**  -0.003 -0.006  0.004** 0.005 
 (0.007) (0.008)  (0.007) (0.008)  (0.001) (0.008) 
Has children -0.021*** -0.025***  -0.057*** -0.057***  -0.010*** 0.050*** 
 (0.007) (0.009)  (0.007) (0.008)  (0.002) (0.008) 
Lives in urban area -0.006 -0.010  0.011* 0.028***  -0.001 -0.020*** 
 (0.006) (0.007)  (0.006) (0.007)  (0.001) (0.006) 
Christian 0.024*** 0.026***  0.020*** 0.033***  0.003* -0.029*** 
 (0.006) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.008)  (0.001) (0.007) 
Has good health 0.019*** 0.027***  0.006 0.008  -0.002* -0.019*** 
 (0.005) (0.007)  (0.005) (0.007)  (0.001) (0.006) 
White British 0.015* 0.007  0.061*** 0.071***  -0.000 -0.061*** 
 (0.009) (0.012)  (0.008) (0.012)  (0.002) (0.011) 
Log of net household wealth 0.036*** 0.051***  0.010*** -0.003  0.000 -0.010*** 
 (0.004) (0.005)  (0.002) (0.004)  (0.000) (0.003) 
Log of net financial wealth 0.068*** 0.077***  0.091*** 0.124***  0.001*** -0.125*** 
 (0.002) (0.003)  (0.001) (0.002)  (0.000) (0.002) 
Region dummies (Base = North East)         
North West 0.009 0.007  0.013 0.010  -0.003 -0.016 
 (0.014) (0.018)  (0.012) (0.017)  (0.003) (0.016) 
Yorkshire & Humber 0.025* 0.016  0.030** 0.033*  -0.003 -0.029* 
 (0.014) (0.019)  (0.013) (0.018)  (0.003) (0.017) 
East Midlands 0.029** 0.006  0.034*** 0.031*  0.001 -0.026 
 (0.014) (0.018)  (0.013) (0.018)  (0.003) (0.017) 
West Midlands -0.010 -0.037**  0.024* 0.014  -0.001 -0.007 
 (0.014) (0.019)  (0.012) (0.018)  (0.003) (0.016) 
East of England 0.033** 0.031*  0.023* 0.009  -0.003 -0.015 
 (0.014) (0.018)  (0.012) (0.017)  (0.003) (0.016) 
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Table 3.10 Continued 
         
Independent variables Risky asset  Fairly safe asset  Safe asset 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 Ownership Portfolio share   Ownership Portfolio share   Ownership Portfolio share  
London 0.044*** 0.033*  -0.008 -0.065***  0.002 0.047*** 
 (0.014) (0.019)  (0.013) (0.018)  (0.003) (0.017) 
South East 0.058*** 0.053***  0.018 -0.023  0.001 0.005 
 (0.013) (0.017)  (0.012) (0.017)  (0.003) (0.015) 
South West 0.037*** 0.036*  0.031** 0.014  0.002 -0.024 
 (0.014) (0.018)  (0.013) (0.017)  (0.003) (0.016) 
Wales -0.011 -0.017  0.004 -0.005  -0.003 0.005 
 (0.016) (0.021)  (0.013) (0.020)  (0.003) (0.018) 
Scotland 0.012 0.024  0.009 0.024  -0.001 -0.033** 
 (0.014) (0.019)  (0.012) (0.018)  (0.003) (0.017) 
Year dummies (Base = 2006)         
2007 -0.016** -0.017**  -0.017*** -0.017**  0.001 0.017** 
 (0.006) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.008)  (0.001) (0.008) 
2008 -0.021*** -0.043***  0.013** 0.025***  0.002 -0.007 
 (0.006) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.008)  (0.002) (0.008) 
2009 -0.005 -0.038***  0.049*** 0.061***  0.007*** -0.034*** 
 (0.007) (0.009)  (0.007) (0.009)  (0.002) (0.008) 
2010 -0.017** -0.049***  0.052*** 0.081***  0.006*** -0.053*** 
 (0.008) (0.010)  (0.008) (0.011)  (0.002) (0.010) 
Constant  -1.713***   -1.162***   2.221*** 
  (0.057)   (0.045)   (0.042) 
Pseudo R 2  0.245 0.269  0.377 0.235  0.146 0.285 
Observations 34205 33988  34205 33988  34205 33453 
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 Regarding sources of financial advice, use of the “print, media and internet” has a 
significant effect on ownership and portfolio share in risky assets; use of “professional 
agents” has positive effects on both ownership of and portfolio share in fairly safe 
assets and a negative effect on portfolio share in safe assets; use of “other independent 
advisors” and “independent financial advisors” both have a positive effect on 
ownership of and portfolio share in risky assets and fairly safe assets, and have negative 
effects on portfolio share of safe assets. 
In sum, these results provide further support for Hypotheses (1) to (3) and our results in 
Table 3.4 to Table 3.9 which demonstrate that mental accounting behaviour can explain 
differences in portfolio choice. 
3.6 Robustness checks 
In classifying financial assets and constructing proxies for the key independent 
variables, I make assumptions regarding the level of risk ascribed across asset classes, 
and categorisations of both mental accounting and sources of financial advice. 
Furthermore, the separate regressions for different asset classes ignore common 
unobserved factors across these regressions. As these assumptions could contaminate 
the results, in this section I carry out robustness checks using sub-samples, alternative 
classifications of financial assets, and re-parameterized dependent variable.  Generally, 
the robustness checks are consistent with and strengthen the main conclusions.  
3.6.1 Multi-equation estimates 
A concern in all of the empirical analysis in Section 3.5 is that the estimated 
coefficients may be biased by possible correlations of error terms across the three sets 
of regressions for both asset ownership and portfolio share. In other words, there may 
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be common unobserved factors that influence the dependent variables in the three 
regressions. In addition, the separate equations do not provide a mechanism for testing 
whether the coefficient estimates are significantly different across the three regressions. 
Using the seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) framework (Zellner, 1962) to account 
for these correlations, I estimate  two-equation and three-equation models for both 
ownership and portfolio share using conditional mixed process (CMP) estimator 
(Roodman, 2009; Roodman, 2011). These models contain the same set of regressors. In 
the two-equation model, I exclude the equation for safe assets while all the three asset 
classes are included in the three-equation model. The two-equation model is given by 
Equation (9) and (10) while the three-equation model includes these two equations and 
Equation (11) as below: 
   
      
                                      
                          (9) 
 
      
                                      
                          (10) 
 
      
                                      
                         (11) 
Cov(       ) ≠ 0 
Cov(        ) ≠ 0      (12) 
Cov(       ) ≠ 0  
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Where the variables are as defined in Section 3.4; however, the subscripts r represents 
ownership of a risky asset, f represents ownership of a fairly safe asset and s represents 
ownership of a safe asset. The dependent variable, AC, represents either ownership 
of or portfolio share in each asset class. Most importantly, the error terms given by   
accounts for non-zero correlations of common unobserved factors across the three 
equations as in Equation (12) and the estimated coefficient represents the extent 
to which these factors determine ownership or portfolio share in each asset class. 
First, I run the ownership regressions in Table 3.9 using both a bivariate probit model 
(BPM) and a three-equation probit model (TPM). The BPM and the TPM estimates 
reported in Table 3.11 are generally consistent with those reported in Table 3.9 columns 
(1), (3) and (5); however, for some covariates the levels of significance improve and for 
others there is a miniscule increase in magnitude. This can be attributed to the low error 
correlations between equations. For the BPM, the correlation between the regression for 
ownership of a risky asset (column (1)) and that for ownership of a fairly safe asset 
(column (2)) is positive and significant. For the TPM, when compared to the BPM, the 
results for the risky asset ownership regression remain unchanged and they slightly 
change for the fairly safe asset ownership regression. There is a positive significant 
correlation between the equations for ownership of a risky asset and ownership of a 
fairly safe asset (0.144); an insignificant correlation between the equations for 
ownership of a risky asset and ownership of a safe asset; and a negative significant 
correlation between the equations for ownership of a fairly safe asset and ownership of 
a safe asset (0.188). Nevertheless, Wald tests show that the key variables mental 
accounting, financial advice and housing are significantly different from zero across the 
three equations.  
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Table 3.11 Bivariate and three-equation probit models estimates for asset 
ownership 
The table presents coefficient estimates from bivariate probit model (BPM) and three-equation probit 
model (MPM). The BPM is for ownership of a risky asset (column (1)) and ownership of a fairly safe 
asset (column (2)) while the MPM is for ownership a risky asset (column (3)), ownership of a fairly safe 
asset (column (4)) and ownership of a safe asset (column (5)). Risky assets include shares or stocks in 
listed or unlisted companies (overseas or UK). Fairly safe assets include investments in fixed-term 
investment bonds, unit or investment trust, employee share options and shares, overseas and UK gilts, 
endowment or regular premium policy, single premium policy, lump sum insurance policy, individual 
retirement accounts, or other financial assets. Safe assets include investments in individual savings and 
current accounts, friendly society saving plan, informal savings, or national savings products. Mental 
accounts is a categorical variable with three dummies: no mental account equals one if a household has 
no specific reason for saving money and zero otherwise (base level); single mental account equals one if 
a household identifies only one reason for saving money and zero otherwise; and multiple mental 
accounts equals one if a household identifies more than one reason for saving money and zero otherwise. 
Financial advice is a categorical variable with three dummies: no advice equals one if a respondent does 
not identify any source of advice (base level); single advice equals one if respondent identifies only one 
source of advice and zero otherwise; and multiple sources of advice equals one if respondent identifies 
more than one source of advice and zero otherwise. Housing tenure is a categorical variable with three 
dummies: rents current accommodation (base level); owns through a mortgage; and owns outright. The 
control variables as described in Table 3.1 are time preference, risk tolerance, cognitive ability, age, age 
square, male, couple, degree level or above, has children, lives in urban area, Christian, has good health, 
White British, log of net financial wealth, log of net household wealth, region dummies, and year 
dummies. The correlation coefficient between equations is represented by “atanhrho”, which is an 
unbounded transformation of “rho” using arc-hyperbolic tangents; the calculated p-value tests the 
hypothesis that the error terms of pairs of equations are not significantly different from zero. Standard 
errors are clustered at the individual level and are reported in parentheses. The levels of significance are 
given by * for 10%, ** for 5%, and *** for 1%. 
 
 Bivariate  probit model  Three-equation probit model 
Independent variables Ownership of 
risky asset 
Ownership 
of fairly safe 
asset 
 Ownership 
risky asset 
Ownership 
fair safe 
asset 
Ownership 
safe asset 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
Mental account (Base=none) 
      
Single mental account -0.305*** 0.127**  -0.305*** 0.127** 0.247 
 (0.101) (0.062)  (0.101) (0.062) (0.173) 
Multiple mental account 0.111 0.345***  0.111 0.345*** 0.291 
 (0.087) (0.064)  (0.086) (0.064) (0.184) 
Financial advice (Base=none)       
Single source -0.032 0.094***  -0.031 0.094*** -0.116 
 (0.040) (0.032)  (0.040) (0.032) (0.074) 
Multiple sources 0.078** 0.176***  0.078** 0.176*** 0.022 
 (0.039) (0.034)  (0.039) (0.034) (0.087) 
Home tenure (Base=rents)       
Under a mortgage -0.038 -0.029  -0.038 -0.031 0.120 
 (0.061) (0.045)  (0.061) (0.045) (0.098) 
Own outright  0.004 0.342***  0.004 0.341*** 0.129 
 (0.058) (0.042)  (0.058) (0.042) (0.097) 
Time preference 0.042 0.081**  0.042 0.081** -0.009 
 (0.038) (0.035)  (0.038) (0.035) (0.084) 
Risk tolerance 0.097** 0.035  0.097** 0.035 0.022 
 (0.038) (0.035)  (0.038) (0.035) (0.083) 
Cognitive ability  0.123*** 0.063**  0.123*** 0.063** 0.020 
 (0.041) (0.031)  (0.041) (0.031) (0.064) 
Single mental account * single source 0.044 0.011  0.044 0.011 0.007 
 (0.058) (0.051)  (0.058) (0.051) (0.144) 
Single mental account * multiple sources 0.041 0.048  0.041 0.047 -0.171 
 (0.057) (0.054)  (0.057) (0.054) (0.151) 
Multiple mental account * single source -0.048 -0.089*  -0.048 -0.088* 0.440** 
 (0.053) (0.051)  (0.053) (0.051) (0.214) 
Multiple mental account * multiple sources -0.089* -0.009  -0.089* -0.009 0.020 
 (0.049) (0.050)  (0.049) (0.050) (0.162) 
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Table 3.11 continued 
       
 Bivariate  probit model  Three-equation probit model 
Independent variables Ownership of 
risky asset 
Ownership 
of fairly safe 
asset 
 Ownership 
risky asset 
Ownership 
fair safe 
asset 
Ownership 
safe asset 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
Single mental account * under a mortgage 0.360*** 0.172***  0.360*** 0.172*** -0.424*** 
 (0.093) (0.062)  (0.093) (0.062) (0.152) 
Single mental account * own outright 0.258*** -0.067  0.258*** -0.068 -0.217 
 (0.088) (0.056)  (0.088) (0.056) (0.153) 
Multiple mental account * under a mortgage 0.148* 0.199***  0.148* 0.200*** 0.109 
 (0.077) (0.060)  (0.077) (0.060) (0.185) 
Multiple mental account * own outright 0.109 -0.052  0.109 -0.052 -0.072 
 (0.073) (0.057)  (0.073) (0.057) (0.179) 
Single mental account * time preference 0.048 -0.013  0.049 -0.012 0.018 
 (0.054) (0.054)  (0.054) (0.054) (0.151) 
Multiple mental account * time preference 0.030 0.027  0.030 0.026 -0.117 
 (0.046) (0.050)  (0.046) (0.050) (0.158) 
Single mental account * risk tolerance  -0.096* -0.033  -0.096* -0.033 0.500** 
 (0.056) (0.055)  (0.056) (0.055) (0.215) 
Multiple mental account * risk tolerance -0.024 -0.064  -0.023 -0.065 -0.046 
 (0.048) (0.051)  (0.048) (0.051) (0.166) 
Single mental account * cognitive ability  0.036 -0.030  0.036 -0.030 0.112 
 (0.059) (0.048)  (0.059) (0.048) (0.123) 
Multiple mental account * cognitive ability -0.045 0.006  -0.045 0.005 0.049 
 (0.053) (0.048)  (0.053) (0.048) (0.163) 
Age -0.005 -0.003  -0.005 -0.003 0.019** 
 (0.005) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) 
Age square 0.000 -0.000*  0.000 -0.000* -0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.038 -0.197***  0.039 -0.197*** 0.053 
 (0.024) (0.023)  (0.024) (0.023) (0.053) 
Couple 0.005 0.143***  0.005 0.143*** 0.184*** 
 (0.024) (0.023)  (0.024) (0.023) (0.058) 
Degree level or above qualification 0.142*** 0.097***  0.142*** 0.097*** 0.033 
 (0.024) (0.027)  (0.024) (0.027) (0.070) 
Employed or self-employed 0.037 -0.000  0.038 0.000 0.192*** 
 (0.029) (0.029)  (0.029) (0.029) (0.074) 
Has children -0.099*** -0.251***  -0.099*** -0.250*** -0.421*** 
 (0.029) (0.028)  (0.029) (0.028) (0.059) 
Lives in urban area -0.024 0.048**  -0.024 0.048** -0.070 
 (0.024) (0.024)  (0.024) (0.024) (0.068) 
Christian 0.100*** 0.086***  0.100*** 0.086*** 0.114* 
 (0.028) (0.027)  (0.028) (0.027) (0.060) 
Has good health 0.085*** 0.033  0.085*** 0.034 -0.097 
 (0.023) (0.022)  (0.023) (0.022) (0.061) 
White British 0.069* 0.269***  0.069* 0.269*** -0.011 
 (0.040) (0.035)  (0.040) (0.035) (0.083) 
Log of net household wealth 0.162*** 0.045***  0.162*** 0.046*** 0.020 
 (0.015) (0.011)  (0.015) (0.011) (0.017) 
Log of net financial wealth 0.296*** 0.412***  0.296*** 0.413*** 0.048*** 
 (0.008) (0.008)  (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) 
Region (Base = North East)       
North West 0.035 0.057  0.035 0.057 -0.130 
 (0.059) (0.054)  (0.059) (0.054) (0.136) 
Yorkshire & Humber 0.105* 0.137**  0.105* 0.137** -0.135 
 (0.061) (0.056)  (0.061) (0.056) (0.140) 
East Midlands 0.124** 0.156***  0.124** 0.157*** 0.038 
 (0.061) (0.057)  (0.061) (0.057) (0.152) 
West Midlands -0.040 0.112**  -0.041 0.113** -0.056 
 (0.061) (0.055)  (0.061) (0.055) (0.141) 
East of England 0.135** 0.100*  0.135** 0.099* -0.169 
 (0.059) (0.055)  (0.059) (0.055) (0.139) 
London 0.189*** -0.025  0.189*** -0.025 0.146 
 (0.061) (0.058)  (0.061) (0.058) (0.154) 
South East 0.252*** 0.089*  0.252*** 0.089* 0.052 
 (0.056) (0.053)  (0.056) (0.053) (0.144) 
South West 0.161*** 0.147***  0.161*** 0.148*** 0.103 
 (0.060) (0.056)  (0.060) (0.056) (0.161) 
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Table 3.11 continued 
       
 Bivariate  probit model  Three-equation probit model 
Independent variables Ownership of 
risky asset 
Ownership 
of fairly safe 
asset 
 Ownership 
risky asset 
Ownership 
fair safe 
asset 
Ownership 
safe asset 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
Wales -0.054 0.013  -0.054 0.013 -0.107 
 (0.067) (0.060)  (0.067) (0.060) (0.153) 
Scotland 0.048 0.045  0.048 0.044 -0.033 
 (0.060) (0.055)  (0.060) (0.055) (0.140) 
Year (Base = 2006)       
2007 -0.065** -0.088***  -0.065** -0.088*** 0.061 
 (0.027) (0.027)  (0.027) (0.027) (0.071) 
2008 -0.085*** 0.033  -0.085*** 0.033 0.122 
 (0.026) (0.028)  (0.026) (0.028) (0.084) 
2009 -0.021 0.188***  -0.021 0.188*** 0.379*** 
 (0.031) (0.032)  (0.031) (0.032) (0.101) 
2010 -0.079** 0.201***  -0.080** 0.201*** 0.347*** 
 (0.036) (0.038)  (0.036) (0.038) (0.119) 
Constant -6.173*** -4.463***  -6.175*** -4.466*** 0.855*** 
 (0.183) (0.141)  (0.183) (0.141) (0.271) 
Correlation coefficients between residuals       
atanhrho_12  0.145***     
  (0.015)     
atanhrho_34      0.144*** 
      (0.015) 
atanhrho_35      0.053 
(0.050) 
atanhrho_45      -0.188*** 
(0.041) 
Observations 34205 34205  34205 34205 34205 
 
 
 
Using the BPM, I further investigate whether mental accounting, financial advice and 
housing are differentially associated with different combinations of ownership of the 
two asset classes. The results reported in Table 3.12, show that having multiple mental 
accounts, multiple sources of financial advice and homeownership increases the 
bivariate probability of owning both a risky and a fairly safe asset (column (1)) or 
owning a fairly safe and not a risky asset (column (4)). In contrast, these variables are 
negatively associated with the bivariate probability of not owning either of the two 
assets (column (2)) and owning a risky and not a fairly safe asset (column (3). These 
results are consistent with the marginal effects reported in Table 3.13 for the univariate 
and conditional probabilities of ownership of a risky asset and fairly safe asset.  
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Table 3.12 Bivariate marginal effects for different ownership combinations  
The table presents marginal effects from bivariate probit regressions for the probability of owning both a 
risky and a fairly safe asset (column (1)); the probability of not owning either asset (Column (2)); the 
probability of owning a risky asset and not owning a fairly safe asset (column (3)); and the probability of 
owning a fairly safe asset and not owning a risky asset (column (4)).  Risky assets include shares or 
stocks in listed or unlisted companies (overseas or UK). Fairly safe assets include investments in fixed-
term investment bonds, unit or investment trust, employee share options and shares, overseas and UK 
gilts, endowment or regular premium policy, single premium policy, lump sum insurance policy, 
individual retirement accounts, or other financial assets. Safe assets include investments in individual 
savings and current accounts, friendly society saving plan, informal savings, or national savings products. 
Mental accounts is a categorical variable with three dummies: no mental account equals one if a 
household has no specific reason for saving money and zero otherwise (base level); single mental account 
equals one if a household identifies only one reason for saving money and zero otherwise; and multiple 
mental accounts equals one if a household identifies more than one reason for saving money and zero 
otherwise. Financial advice is a categorical variable with three dummies: no advice equals one if a 
respondent does not identify any source of advice (base level); single advice equals one if respondent 
identifies only one source of advice and zero otherwise; and multiple sources of advice equals one if 
respondent identifies more than one source of advice and zero otherwise. Housing tenure is a categorical 
variable with three dummies: rents current accommodation (base level); owns through a mortgage; and 
owns outright. The control variables as described in Table 3.1 are time preference, risk tolerance, 
cognitive ability, age, age square, male, couple, degree level or above, has children, lives in urban area, 
Christian, has good health, White British, log of net financial wealth, log of net household wealth, region 
dummies, and year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and are reported in 
parentheses. The levels of significance are given by * for 10%, ** for 5%, and *** for 1%. 
 
Independent variable Probability 
(risky=1 and    
fairly safe =1) 
Probability 
(risky=0 and    
fairly safe =0) 
Probability 
(risky=1 and    
fairly safe =0) 
Probability 
(risky=0 and    
fairly safe =1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mental account (Base=none)     
Single mental account 0.002 -0.042*** -0.008*** 0.047*** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.002) (0.008) 
Multiple mental account 0.040*** -0.109*** -0.009*** 0.078*** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.002) (0.008) 
Financial advice (Base=none)     
Single source -0.004 -0.018** -0.005*** 0.026*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.002) (0.008) 
Multiple sources 0.019*** -0.058*** -0.005*** 0.044*** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.002) (0.008) 
Housing tenure (Base=rents)     
Under a mortgage 0.021*** -0.034*** 0.003 0.010 
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.003) (0.013) 
Own outright  0.032*** -0.099*** -0.007*** 0.074*** 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.003) (0.013) 
Time preference 0.016*** -0.029*** -0.000 0.014* 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.002) (0.007) 
Risk tolerance 0.012*** -0.005 0.004** -0.011 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.002) (0.008) 
Cognitive ability  0.022*** -0.024*** 0.004** -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.002) (0.008) 
Age -0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Age square 0.000 0.000* 0.000* -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male -0.002 0.056*** 0.011*** -0.065*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.002) (0.008) 
Couple 0.007* -0.043*** -0.006*** 0.042*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.002) (0.008) 
Degree level or above qualification 0.031*** -0.036*** 0.004* 0.002 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.002) (0.009) 
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Table 3.12 continued 
     
Independent variable Probability 
(risky=1 and    
fairly safe =1) 
Probability 
(risky=0 and    
fairly safe =0) 
Probability 
(risky=1 and    
fairly safe =0) 
Probability 
(risky=0 and    
fairly safe =1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Employed or self-employed 0.007 -0.002 0.002 -0.007 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.002) (0.010) 
Has children -0.028*** 0.084*** 0.005** -0.061*** 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.002) (0.010) 
Lives in urban area -0.002 -0.013* -0.004** 0.019** 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.002) (0.008) 
Christian 0.021*** -0.032*** 0.002 0.009 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.002) (0.009) 
Has good health 0.016*** -0.015** 0.003** -0.005 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.002) (0.007) 
White British 0.024*** -0.089*** -0.008*** 0.073*** 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.003) (0.013) 
Log of net household wealth 0.031*** -0.023*** 0.007*** -0.016*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) 
Log of net financial wealth 0.072*** -0.139*** -0.002*** 0.070*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) 
Region dummies (Base = North East)     
North West 0.008 -0.020 -0.000 0.012 
 (0.010) (0.017) (0.004) (0.019) 
Yorkshire & Humber 0.024** -0.047*** -0.000 0.024 
 (0.011) (0.018) (0.004) (0.019) 
East Midlands 0.028*** -0.054*** 0.000 0.026 
 (0.011) (0.018) (0.004) (0.020) 
West Midlands -0.002 -0.033* -0.006* 0.041** 
 (0.010) (0.018) (0.004) (0.019) 
East of England 0.027*** -0.038** 0.003 0.007 
 (0.010) (0.018) (0.004) (0.019) 
London 0.031*** -0.004 0.013*** -0.040** 
 (0.011) (0.019) (0.004) (0.020) 
South East 0.050*** -0.042** 0.011*** -0.019 
 (0.010) (0.017) (0.004) (0.018) 
South West 0.035*** -0.053*** 0.002 0.016 
 (0.011) (0.018) (0.004) (0.019) 
Wales -0.008 -0.001 -0.003 0.012 
 (0.011) (0.019) (0.004) (0.021) 
Scotland 0.010 -0.017 0.001 0.006 
 (0.010) (0.018) (0.004) (0.019) 
Year dummies (Base = 2006)     
2007 -0.016*** 0.031*** 0.000 -0.015* 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.002) (0.009) 
2008 -0.014*** -0.005 -0.007*** 0.025*** 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.002) (0.009) 
2009 0.005 -0.052*** -0.010*** 0.057*** 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.002) (0.011) 
2010 -0.006 -0.053*** -0.013*** 0.072*** 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.002) (0.012) 
Interaction terms Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 34205 34205 34205 34205 
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Table 3.13 Univariate and conditional marginal effects 
The table presents marginal effects for the univariate (column (1) and (2)) and conditional (column (3) 
and (4)) probability of success for ownership of a risky asset and ownership of a fairly safe asset. Risky 
assets include shares or stocks in listed or unlisted companies (overseas or UK). Fairly safe assets include 
investments in fixed-term investment bonds, unit or investment trust, employee share options and shares, 
overseas and UK gilts, endowment or regular premium policy, single premium policy, lump sum 
insurance policy, individual retirement accounts, or other financial assets. Safe assets include investments 
in individual savings and current accounts, friendly society saving plan, informal savings, or national 
savings products. Mental accounts is a categorical variable with three dummies: no mental account equals 
one if a household has no specific reason for saving money and zero otherwise (base level); single mental 
account equals one if a household identifies only one reason for saving money and zero otherwise; and 
multiple mental accounts equals one if a household identifies more than one reason for saving money and 
zero otherwise. Financial advice is a categorical variable with three dummies: no advice equals one if a 
respondent does not identify any source of advice (base level); single advice equals one if respondent 
identifies only one source of advice and zero otherwise; and multiple sources of advice equals one if 
respondent identifies more than one source of advice and zero otherwise. Housing tenure is a categorical 
variable with three dummies: rents current accommodation (base level); owns through a mortgage; and 
owns outright. The control variables as described in Table 3.1 are time preference, risk tolerance, 
cognitive ability, age, age square, male, couple, degree level or above, has children, lives in urban area, 
Christian, has good health, White British, log of net financial wealth, log of net household wealth, region 
dummies, and year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and are reported in 
parentheses. The levels of significance are given by * for 10%, ** for 5%, and *** for 1%. 
 
 
 Univariate probability of success  Conditional probability of 
success 
Independent variables (risky=1)   (fairly 
safe=1) 
  (risky=1 | 
fairly safe =1) 
 (fairly safe=1 
| risky=1) 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Mental account (Base=none)      
Single mental account -0.005 0.049***  -0.008 0.044*** 
 (0.006) (0.008)  (0.007) (0.007) 
Multiple mental account 0.031*** 0.118***  0.027*** 0.098*** 
 (0.006) (0.007)  (0.006) (0.007) 
Financial advice (Base=none)      
Single source -0.009 0.023***  -0.011* 0.021*** 
 (0.006) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.007) 
Multiple sources 0.013** 0.063***  0.011* 0.053*** 
 (0.006) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.007) 
Housing tenure (Base=rents)      
Under a mortgage 0.023** 0.031**  0.024** 0.024** 
 (0.009) (0.013)  (0.010) (0.012) 
Own outright  0.024*** 0.106***  0.021** 0.088*** 
 (0.009) (0.012)  (0.010) (0.011) 
Time preference 0.016*** 0.030***  0.015*** 0.023*** 
 (0.005) (0.007)  (0.006) (0.006) 
Risk tolerance 0.016*** 0.001  0.017*** -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.007) 
Cognitive ability  0.026*** 0.020**  0.027*** 0.013* 
 (0.006) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.007) 
Age -0.001 -0.001  -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Age square 0.000 -0.000*  0.000 -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.009 -0.067***  0.013** -0.059*** 
 (0.006) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.007) 
Couple 0.001 0.049***  -0.001 0.043*** 
 (0.006) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.007) 
Degree level or above qualification 0.035*** 0.033***  0.035*** 0.024*** 
 (0.006) (0.009)  (0.006) (0.008) 
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Table 3.13 continued 
      
 Univariate probability of success  Conditional probability of 
success 
Independent variables (risky=1)   (fairly 
safe=1) 
  (risky=1 | 
fairly safe =1) 
 (fairly safe=1 
| risky=1) 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Employed or self-employed 0.009 -0.000  0.009 -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.010)  (0.007) (0.009) 
Has children -0.023*** -0.089***  -0.020*** -0.075*** 
 (0.006) (0.010)  (0.007) (0.009) 
Lives in urban area -0.006 0.017**  -0.007 0.015** 
 (0.006) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.007) 
Christian 0.023*** 0.030***  0.023*** 0.022*** 
 (0.006) (0.010)  (0.007) (0.008) 
Has good health 0.020*** 0.011  0.021*** 0.007 
 (0.005) (0.007)  (0.006) (0.006) 
White British 0.016* 0.097***  0.012 0.084*** 
 (0.009) (0.013)  (0.010) (0.012) 
Log of net household wealth 0.038*** 0.015***  0.040*** 0.008** 
 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.003) 
Log of net financial wealth 0.070*** 0.141***  0.068*** 0.112*** 
 (0.002) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.004) 
Region dummies (Base = North East)      
North West 0.008 0.020  0.007 0.016 
 (0.013) (0.019)  (0.014) (0.017) 
Yorkshire & Humber 0.023* 0.047**  0.023 0.037** 
 (0.013) (0.019)  (0.014) (0.017) 
East Midlands 0.028** 0.054***  0.028* 0.042** 
 (0.013) (0.020)  (0.014) (0.017) 
West Midlands -0.008 0.039**  -0.011 0.035** 
 (0.013) (0.019)  (0.014) (0.017) 
East of England 0.031** 0.035*  0.031** 0.026 
 (0.013) (0.019)  (0.014) (0.017) 
London 0.044*** -0.009  0.048*** -0.015 
 (0.014) (0.021)  (0.015) (0.018) 
South East 0.061*** 0.031*  0.064*** 0.018 
 (0.013) (0.019)  (0.013) (0.016) 
South West 0.037*** 0.051***  0.037*** 0.038** 
 (0.013) (0.019)  (0.014) (0.017) 
Wales -0.011 0.005  -0.012 0.006 
 (0.014) (0.021)  (0.015) (0.018) 
Scotland 0.010 0.016  0.011 0.012 
 (0.013) (0.019)  (0.014) (0.017) 
Year dummies (Base = 2006)      
2007 -0.016** -0.031***  -0.015** -0.025*** 
 (0.007) (0.010)  (0.007) (0.008) 
2008 -0.020*** 0.011  -0.022*** 0.013 
 (0.006) (0.010)  (0.007) (0.008) 
2009 -0.005 0.062***  -0.009 0.054*** 
 (0.008) (0.011)  (0.008) (0.009) 
2010 -0.019** 0.066***  -0.024*** 0.059*** 
 (0.008) (0.012)  (0.009) (0.011) 
Interaction terms Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 34205 34205  34205 34205 
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Second, I estimate the portfolio share regressions in Table 3.9, columns (2), (4) and (6), 
using a bivariate tobit model (BTM) and a three-equation tobit model (TTM). The 
results are reported in Table 3.14. Unlike the results for asset ownership reported in 
Table 3.11, when compared to the results in Table 3.9, here we see significant 
differences within and across models, especially for the TTM model. The estimates for 
the BTM model are generally consistent with those in Table 3.9, with a negative 
significant correlation (0.206). In the three-equation model, the coefficient estimates 
drop by more than 50% and the levels of significance either drop or increase across the 
three equations. The three pairs of correlation coefficients for the residuals are all 
negative and highly significant: that is, between equations for portfolio share in a risky 
asset and a fairly safe asset, 0.193; for portfolio share in a risky asset and in a safe asset, 
0.213; and for portfolio share in a fairly safe asset and in a safe asset, 1.551.  
Taken together, these results show that, although the residuals are correlated across 
equations, mental accounting behaviour is associated with both ownership of and 
portfolio share in a risky asset, a fairly safe asset and a safe asset.     
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Table 3.14 Bivariate and three-equation tobit estimates for portfolio share  
The table presents coefficient estimates from bivariate tobit model (BTM) and three-equation tobit model 
(TTM). The BTM is for portfolio share in a risky asset (column (1)) and portfolio share in a fairly safe 
asset (column (2)) while the TTM is for portfolio share in a risky asset (column (3)), portfolio share in a 
fairly safe asset (column (4)) and portfolio share in a safe asset (column (5)). Risky assets include shares 
or stocks in listed or unlisted companies (overseas or UK). Fairly safe assets include investments in fixed-
term investment bonds, unit or investment trust, employee share options and shares, overseas and UK 
gilts, endowment or regular premium policy, single premium policy, lump sum insurance policy, 
individual retirement accounts, or other financial assets. Safe assets include investments in individual 
savings and current accounts, friendly society saving plan, informal savings, or national savings products. 
Mental accounts is a categorical variable with three dummies: no mental account equals one if a 
household has no specific reason for saving money and zero otherwise (base level); single mental account 
equals one if a household identifies only one reason for saving money and zero otherwise; and multiple 
mental accounts equals one if a household identifies more than one reason for saving money and zero 
otherwise. Financial advice is a categorical variable with three dummies: no advice equals one if a 
respondent does not identify any source of advice (base level); single advice equals one if respondent 
identifies only one source of advice and zero otherwise; and multiple sources of advice equals one if 
respondent identifies more than one source of advice and zero otherwise. Housing tenure is a categorical 
variable with three dummies: rents current accommodation (base level); owns through a mortgage; and 
owns outright. The control variables as described in Table 3.1 are time preference, risk tolerance, 
cognitive ability, age, age square, male, couple, degree level or above, has children, lives in urban area, 
Christian, has good health, White British, log of net financial wealth, log of net household wealth, region 
dummies, and year dummies. The correlation coefficient between equations is represented by “atanhrho”, 
which is an unbounded transformation of “rho” using arc-hyperbolic tangents; the calculated p-value tests 
the hypothesis that the error terms of pairs of equations are not significantly different from zero. Standard 
errors are clustered at the individual level and are reported in parentheses. The levels of significance are 
given by * for 10%, ** for 5%, and *** for 1%. 
 
 Bivairate tobit model   Three-equation tobit model 
Independent variable Portfolio 
share risky 
asset 
Portfolio 
share fairly 
safe asset 
 Portfolio share 
risky asset 
Portfolio 
share fair 
safe asset 
Portfolio 
share safe 
asset 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
Mental account (Base=none) 
      
Single mental account -0.069** 0.108***  -0.015* 0.025* 0.012 
 (0.032) (0.025)  (0.009) (0.014) (0.012) 
Multiple mental account 0.042 0.225***  0.018** 0.085*** -0.028** 
 (0.027) (0.024)  (0.008) (0.015) (0.014) 
Financial advice (Base=none)       
Single source -0.010 0.061***  -0.001 0.031*** -0.027*** 
 (0.013) (0.012)  (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) 
Multiple sources 0.029** 0.084***  0.010** 0.047*** -0.051*** 
 (0.013) (0.013)  (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) 
Home tenure (Base=rents)       
Under a mortgage 0.016 0.129***  0.011 0.059*** -0.020** 
 (0.021) (0.019)  (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) 
Own outright  0.010 0.206***  0.014** 0.116*** -0.065*** 
 (0.019) (0.017)  (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) 
Time preference -0.006 0.023*  -0.003 0.013 -0.006 
 (0.012) (0.012)  (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) 
Risk tolerance 0.036*** -0.005  0.014*** -0.003 -0.006 
 (0.013) (0.012)  (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) 
Cognitive ability  0.019 0.030**  0.004 0.015** -0.009 
 (0.014) (0.012)  (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) 
Single mental account * single source 0.014 -0.028  0.003 -0.008 0.006 
 (0.018) (0.018)  (0.005) (0.012) (0.011) 
Single mental account * multiple sources 0.004 -0.034*  0.000 -0.011 0.011 
 (0.018) (0.018)  (0.006) (0.012) (0.012) 
Multiple mental account * single source -0.013 -0.035**  -0.007 -0.005 0.007 
 (0.016) (0.016)  (0.005) (0.011) (0.010) 
Multiple mental account * multiple sources -0.034** -0.047***  -0.009* -0.011 0.012 
 (0.015) (0.015)  (0.005) (0.011) (0.010) 
  
Mental accounting and portfolio choice 
 
 
 172 
Table 3.14 continued 
       
 Bivairate tobit model   Three-equation tobit model 
Independent variable Portfolio 
share risky 
asset 
Portfolio 
share fairly 
safe asset 
 Portfolio share 
risky asset 
Portfolio 
share fair 
safe asset 
Portfolio 
share safe 
asset 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
Single mental account * under a mortgage 0.058* 0.026  0.013 0.050*** -0.065*** 
 (0.031) (0.025)  (0.009) (0.015) (0.014) 
Single mental account * own outright 0.035 -0.077***  0.007 -0.015 -0.012 
 (0.029) (0.022)  (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) 
Multiple mental account * under a mortgage 0.006 -0.032  -0.007 0.022 -0.049*** 
 (0.025) (0.023)  (0.008) (0.015) (0.013) 
Multiple mental account * own outright 0.004 -0.155***  -0.003 -0.052*** 0.001 
 (0.023) (0.021)  (0.007) (0.013) (0.012) 
Single mental account * time preference 0.024 -0.032*  0.009 -0.018 0.010 
 (0.016) (0.017)  (0.006) (0.012) (0.011) 
Multiple mental account * time preference 0.009 -0.034**  0.003 -0.015 0.008 
 (0.014) (0.014)  (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) 
Single mental account * risk tolerance  -0.043** -0.019  -0.017*** -0.012 0.023** 
 (0.017) (0.017)  (0.006) (0.012) (0.011) 
Multiple mental account * risk tolerance -0.015 -0.023  -0.002 -0.015 0.011 
 (0.015) (0.015)  (0.005) (0.011) (0.010) 
Single mental account * cognitive ability  0.024 -0.025  0.008 -0.010 0.002 
 (0.019) (0.017)  (0.005) (0.011) (0.011) 
Multiple mental account * cognitive ability -0.017 -0.035**  -0.003 -0.012 0.006 
 (0.017) (0.015)  (0.005) (0.011) (0.010) 
Age -0.004*** 0.006***  -0.000 0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age square 0.000*** -0.000***  0.000 -0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.016** -0.051***  0.006** -0.031*** 0.024*** 
 (0.007) (0.007)  (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
Couple -0.018** 0.036***  -0.007*** 0.029*** -0.021*** 
 (0.007) (0.007)  (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Degree level or above qualification 0.035*** -0.018***  0.021*** -0.006 -0.013*** 
 (0.007) (0.007)  (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Employed or self-employed 0.017** -0.011  -0.001 -0.021*** 0.024*** 
 (0.008) (0.008)  (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) 
Has children -0.020** -0.055***  -0.003 -0.033*** 0.027*** 
 (0.009) (0.009)  (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) 
Lives in urban area -0.009 0.031***  -0.006** 0.020*** -0.012** 
 (0.007) (0.007)  (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Christian 0.023*** 0.025***  0.006** 0.017*** -0.019*** 
 (0.008) (0.008)  (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) 
Has good health 0.025*** 0.012*  0.008*** 0.010** -0.015*** 
 (0.007) (0.007)  (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
White British 0.006 0.083***  0.003 0.050*** -0.042*** 
 (0.012) (0.012)  (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) 
Log of net household wealth 0.049*** -0.007**  0.010*** -0.008*** 0.003* 
 (0.005) (0.004)  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Log of net financial wealth 0.075*** 0.126***  0.021*** 0.075*** -0.075*** 
 (0.003) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Region (Base = North East)       
North West 0.004 0.004  0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.018) (0.018)  (0.005) (0.012) (0.011) 
Yorkshire & Humber 0.021 0.028  0.004 0.014 -0.011 
 (0.019) (0.018)  (0.006) (0.013) (0.012) 
East Midlands 0.002 0.031*  -0.004 0.020 -0.011 
 (0.018) (0.018)  (0.006) (0.013) (0.012) 
West Midlands -0.035* 0.019  -0.013** 0.012 0.001 
 (0.019) (0.018)  (0.005) (0.012) (0.011) 
East of England 0.023 0.008  0.006 0.002 0.000 
 (0.018) (0.018)  (0.006) (0.012) (0.011) 
London 0.032* -0.069***  0.011* -0.048*** 0.043*** 
 (0.019) (0.018)  (0.006) (0.012) (0.012) 
South East 0.044*** -0.030*  0.016*** -0.024** 0.015 
 (0.017) (0.017)  (0.005) (0.012) (0.011) 
South West 0.032* 0.018  0.008 0.010 -0.009 
 (0.018) (0.018)  (0.006) (0.012) (0.012) 
  
Mental accounting and portfolio choice 
 
 
 173 
Table 3.14 continued  
       
 Bivairate tobit model   Three-equation tobit model 
Independent variable Portfolio 
share risky 
asset 
Portfolio 
share fairly 
safe asset 
 Portfolio share 
risky asset 
Portfolio 
share fair 
safe asset 
Portfolio 
share safe 
asset 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
Wales -0.011 -0.007  -0.004 -0.009 0.010 
 (0.021) (0.020)  (0.006) (0.014) (0.013) 
Scotland 0.017 0.026  0.006 0.018 -0.026** 
 (0.019) (0.018)  (0.006) (0.012) (0.011) 
Year (Base = 2006)       
2007 -0.008 -0.019**  -0.001 -0.011* 0.009 
 (0.008) (0.008)  (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) 
2008 -0.037*** 0.018**  -0.014*** 0.014** -0.001 
 (0.008) (0.008)  (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) 
2009 -0.031*** 0.056***  -0.015*** 0.041*** -0.022*** 
 (0.009) (0.009)  (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) 
2010 -0.048*** 0.082***  -0.020*** 0.063*** -0.041*** 
 (0.010) (0.011)  (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) 
Constant -1.629*** -1.323***  -0.363*** -0.604*** 1.545*** 
 (0.057) (0.047)  (0.016) (0.029) (0.026) 
       
Correlations coefficients between residuals       
atanhrho_12  -0.206***     
  (0.010)     
atanhrho_34      -0.193*** 
      (0.006) 
atanhrho_35      -0.213*** 
      (0.006) 
atanhrho_45      -1.551*** 
      (0.015) 
Observations 31227 31227  31227 31227 31227 
 
3.6.2 Estimates using sub-samples 
Although our main analyses show that mental accounting and housing tenure are 
important determinants of portfolio choice, the conditional analyses show variations in 
household behaviour when these variables are interacted together. This suggests that the 
effects of these variables are hidden in the complete sample or that there may be other 
household characteristics which have been subordinated in the main regressions. In the 
results reported in Table 3.15 I split the sample into sub-samples of mental accounting; 
no mental account, single mental account and multiple mental accounts. Further, to 
examine whether all coefficients vary between the full model for each asset class and 
the corresponding mental accounting sub-samples, I use Chow-type tests, which test the 
hypothesis that all coefficients of a model do not vary between disjointed subsets of the 
data (Hosmer and Leshow, 2000).  
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For housing tenure, outright ownership is significant for ownership of fairly safe assets 
among households that exhibit no mental account; both outright ownership and 
ownership through a mortgage are significant for ownership of risky assets and fairly 
safe assets, among households that exhibit a single mental account; and, for households 
that exhibit multiple mental accounts, both ownership through a mortgage and outright 
ownership have significant effects on ownership of fairly safe assets. Time preference 
has a significant effect on ownership of fairly safe assets for households that exhibit no 
mental account; it has a significant effect on ownership of risky asset for households 
that exhibit a single mental account; and it has a significant effect on ownership of both  
risky and fairly safe assets among household that exhibit multiple mental accounts. This 
implies that households time preferences are linked with ownership of financial 
products especially fairly safe assets.  
The effect of risk tolerance is significant for ownership of risky assets among 
households that exhibit no mental account and multiple mental accounts; and it is 
significant for ownership of safe assets among households that exhibit a single mental 
account. Cognitive ability has a significant effect on ownership of risky assets among 
households that exhibit no mental account and those that exhibit a single mental 
account.  
Panel B presents the results for portfolio share in the three asset classes. The results are 
generally consistent with the results reported in Table 3.8. However, for housing tenure 
(both under a mortgage and outright ownership), the results differ and I find significant 
effects on portfolio share in risky assets among households that exhibit a single mental 
account and none for households that exhibit no mental account or multiple mental 
accounts. 
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Table 3.15 Estimates using sub-samples of mental accounts 
The table presents marginal effects from both pooled probit regressions (Panel A) and from pooled tobit regressions (Panel B). The dependent variables are risky asset, fairly 
safe asset and safe asset; ownership equals one if households owns at least one asset in each asset class or zero otherwise and portfolio share is the proportion of financial 
assets invested in each asset class to total financial assets. Risky assets include shares or stocks in listed or unlisted companies (overseas or UK). Fairly safe assets include 
investments in fixed-term investment bonds, unit or investment trust, employee share options and shares, overseas and UK gilts, endowment or regular premium policy, 
single premium policy, lump sum insurance policy, individual retirement accounts, or other financial assets. Safe assets include investments in individual savings and current 
accounts, friendly society saving plan, informal savings, or national savings products. Mental accounts is a categorical variable with three dummies: no mental account equals 
one if a household has no specific reason for saving money and zero otherwise (base level); single mental account equals one if a household identifies only one reason for 
saving money and zero otherwise; and multiple mental accounts equals one if a household identifies more than one reason for saving money and zero otherwise. Financial 
advice is a categorical variable with three dummies: no advice equals one if a respondent does not identify any source of advice (base level); single advice equals one if 
respondent identifies only one source of advice and zero otherwise; and multiple sources of advice equals one if respondent identifies more than one source of advice and 
zero otherwise. Housing tenure is a categorical variable with three dummies: rents current accommodation (base level); owns through a mortgage; and owns outright. The 
control variables as described in Table 3.1 are time preference, risk tolerance, cognitive ability, age, age square, male, couple, degree level or above, has children, lives in 
urban area, Christian, has good health, White British, log of net financial wealth, log of net household wealth, region dummies, and year dummies. Standard errors are 
clustered at the individual level and are reported in parentheses. The levels of significance are given by * for 10%, ** for 5%, and *** for 1%. 
 
Independent variable No mental account  Single mental account  Multiple mental accounts 
 Risky asset Fairly safe 
asset 
Safe asset  Risky asset Fairly safe 
asset 
Safe asset  Risky asset Fairly safe 
asset 
Safe asset 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Panel A: Probability of ownership            
            
Financial advice (Base=none)            
Single source -0.007 0.022** -0.005*  0.001 0.030*** -0.002  -0.021* 0.001 0.002 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.003)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.002)  (0.011) (0.008) (0.001) 
Multiple sources 0.011 0.044*** -0.000  0.026** 0.058*** -0.003  0.001 0.030*** 0.001 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.003)  (0.011) (0.012) (0.003)  (0.011) (0.008) (0.001) 
Housing tenure (Base=rents)            
Under a mortgage -0.015 -0.008 0.004  0.092*** 0.034* -0.007**  0.030* 0.035*** 0.002 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.003)  (0.017) (0.018) (0.003)  (0.018) (0.013) (0.001) 
Own outright  -0.007 0.072*** 0.004  0.070*** 0.080*** -0.001  0.035* 0.068*** 0.000 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.003)  (0.017) (0.017) (0.002)  (0.018) (0.013) (0.002) 
Time preference 0.008 0.018** -0.000  0.022** 0.017 -0.000  0.021** 0.021*** -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.003)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.002)  (0.009) (0.007) (0.001) 
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Table 3.15 Continued 
            
Independent variable No mental account  Single mental account  Multiple mental accounts 
 Risky asset Fairly safe 
asset 
Safe asset  Risky asset Fairly safe 
asset 
Safe asset  Risky asset Fairly safe 
asset 
Safe asset 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Panel A: Probability of ownership            
Risk tolerance 0.019*** 0.008 0.001  0.002 -0.001 0.006***  0.019** -0.004 -0.000 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.003)  (0.010) (0.011) (0.001)  (0.009) (0.007) (0.001) 
Cognitive ability  0.021*** 0.013 0.001  0.040*** 0.007 0.002  0.020* 0.015* 0.001 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.002)  (0.011) (0.010) (0.002)  (0.011) (0.008) (0.001) 
Age -0.000 0.001 0.001***  -0.001 0.001 -0.000  -0.002 -0.003* 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.000)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.000)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
Age square 0.000 -0.000* -0.000**  0.000 -0.000* 0.000  0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.001 -0.046*** 0.001  0.002 -0.047*** 0.002  0.023** -0.040*** -0.000 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.002)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.002)  (0.010) (0.007) (0.001) 
Couple -0.001 0.042*** 0.006**  -0.002 0.041*** 0.003*  0.009 0.016** 0.000 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.002)  (0.010) (0.011) (0.002)  (0.010) (0.008) (0.001) 
Degree level or above qualification 0.029*** 0.035*** 0.004  0.048*** 0.015 -0.004  0.032*** 0.015* 0.000 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.003)  (0.011) (0.012) (0.003)  (0.010) (0.008) (0.001) 
Employed or self-employed 0.008 0.001 0.008***  -0.007 0.011 0.003  0.018 -0.010 -0.002** 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.003)  (0.013) (0.014) (0.003)  (0.012) (0.010) (0.001) 
Has children -0.015 -0.073*** -0.018***  -0.023* -0.041*** -0.007**  -0.032*** -0.049*** -0.003** 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.004)  (0.013) (0.013) (0.003)  (0.012) (0.009) (0.001) 
Lives in urban area 0.001 0.002 -0.004*  -0.023** 0.007 -0.002  -0.001 0.024*** 0.002 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.002)  (0.010) (0.011) (0.002)  (0.010) (0.008) (0.001) 
Christian 0.003 0.011 0.002  0.040*** 0.028** 0.007**  0.034*** 0.018** -0.000 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.003)  (0.011) (0.012) (0.003)  (0.011) (0.009) (0.001) 
Has good health 0.016** 0.012 -0.005**  0.017 0.003 0.001  0.026** 0.006 0.000 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.002)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.002)  (0.010) (0.008) (0.001) 
White British 0.022* 0.068*** 0.003  0.002 0.064*** -0.002  0.017 0.061*** -0.001 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.004)  (0.018) (0.017) (0.002)  (0.017) (0.013) (0.001) 
Log of net household wealth 0.036*** 0.009** 0.001  0.029*** 0.009* 0.000  0.042*** 0.013*** 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.001)  (0.007) (0.005) (0.001)  (0.007) (0.004) (0.000) 
Log of net financial wealth 0.047*** 0.105*** 0.001  0.072*** 0.100*** 0.002***  0.097*** 0.073*** 0.001*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.000)  (0.004) (0.003) (0.000)  (0.004) (0.003) (0.000) 
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Table 3.15 Continued 
Independent variable No mental account  Single mental account  Multiple mental accounts 
 Risky asset Fairly safe 
asset 
Safe asset  Risky asset Fairly safe 
asset 
Safe asset  Risky asset Fairly safe 
asset 
Safe asset 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Panel A: Probability of ownership            
Region (Base = North East)            
North West -0.016 0.034 -0.009  0.035 -0.004 0.001  0.015 0.004 0.000 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.006)  (0.026) (0.023) (0.004)  (0.025) (0.016) (0.002) 
Yorkshire & Humber 0.015 0.041* -0.009  0.037 0.041* 0.002  0.022 0.018 0.000 
 (0.018) (0.022) (0.006)  (0.027) (0.024) (0.005)  (0.026) (0.017) (0.002) 
East Midlands 0.008 0.047** -0.004  0.075*** 0.048* 0.001  0.020 0.017  
 (0.018) (0.022) (0.006)  (0.026) (0.025) (0.005)  (0.026) (0.018)  
West Midlands -0.017 0.049** -0.006  0.006 0.024 -0.001  -0.011 -0.000 0.003 
 (0.018) (0.022) (0.006)  (0.026) (0.023) (0.004)  (0.027) (0.017) (0.003) 
East of England 0.022 0.046** -0.010*  0.078*** 0.029 -0.002  0.006 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.018) (0.022) (0.006)  (0.025) (0.023) (0.004)  (0.025) (0.016) (0.002) 
London 0.020 0.000 0.000  0.102*** 0.012 0.005  0.030 -0.022 0.003 
 (0.019) (0.023) (0.006)  (0.026) (0.024) (0.005)  (0.026) (0.018) (0.003) 
South East 0.032* 0.040* 0.001  0.083*** 0.021 0.000  0.069*** 0.003 0.001 
 (0.017) (0.021) (0.006)  (0.024) (0.023) (0.004)  (0.024) (0.016) (0.002) 
South West 0.023 0.048** 0.006  0.076*** 0.041* 0.004  0.026 0.015 -0.001 
 (0.018) (0.022) (0.007)  (0.026) (0.024) (0.005)  (0.026) (0.017) (0.002) 
Wales -0.018 0.013 -0.009  0.011 0.026 0.002  -0.023 -0.023 0.001 
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.006)  (0.028) (0.025) (0.005)  (0.029) (0.019) (0.002) 
Scotland -0.008 0.017 -0.007  0.040 0.002 0.003  0.013 0.013 0.002 
 (0.018) (0.022) (0.006)  (0.025) (0.022) (0.004)  (0.026) (0.017) (0.002) 
Year (Base = 2006)            
2007 -0.013 -0.025** 0.004  -0.012 -0.023* 0.001  -0.021* -0.011 -0.001 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.003)  (0.013) (0.013) (0.002)  (0.012) (0.009) (0.001) 
2008 -0.009 0.011 0.005  -0.018 0.003 0.002  -0.033*** 0.008 0.001 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.003)  (0.013) (0.014) (0.003)  (0.012) (0.009) (0.002) 
2009 0.006 0.043*** 0.014***  0.008 0.040*** 0.009**  -0.026* 0.045*** 0.000 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.004)  (0.014) (0.015) (0.004)  (0.014) (0.011) (0.002) 
2010 -0.017 0.056*** 0.016***  0.015 0.052*** 0.006  -0.043*** 0.028** -0.001 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.005)  (0.017) (0.019) (0.004)  (0.016) (0.013) (0.002) 
Pseudo R2            
Observations 13512 13512 13512  8235 8235 8235  12458 12458 11434 
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Table 3.15 Continued 
Independent variable No mental account  Single mental account  Multiple mental accounts 
 Risky asset Fairly safe 
asset 
Safe asset  Risky asset Fairly safe 
asset 
Safe asset  Risky asset Fairly safe 
asset 
Safe asset 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Panel B: Portfolio share            
Financial advice (Base=none)            
Single source -0.015 0.050*** -0.050***  -0.000 0.048*** -0.042***  -0.023** 0.030*** -0.022** 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.013)  (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)  (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
Multiple sources 0.031* 0.070*** -0.080***  0.033** 0.060*** -0.069***  0.002 0.050*** -0.050*** 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.013)  (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Housing tenure (Base=rents)            
Under a mortgage -0.021 0.094*** -0.083***  0.113*** 0.159*** -0.146***  0.020 0.128*** -0.106*** 
 (0.027) (0.024) (0.021)  (0.028) (0.022) (0.021)  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Own outright  -0.028 0.121*** -0.099***  0.075*** 0.146*** -0.126***  0.009 0.121*** -0.094*** 
 (0.026) (0.022) (0.020)  (0.028) (0.022) (0.021)  (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) 
Time preference -0.002 -0.000 0.011  0.014 -0.010 0.011  0.004 0.006 -0.002 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.012)  (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Risk tolerance 0.052*** -0.022 0.000  -0.015 -0.012 0.024**  0.019** -0.014* 0.001 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.012)  (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)  (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
Cognitive ability  0.038** 0.011 -0.019  0.044*** 0.003 -0.015  0.005 0.013 -0.009 
 (0.017) (0.013) (0.012)  (0.015) (0.013) (0.013)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
Age -0.002 0.005* -0.005*  -0.005* 0.006** -0.003  -0.005** 0.005** -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age square 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000***  0.000** -0.000*** 0.000**  0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.001 -0.083*** 0.074***  0.017 -0.058*** 0.044***  0.017** -0.031*** 0.023*** 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.012)  (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Couple -0.009 0.055*** -0.052***  -0.036*** 0.039*** -0.019  -0.015* 0.021** -0.012 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.013)  (0.014) (0.013) (0.012)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Degree level or above qualification 0.065*** 0.018 -0.035***  0.048*** -0.024* 0.015  0.024*** -0.007 -0.004 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.014)  (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
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Table 3.15 Continued 
            
Independent variable No mental account  Single mental account  Multiple mental accounts 
 Risky asset Fairly safe 
asset 
Safe asset  Risky asset Fairly safe 
asset 
Safe asset  Risky asset Fairly safe 
asset 
Safe asset 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Panel B: Portfolio share            
Employed or self-employed 0.034* -0.002 -0.004  -0.004 -0.009 0.015  0.021** -0.015 0.009 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.015)  (0.016) (0.016) (0.015)  (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
Has children -0.023 -0.107*** 0.079***  -0.024 -0.031* 0.029*  -0.024** -0.022** 0.027*** 
 (0.022) (0.019) (0.017)  (0.017) (0.016) (0.015)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Lives in urban area 0.003 0.034** -0.037***  -0.031** 0.021 -0.003  -0.005 0.032*** -0.025*** 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.012)  (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)  (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
Christian 0.011 0.030* -0.021  0.043*** 0.036** -0.033**  0.024** 0.027*** -0.029*** 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.015)  (0.016) (0.015) (0.014)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Has good health 0.040*** 0.010 -0.024**  0.026* 0.010 -0.019  0.022** 0.009 -0.016* 
 (0.015) (0.013) (0.012)  (0.014) (0.013) (0.012)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
White British 0.043 0.109*** -0.100***  -0.013 0.053** -0.051**  -0.000 0.064*** -0.051*** 
 (0.029) (0.023) (0.022)  (0.023) (0.022) (0.021)  (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
Log of net household wealth 0.082*** 0.004 -0.015**  0.044*** -0.006 -0.007  0.041*** -0.009 -0.008 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.006)  (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Log of net financial wealth 0.092*** 0.172*** -0.162***  0.083*** 0.116*** -0.121***  0.072*** 0.079*** -0.089*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Region (Base = North East)            
North West -0.035 0.034 -0.031  0.051 -0.027 0.016  0.000 0.019 -0.025 
 (0.042) (0.037) (0.033)  (0.034) (0.031) (0.029)  (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) 
Yorkshire & Humber 0.013 0.055 -0.045  0.025 0.001 0.007  0.008 0.045** -0.046** 
 (0.041) (0.038) (0.034)  (0.035) (0.032) (0.031)  (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) 
East Midlands -0.030 0.064* -0.045  0.086** 0.005 -0.018  -0.011 0.034 -0.028 
 (0.041) (0.038) (0.034)  (0.034) (0.032) (0.030)  (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) 
West Midlands -0.057 0.055 -0.047  -0.003 -0.019 0.021  -0.044** 0.014 -0.001 
 (0.042) (0.038) (0.033)  (0.034) (0.030) (0.029)  (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) 
East of England 0.028 0.048 -0.047  0.098*** 0.009 -0.027  -0.003 -0.004 0.003 
 (0.040) (0.037) (0.033)  (0.033) (0.030) (0.029)  (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) 
London 0.030 -0.061 0.021  0.102*** -0.078** 0.053*  -0.003 -0.055** 0.056*** 
 (0.042) (0.040) (0.035)  (0.034) (0.032) (0.030)  (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
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Table 3.15 Continued 
            
Independent variable No mental account  Single mental account  Multiple mental accounts 
 Risky asset Fairly safe 
asset 
Safe asset  Risky asset Fairly safe 
asset 
Safe asset  Risky asset Fairly safe 
asset 
Safe asset 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Panel B: Portfolio share             
South East 0.046 0.024 -0.031  0.105*** -0.054* 0.018  0.032 -0.017 0.007 
 (0.038) (0.037) (0.032)  (0.032) (0.029) (0.028)  (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
South West 0.035 0.044 -0.054  0.093*** -0.033 0.010  0.009 0.028 -0.029 
 (0.041) (0.038) (0.033)  (0.034) (0.031) (0.029)  (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) 
Wales -0.058 0.004 0.005  0.016 -0.000 -0.003  -0.008 -0.008 0.002 
 (0.045) (0.040) (0.036)  (0.037) (0.034) (0.032)  (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) 
Scotland -0.007 0.043 -0.041  0.068** -0.020 -0.003  0.017 0.051** -0.060*** 
 (0.042) (0.038) (0.033)  (0.033) (0.030) (0.029)  (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) 
Year (Base = 2006)            
2007 -0.025 -0.038** 0.033**  -0.018 -0.030* 0.034**  -0.010 -0.005 0.005 
 (0.020) (0.018) (0.016)  (0.017) (0.016) (0.015)  (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
2008 -0.044** 0.023 -0.009  -0.044** 0.006 0.023  -0.038*** 0.020* -0.005 
 (0.020) (0.018) (0.017)  (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)  (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
2009 -0.028 0.062*** -0.032*  -0.019 0.028 -0.010  -0.049*** 0.062*** -0.033*** 
 (0.021) (0.019) (0.018)  (0.018) (0.018) (0.017)  (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) 
2010 -0.065** 0.099*** -0.072***  -0.019 0.069*** -0.042**  -0.056*** 0.060*** -0.030** 
 (0.026) (0.022) (0.020)  (0.021) (0.021) (0.020)  (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) 
Constant -2.414*** -1.833*** 2.822***  -1.738*** -1.073*** 2.114***  -1.385*** -0.629*** 1.779*** 
 (0.134) (0.093) (0.084)  (0.103) (0.080) (0.074)  (0.067) (0.060) (0.058) 
Pseudo R 2  0.251 0.260 0.296  0.254 0.183 0.230  0.246 0.144 0.209 
Observations 13329 13329 12987  8209 8209 8123  12450 12450 12343 
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Risk tolerance is significant among households that exhibit no mental account and those 
households exhibiting multiple mental accounts while cognitive ability has significant 
effects among households that exhibit no mental account and those that exhibit a single 
mental account. Regarding control variables, the effect of the variable degree or above 
qualification is about three times higher in magnitude among households that exhibit no 
mental account, when compared to the effects among households that exhibit multiple 
mental accounts. Another important finding, concerns year dummies where I observe 
consistent and significant negative effects during 2008, 2009 and 2010 for portfolio 
share in a risky asset and positive and significant effects during 2009 and 2010 for 
portfolio share in a fairly risky asset, among households that exhibit multiple mental 
accounts. This finding suggests that households that exhibit multiple mental accounts 
responded to the crisis by reducing investment in risky assets while increasing 
investment in fairly safe assets.  
Most importantly, when I use Chow-type tests, I reject at the 1% level the hypothesis 
that the coefficient estimates derived for each mental account sub-sample, for both 
ownership and portfolio share, are not statistically different from the full sample 
coefficient estimates. Thus I conclude that mental accounts lead households to make 
different portfolio choices.   
3.6.3 Alternative classification of financial assets 
Classification of financial assets into risky, fairly safe or safe assets is debatable in the 
literature and compositions of assets in each category vary across studies (See for 
example Guiso et al., 2000; Christelis et al., 2010; Atella et al., 2012). This is because 
some financial products provide tax benefits (for example, ISAs and friendly society 
savings plans in the UK) while other products consist of varying levels of risk 
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depending on the proportion invested in a risky or a riskless asset (for example unit 
trusts). This suggests that the results may be driven by the manner in which assets have 
been classified into the three asset classes.  Thus, in the alternative classifications, I 
consider risky assets to consist of direct holding of stock in UK or overseas (listed or 
unlisted companies), employee shares, investment ISAs and unit or investment bonds. 
Fairly safe assets include investments in fixed-term investment bonds, overseas and UK 
gilts, endowment or regular premium policies, single premium policies, lump-sum 
insurance policies, national savings products, individual retirement accounts or other 
financial assets and friendly society saving plans. Finally, safe assets include 
investments in individual savings and current accounts. Table 3.16 reports raw 
coefficient estimates from pooled probit regressions and tobit regressions using the 
specifications for conditional analysis in Table 3.9.  
Overall the results are consistent with the findings in Table 3.9. Nevertheless, as 
expected, the effects of some variables become significant or the levels of significance 
increase. For example, the negative effect of exhibiting a single mental account on 
ownership of and portfolio share in a risky asset declines while the level of significance 
for the effect of exhibiting multiple mental accounts increases for portfolio share in a 
risky asset. For financial advice, the effect of a single source becomes significant for 
ownership of and portfolio share in a risky asset while its effect on ownership of a fairly 
safe asset dissipates. The negative effect of housing tenure (under mortgage) on 
ownership of a risky asset becomes significant and its effect on other asset classes is 
stable.
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Table 3.16 Estimates using alternative definitions of asset class 
The table presents marginal effects from both pooled probit regressions (Column (1), (3) and (5)) and from pooled tobit regressions (Column (2), (4) and (6)). The dependent 
variables are risky asset, fairly safe asset and safe asset; ownership equals one if households owns at least one asset in each asset class or zero otherwise and portfolio share is 
the proportion of financial assets invested in each asset class to total financial assets.  Risky assets consist of direct holding of stock in UK or overseas (listed or unlisted 
companies), employee shares, investment ISAs and unit or investment bonds. Fairly safe assets include investments in fixed-term investment bonds, overseas and UK gilts, 
endowment or regular premium policy, single premium policy, lump-sum insurance policy, individual retirement accounts or other financial assets and friendly society saving 
plan. Safe assets include investments in individual savings and current accounts, informal savings, or national savings products. Mental accounts is a categorical variable with 
three dummies: no mental account equals one if a household has no specific reason for saving money and zero otherwise (base level); single mental account equals one if a 
household identifies only one reason for saving money and zero otherwise; and multiple mental accounts equals one if a household identifies more than one reason for saving 
money and zero otherwise. Financial advice is a categorical variable with three dummies: no advice equals one if a respondent does not identify any source of advice (base 
level); single advice equals one if respondent identifies only one source of advice and zero otherwise; and multiple sources of advice equals one if respondent identifies more 
than one source of advice and zero otherwise. Housing tenure is a categorical variable with three dummies: rents current accommodation (base level); owns through a 
mortgage; and owns outright. The control variables as described in Table 3.1 are time preference, risk tolerance, cognitive ability, age, age square, male, couple, degree level 
or above, has children, lives in urban area, Christian, has good health, White British, log of net financial wealth, log of net household wealth, region dummies, and year 
dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and are reported in parentheses. The levels of significance are given by * for 10%, ** for 5%, and *** for 1%. 
Independent variable Risky asset  Fairly safe asset  Safe asset 
 ownership  portfolio share   ownership  portfolio share   ownership  portfolio share  
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Mental account (Base=none) 
        
Single mental account -0.188** -0.053*  0.086 0.124***  0.320** -0.063*** 
 (0.083) (0.031)  (0.060) (0.023)  (0.152) (0.022) 
Multiple mental account 0.109 0.072***  0.366*** 0.212***  0.231 -0.175*** 
 (0.075) (0.028)  (0.061) (0.021)  (0.160) (0.021) 
Financial advice (Base=none)         
Single source 0.088** 0.085***  0.026 0.067***  -0.062 -0.044*** 
 (0.035) (0.014)  (0.031) (0.011)  (0.069) (0.011) 
Multiple sources 0.166*** 0.119***  0.140*** 0.064***  0.028 -0.086*** 
 (0.036) (0.014)  (0.033) (0.011)  (0.082) (0.011) 
Home tenure (Base=rents)         
Under a mortgage -0.138*** 0.018  0.021 0.128***  0.053 -0.112*** 
 (0.052) (0.021)  (0.043) (0.016)  (0.092) (0.016) 
Own outright  0.009 0.013  0.324*** 0.155***  0.015 -0.160*** 
 (0.050) (0.020)  (0.040) (0.015)  (0.089) (0.015) 
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Table 3.16 Continued 
         
Independent variable Risky asset  Fairly safe asset  Safe asset 
 ownership  portfolio share   ownership  portfolio share   ownership  portfolio share  
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Time preference 0.034 -0.001  0.027 0.002  -0.031 0.003 
 (0.036) (0.013)  (0.034) (0.011)  (0.077) (0.011) 
Risk tolerance 0.041 0.024*  0.105*** -0.018*  0.059 -0.020* 
 (0.035) (0.013)  (0.033) (0.011)  (0.078) (0.011) 
Cognitive ability  0.098*** 0.023*  0.087*** 0.025**  0.064 -0.038*** 
 (0.035) (0.014)  (0.029) (0.011)  (0.059) (0.011) 
Single mental account * single source -0.037 -0.046**  0.015 -0.031*  -0.013 0.019 
 (0.053) (0.020)  (0.049) (0.016)  (0.134) (0.016) 
Single mental account * multiple sources 0.022 -0.049**  0.061 -0.047***  -0.159 0.028* 
 (0.054) (0.020)  (0.052) (0.016)  (0.139) (0.016) 
Multiple mental account * single source -0.087* -0.055***  -0.047 -0.066***  0.518** 0.034** 
 (0.049) (0.017)  (0.049) (0.015)  (0.210) (0.014) 
Multiple mental account * multiple sources -0.071 -0.081***  -0.018 -0.086***  0.036 0.059*** 
 (0.047) (0.017)  (0.048) (0.014)  (0.148) (0.013) 
Single mental account * under a mortgage 0.339*** 0.071**  0.177*** -0.030  -0.298** -0.020 
 (0.077) (0.030)  (0.059) (0.022)  (0.144) (0.021) 
Single mental account * own outright 0.161** 0.033  -0.016 -0.089***  -0.174 0.046** 
 (0.072) (0.028)  (0.054) (0.020)  (0.138) (0.019) 
Multiple mental account * under a mortgage 0.219*** 0.020  0.156*** -0.062***  0.046 0.028 
 (0.067) (0.026)  (0.056) (0.020)  (0.180) (0.019) 
Multiple mental account * own outright 0.120* -0.012  -0.069 -0.145***  -0.073 0.108*** 
 (0.063) (0.024)  (0.054) (0.019)  (0.168) (0.018) 
Single mental account * time preference 0.073 0.013  0.013 -0.023  0.028 0.007 
 (0.051) (0.018)  (0.053) (0.015)  (0.140) (0.015) 
Multiple mental account * time preference 0.044 -0.021  0.082* -0.011  -0.054 0.010 
 (0.045) (0.015)  (0.047) (0.013)  (0.145) (0.013) 
Single mental account * risk tolerance  -0.053 -0.027  -0.112** -0.005  0.180 0.037** 
 (0.052) (0.019)  (0.052) (0.016)  (0.164) (0.015) 
Multiple mental account * risk tolerance 0.054 -0.006  -0.127*** -0.011  0.004 0.025* 
 (0.046) (0.016)  (0.048) (0.014)  (0.160) (0.013) 
Single mental account * cognitive ability  0.003 0.012  -0.005 -0.033**  0.013 0.019 
 (0.053) (0.020)  (0.047) (0.016)  (0.115) (0.015) 
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Table 3.16 Continued 
         
Independent variable Risky asset  Fairly safe asset  Safe asset 
 ownership  portfolio share   ownership  portfolio share   ownership  portfolio share  
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Multiple mental account * cognitive ability -0.038 -0.027  -0.026 -0.034**  0.111 0.038*** 
 (0.048) (0.017)  (0.046) (0.014)  (0.145) (0.014) 
Age -0.011** -0.005***  0.003 0.004***  0.019** -0.002* 
 (0.005) (0.002)  (0.004) (0.001)  (0.008) (0.001) 
Age square 0.000 0.000**  -0.000** -0.000***  -0.000** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.035 0.025***  -0.206*** -0.055***  0.043 0.043*** 
 (0.022) (0.007)  (0.022) (0.006)  (0.050) (0.006) 
Couple -0.033 -0.045***  0.193*** 0.035***  0.155*** -0.025*** 
 (0.022) (0.007)  (0.022) (0.006)  (0.055) (0.006) 
Degree level or above qualification 0.170*** 0.046***  0.021 -0.048***  0.003 0.000 
 (0.023) (0.007)  (0.025) (0.006)  (0.064) (0.006) 
Employed or self-employed 0.019 0.002  -0.000 -0.007  0.136* 0.016** 
 (0.027) (0.009)  (0.028) (0.008)  (0.070) (0.007) 
Has children -0.079*** -0.017**  -0.243*** -0.034***  -0.398*** 0.044*** 
 (0.027) (0.009)  (0.026) (0.008)  (0.057) (0.007) 
Lives in urban area -0.025 -0.002  0.042* 0.027***  -0.061 -0.016** 
 (0.022) (0.007)  (0.023) (0.006)  (0.062) (0.006) 
Christian 0.095*** 0.025***  0.072*** 0.017**  0.078 -0.027*** 
 (0.026) (0.009)  (0.025) (0.007)  (0.057) (0.007) 
Has good health 0.094*** 0.031***  0.039* -0.001  -0.122** -0.025*** 
 (0.021) (0.007)  (0.021) (0.006)  (0.056) (0.006) 
White British 0.146*** 0.040***  0.295*** 0.071***  -0.069 -0.080*** 
 (0.037) (0.013)  (0.033) (0.011)  (0.080) (0.011) 
Log of net household wealth 0.173*** 0.054***  0.030*** -0.002  0.028* -0.009** 
 (0.014) (0.004)  (0.011) (0.003)  (0.016) (0.004) 
Log of net financial wealth 0.364*** 0.096***  0.338*** 0.068***  0.064*** -0.118*** 
 (0.008) (0.003)  (0.007) (0.002)  (0.013) (0.002) 
Region (Base = North East)         
North West 0.035 0.012  0.141*** 0.004  -0.034 -0.020 
 (0.054) (0.019)  (0.049) (0.016)  (0.126) (0.016) 
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Table 3.16 Continued 
         
Independent variable Risky asset  Fairly safe asset  Safe asset 
 ownership  portfolio share   ownership  portfolio share   ownership  portfolio share  
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Yorkshire & Humber 0.044 0.009  0.226*** 0.025  -0.029 -0.032** 
 (0.056) (0.019)  (0.052) (0.016)  (0.130) (0.016) 
East Midlands 0.070 -0.005  0.257*** 0.031*  0.117 -0.031* 
 (0.056) (0.019)  (0.053) (0.016)  (0.140) (0.016) 
West Midlands -0.055 -0.022  0.197*** 0.029*  -0.059 -0.021 
 (0.055) (0.019)  (0.052) (0.016)  (0.128) (0.016) 
East of England 0.122** 0.020  0.265*** 0.022  -0.044 -0.035** 
 (0.054) (0.018)  (0.052) (0.016)  (0.129) (0.016) 
London 0.111* 0.009  0.066 -0.047***  0.093 0.027* 
 (0.057) (0.019)  (0.054) (0.016)  (0.142) (0.016) 
South East 0.229*** 0.040**  0.194*** -0.020  0.016 -0.017 
 (0.052) (0.018)  (0.050) (0.015)  (0.128) (0.015) 
South West 0.153*** 0.034*  0.317*** 0.021  0.228 -0.052*** 
 (0.055) (0.019)  (0.052) (0.016)  (0.151) (0.016) 
Wales -0.058 -0.014  0.077 -0.012  0.018 0.003 
 (0.061) (0.021)  (0.055) (0.018)  (0.143) (0.018) 
Scotland 0.033 0.025  0.059 0.015  0.044 -0.026 
 (0.055) (0.019)  (0.051) (0.016)  (0.131) (0.016) 
Year (Base = 2006)         
2007 -0.091*** -0.033***  -0.046* -0.008  0.037 0.016** 
 (0.026) (0.009)  (0.026) (0.008)  (0.065) (0.007) 
2008 -0.138*** 0.014  0.021 0.084***  0.109 -0.002 
 (0.026) (0.009)  (0.027) (0.008)  (0.077) (0.007) 
2009 -0.065** 0.196***  0.148*** 0.229***  0.402*** -0.029*** 
 (0.030) (0.010)  (0.031) (0.008)  (0.094) (0.008) 
2010 -0.144*** 0.218***  0.169*** 0.247***  0.349*** -0.050*** 
 (0.035) (0.012)  (0.036) (0.010)  (0.110) (0.009) 
Constant -6.068*** -1.673***  -4.028*** -0.768***  0.742*** 2.231*** 
 (0.161) (0.052)  (0.134) (0.041)  (0.254) (0.041) 
Pseudo R 2  0.309 0.306  0.316 0.178  0.133 0.298 
Observations 34205 26368  34205 30320  34205 33395 
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An interesting finding that supports our conjecture about risk is the change in the effects 
of risk tolerance, which now becomes insignificant for ownership of a risky asset but 
become significant for ownership of a fairly safe asset. This observation is also 
reflected by the change in the signs of year dummies for portfolio share in a risky asset 
and the increase in the magnitudes of their effects for portfolio share in both a risky 
asset and a fairly safe asset. In contrast, for ownership of a fairly safe asset, the effects 
of year dummies decline. 
The corresponding interaction effects are seen across most of the interaction terms 
between mental accounting with financial advice, housing tenure, time preference, risk 
tolerance and cognitive ability. For example, the interaction terms between mental 
accounting and financial advice become significant for portfolio share in risky assets 
while still remaining significant for portfolio share in both fairly safe assets and safe 
assets.  The negative effect of risk tolerance on mental accounting dissipates for 
portfolio share in risky assets but becomes influential for ownership of fairly safe 
assets; however, its effect on portfolio share in safe assets remains unchanged. Whereas 
the interaction effects between mental accounting and time preference are eliminated, 
the effects between mental accounting and cognitive ability remain unchanged. In sum, 
these results indicate that mental accounting does play an important role in the manner 
in which households respond to portfolio choices irrespective of how assets are 
classified.   
3.6.4 Estimates from poisson regressions 
Thus far, I have assumed that mental accounts are distinct from specific financial 
products that constitute the different asset classes. In other words, I take for granted that 
an investor does not literally link a specific mental account to a specific financial 
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product or vice versa. However, as pointed out by Zhou and Pham (2004) households 
may “infer their investment priorities ex post from the financial products available to 
them” so that, in our case, mental accounting could simply be capturing the effects of 
the number of financial products. To investigate this, I first estimate poisson regressions 
where the dependent variable is the number of financial products held by a household in 
each asset class, using the specifications in Table 3.9. In these regressions, because of 
the way I construct mental accounting variables, I should expect to find significant 
effects of mental accounting on the number of financial products held by a household. 
Thus, in the second set of poisson regressions, I re-parameterize the categorical variable 
for mental accounting to be a continuous variable representing the number of reasons 
for saving money that households identify. This allows me to examine whether there is 
indeed a strong relationship between the number of investment products and the number 
of reasons for saving money. The results are presented in Table 3.17 and I report 
incidence-rate ratios (IRRs). 
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Table 3.17 Poisson regression estimates 
Table presents incidence- rate ratios from poisson regressions. The dependent variables are the number of 
all financial assets held in each asset class. Risky assets include shares or stocks in listed or unlisted 
companies (overseas or UK). Fairly safe assets include investments in fixed-term investment bonds, unit 
or investment trust, employee share options and shares, overseas and UK gilts, endowment or regular 
premium policy, single premium policy, lump sum insurance policy, individual retirement accounts, or 
other financial assets. Safe assets include investments in individual savings and current accounts, friendly 
society saving plan, informal savings, or national savings products. Mental accounts is a categorical 
variable with three dummies: no mental account equals one if a household has no specific reason for 
saving money and zero otherwise (base level); single mental account equals one if a household identifies 
only one reason for saving money and zero otherwise; and multiple mental accounts equals one if a 
household identifies more than one reason for saving money and zero otherwise. Financial advice is a 
categorical variable with three dummies: no advice equals one if a respondent does not identify any 
source of advice (base level); single advice equals one if respondent identifies only one source of advice 
and zero otherwise; and multiple sources of advice equals one if respondent identifies more than one 
source of advice and zero otherwise. Housing tenure is a categorical variable with three dummies: rents 
current accommodation (base level); owns through a mortgage; and owns outright. The control variables 
as described in Table 3.1 are time preference, risk tolerance, cognitive ability, age, age square, male, 
couple, degree level or above, has children, lives in urban area, Christian, has good health, White British, 
log of net financial wealth, log of net household wealth, region dummies, and year dummies. Panel A 
replicates the specifications Table 3.9 while in Panel B the same specification is used apart from the 
categorical variable, mental accounts, which is replaced by a continuous variable, number of mental 
accounts.  Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and are reported in parentheses. The levels 
of significance are given by * for 10%, ** for 5%, and *** for 1%. 
 
Independent variable All financial 
assets 
Risky assets Fairly safe 
assets 
Safe assets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Using specifications in Table 3.9    
Mental account (Base=none) 
    
Single mental account 1.076*** 0.931 1.391*** 1.125*** 
 (0.018) (0.091) (0.073) (0.017) 
Multiple mental account 1.202*** 1.729*** 1.829*** 1.196*** 
 (0.020) (0.142) (0.087) (0.018) 
Financial advice (Base=none)     
Single source 1.029*** 1.074** 1.083*** 1.015* 
 (0.009) (0.039) (0.025) (0.008) 
Multiple sources 1.069*** 1.196*** 1.129*** 1.039*** 
 (0.010) (0.042) (0.026) (0.009) 
Home tenure (Base=rents)     
Under a mortgage 0.971** 1.289*** 1.296*** 0.989 
 (0.013) (0.084) (0.052) (0.012) 
Own outright  1.123*** 1.573*** 1.641*** 1.084*** 
 (0.013) (0.099) (0.062) (0.012) 
Time preference 1.040*** 1.096*** 1.095*** 1.013 
 (0.010) (0.035) (0.024) (0.009) 
Risk tolerance 1.031*** 1.091*** 0.999 1.028*** 
 (0.010) (0.035) (0.022) (0.009) 
Cognitive ability  1.051*** 1.177*** 1.050** 1.047*** 
 (0.009) (0.046) (0.024) (0.008) 
Single mental account * single source 1.001 1.007 0.993 0.991 
 (0.013) (0.051) (0.032) (0.012) 
Single mental account * multiple sources 1.015 1.017 0.985 1.005 
 (0.014) (0.049) (0.032) (0.012) 
Multiple mental account * single source 0.981 0.989 0.927*** 0.980* 
 (0.012) (0.043) (0.027) (0.011) 
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Table 3.17 Continued 
     
Independent variable All financial 
assets 
Risky assets Fairly safe 
assets 
Safe assets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Using specifications in Table 3.9    
Multiple mental account * multiple 
sources 
0.970*** 0.911** 0.919*** 0.965*** 
 (0.011) (0.037) (0.025) (0.010) 
Single mental account * under a mortgage 1.083*** 1.355*** 0.957 1.005 
 (0.019) (0.125) (0.049) (0.015) 
Single mental account * own outright 0.972* 1.067 0.814*** 0.935*** 
 (0.014) (0.093) (0.039) (0.012) 
Multiple mental account * under a 
mortgage 
1.088*** 0.976 0.859*** 1.030** 
 (0.017) (0.073) (0.039) (0.015) 
Multiple mental account * own outright 0.965** 0.783*** 0.698*** 0.944*** 
 (0.014) (0.055) (0.029) (0.012) 
Single mental account * time preference 0.996 1.007 0.933** 1.004 
 (0.013) (0.043) (0.027) (0.012) 
Multiple mental account * time preference 0.986 0.931* 0.929*** 0.993 
 (0.011) (0.034) (0.023) (0.010) 
Single mental account * risk tolerance  0.990 0.947 0.986 0.994 
 (0.013) (0.042) (0.031) (0.012) 
Multiple mental account * risk tolerance 0.987 0.975 0.959 0.982* 
 (0.011) (0.036) (0.025) (0.010) 
Single mental account * cognitive ability  0.992 0.991 0.950 0.990 
 (0.013) (0.053) (0.031) (0.011) 
Multiple mental account * cognitive 
ability 
0.984 0.884*** 0.959 0.981* 
 (0.011) (0.041) (0.027) (0.010) 
Age 1.001 0.992** 1.009*** 0.997*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) 
Age square 1.000*** 1.000 1.000*** 1.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.972*** 1.049*** 0.901*** 0.981*** 
 (0.005) (0.019) (0.010) (0.005) 
Couple 1.056*** 0.983 1.130*** 1.044*** 
 (0.006) (0.018) (0.014) (0.005) 
Degree level or above qualification 1.036*** 1.137*** 0.972** 1.005 
 (0.006) (0.019) (0.012) (0.005) 
Employed or self-employed 0.997 1.029 1.016 0.997 
 (0.006) (0.021) (0.014) (0.006) 
Has children 0.947*** 0.932*** 0.894*** 0.962*** 
 (0.006) (0.021) (0.014) (0.006) 
Lives in urban area 1.002 1.007 1.058*** 0.987*** 
 (0.005) (0.018) (0.013) (0.005) 
Christian 1.032*** 1.095*** 1.031** 1.015*** 
 (0.006) (0.023) (0.015) (0.006) 
Has good health 1.020*** 1.078*** 1.020* 1.010** 
 (0.005) (0.020) (0.012) (0.005) 
White British 1.078*** 1.124*** 1.130*** 1.047*** 
 (0.010) (0.041) (0.026) (0.008) 
Log of net household wealth 1.033*** 1.127*** 0.989 1.024*** 
 (0.003) (0.014) (0.007) (0.002) 
Log of net financial wealth 1.175*** 1.470*** 1.322*** 1.074*** 
 (0.002) (0.010) (0.006) (0.002) 
Region dummies (Base = North East)     
North West 1.034** 1.034 1.026 1.037*** 
 (0.014) (0.051) (0.030) (0.012) 
Yorkshire & Humber 1.058*** 1.037 1.086*** 1.055*** 
 (0.015) (0.053) (0.033) (0.013) 
East Midlands 1.088*** 1.110** 1.127*** 1.067*** 
 (0.015) (0.056) (0.034) (0.013) 
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Table 3.15 Continued 
     
Independent variable All financial 
assets 
Risky assets Fairly safe 
assets 
Safe assets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Using specifications in Table 3.9    
West Midlands 1.055*** 1.011 1.076** 1.055*** 
 (0.015) (0.052) (0.033) (0.013) 
East of England 1.077*** 1.107** 1.026 1.095*** 
 (0.015) (0.054) (0.031) (0.013) 
London 1.051*** 1.093* 0.941* 1.068*** 
 (0.015) (0.055) (0.030) (0.013) 
South East 1.092*** 1.202*** 0.994 1.088*** 
 (0.014) (0.056) (0.028) (0.012) 
South West 1.102*** 1.165*** 1.065** 1.104*** 
 (0.015) (0.057) (0.032) (0.013) 
Wales 1.002 0.972 0.999 1.015 
 (0.015) (0.056) (0.033) (0.014) 
Scotland 1.005 1.073 1.022 0.980* 
 (0.014) (0.054) (0.032) (0.012) 
Year dummies (Base = 2006)     
2007 0.973*** 0.906*** 0.978 0.988** 
 (0.006) (0.018) (0.015) (0.006) 
2008 0.989* 0.898*** 1.045*** 0.996 
 (0.006) (0.017) (0.015) (0.006) 
2009 1.055*** 0.985 1.180*** 1.031*** 
 (0.007) (0.022) (0.019) (0.007) 
2010 1.038*** 0.928*** 1.163*** 1.024*** 
 (0.008) (0.025) (0.021) (0.008) 
Pseudo R 2  0.168 0.246 0.147 0.041 
Observations 34205 34205 34205 34205 
Panel B: Re-parameterized variables     
Number of mental accounts 1.061*** 1.179*** 1.171*** 1.059*** 
 (0.005) (0.022) (0.014) (0.005) 
Financial advice (Base=none)     
Single source 1.026*** 1.071** 1.069*** 1.013* 
 (0.007) (0.029) (0.018) (0.007) 
Multiple sources 1.083*** 1.206*** 1.134*** 1.051*** 
 (0.008) (0.031) (0.019) (0.007) 
Home tenure (Base=rents)     
Under a mortgage 1.015 1.486*** 1.318*** 1.009 
 (0.011) (0.076) (0.042) (0.010) 
Own outright  1.121*** 1.620*** 1.546*** 1.070*** 
 (0.011) (0.082) (0.048) (0.010) 
Time preference 1.048*** 1.097*** 1.071*** 1.028*** 
 (0.007) (0.024) (0.016) (0.006) 
Risk tolerance 1.030*** 1.074*** 0.993 1.029*** 
 (0.007) (0.024) (0.016) (0.006) 
Cognitive ability  1.055*** 1.180*** 1.046** 1.050*** 
 (0.007) (0.034) (0.019) (0.007) 
No. of mental accounts * single source of 
advice 
0.998 1.000 0.989 0.996 
 (0.003) (0.010) (0.007) (0.003) 
No. of mental accounts * multiple sources of 
advice 
0.986*** 0.973*** 0.974*** 0.984*** 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.006) (0.003) 
No. of mental accounts * under a mortgage 1.009** 0.958*** 0.948*** 0.997 
 (0.004) (0.016) (0.010) (0.004) 
No. of mental accounts * own outright 0.987*** 0.927*** 0.913*** 0.981*** 
 (0.004) (0.015) (0.009) (0.004) 
No. of mental accounts * time preference 0.992*** 0.983** 0.985*** 0.991*** 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.005) (0.002) 
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Table 3.17 Continued 
     
Independent variable All financial 
assets 
Risky assets Fairly safe 
assets 
Safe assets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel B: Re-parameterized variables     
No. of mental accounts * risk tolerance 0.995* 0.995 0.990* 0.993*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.002) 
No. of mental accounts * cognitive ability 0.991*** 0.964*** 0.983** 0.991*** 
 (0.003) (0.010) (0.006) (0.003) 
Age 1.000 0.991** 1.007*** 0.996*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) 
Age square 1.000 1.000 1.000*** 1.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.971*** 1.046** 0.900*** 0.980*** 
 (0.005) (0.019) (0.010) (0.005) 
Couple 1.055*** 0.982 1.129*** 1.043*** 
 (0.006) (0.018) (0.014) (0.005) 
Degree level or above qualification 1.034*** 1.134*** 0.970** 1.005 
 (0.006) (0.019) (0.011) (0.005) 
Employed or self-employed 1.000 1.027 1.021 1.001 
 (0.006) (0.021) (0.014) (0.006) 
Has children 0.943*** 0.928*** 0.887*** 0.958*** 
 (0.006) (0.021) (0.014) (0.006) 
Lives in urban area 1.003 1.008 1.060*** 0.988** 
 (0.005) (0.018) (0.013) (0.005) 
Christian 1.033*** 1.096*** 1.033** 1.017*** 
 (0.006) (0.023) (0.015) (0.006) 
Has good health 1.021*** 1.077*** 1.022* 1.010** 
 (0.005) (0.020) (0.012) (0.005) 
White British 1.080*** 1.127*** 1.133*** 1.048*** 
 (0.010) (0.041) (0.026) (0.008) 
Log of net household wealth 1.033*** 1.125*** 0.989 1.024*** 
 (0.003) (0.014) (0.007) (0.002) 
Log of net financial wealth 1.175*** 1.466*** 1.321*** 1.075*** 
 (0.002) (0.010) (0.006) (0.001) 
Region dummies (Base = North East)     
North West 1.031** 1.032 1.022 1.034*** 
 (0.014) (0.051) (0.030) (0.012) 
Yorkshire & Humber 1.055*** 1.034 1.079** 1.052*** 
 (0.015) (0.053) (0.033) (0.013) 
East Midlands 1.086*** 1.105** 1.121*** 1.064*** 
 (0.015) (0.056) (0.034) (0.013) 
West Midlands 1.051*** 1.005 1.069** 1.051*** 
 (0.015) (0.052) (0.033) (0.013) 
East of England 1.075*** 1.105** 1.022 1.092*** 
 (0.014) (0.054) (0.031) (0.013) 
London 1.047*** 1.087* 0.934** 1.064*** 
 (0.015) (0.054) (0.030) (0.013) 
South East 1.089*** 1.197*** 0.988 1.084*** 
 (0.014) (0.055) (0.028) (0.012) 
South West 1.098*** 1.159*** 1.058* 1.099*** 
 (0.015) (0.056) (0.032) (0.013) 
Wales 1.000 0.968 0.995 1.013 
 (0.015) (0.056) (0.033) (0.014) 
Scotland 1.005 1.073 1.022 0.980* 
 (0.014) (0.054) (0.032) (0.012) 
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Table 3.17 Continued 
     
Independent variable All financial 
assets 
Risky assets Fairly safe 
assets 
Safe assets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel B: Re-parameterized variables     
Year dummies (Base = 2006)     
2007 0.972*** 0.906*** 0.977 0.987** 
 (0.006) (0.018) (0.015) (0.006) 
2008 0.991 0.902*** 1.046*** 0.997 
 (0.006) (0.017) (0.015) (0.006) 
2009 1.057*** 0.986 1.182*** 1.032*** 
 (0.007) (0.022) (0.019) (0.007) 
2010 1.041*** 0.932*** 1.164*** 1.025*** 
 (0.008) (0.025) (0.021) (0.008) 
Pseudo R 2  0.167 0.244 0.146 0.040 
Observations 34205 33962 34205 34205 
 
 
In Panel A, I present IRRs using the specifications in Table 3.9. The results show that, 
when compared to households that exhibit no mental account, households that exhibit 
multiple mental accounts overall hold 20% more financial assets, 73% more financial 
products in risky assets (Column (2)), 83% more financial products in fairly safe assets 
(Column (3)) and 20% more financial products in safe assets (Column (4)). When I 
interact mental accounts with financial advice, housing tenure and time preference, risk 
tolerance and cognitive ability, our results remain unchanged from the results in Table 
3.9. For example, when compared to households that rent and exhibit no mental 
account, homeowners that hold a mortgage and exhibit a single mental account hold 
35% more financial products in risky assets; outright homeowners who exhibit multiple 
mental accounts hold 22% less financial products in risky assets, 30% less in fairly safe 
assets and 6% less in safe assets.  
In Panel B, I replace the categorical variable for mental accounting with the number of 
mental accounts. The results show that the number of mental accounts increases the 
overall number of financial products by 6%; the number of risky assets held by 18%; 
the number of fairly safe assets held by 17%; and the number of safe assets held by 6%. 
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When I interact the number of mental accounts with financial advice, time preference, 
risk tolerance, and cognitive ability, the results show that mental accounting decreases 
the overall number of financial products held and the number of financial products held 
in each asset class. All the interaction terms are significant, apart from the interaction 
terms between number of mental account with a single source of advice and risk 
tolerance. In summary, although the IRRs in Panel A suggest that there may be a strong 
relationship between mental accounting and the number of financial products, the 
results in Panel B show a decline in the magnitudes which rules out the possibility that 
households mainly infer their investment goals from the financial products available in 
the market.  
3.7 Conclusion 
Behavioural portfolio theory suggests that people manage their investments in layers, 
known as mental accounts, that they design sub-portfolios for each layer and that their 
risk appetite varies by these accounts. In contrast, standard portfolio theory assumes 
that people have one aggregate portfolio and a single measure of risk – overall portfolio 
risk.  Motivated by new theoretical insights concerning the influences of financial 
advice and background risks on portfolio choice that are conditional on mental 
accounting behaviour, this study uses survey data to investigate whether these variables 
can explain differences in ownership and portfolio share in three asset classes.   
Using two waves of the WAS, which covers the period 2006 to 2010, this Chapter 
builds on the existing literature in several ways. First, in contrast to previous studies 
that use different mental frames and subsets of household portfolios (Benartzi and 
Thaler, 2007; Choi et al., 2009), I use investment goals and the entire household 
portfolio – three asset classes (risky asset, fairly safe asset and safe asset) – to provide 
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new evidence of the influence of mental accounting behaviour. Following Shefrin and 
Statman (2000), I distinguish between households that have a single mental account and 
those that have multiple mental accounts and compare their portfolio choices with those 
of households that do not readily identify a reason for saving money.  Second, I 
investigate whether risk tolerance, time preference and cognitive ability influence 
portfolio choice and whether these variables have an indirect influence through mental 
accounting. Third, I examine whether, conditional on mental accounting behaviour, 
differences in portfolio choice can be explained by background risk/assets and financial 
advice. Fourth, I examine the effect of specific mental accounts (such as saving for a 
holiday, a home purchase, home improvements, a bequest, and education) on the 
probability of owning, and the portfolio share in, the three asset classes.  
Overall, I conclude that mental accounting behaviour does influence portfolio choice 
with statistically significant differences among households that exhibit no mental 
account, a single mental account and multiple mental accounts. In addition, the 
influence of mental accounting is mitigated (increased) by financial advice and housing 
tenure. The evidence shows that households that exhibit a single mental account are less 
likely to own and have low investment in risky assets. When compared to exhibiting no 
mental account, exhibiting a single mental account or multiple mental accounts 
increases the share of fairly safe assets but decreases the share of safe assets. Financial 
advice reduces the portfolio share in both risky assets and fairly safe assets but 
increases share in safe assets among households that have multiple mental accounts. In 
addition, I find that mental accounting eliminates the direct influence of housing tenure 
on investment in risky assets. Most importantly, both homeownership through a 
mortgage and outright ownership increase both the likelihood of holding and the share 
of investment in risky assets among households that exhibit a single mental account.  
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In the results for specific mental account types and sources of financial advice, I 
conclude that saving money for unexpected expenditure, for purchase of property, for 
holiday, and for good interest or to see money grow, all influence portfolio choice.  
Furthermore, for particular mental account types, I find differences in the share invested 
in different asset classes, which depends on risk tolerance, risk perceptions, or both. 
This suggests that for long term investments such as purchase of property, investors 
who are risk tolerant and have positive risk perceptions hold a high share of risky assets 
while those who only tolerate risk have a low share in risky assets but a high share in 
fairly safe assets. In sum, our results indicate that mental accounting behaviour is an 
important financial management tool, which improves our understanding of the 
household financial decision making process.  
As noted in Chapter Two, a short panel and a low transition in asset ownership, which 
is also observed in the WAS sample, make it hard to control for unobserved effects and 
to address the problem of endogenous regressors. Although I use multi-equation models 
as a robustness check to control for correlated errors across equations, reverse causality 
may still occur because mental accounting behaviour might, for example, be determined 
by the available financial assets and the proportion of money invested. Thus, the 
significant correlations in my results should not be inferred as causal relationships. 
With this caveat in mind, the findings in this study have important implications. The 
main effect of mental accounting indicates that investors, while evaluating asset choices 
and asset allocation decisions, should be aware of the discrepancies caused by mental 
accounting. Moreover, considering the overarching effect of financial advice on mental 
accounting, investors should also be aware of, and be able to decipher, the different sets 
of information received from financial advisors or the nature of the investment products 
they provide.  
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This is important because our findings suggest that investors who trust more than one 
financial advisor may be inclined to sign up for similar investment products, which 
could impact negatively on portfolio composition and performance, if they also have 
multiple mental accounts. On the other hand, financial advisors should be aware of the 
benefits and the pitfalls of mental accounting and the current composition of their 
clients’ portfolios so as to be able to appropriately guide investors. With regard to time 
preference and risk tolerance, the finding that both variables have varying effects on 
different asset classes and that mental accounting mediates these effects implies that 
financial advisors should regularly elicit more information about risk attitudes. Most 
importantly, advisors should broaden the type of questions asked to include questions 
that can capture levels of overconfidence, regret, trust and life satisfaction because such 
attitudes have been found to be correlated with risk attitudes (Pan and Statman, 2012). 
Mental accounting behaviour also has important implications for the operations of 
financial markets and the wider economy. Because investment in fairly safe assets 
appears to be appealing to households that have multiple mental accounts, introduction 
of innovative and attractive financial products could encourage long term saving and 
investment behaviour. In turn, this could further enhance the development of financial 
markets and the available opportunities for wealth accumulation, which is beneficial to 
the wider economy because an increase in households’ net worth increases the marginal 
propensity to consume (Poterba, 2000).    
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Chapter 4 Anchoring bias, asymmetric information and house prices 
“What someone will pay for your house at the time you’re trying to sell it is based on a 
whole host of non-monetary factors that an index can’t even begin to touch” 
(Greg Davies, Financial Times, June 2013) 
4.1 Introduction 
House price indices provide important information about housing market trends and 
general socio-economic conditions, which are useful to current and potential home 
owners and policy makers. These trends merit attention because housing contributes a 
significant proportion of both household and national wealth (see summary in Black et 
al., 2006);32 is the most talked about and watched investment (Himmelberg et al., 2005; 
Shiller, 2007); and a key determinant of households’ financial decision-making 
regarding consumption and investment (e.g. Campbell and Cocco, 2007; Disney et al., 
2010b). Further, house price indices are prevalent in print and online media and provide 
both historic data and online tools which enable homeowners to infer the value of their 
homes.   In view of this, we might expect home owners to closely monitor and anchor 
their estimates of home house values on house price indices. Anchoring bias, a form of 
systematic bias - prevalent in most people and predictable - supposes that individuals 
are influenced by reference points while estimating the true value of a subject and are, 
for example, unable to sufficiently adjust for new information (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1974). An important question is whether it is rational for homeowners to anchor on 
house price indices on the basis that in so doing they learn about trends in the housing 
market which they might not ordinarily observe, or whether it is a bias given that house 
price indices only represent the price of a hypothetical house.  
This Chapter investigates whether changes in the quarterly hedonic house price index 
published by Nationwide between 1993 and 2008 (hereafter referred to as the house 
                                                 
32 In the UK, more than 78% of households live in owner occupied accommodation and housing wealth is 
estimated to be 80% of total household wealth (Office of National Statistics, 2013a).  
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price index) can help explain changes in self-reported housing wealth (interchangeably 
referred to as self-reported house values) derived from the British Household Panel 
Study (BHPS). Self-reported housing wealth   has been found to provide valuable 
information which may influence household financial decisions (Engelhardt, 1996). 
Second, I examine the influence of financial expectations and housing tenure (outright 
or through a mortgage) on anchoring. The literature documents the relationships 
between these factors and household financial decisions, suggesting a critical 
connection with anchoring. Third, I investigate whether mortgage refinancing and the 
use of money raised for home investment or other consumption purposes independently 
and conditionally influence changes in self-reported house values. Fourth, as suggested 
by Epley and Gilovich (2010), I investigate whether social factors influence anchoring 
bias. Specifically, I analyse the independent and conditional influence of both computer 
use and social engagement measures such as involvement in social groups, trust and 
religion. I am not aware of any other study that uses self-reported housing wealth to 
examine anchoring biases or the influence of socio-economic factors in the housing 
market. As a result, I add to the anchoring literature and provide new evidence about 
the mediating role played by socio-economic factors. 
Previous studies primarily investigate whether economic fundamentals and behavioural 
factors can explain households’ reactions to changes in house prices and trends in the 
housing market. As far as economic fundamentals are concerned, most studies examine 
how changes in house prices influence consumption (Attanasio et al., 2009; Disney et 
al., 2010b); indebtedness (Disney et al., 2010a); savings behaviour (Engelhardt, 1996); 
and later life housing adjustments33  (Ermisch and Jenkins, 1999). These studies find 
mixed results regarding the influence and significance of three life-cycle theories: the 
                                                 
33 Later life housing adjustments include changes which are associated with house value and rental costs, 
the number of `excess' rooms, and the nature of housing tenure. 
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wealth effect, which holds that increases in perceived housing wealth trigger 
consumption among older people; the collateral effect, which posits that increases in 
house prices are correlated with indebtedness, especially among younger individuals; 
and a combination of the two, where both effects occur regardless of age (known as 
common causality). The few studies that approach this topic from a behavioural 
perspective focus on how psychological expectations influence market sentiments and 
momentum in house prices (Case and Shiller, 2003; Himmelberg et al., 2005; Mayer 
and Sinai, 2009); on money illusion (Brunnermeier and Julliard, 2008; Mayer and Sinai, 
2009); on loss aversion (Genesove and Mayer, 2001); and on how property pricing 
decisions are anchored on the initial price at which a property is listed (Northcraft and 
Neale, 1987). Connecting fundamental economic factors with behavioural factors, 
Disney et al. (2010a) find that the influence of changes in house prices on consumption 
is suppressed when they include a measure of financial expectations in their analysis. 
I take a different approach from these studies and examine the relationship between 
changes in self-reported house values and changes in a widely reported house price 
index. Self-reported house values are arbitrary estimates of home values, reported by 
homeowners in most household surveys, and are commonly used to measure housing 
wealth.  On the other hand, house price indices are determined from hedonic price 
functions and represent the price of a hypothetical average house; in reality prices 
reflect specific house types, unique attributes and regional location, among other 
factors. Furthermore, because trends in house prices vary across and within regions 
(Case and Shiller, 2003; Himmelberg et al., 2005), an additional source of error 
emanates from the fact that both national and regional house price indices may conceal 
these differences. I posit that homeowners anchor their self-reported housing wealth on 
regional house prices and are unaware of these estimation errors that could cause house 
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price indices to be different from the true market value of their homes. In other words, 
because of information asymmetries among homeowners, some fail to successfully 
adjust for unique hedonic characteristics, exceptional regional price movements, and 
other new market information.  
Within the finance literature, and in support of my approach, different dimensions of 
anchoring are well documented in experimental and empirical studies.  Studies that 
compare the influence of self-generated anchors (where judges are left to decide the 
anchor to use) with experimenter-provided anchors (where judges are provided with 
specific anchor values) show that self-generated anchors increase anchoring effects (e.g. 
Epley and Gilovich, 2001; Epley and Gilovich, 2010). Given the prevalence of house 
price indices in the media, I assume that homeowners’ choose these indices as reference 
points– self-generated anchors. To isolate anchoring as a behavioural bias, some studies 
show that experts (professionals) are able to decipher market information and are less 
prone to anchoring in comparison to amateurs (lay persons) (e.g.Northcraft and Neale, 
1987; Kaustia et al., 2008). I examine whether information asymmetries among outright 
owners, mortgage holders who do not refinance and mortgage holders who refinance 
experience varying levels of anchoring. Here, the assumption is that mortgage holders 
are more likely to be interested in economic news about interest rates and house prices, 
and are more likely to consume market information from mortgage providers. Whereas, 
for individuals who refinance their mortgages, they are more likely to incorporate in 
their self-reported housing wealth additional information contained in professional 
valuations. In addition, those who use the funds raised from re-financing for home 
improvements or extensions will be more likely to incorporate these in their estimates, 
as compared to those who use the funds raised for other consumption purposes.  
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Using fixed effects OLS regressions and quantile regressions I find that a 10% change 
in the Nationwide house price is associated with a 2.6% change in self-reported house 
value and that this effect remains virtually unchanged whether I control for property 
characteristics, individual characteristics or both. When I extend the baseline 
specification to include proxies for financial expectations and ownership type, I find 
that having greater financial expectations and owning a home through a mortgage both 
increase anchoring by 11%. In addition, I show that, among individuals who refinance 
their mortgages, investing in both home improvements and extensions increases self-
reported house value   by 5%; however, conditional on a change in the house price 
index, investing in both home improvements and extensions leads to a 10% decrease in 
self-reported housing wealth. For homeowners who use the funds from mortgage 
refinancing for other consumption purposes, I find no direct correlation with self-
reported housing wealth; however, the interactive effect, conditional on a change in the 
house price index, leads to a 7% decline in self-reported housing wealth. This evidence 
indicates that refinancing a mortgage provides new information about home values, 
which homeowners who refinance and use funds for home improvement incorporate in 
their self-reported house values. Furthermore, these results provide evidence of 
anchoring-and-adjustment because, when compared to homeowners who do not 
refinance, those who refinance are less anchored to the house price index.  When I 
address potential endogeneity issues using a dynamic GMM estimator, my results are 
consistent regardless of the estimation strategy used. 
The rest of the Chapter is organised as follows. In Section 4.2, I discuss the literature 
concerning anchoring bias and review empirical findings. Section 4.3 describes the data 
and key variables used in the empirical analysis. In Section 4.4, I discuss the empirical 
strategy. In Section 4.5, I report the findings of the main analysis and robustness 
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checks. I conclude in Section 4.6 with a brief discussion of the implications of this 
study.  
4.2 Prior literature and hypotheses development 
There is a growing literature that investigates the relationship between changes in house 
prices and household financial decisions. One strand of the literature links house price 
shocks to changes in household consumption. Generally, these studies investigate the 
wealth effect, the collateral effect, and the common-causality hypotheses34 which argue 
that households revise their consumption and investment plans in response to changes 
in house prices. As previously mentioned, the findings are mixed and inconclusive. For 
example, Campbell and Cocco (2007) find evidence of a wealth effect and show that 
changes in house prices are correlated with changes in household consumption and that 
the effects are higher among older homeowners. In contrast, Attanasio et. al. (2009) 
find this relationship to be more pronounced among younger households and they 
conclude that common causality could be a plausible explanation. Furthermore, when 
households’ financial expectations are controlled for, the relationship between house 
price shocks and consumption becomes smaller, as does the difference between older 
and younger households (Disney et al., 2010b). Regarding the collateral effect, Disney 
et. al. (2010a) find borrowing-constrained households to be more likely to use 
unsecured debt. These findings indicate that the relationships between house prices and 
fundamental factors remain open to debate.  
Another strand of literature associates changes in house prices with psychological and 
other behavioural biases. These studies argue that, as opposed to the assumption of 
                                                 
34 The three theories are: (1) the wealth effect – a surprise increase in house prices leads to increase in 
household wealth and thereby consumption; (2) the collateral effect – growth in house prices leads to 
increase in housing equity; and (3) common causality – house prices and consumption are both 
influenced by changes in expected future income.  
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rational behaviour in standard finance theory, real people in real situations behave 
differently and that departures from rationality are highly pervasive and systematic. 
First, there is increasing evidence that psychological expectations affect asset pricing. 
Based on surveys conducted in the US in 1988 and 2003, Case and Shiller (1988; 2003) 
find that most homeowners expect future house prices to continue increasing simply 
because national and global prices are also rising.  They argue that house price 
momentum is driven by market psychology. Second, there is evidence that individuals 
are unable to distinguish between real and nominal values of a currency, a phenomenon 
referred to as money illusion. For example, homeowners perceive a decrease in inflation 
to be linked to a decrease in real interest rates leading them to the irrational belief that 
future real mortgage obligations will be lower (Brunnermeier and Julliard, 2008). Third, 
research suggests that individuals use reference points in assessing losses and gains 
(loss aversion) and in deriving subject values and forecasts (anchoring bias). Genesove 
and Mayer (2001) find that both investors and homeowners use the nominal purchase 
price of a house as a reference point and that they tend to quote a listing price higher 
than the purchase price, as evidence of loss-aversion. Regarding anchoring bias, the 
literature suggests that individuals’ assessment of a target to be judged against and 
market forecasts are anchored on the listing price (Northcraft and Neale, 1987) and 
historical returns (Kaustia et al., 2008) respectively.  In this study, I focus on anchoring 
bias and the conditional effects of both mortgage refinancing decisions and social 
factors. 
4.2.1 Anchoring bias 
Following the work by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) concerning the influence of 
numerical anchors and insufficient adjustment to new information (basic anchoring), 
other perspectives on anchoring have been proposed in the literature, including 
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anchoring-as-activation (Chapman and Johnson, 1999), also referred to as semantic 
anchoring (Mussweiler and Strack, 2001), and elaboration anchoring (Blankenship et 
al., 2008; Wegener et al., 2010).  Regarding insufficient adjustment to new information, 
also referred to as anchoring-and-adjustment, individuals begin with a specific 
reference point, the anchor, and adjust for new information about the target value. To 
the extent that they are able to accurately incorporate new information, their estimates 
should gravitate towards the true value. However, if the new information is 
insufficiently adjusted for, the estimate of the target value will be biased towards the 
anchor. Anchoring as activation supposes that a chosen anchor only triggers 
information that is consistent with it: that is, “the notion that an anchor influences the 
availability, construction, or retrieval of features of the object to be judged” (Chapman 
and Johnson, 1999). In this account, when a low anchor is provided, an individual will 
tend to retrieve information and constructs that closely match the low anchor. Thus, 
anchoring occurs because of bias in the information retrieved and not as a result of 
insufficient adjustment.  
In a similar context, Mussweiler and Strack (2001) suggest that anchoring is connected 
with a knowledge accessibility effect and that anchoring is a two stage process: (1) 
selection anchoring, which occurs at the point when judges identify specific bases for 
comparison; and (2) comparison anchoring, which involves a comprehensive process of 
testing whether the subject value could be similar to the anchor, using knowledge 
produced by judges about the subject.  Further, Mussweiler and Strack note that 
selection anchoring plays an important role in everyday judgements where numerical 
anchors are not provided. Wegener et al. (2010) link the attitudes and persuasion 
literature (regarding how attitudes affect behaviour) and anchoring, and they propose 
that anchoring depends on the level of subject/anchor elaboration – high and low 
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elaboration anchoring. Under high-elaboration anchoring, judges might engage in a 
thoughtful process using target-relevant knowledge whereas in low-elaboration 
anchoring judges do not engage in a thoughtful process about target-relevant 
knowledge. These differences in the level of elaboration may lead to varying anchoring 
effects.  
This study focuses on anchoring-and-adjustment. I posit that homeowners perceive and 
respond differently to broad economic news and to mortgage-related information, 
which leads to insufficient adjustment.  I make two important assumptions. First, 
because news about trends in the housing market may draw the attention of most 
homeowners (Himmelberg et al., 2005; Shiller, 2007), I assume that homeowners use 
house price indices as anchors when they are asked to estimate the value of their homes. 
Epley and Gilovich (2001; 2010) argue that, when an anchor is self-generated, 
anchoring bias is caused by an inability to adequately adjust for available information 
and its effect is more pronounced than that observed with experimenter-provided 
numerical anchors. In the main analysis, I use the Nationwide house price index and I 
carry out robustness checks using Halifax house price index.  
Second, given that we might expect information asymmetries in the housing market 
(both market wide and concerning mortgage related information) I consider three types 
of homeowners: outright owners, mortgage holders who do not refinance, and those 
who refinance their mortgages. Across these groups, I might expect that the 
accessibility, relevance and depth of information available to each group will differ. For 
outright homeowners, housing constitutes a significant proportion of net total wealth, 
they are not debt constrained and they may view housing as an investment. Thus, they 
are likely to focus more attention on trends in house prices and to be more anchored on 
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house price indices. On the other hand, mortgage holders are likely to be debt 
constrained and housing wealth, as a proportion of total wealth, varies with the amount 
of outstanding mortgage payments.  Therefore, mortgage holders might worry about 
news concerning broad economic conditions and government policy which may affect 
interest rates and their ability to meet mortgage obligations. This implies that they are 
likely to be anchored on house price indices, just like outright owners, because house 
prices are believed to be good proxies for economic conditions (Sutton, 2002). 
However, among mortgage holders, homeowners who refinance their mortgages have 
access to additional information, including a recent professional valuation. Furthermore, 
if they use the money raised from mortgage refinancing for home improvements or an 
extension, they can estimate the change in the value of their house using the bills paid 
or the actual cost. Taken together, these information asymmetries (i.e. between outright 
owners and mortgage holders, and between homeowners who refinance and those who 
do not) point to a plausible anchoring bias that could also be subject to insufficient 
adjustment for available information.  
In the finance literature, as I discuss below, anchoring biases are well documented in 
studies that examine asset pricing (e.g. Huberman and Regev, 2001; Coval and 
Shumway, 2005) and asset allocation (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Shefrin and 
Statman, 1985; Feng and Seasholes, 2005). Generally, these studies show that financial 
markets are not efficient and that investors are not rational in their financial decisions 
(e.g. Linneman, 1986). Indeed, as argued by Case and Shiller (1989) the housing market 
is far from efficient, implying that irrational behaviour could be more pronounced and 
we can therefore learn more about individual behaviour. I now review the literature that 
links anchoring bias to financial forecasts and social factors, and derive my hypotheses.  
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4.2.2 Anchoring bias and financial forecasts 
The evidence from both laboratory and ‘real world’ experiments shows that people 
respond conservatively to new information (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Northcraft 
and Neale, 1987; Chapman and Johnson, 1999) and that forecasts are biased towards 
reference points. Northcraft and Neale (1987) use real market information to investigate 
whether estimation measures, decision processes, and demographic factors differ 
between experts (real estate agents) and amateurs (business school undergraduate 
students). Both groups were provided with comprehensive information about property 
listings, summaries of property sales, neighbourhood property characteristics, 
neighbourhood property standard listing prices, and a questionnaire to be filled in after 
touring the evaluated properties. Using two experiments with different participants, they 
find a pattern consistent with anchoring-and-adjustment bias: both groups were 
influenced by the listing price and were more likely to use comparison computations 
(using values of similar properties in the neighbourhood or market values). In addition, 
amateurs were more likely to use a concrete referent (value adjustment using values of 
related property features) and were influenced by previous experiences in home buying.  
Anchoring-and-adjustment bias is also documented in experimental studies that 
examine its effects in macroeconomic forecasts and financial markets forecasts. 
Campbell and Sharpe (2009) use monthly macroeconomic data to investigate whether 
experts’ forecasts are correlated with previous months’ releases. They find that experts’ 
forecasts of economic releases such as consumer confidence, consumer price indices, 
and retail sales are biased towards the actual values released in previous months. This 
result is supported by the finding in Glaser et al. (2007) who investigate framing effects 
on stock market forecasts. They conducted three experiments in two German 
universities, Mannheim and Mϋnster, using two classes of students attending advanced 
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courses in decision theory and behavioural finance respectively. Respondents were 
provided with price charts and a performance index and were asked to state price 
estimates and return forecasts in two stages: in the first stage the stocks were not 
disclosed and in the second part they were disclosed. The authors find evidence of 
framing effects; compared to price forecasts, higher return forecasts were quoted for 
upward trends in forecasts and lower return forecasts for downward trends in forecasts. 
However, the price forecast estimates were lower than return forecasts. They also find 
that higher financial education reduced framing effects and overconfidence.   
Kaustia et al. (2008) show the effects of both self-generated and ‘disclosed’ historical 
stock market return anchors and semantic priming35 on stock market forecasts. They use 
a sample consisting of both professionals and student participants in 3 experiments 
involving: (1) self-generated versus disclosed historical stock returns, (2) low versus 
high numerical anchors, and (3) semantic priming using good versus bad stock market 
experiences. They report strong anchoring effects in experiments (1) and (2) and 
insignificant effects in experiment (3). However, the effects were larger for self-
generated anchors than for numerical anchors. In addition, they find a larger anchoring 
effect for student subjects compared to experts and a lower anchoring effect among 
students with investment experience. This finding confirms the results in a previous 
study by Epley and Gilovich (2001) who argue that self-generated anchors “activate 
different mental processes than experiment-provided anchors”. These studies provide 
consistent evidence of anchoring bias and the mitigating effects of experience and 
expert knowledge.  
                                                 
35 Semantic priming involves providing additional information about the subject value; for example, 
priming respondents about good (bad) periods of market development, historical stock market returns, 
and reminding respondents about disclosed information (Kaustia et al., 2008; Wang and Dowding, 2010).   
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In this study I investigate whether there is an association between self-reported house 
values and actual house prices reflected in published house price indices. The intuition 
is that the question “about how much would you expect to get for your home if you sold 
it today?” asked of home owners in the BHPS plausibly activates a mental process in 
which respondents generate anchors that help them derive these values. Note that the 
question does not provide anchors or a guide to respondents on how to compute the 
target value. As discussed earlier, one possible self-generated anchor that individuals 
could use as a reference point is the publicly available national house price indices that 
are released at the regional and aggregate national level. Another possible self-
generated reference point is the purchase price of the property. Genesove and Mayer 
(2001) show that homeowners fix a reservation price that is higher than the purchase 
price because sellers are averse to loss – selling at a price that is below their purchase 
price. However, considering that house price indices are released on monthly and 
quarterly bases, homeowners could be inclined to revise their reference points (Baker 
and Nofsinger, 2002) and thereby use the latest estimated house price as a reference 
point instead of the historic purchase price. Furthermore, most homeowners view 
housing as an investment (Shiller, 2007) and they would therefore tend to evaluate 
performance using the most recently reported house prices.  
Nonetheless, reported house prices are computed using hedonic estimates and represent 
a non-existent, average house, implying that reported house prices will deviate from the 
target estimated market value of any home that does not correspond to the average. 
Theoretically, the estimated market value of a home should be its intrinsic value, which 
is derived using a capitalization process that considers the market value of the 
property’s attributes, the market value of comparable properties, or property prices in 
the local market (Brueggeman, 2011). As mentioned previously, when provided with 
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anchors and a set of housing market information, individuals tend to use ‘comparison 
computations’ and ‘concrete referent’ valuation strategies in determining the estimated 
market value (Northcraft and Neale, 1987). I conjecture that, from the observed 
regional house price index, individuals should be able to adjust for changes in the value 
of their own homes – associated with the unique characteristics and condition of their 
property – and changes in local house prices. Specifically, a home that deviates 
substantially from an average home in terms of its attributes should have a self-reported 
value that is explained more by its attributes and by local house prices rather than by 
regional house prices indices.  An anchoring bias will occur if the adjustment process 
leads to a self-reported target value that is biased towards the reported regional house 
price index. The hypothesis to be tested is   
Hypothesis 1: Changes in self-reported house values are anchored on changes in 
regional house price indices. 
Change in self-reported house value might, however, may be associated with 
homeowners beliefs that house prices will grow into the foreseeable future. This 
argument is supported by a general notion among homeowners that housing is the best 
investment that cannot lose money (Case and Shiller, 2003). Two surveys conducted by 
these authors in four US metropolitan cities in 1988 and 2003 provide interesting 
findings (Case and Shiller, 1988; 2003). Respondents were upbeat about future price 
appreciation both in the short-run (12 months) and long-run (over 10 years); they 
projected a substantial increase in future house prices; and believed that it was a good 
time to buy a house because house prices were expected to go up. When asked whether 
they discussed issues about the housing market with friends, more than 50% of the 
respondents acknowledged that they did so, sometimes or frequently.  The authors 
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conclude that expectations of future increases in house prices precipitate booms while 
word-of-mouth amplifies the effects.  
In the BHPS, three questions relating to financial expectations are asked of respondents: 
(1) “how well would you say you yourself are managing financially these days”; (2) 
“Would you say that you yourself are better off, worse off or about the same financially 
than you were a year ago?”; and (3) “Looking ahead, how do you think you yourself 
will be financially a year from now?”. These variables are good proxies for 
expectations about both the national economic outlook and individuals’ expectations. I 
use variables generated from these questions to test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between changes in self-reported house value and 
changes in the regional house price index is moderated by financial expectations. 
In the BHPS sample, approximately 63% of homeowners own their homes through a 
mortgage. Intuitively, holders of a mortgage are likely to keep abreast of house prices 
through interaction with their mortgage providers or they could merely be interested in 
observing house prices because they want to evaluate their outstanding mortgage 
obligations against house values (the loan-to-value – LTV ratio). This argument is 
supported by the finding in Disney et. al. (2010a) who, using LTV ratios36 as a proxy 
for collateral constraints, show that homeowners with high LTV ratios are  more likely 
to hold unsecured debt while those for whom LTV ratios are low are more likely to hold 
secured debt (and to refinance their mortgages). This implies that mortgage holders are 
more likely to anchor on house prices as compared to outright owners. I therefore test 
the following hypothesis: 
                                                 
36
 Their loan-to-value is derived from self-reported house value and other mortgage details in the BHPS. 
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Hypothesis 3: Home ownership through a mortgage increases anchoring on changes in 
house price indices.  
Further, given that increases in house prices provide an incentive to refinance a 
mortgage (Campbell and Cocco, 2007; Disney et al., 2010a), the use to which the funds 
generated by a mortgage refinancing are put might help illuminate the concept of 
anchoring-and-adjustment. An implicit assumption in hypothesis (2) is that mortgage 
holders who refinance their mortgages and those who do not refinance receive the same 
set of information. However, it could be the case that homeowners who refinance learn 
more about the estimated value of their homes as opposed to simply gleaning home 
values from house price indices. Since the process of mortgage refinancing invariably 
involves property appraisal, I would expect that, among homeowners who refinance 
their mortgages, self-reported house value will be closer to the true market price of a 
home. In this case, anchoring on regional house price should be lower when compared 
to outright ownership. Moreover, if a homeowner invests the loan on home 
improvements or an extension, I should expect anchoring to decline and to see a 
positive influence on the self-reported housing wealth (i.e. more accurate self-reported 
house value). Similarly, if the loan is used for other consumption purposes, I should 
expect to see decreasing anchoring effects; however, I should expect to see a weaker 
relationship with the self-reported value of housing wealth.   
To investigate these issues, I use the question: “What was this additional mortgage/loan 
used for?” The responses to this question include: for home extension; for home 
improvements or repairs; for car purchase; for other consumer goods; and other 
specified reason (see variable description in Table 4.1). I test the following hypotheses:  
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Hypothesis 4a: Households that refinance their mortgages are less likely to be 
anchored on changes in house price indices relative to households that do not 
refinance.  
Hypothesis 4b: Investing funds from mortgage refinancing in home improvement is 
positively associated with changes in self-reported house values relative to mortgage 
refinancing used for other consumption purposes. 
 Hypothesis 4c: Investing funds from mortgage refinancing in both home improvement 
and other consumption purposes equally reduce anchoring on changes in house price 
indices. 
4.2.3 Anchoring and social moderators 
Recent studies suggest versions of anchoring which consider the role of attitudes and 
persuasion in moderating anchoring effects, especially in real world situations (Epley 
and Gilovich, 2010; Wegener et al., 2010). For example, social factors such as the 
credibility of an anchor’s source, social status and self-affirmation might influence the 
extent to which individuals are anchored on self-generated or externally-provided 
anchors (Epley and Gilovich, 2010). People who belong to a high social class or those 
who are confident about their ability may believe that they have sufficient knowledge 
about the credibility of an anchor and are able to make a good judgement about the 
target value. These perspectives closely mirror the discussion and findings in Chapter 2 
concerning the relationship between social engagement and stock market participation. 
In this case, we might expect social engagement to influence the level of anchoring on 
house price indices possibly because social engagement exposes individuals to more 
information about the housing market. Shiller (2003; 2007) suggests that home 
purchase decisions are influenced by ‘casual word of mouth’ and that booms and busts 
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in the housing market are influenced by stories about house price forecasts. 
Furthermore, since homeownership tends to limit movement, homeowners are more 
likely to participate in elections, to join in the activities of non-professional 
organisations, and to frequently attend church when compared to renters (DiPasquale 
and Glaeser, 1999). In line with Putnam’s (2000) Social Capital Index, DiPasquale and 
Glaeser (1999) also find a positive association between homeownership and investment 
in social capital. This can partially explain variations in house prices across regions and 
why homeowners might under (over) value their homes.  
The question then, is whether the level of anchoring on house price indices varies 
across households, conditional on social engagement.  I hypothesize that socially 
engaged homeowners are better informed about developments in the housing market 
both at national and local level and are able to incorporate this information in their self-
reported values of housing wealth.  
Hypothesis 5a: Trust increases anchoring on house price indices.  
Hypothesis 5b: Involvement in social groups decreases anchoring on house price 
indices.  
Hypothesis 5c: Political party identification increases anchoring on house price 
indices.  
Hypothesis 5d: Religion decreases anchoring on house price indices.  
Hypothesis 5e:  Computer use increases anchoring on house price indices.   
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4.3 Data 
4.3.1 Variables description 
In this Chapter I use two types of data sets: the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) 
and both the Nationwide Building Society house price index and (for robustness) the 
Halifax house price index. Table 4.1 presents the definitions of all of the variables used 
in the analysis.  
The Nationwide Building Society provides a series of seasonally adjusted house price 
indices that date back to 1952, broken down by region, house type, buyer type, and 
property age. The house prices are derived from mortgage data for houses that are at 
their valuation stage when the respective valuation reports have been completed. The 
data excludes re-mortgaged, buy-to-let, and discounted right-to-buy sales properties and 
any property that does not fall within specified floor size limits for each house type. 
Property prices are estimated using property characteristics such as location, type of 
neighbourhood, floor size, and the actual price at which the property was sold for in the 
market. Thus, the reported house prices represent the price of a non-existent, average 
house. I use the series that reports quarterly and annual house prices by 12 UK regions 
and by house type – detached houses, semi-detached houses, terraced houses, and 
flats/apartments – covering the period 1993 to 2011. The existence of quarterly, in 
addition to annual, data provide additional variation because house prices are known to 
be seasonal, allowing me to control for any bias arising from households interviewed 
during low or high seasons. As I discuss below, I match and merge the reported house 
price data with the BHPS data.   
The BHPS is a longitudinal study of a representative sample of households in Great 
Britain, which began in 1991 and lasted until 2008 when it was replaced by the 
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UKHLS. As noted in Chapter 2, the BHPS survey consists of data for approximately 
5,500 households and 13,500 individuals, boosted over the years by additional 
households from Scotland, Northern Ireland and ethnic minorities. The UKHLS, which 
retains respondents in the BHPS sample, has a larger sample of 100,000 individuals and 
more than 40,000 households. This study uses 16 waves of the BHPS, covering surveys 
conducted from 1993 to 2008. The sample is restricted to homeowners during the panel 
period but excludes the first two waves of the BHPS because self-reported house values 
were not reported for 1992. The data set contain detailed individual information about 
self-reported house values, property attributes, and mortgage details and the 
respondents’ demographic and socioeconomic characteristics.  
I generate house type, geographic location, and time variables which facilitate matching 
and merging of house price data with BHPS data as well as to control for house type 
characteristics. In the BHPS, house type information is categorised into 12 house types 
before 1995 and 14 house types thereafter.  These are: detached house or bungalow; 
semi-detached house or bungalow; enclosed terraced house; terraced house; purposed 
built flat; converted flat; house including business premises; bedsitter under 10; 
bedsitter more than 10; sheltered accommodation; institutional accommodation; and 
other types. For the waves after 1995 purpose built flats and converted flat house types 
were each broken down into two more categories, by number of units – less than 10 
units and more than 10 units. In order to appropriately match house price data with the 
BHPS data, I generate four house types as defined in the Nationwide dataset: detached, 
semi-detached, terraced and flat.  The sub-categories for terraced houses and flats are 
combined and the remaining house types are excluded. For geographic regions, I use 
the variable ‘government office region’ which describes the 13 UK regions; these 
comprise the 12 regions used in the Nationwide dataset and the Channel Islands.
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Table 4.1 Variable definitions  
The Table provides definitions of all the variables used in this Chapter. The data is drawn from Nationwide House Price information and the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS) for the period between 1993 and 2008.  
Variable Description Value Source Wave/Year 
Dependent Variables 
    Change in self-reported 
house value 
About how much would you expect to get for your home if you sold it 
today? 
The logarithmic value of change in self-reported 
house value, excluding house values below £10,000. 
BHPS 1991 - 2008 
Key variables      
Change in house price 
index 
Nationwide quarterly house price of a typical house by region and house 
type estimated using hedonic regressions. Hedonic characteristics include: 
region; house type (detached, semi-detached, terraced and flats); type of 
neighbourhood; floor size; and the actual sale price of the house. 
The logarithmic value of change in house price 
index. 
Nationwide 
& Halifax 
1991 - 2008 
Under mortgage Derived variable: owned outright, owned with mortgage, local authority 
rent, housing association rented, rented from employer, rented private 
unfurnished, rented private furnished or other rented 
owned with a mortgage =1 ; owned outright = 0; all 
rented accommodation are excluded 
BHPS  1991 - 2008 
Extra loan Have you taken out any additional mortgage or loan on this house/flat since 
September 1st 1994? 
Yes = 1; No = 0 BHPS  1991 - 2008 
Home investment What was this additional mortgage/loan used for? To which respondents 
select: home extension;  home improvements or repairs; car purchase; other 
consumer goods; other specified reason 
home extension & home improvements or repairs = 1 
otherwise = 0 
BHPS  1991 - 2008 
Other Consumption What was this additional mortgage/loan used for? To which respondents 
select:  car purchase; other consumer goods; other specified reason 
car purchase or other consumer goods or other 
specified reason = 0; otherwise = 0 
BHPS  1991 - 2008 
Computer user Which item do you have? Home computer Yes = 1; No = 0 BHPS 1991 - 2008 
Religious How much difference would you say religious beliefs make to your life? some  or a great difference = 1 ; a little  or no 
difference = 0 
BHPS 1992 - 2008 
Active in tenants group Respondents are asked "Are you currently active in: Tenants'/Residents' 
Group or Neighbourhood Watch" 
I assign the value if response is yes, and zero 
otherwise 
BHPS 1991 – 2008 
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Table 4.1 Continued 
Variable Description Value Source Wave/Year 
Trusts most people Generally speaking, would say that most people can be trusted, or that you 
can't be too careful in dealing with people? 
most people can be trusted = 1; can't be too careful = 
0 
BHPS 1991 - 2008 
Overvalued Calculated as the difference between self-assessed house value and the 
predicted market price.  
I assign the value one if house value is higher than 
market price, and zero otherwise 
BHPS & 
Nationwide 
1991 - 2008 
Property attributes      
House type The classifications are: detached house or bungalow; semi-detached house 
or bungalow; enclosed terraced house; terraced house; purposed built flat; 
converted flat; house including business premises; bedsitter under 10; 
bedsitter more than 10; sheltered accommodation; institutional 
accommodation; and other types. For the waves after 1995 purpose built 
flats and converted flats house types were each broken into two more 
categories by number of units – less than 10 units and more than 10 units.  
The sub-categories for terraced houses and flats are 
combined and the remaining house types are 
excluded in our analysis. I generate a binary variable 
for each house type.  
BHPS 1991 - 2008 
Number of rooms Respondents are asked about "How many rooms are there here, including 
bedrooms but excluding kitchens, bathrooms, and any rooms you may let or 
sublet?" Number or rooms range from 1 to 19 
The log of the number of rooms. BHPS 1991 - 2008 
Prefers to move  If you could choose, would you stay here in your present home or would 
you prefer to move somewhere else? Respondents chose either to 'stay here' 
or 'prefer to move' 
I assign the value one for those who prefer to 'stay 
here' and zero otherwise. 
BHPS 1991 - 2008 
Likes present 
neighbourhood 
Overall, do you like living in this neighbourhood? I assign the value one if respondent likes present 
neighbourhood and the value zero otherwise.  
BHPS 1991 - 2008 
Control variables     
Health    Please think back over the last 12 months about how your health has been 
compared to people of your own age, would you say that your health has on 
the whole been... 
excellent and good = 1 ; fair, poor or very poor =0 BHPS 1991 - 2008 
Male Interviewer check sex of the respondent male = 1 ; female = 0 BHPS 1991 - 2008 
Age Derived variable: uses date of birth variables on survey database age at date of interview BHPS 1991 - 2008 
Married Married, separated, divorced, widowed or never married married = 1 ; separated, divorced, widowed or never 
married = 0 
BHPS 1991 - 2008 
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Table 4.1 Continued 
     
Variable Description Value Source Wave/Year 
Number of children Number of own children below 16 years of age: derived from a set of 
questions  
  one=1; two=2,; three=3 ; four or more kids = 4  BHPS 1991 – 2008 
First degree or above 
qualification 
Derived variable - yearly updated qualification of new entrants and existing 
panel members qualifications include no qualification ; commercial 
qualification, no o-levels, CSE grade 2-5 or Scotland grade 4-5 ; GCE A-
levels, GCE o-levels or equivalent; teaching , other higher or nursing 
qualifications ; and first or higher degree 
first or higher degree = 1; other categories = 0  BHPS 1991 - 2008 
Employed  Please look at this card and tell me which best describes your current 
situation? Self- employed, in paid employ, unemployed, retired, family care, 
FT student, long term sick/disabled, on maternity leave, government 
training or other 
unemployed, maternity leave, family care, full time 
student, sick, disabled, government training scheme,  
or other = 1 ; retired = 2 ; self-employed = 3 ; and 
employed = 4 
BHPS 1991 - 2008 
Region Internally computed government office region North East = 1 ; North West = 2 ; Yorkshire and 
Humber = 3 ; East Midlands = 4 ; West Midlands = 5 
; East of England = 6 ; London = 7 ; South East = 8 ; 
South West = 9 ; Wales = 10 ; Scotland = 11 ; 
Northern Ireland = 12 ; and Channel Islands = 13 
BHPS 1991 - 2008 
Income Derived variable that sums up all sources of income indicated by the 
respondent including : labour income and non-labour income 
  BHPS 1991 - 2008 
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I exclude the Channel Islands because data for the region consist of only three 
observations, cover a short period and in any event are not included in the Nationwide 
data. With respect to the time variable, I use the month and year when a respondent was 
interviewed to generate a quarterly time variable. Using these variables, I match the two 
datasets by region, house type, and interview date (quarter) from which I end up with 
151,482 observations. 
The question concerning self-reported value for housing wealth asked of the head of 
each household is: About how much would you expect to get for your home if you sold it 
today? The question is repeated in all waves apart from Wave 2; only respondents who 
were not interviewed in Wave 1 were asked the question. Using this self-reported value, 
the dependent variable, change in self-reported house value, is the log of the change in 
the value reported during each wave: that is, the current self-reported house value minus 
the preceding period value divided by the preceding period value. Because I am able to 
match the quarters in which the Nationwide and Halifax house price indices are 
reported with the quarter during which a respondent was interviewed, I use a similar 
construction for our measure of anchoring bias – change in house price index.  From 
Table 4.2, I see that the distribution of self-reported house values in the BHPS varies 
considerably from the Nationwide house prices so I exclude individuals who report 
values below £ 5,000 and in excess of £ 1million as outliers. Further, I note that self-
reported house values may be subject to measurement errors (the difference between the 
observed value and the true market value), as argued by some authors (e.g. Disney et 
al., 2010a), though there is support for their use elsewhere in spite of these 
measurement errors (e.g. DiPasquale and Somerville, 1995; Engelhardt, 1996). 
Moreover, Goodman and Ittner (1992) suggest that rates of change in self-reported 
house values are unbiased. 
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To measure respondents’ perceptions about financial wellbeing, three questions that ask 
about past, current, and future financial expectations are asked of respondents. 
Concerning future financial expectations, respondents are asked – looking ahead, how 
do you think you will be financially a year from now? – to which they can respond 
“better than now”, “worse than now”, or “about the same”. The variable financial 
expectation equals one if the response is “better than now” and zero otherwise. This 
measure has been used in previous studies that examine, for example, the relationship 
between financial over-optimism and mortgage arrears (Dawson and Henley, 2012) and 
the relationship between consumption and house prices (Disney et al., 2010b).  
Four variables concerning homeownership tenure, mortgage refinancing, and use of 
money raised from refinancing are generated from three questions in the BHPS. The 
first variable is derived from the responses to the question – Is this accommodation 
owned outright or through a mortgage? I generate the variable under mortgage, which 
equals one if a home is owned through a mortgage and zero if owned outright. The 
second variable is derived from the responses to the question – since last year have you 
taken out any additional mortgage or loan on this house/flat? From this question, I 
generate the variable taken out extra loan which equals one for positive responses and 
zero otherwise. Finally, respondents who positively respond to this question are then 
asked two additional questions about the total amount of the additional loan taken and 
what the loan was used for. Responses to the question about the use of the loan include 
“for home improvement”, “for home extension”, “for car purchase”, “for other 
consumer goods”, and “for other specified reason”.  The variable home investment 
equals one if the response is home improvement or home extension and zero otherwise, 
while the variable other consumption equals one if the response is car purchase, other 
consumer goods, or other specified reason and zero otherwise.   
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The social moderators included in the analysis are represented by computer use and 
four social engagement measures. I define computer ownership as a dummy variable 
that equals 1 for positive responses and 0 otherwise.   The four social engagement 
measures include active in tenancy groups; trusts most people; political party 
identification; and religion makes a difference in life. Active in tenancy groups is 
measured using responses to the question: “Do you join in the activities of any of these 
organisations on a regular basis: Tenants'/Residents' Group or Neighbourhood Watch?” 
The variable active in tenancy group equals 1 if the response is “yes” and zero if “no”. 
The variable trusts most people is generated from the question – generally speaking, 
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in 
dealing with people? – and equals 1 for positive responses and 0 otherwise. Religiosity 
is measured by the dummy variable religion makes a difference. This takes a value 1 if 
respondents answer: a little difference, some difference or a great difference to the 
question: how much difference would you say religious beliefs make to your life?  It 
takes the value 0 if the answer is no difference.  
I control for a number of socio-economic and demographic factors that are associated 
with homeownership and may influence self-reported house values. Educational 
attainment is measured using the question about the highest academic qualification 
attained by respondents. These qualifications are broken down into five categories: “no 
qualification”; “commercial qualification, no o-levels, CSE grade 2-5 or Scotland grade 
4-5”; “GCE A-levels, GCE o-levels or equivalent”; “teaching, other higher or nursing 
qualifications”; and “first or higher degree”. The variable first degree and above equals 
1 if respondent has ‘first or higher degree’ qualification and equals 0 otherwise. 
Responses to the question regarding occupation include employed, retired, self-
employed and unemployed (the latter category includes those in family care, full time 
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students, the long term sick/disabled, those on maternity leave, on government training 
or others). The variable employed equals 1 if respondent is employed and 0 otherwise. 
Respondents’ income is a derived variable, which combines labour income and non-
labour income at the individual level. I generate the variable log of income which is the 
logarithmic transformation of income. The variable good health takes the value 1 for 
respondents who say that their health condition is “excellent”, “good”, or “fair” and the 
value 0 if “poor” or “very poor”.  Age is controlled using the age at the date of 
interview and its square to capture possible non-linearity. The Cohort effect is 
accounted for using the variable year of birth to control for socio-economic 
circumstances peculiar to specific cohorts and time effects.  Married is a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 for ‘married’ and 0 otherwise. 
Finally, I control for property attributes that could also be associated with self-reported 
house values. I would expect that homeowners are more informed about the specific 
characteristics that could reduce or increase the value of their homes. The variable 
number of rooms is the logarithmic transformation of the number of rooms in the house. 
From the question – “overall, do you like living in this neighbourhood” – I generate the 
variable likes present neighbourhood, which equals 1 if the response is ‘yes’ and 0 if 
the response is ‘no’. The variable prefers to move house is generated from the question 
– if you could choose, would you stay here in your present home or would you prefer to 
move somewhere else – and equals 1 if the respondent prefers to move and zero 
otherwise.  The question asked about ownership of other property is – you or any 
members of your household own any of the types of property listed on this card? I 
generate a dummy variable, other property, that takes the value 1 for positive responses, 
“yes”, and the value 0 otherwise.    
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4.3.2 Descriptive statistics  
4.3.2.1 Summary statistics 
The summary statistics for the key variables used in the empirical analysis are reported 
in Table 4.2. I report summary statistics for two house price indices, the Nationwide 
index and the Halifax index, and for the BHPS self-reported value of housing wealth, 
property attributes and individual characteristics. 
I find that the BHPS self-reported house values are widely distributed with a mean of 
£147,602 and a high standard deviation, when compared to the Nationwide house price 
mean of £113,411 and the Halifax house price mean of £124,336, with both having 
standard deviations which are more than 50% lower. This is expected because the 
hedonic prices derived from the Nationwide and Halifax data are based on an average 
house and geographic region, as discussed in the previous section. Dividing the sample 
by percentiles, I find that self-reported house values are close to the Nationwide house 
prices at the median and at the 10th and 25th percentiles but they deviate substantially 
more at the 75th and 90th percentiles. Because I use the logs of change in both the self-
reported house values and the house price indices I do not expect this distribution to 
affect the analysis, and for robustness I use quantile regression and alternative house 
price indices.  
Examining the proportion of homeowners who over/(under)  value  their homes, I find 
that relative to both the Nationwide and Halifax house price indices 61% and 57% of 
the households in the sample overvalue their homes, respectively. Regarding ownership 
tenure and mortgage refinancing, I find that 61% own their homes through a mortgage, 
whereas 4% refinance their mortgages; 3% use an extra loan for home improvement or 
an extension while 2% use an extra loan for other consumption.   
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Table 4.2 Summary statistics 
Table reports weighted summary statistics for all the variables used in the study as described in Table 4.1. The data is drawn from Nationwide and Halifax house price indices 
and the BHPS for the period 1993 to 2008. For the BHPS, the sample consists of all respondents who own a house outright or through a mortgage and excludes Northern 
Ireland.  The reported statistics are weighted using the BHPS cross-sectional enumerated individual weights. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Percentile         N 
   
10th  25th  50th 75th 90th 
 Self-reported house value (GB£)          147,602  151540.8             44,000              65,000           105,000           185,000           380,000  101491 
House price index - Nationwide (GB£)          113,411  71459.1             40,978              56,184              94,792           146,448           258,686  101102 
House price index - Halifax (GB£)          124,336  62459             56,950              70,051           102,855           168,908           246,858  101491 
Overvaluation relative to Nationwide index 0.6147 0.4867 0 0 1 1 1 101102 
Overvaluation - relative to Halifax index 0.5746 0.4944 0 0 1 1 1 101491 
Under a mortgage 0.6117 0.4874 0 0 1 1 1 101491 
Taken out extra loan 0.04406 0.2052 0 0 0 0 0 101491 
Financial expectations 0.2602 0.4388 0 0 0 1 1 95179 
House improvement 0.02796 0.1649 0 0 0 0 0 101491 
Other consumption 0.01989 0.1396 0 0 0 0 0 101491 
Number of rooms in the house 5.028 1.6279 3 4 5 6 8 101379 
Likes present neighbourhood 0.9404 0.2367 1 1 1 1 1 98377 
Prefers to move house 0.3088 0.462 0 0 0 1 1 97781 
Detached 0.3188 0.466 0 0 0 1 1 101491 
Semi-detached 0.3703 0.4829 0 0 0 1 1 101491 
Terraced 0.2462 0.4308 0 0 0 0 1 101491 
Flats 0.06469 0.246 0 0 0 0 1 101491 
Male 0.4723 0.4992 0 0 0 1 1 101491 
Age 48 18.308 23 34 47 61 79 101217 
Cohort 1953 18.617 1926 1939 1953 1966 1982 101483 
Has children 0.2551 0.4359 0 0 0 1 1 101491 
Married 0.615 0.4866 0 0 1 1 1 101463 
Employed  0.5284 0.4992 0 0 1 1 1 101432 
First degree or above qualification 0.1316 0.3381 0 0 0 0 1 97581 
Income 14410 14837.6               2,307                5,415              11,048              19,175              37,605  96438 
 
Anchoring bias, asymmetric information and house prices 
 
 227 
For property characteristics, I find that the average number of rooms in the sample is 5 
rooms. Only 8% of homeowners live in flats, while 23% live in terraced houses, 35% in 
semi-detached and 32% in detached houses. On average, most homeowners like their 
present neighbourhood (95%) while those who prefer to move house constitutes 30% of 
the sample. Overall, most of the explanatory variables show high variations in the data 
apart from mortgage refinancing variables which have relatively low standard 
deviations.  
Table 4.3 reports weighted pairwise correlations for all of the variables in our analysis, 
with the indicated levels of significance representing the 5% level and below. 
Interestingly, I see large differences in the correlations between the dependent variable 
and changes in regional house price indices; for the Nationwide index the coefficient is 
0.233 while the coefficient for the Halifax index is 0.119. This may be associated with 
the manner in which the two indices are calculated as the Halifax house price index 
does not take into account quarterly changes in sample composition. However, for the 
national level indices, the correlation between the changes in self-reported house value 
and the change in the Halifax house price index is 0.310, which is much higher than the 
correlation coefficient for the change in the Nationwide house price index, 0.256. Other 
independent variables that are correlated with the dependent variable include the 
number of rooms (0.063), detached houses (0.0380) and income (0.029). I find a 
negative correlation between change in self-reported house values and prefers to move 
house (-0.024), terraced house types (-0.011), and flats (-0.064). Regarding housing 
tenure and mortgage refinancing, I note that homeownership through a mortgage and 
mortgage refinancing have positive correlations with changes in self-reported house 
values and changes in all house price indices apart from changes in the regional Halifax 
house price index, which is insignificant.  
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Table 4.3 Pairwise correlation matrix 
Table reports weighted pairwise correlation matrix for all variables as described in Table 1. The data is drawn from Nationwide and Halifax house price indices and the 
BHPS for the period 1993 to 2008. For the BHPS, the sample consists of all respondents who own a house outright or through a mortgage and excludes Northern Ireland.  The 
reported levels of significance are based on Bonferroni-adjusted p-values and are given by * for significance levels of 0.05 or less. 
  Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) Change in self-reported house value 1 
           (2) Change in Nationwide index (regional) 0.2326* 1 
          (3) Change in Nationwide index (National) 0.2559* 0.8243* 1 
         (4) Change in Halifax index (Regional) 0.1190* 0.2171* 0.2686* 1 
        (5) Change in Halifax index (National) 0.3104* 0.5612* 0.7125* 0.3696* 1 
       (6) Overvalue (relative to Nationwide index) 0.1020* -0.1518* -0.1148* -0.0236* -0.0674* 1 
      (7) Overvalue (relative to Halifax index) 0.0984* -0.0352* -0.0543* -0.2910* -0.0715* 0.3885* 1 
     (8) Financial expectations 0.0252* 0.0223* 0.0307* 0.0064 0.0400* 0.0083* 0.0262* 1 
    (9) Under mortgage 0.0313* 0.0153* 0.0223* -0.0004 0.0260* 0.0108* 0.0222* 0.2359* 1 
   (10) Home investment 0.0376* 0.0171* 0.0166* 0.0095* 0.0213* 0.0088* 0.0101* 0.0356* 0.1351* 1 
  (11) Other consumption 0.0105* 0.0156* 0.0167* 0.006 0.0205* 0.0078* 0.0204* 0.0544* 0.1135* 0.1468* 1 
 (12) Number of rooms 0.0625* 0.0113* 0.0140* 0.0163* 0.0130* 0.3507* 0.3004* 0.0264* 0.0456* 0.0283* 0.0217* 1 
(13) Likes present neighbourhood 0.0131* 0.0068* 0.0088* 0.003 0.0044 0.0979* 0.0490* -0.0185* -0.0088* 0.0085* -0.0021 0.0620* 
(14) Prefers to move house -0.0234* -0.0058 -0.0061 -0.0096* -0.0078* -0.1032* -0.0449* 0.0965* 0.1115* -0.0024 0.0255* -0.0917* 
(15) Detached 0.0351* 0.1261* 0.1443* 0.0715* 0.1134* 0.0142* 0.0728* -0.0355* -0.0907* -0.0091* -0.0097* 0.3889* 
(16) Semi-detached 0.0002 -0.1667* -0.1681* -0.0224* -0.0546* 0.4163* -0.0561* -0.0017 0.0400* 0.0157* -0.0072* -0.0656* 
(17) Terraced -0.0149* 0.0628* 0.0500* -0.0364* -0.0600* -0.4069* -0.0258* 0.0266* 0.0540* 0.0041 0.0168* -0.1753* 
(18) Flat -0.0419* -0.0236* -0.0329* -0.0295* -0.0043 -0.1292* 0.0176* 0.0238* -0.0013 -0.0206* 0.003 -0.3010* 
(19) Male 0.0029 0.0018 0.0044 0.0027 0.006 0.0097* 0.002 0.0788* 0.0304* -0.0011 0.0038 0.0233* 
(20) Age -0.0377* -0.0223* -0.0311* -0.0057 -0.0373* -0.0182* -0.0356* -0.3514* -0.5749* -0.0927* -0.0746* -0.1045* 
(21) Cohort 0.0489* 0.0150* 0.0218* 0.0062 0.0211* 0.0186* 0.0179* 0.3416* 0.5488* 0.0962* 0.0866* 0.1233* 
(22) Has child(ren) 0.0317* 0.0091* 0.0161* 0.0028 0.0183* 0.0539* 0.0330* 0.0796* 0.3527* 0.1023* 0.0537* 0.1514* 
(23) Married 0.0065* -0.0071* -0.0085* 0.0013 -0.0085* 0.0878* 0.0439* -0.1256* 0.0144* 0.0244* -0.0121* 0.1273* 
(24) Employed or self-employed 0.0245* 0.0149* 0.0147* -0.0007 0.0152* -0.0033 0.005 0.1469* 0.3995* 0.0748* 0.0507* 0.0057 
(25) First degree or above qualification 0.0258* 0.0047 0.0055 0.0043 0.0067* 0.1002* 0.1241* 0.0658* 0.0962* 0.0156* 0.0203* 0.1416* 
(26) Income 0.0205* 0.0018 -0.0006 0.0016 -0.0065 0.0411* 0.0463* 0.0093* 0.1204* 0.0286* 0.0308* 0.0250* 
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Table 4.3 Continued 
 
 
  Variables (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) 
(13) Likes present neighbourhood 1 
            (14) Prefers to move house -0.3540* 1 
           (15) Detached 0.0812* -0.1349* 1 
          (16) Semi-detached 0.0181* -0.0042 -0.5246* 1 
         (17) Terraced -0.0855* 0.1193* -0.3910* -0.4383* 1 
        (18) Flat -0.0398* 0.0546* -0.1799* -0.2017* -0.1503* 1 
       (19) Male 0.0150* 0.0184* 0.0107* 0.004 -0.0091* -0.0123* 1 
      (20) Age 0.0254* -0.1549* 0.0892* -0.0301* -0.0699* 0.0124* -0.0395* 1 
     (21) Cohort -0.0151* 0.1326* -0.0832* 0.0303* 0.0674* -0.0197* 0.0367* -0.9690* 1 
    (22) Has child(ren) 0.0070* 0.0452* -0.0021 0.0385* 0.0074* -0.0846* -0.0194* -0.2935* 0.2798* 1 
   (23) Married 0.0271* -0.0290* 0.1350* 0.0119* -0.0741* -0.1493* 0.0389* 0.2313* -0.2422* 0.2739* 1 
  (24) Employed or self-employed 0.0134* 0.0939* -0.0941* 0.0477* 0.0467* 0.0028 0.0479* -0.4175* 0.4052* 0.2150* 0.0370* 1 
 (25) First degree or above qualification 0.0293* 0.0133* 0.0702* -0.0737* -0.0150* 0.0380* 0.0332* -0.1017* 0.1146* 0.0869* -0.0012 0.1325* 1 
(26) Income 0.0352* 0.0055 0.0255* -0.0255* -0.0224* 0.0406* 0.2729* 0.0346* -0.0028 0.1219* 0.0816* 0.3976* 0.2090* 
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Preference to move house is negatively correlated with all of the variables apart from 
house type (terraced and flats) and individual characteristics (first degree and above 
qualification, employed and income).  In summary, the correlations range between -
0.522 and 0.405, implying that I should expect most of the right-hand side variables to 
explain variations in our data. In addition, I carry out multicollinearity tests and do not 
find this to be a problem.37 
4.3.2.2 Graphical analysis 
The relationships between the means of both self-reported house values and the 
Nationwide and Halifax house price indices, at national and regional level, are depicted 
in Figure 4.1 to Figure 4.3.  As observed in the literature these relationships may 
suggest that self-reported house values could be anchored on house prices. Figure 
4.1displays aggregate national means of self-reported housing wealth, the Nationwide 
house price index and the Halifax house price index against years. Overall, it can be 
observed that mean self-reported house values are higher than the mean of the 
Nationwide house price index throughout the period. However, the mean of the Halifax 
house price index is higher than the mean of self-reported house values for part of the 
study period - between 1999 and 2005. This suggests that most households tend to 
overvalue their homes relative to house price indices and that house price indices vary 
because of the different methodologies. Notably, both the mean self-reported house 
values and the means of the two house price indices increased during the period before 
2007 and dropped thereafter, reflecting the peak in the housing market that preceded the 
onset of the financial crisis in 2008.  
                                                 
37 For all the variables used in Table 6, we test for multicollinearity using the STATA software command 
‘collin’ and find that all their variance inflation factors are below 10 (tolerance levels above 0.1) while 
the overall condition number is 10. 
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Figure 4.1 Means self-reported house values and published house price indices 
This figure plots the relation between self-reported house value and house price index during 1993-2008 
period. The self-reported house values are from the BHPS and house price indices are from the 
Nationwide and Halifax house price index series. 
 
 
 
The same pattern is observed across regions, as reported in Figure 4.2, which displays 
the regional means of self-reported house values, the Nationwide house price index and 
the Halifax house price index against years by region. The Nationwide house price 
index is consistently lower than both the Halifax house price index and self-reported 
house values in all regions apart from London and the South East.  
The Halifax house price index is higher than self-reported house values in the North 
East, Yorkshire and Humber, Wales and Scotland. In addition, the gap between the 
mean self-reported house value and both house price indices is wider in the East of 
England, London, and the South East. This finding indicates that there are substantial 
regional variations in both self-reported house values and published house price indices.   
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Figure 4.2 Means of self-reported house values and published house price indices 
by UK regions 
This figure plots the relation between regional self-reported house value and regional house price index 
during 1993-2008 period. The self-reported house value are from the BHSP and the house price index is 
from the Nationwide house price index series. 
 
Furthermore, when the means are calculated by house types and region, for example, 
London and Scotland, as displayed in Figure 4.3, differences by house type across 
regions are apparent. Reflecting differences in the index calculation methodology, more 
erratic price movements are evident for the Halifax index as compared to the 
Nationwide index. In London, there are stark differences between the mean of self-
reported house value and the means of both the Nationwide and the Halifax house price 
indices for detached and semi-detached house types. Moreover, across house types in 
London, the mean of the Halifax house price index is below that of the Nationwide 
house price index.  
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Figure 4.3 Means of self-reported house values and house price index by region 
and house type 
This figure plots the relation between aggregate national self-reported house value and national house 
price index during 1993-2008 period by house type and two UK region: London and Scotland. The self-
reported house values are from the BHSP and house price index is from the Nationwide house price index 
series. 
 
 
 
For terraced and flats house types, there is a high correlation between the self-reported 
housing values and both the Nationwide and the Halifax house price indices.  For 
Scotland, a different pattern is evident as the means of the Halifax index are higher than 
both the means of self-reported house value and the Nationwide house price index. In 
summary, the graphical analysis provides evidence of variations in the data, across 
regions and by house type, which I exploit to investigate whether they are associated 
with anchoring biases.  
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4.4 Empirical strategy 
Anchoring bias occurs when individuals’ predictions are too close to uninformative 
reference points and thus underweight other relevant information about a subject value. 
As noted in section 4.3, aggregate self-reported house values are correlated with 
aggregate house price indices but this correlation varies across individuals, regions, and 
house type. This suggests that variations in self-reported house prices could be 
attributed to property characteristics, neighbourhood characteristics, and market 
information asymmetries among homeowners. Specifically, as in Northcraft and Neale 
(1987), such attributes include house type, square footage, the age of a property, and 
observed local house prices of comparable properties. Similar attributes are used for 
valuation in mortgage origination and related contractual agreements. However, 
variations could also occur because of measurement errors caused by information 
asymmetries that result in individuals being unable to value unique property 
characteristics.  
Most studies that examine anchoring effects, in various fields, use a variety of methods. 
A straightforward analysis involves regressing actual data releases (i.e. house values) 
on the most recent forecasts and testing whether the slope coefficient is significantly 
different from unity (Aggarwal et al., 1995; David C. Schirm, 2003).  Anchoring can 
also be modelled as a ‘surprise’ – forecast subtracted from actual data release – and 
regressed on the expected ‘surprise’ – forecast minus the average value of a lagged 
series of forecasts (Campbell and Sharpe, 2009).  In this case, rationality is overruled if 
the coefficient on the expected ‘surprise’ parameter is positive.  
Following a method proposed by Genesove and Mayer (2001), Beggs and Graddy 
(2009) use a two stage process to isolate anchoring bias in the art market from other 
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effects that could be captured by the residual term in their regression. First, they use a 
hedonic price function to predict the market price of works of art and identify two 
biases in the estimation procedure: (1) anchoring bias, reflected in a deviation of the 
predicted sale price from the lagged sale price; and (2) unobserved characteristics, 
reflected in a deviation of a lagged predicted sale price from a corresponding lagged 
sale price. Second, the authors regress sale prices for works of art on the predicted sale 
prices and the proxies for anchoring bias and unobserved characteristics.  
In the above studies, the aim is to isolate anchoring bias in the presence of many other 
plausible biases. Overall, these studies find significant anchoring effects. I follow these 
studies in examining whether self-reported house values are anchored on a published 
house price index. However, as I discuss below, unlike these studies, I address 
econometric issues concerning unobserved effects (arising from both property and 
individual characteristics) using two strategies. First, rather than using the log of both 
self-reported house values and the Nationwide house price index, I use logarithmic 
transformations of the change in both variables and fixed effects OLS regressions. This 
partially eliminates unobserved effects and measurement errors in both variables. 
Second, for robustness, and to address endogeneity issues, I use instrumental variables 
estimations using generalised methods of moment (GMM).  
As noted earlier, house price data are typically estimated using hedonic regressions in 
which the actual house value is expressed as a function of its characteristics. The 
estimated equation is then used to estimate the house price for an average house 
conditioned on specific property characteristics, house type and geographic region.  The 
hedonic model may be represented by equation (1) where the dependent variable, MP, 
is the market price for specific house unit, and the independent variables are the house 
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characteristics, including property characteristics, PC (e.g. house design, number of 
bathrooms, number of bedrooms, type of garage, and property age); neighbourhood 
characteristics, NC (e.g. location of property and infrastructure); environmental 
characteristics, EC (e.g. noise pollution and air pollution); and a random error term,   , 
which captures the residual errors.  
                                     (1)  
The random error term may be attributed to two types of errors: ‘analyst errors’ and 
‘transactor errors’ (Linneman, 1986). Transactor errors occur when home house values 
do not represent true house prices; for example, a home owner may be forced by 
personal circumstances to sell or buy a house at a price which could be higher or lower 
than the market price. Analyst errors include measurement errors and omitted variables 
that arise because the regression model may be misspecified – i.e. some important 
property characteristics may be excluded in the regression model. As argued by 
Linneman (1986), it is not possible to mathematically distinguish analysts’ errors from 
transactors’ errors. However, as transactors’ errors arise from sellers, the errors can be 
minimized by either including a variable that captures unplanned home relocation or by 
excluding such home owners from the dataset. In this case, the residual term should 
consist solely of analysts’ errors that arise from the imprecise hedonic regression 
model.     
Given that the self-reported house value may be a good proxy for the market price, I 
could replace the dependent variable in Equation (1) with self-reported house values 
and calculate a house price index from the regression estimates. If self-reported house 
values are free from measurement errors and the model specifications are as described 
in Equation (1), the calculated house price index should not significantly vary from an 
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index based on market prices. Previous studies examine the relationship between the 
two approaches to calculating house price indices and find that they have similar 
patterns and both indices differ only at market turning points when compared with a 
market wide house price index.38 This is hardly unexpected because, as previously 
mentioned, house price indices represent the price of a ‘typical house’. Furthermore, 
self-reported house value equations would be imprecisely estimated if a homeowner is 
unable to estimate the market value of property attributes and is influenced by other 
factors including the house price index and individual characteristics.  
Sketching these ideas empirically, I begin with the simple case where I regress the log 
of self-reported house value for individual i at time t,     , on the log of the house price 
index for an equivalent house at time t,    , and a time-specific effect, ᴛ, represented 
by Equation (2). If the coefficient α is not significantly different from unity, I conclude 
that self-reported house values are anchored on analysts’ house prices. Therefore, house 
prices reflect all the available market information and both property and individual 
characteristics do not explain variations in self-reported house values.  Otherwise, the 
error term,   , could be capturing unobserved effects including omitted variables and 
measurement errors.   
                     (2)  
Incorporating property characteristics for individual i,    , and individual 
characteristics,    , into Equation (2) allows the effect of these variables to influence 
                                                 
38Dipasquale and Somerville (1995) compare three price series: two price series constructed by the 
authors using purchase prices and self-reported house values from the American Housing Survey; and a 
national price index.  They find that the three price series generally have similar patterns and only differ 
during market turning points. Using the same survey but comparing self-reported house value and a local 
house price index, Goodman and Ittner (1992) find that owners’ estimates were biased upwards. They 
find that the residual term is uncorrelated with individual characteristics, property attributes or regional 
effects. Similar results are reported by Kiel and Zabel (1999).  
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the self-reported house value, in Equation (3). This regression has three implications: 
(1) If homeowners place more weight on the market information reflected in house 
prices, α will be significantly different from zero and the parameters η and δ will be 
insignificant; (2) if homeowners’ place more weight on the characteristics of their 
homes then the parameter   will be non-zero and the magnitude of α will vary; and (3) 
if homeowners’ perceptions and abilities are correlated with self-reported values, the 
parameter   will also be non-zero and α will vary.  
                                (3)  
The concern, however, is that the unobserved effects in Equation (3) may still be 
correlated with the house price index, property characteristics or individual 
characteristics. Specifically, self-reported house values may lag behind the house price 
index while omitted variables and measurement errors may be correlated with property 
characteristics. To circumvent this problem, I slightly modify Equation (3) and model 
the change in self-reported house value as a function of change in the house price index, 
in Equation (4).  In addition, I use fixed effects OLS regressions to further eliminate 
unobserved individual effects and cluster standard errors at the individual level. This 
model is represented by: 
                                (4)  
To formally test for information asymmetries and the presence of factors that moderate 
anchoring effects, I examine how exposure to different information and new 
information could impact on the weight that homeowners assign to regional house 
prices. The assumption is that new information enables home owners to revise their 
home values towards their true market values so that the weight that is placed upon 
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regional house prices could result in either an increase or decline. Whereas, varying 
exposure to market information could explain differences in self-reported house value 
and anchoring on house price indices, I speculate that this could arise in two ways: (1) 
ownership tenure (outright owner or ownership through a mortgage) including 
mortgage re-financing decisions and the purposes for which an additional loan is used; 
and (2) social factors including computer use and social engagement mechanisms.  
Beginning with ownership tenure, I posit that, when compared to outright homeowners, 
mortgage holders are more likely to be interested in news about the performance of the 
housing market and general economic conditions and are therefore more likely to 
anchor on house price indices. As previously discussed, the interest in such news is 
driven by the need to closely monitor growth in housing wealth and, most importantly, 
mortgage repayment obligations. Thus, a regression that includes an interaction term 
between change in the house price index and the variable under mortgage in Equation 
(4) allows me to test this hypothesis. This regression, as represented by Equation (5) 
below, has two implications: (1) owning a home through a mortgage should have no 
direct effect on change in self-reported house value; and (2) the interaction term should 
be positive and significant – that is, holding other variables constant, owning a home 
through a mortgage increases the effect of the change in the house price index. The 
model is represented by: 
                        (         )             
        
(5)  
Where      represents the variable under mortgage for individual i and the other 
parameters are as defined before.  
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Second, I investigate both the main and conditional effects of mortgage refinancing and 
the use of the money raised, which could provide additional tests of anchoring bias. 
Specifically, it permits an examination of whether anchoring-and-adjustment bias is 
observable given the expected opposite implications of these variables on change in 
self-reported house value and their interactions with changes in the house price index. 
The conjecture is that since homeowners who refinance their mortgages receive a 
professional valuation of their homes I should expect to see less anchoring, when 
compared to both mortgage holders who do not refinance and outright owners 
(Equation (6)). Further, the purposes for which the additional loan is used have three 
implications: (1) if a homeowner who refinances and uses funds for home investment is 
able to adjust for an increase in home value, I should expect to see a  positive 
correlation with change in self-reported house value (Equation (7)); (2) for those who 
use the money raised for other consumption purposes, I should expect to see an 
insignificant relationship with change in self-reported house value (Equation (8)); and 
(3) the interaction terms between change in house price index and both home 
investment and other consumption should be negatively correlated with change in self-
reported house value (Equation (9)). The models are represented by: 
                        (         )               
      
(6)  
                        (         )               
      
(7)  
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                        (         )               
      
(8)  
                                (              )
                    
(9)  
Third, I examine the mediating role of computer use. I posit that homeowners who use a 
computer also frequently access the Internet, which increases access to news about the 
housing market and the likelihood of using on-line tools for calculating home values. 
Because this calculation is based on house price indices I expect to see a positive and 
significant effect in the interaction term between computer use and change in the house 
price index. The model is represented by: 
                        (         )               
      
(10)  
Where      represents computer use by individual i and other parameters are as defined 
before.  
Finally, I investigate the role of three social engagement measures. These have four 
implications: (1) if homeowners are more trusting they are more likely to trust the 
producers of house price indices and so they are more likely to be anchored, as tested 
by Equation (11); (2) if homeowners who are involved in tenancy groups are able to 
learn about local house prices in their neighbourhood, I should expect them to be less 
anchored on house price indices, as tested by Equation (12); and (3) if homeowners 
who are religious view their home as a place to live in, rather than an investment, and 
Anchoring bias, asymmetric information and house prices 
 
 242 
get to learn about house prices through religious activities, then I expect that they will 
be less likely to be anchored, as tested by Equation (13). The models are as follows: 
                       (         )               
      
(11)  
                        (         )               
      
(12)  
                        (         )               
      
(13)  
Where     represents trust most people,     represents membership of a tenancy group, 
and     represents religious beliefs. 
4.5 Empirical results 
In this section, I report the results from the main empirical model. First, I present results 
from baseline fixed effects OLS regressions, in which I examine the roles of changes in 
the house price index, regional and time dummies, a set of property attributes, and a 
vector of individual characteristics on changes in self-reported house values. Second, I 
examine the influence of a number of extended specifications and sub-samples. Third, 
to address concerns regarding the distribution of the dependent variable, I present 
quantile regression estimates. 
4.5.1 Baseline anchoring estimates 
I begin by examining whether self-reported house values are anchored on house price 
indices using univariate analysis and specifications that include property characteristics 
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and individual characteristics. I estimate fixed effects OLS regressions using equation 
(4) and extensions of this equation where the dependent variable is log of change in 
self-reported house value. Change in Nationwide house price index is the key 
independent variable, along with an array of other independent variables including 
property attributes, individual characteristics of the homeowner, time dummies and 
regional dummies.   
In line with the literature concerning both hedonic pricing and behavioural models, 
these variables are known to influence asset pricing and household financial decisions, 
respectively. Property attributes include the variables number of rooms, likes present 
neighbourhood, prefers to move house, and type of accommodation. The individual 
characteristics that I control for include the variables age, male, married, first degree 
and above qualification, employed and income. Table 4.4 reports the coefficient 
estimates for five specifications from fixed effects OLS regressions.  The standard 
errors are clustered at the individual level and are used to derive the levels of 
significance.  
The underlying conjecture in these baseline regressions is that homeowners continually 
track changes in regional house prices and that they use these changes to interpolate 
changes in the value of their own homes. In column (1), I carry out a univariate analysis 
where I regress the log of change in self-reported house value on the log of change in 
Nationwide house price index. This regression indicates that house price index barely 
explains variations in the self-reported house values, with a low R2 of 0.053. However, 
we know that house prices vary substantially across regions and that time-fixed effects 
may be correlated with house prices. When I include both regional and time dummies in 
column (2), the magnitude of the house price index coefficient reduces from 0.266 to 
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0.194 and the r2 increases to 0.090. This result indicates that the house price index is 
invariant to the inclusion of property attributes and individual characteristics; generally, 
time dummies39 have high magnitudes and are significant at the 1% level.   
When I consider a specification with proxies for property attributes, in column (3), I 
find all the proxy variables to be significant, with the expected signs. The coefficient 
estimate of change in house price index remains virtually unchanged. The variations in 
the dependent variable explained by the independent variables in this specification also 
increase, to 0.105.  In the fourth, extended, specification, I examine whether individual 
characteristics explain variations in self-reported house values or whether they may be 
proxies for house prices.  
When I add these variables together with time and regional dummies, Column (4), both 
the R2 and the coefficient estimate for change in house price index drop to 0.090 and 
0.191 respectively. The proxies for individual characteristics are insignificant apart 
from the variables married and first degree and above which are significant at the 1% 
level the 10% level, respectively. As expected, time dummies appear to capture more 
information in the absence of property characteristics. In the final specification, in 
column (5), I bring together the two sets of variables in columns (1) and (2) in one 
regression.  The coefficient for change in house price remains stable at 0.203 and the r2 
at 0.105. The coefficient estimates of the property attributes remain virtually unchanged 
in magnitude and significance, as compared to the results in column (3). When 
compared to the results in column (4), the coefficient estimates for individual 
characteristics become significant for the variable has children and age square.  
                                                 
39 When we test whether time dummies or regional dummies are needed in this regression, we find that 
the joint effects for both are significantly different from zero at the 1% level.  
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Table 4.4 Baseline anchoring regressions - self-reported house value and regional 
house price 
Table reports the estimation results from OLS fixed effects regressions in which the dependent variable is 
log of change in self-reported house value. The independent variables as described in Table 4.1are: in all 
columns, log of change in house price index; column (2, 3, 4 &5), time and regional dummies; 
column(3),  property attributes; column (4), variables for individual characteristics; and column (5), and 
combination of the three sets of variables in column (2), (3) and (4). Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses and the levels of significance are indicated by * (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Change in house price index 0.266*** 0.194*** 0.207*** 0.191*** 0.203*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Number or rooms   0.125***  0.125*** 
   (0.006)  (0.007) 
Likes present neighbourhood   0.012**  0.011** 
   (0.005)  (0.005) 
Prefers to Move   -0.017***  -0.017*** 
   (0.002)  (0.002) 
Detached   0.079***  0.085*** 
   (0.010)  (0.010) 
Semi-detached   0.109***  0.113*** 
   (0.009)  (0.009) 
Terraced   0.022**  0.026*** 
   (0.009)  (0.009) 
Log of Income    -0.000 0.002 
    (0.002) (0.002) 
Age square    0.000 0.000*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
Has Children    0.001 -0.011*** 
    (0.003) (0.003) 
Married    0.023*** 0.015*** 
    (0.004) (0.004) 
Employed    -0.001 -0.000 
    (0.003) (0.003) 
First degree & above    0.003 0.020** 
    (0.010) (0.010) 
Region dummies (Base=North East)      
North West  0.048 0.037 0.038 0.027 
  (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Yorkshire & Humber  0.092** 0.066* 0.081** 0.059 
  (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039) 
East Midlands  0.106*** 0.062 0.095** 0.056 
  (0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) 
West Midlands  0.068* 0.043 0.060 0.034 
  (0.039) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) 
East of England  0.176*** 0.140*** 0.165*** 0.129*** 
  (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
London  0.191*** 0.202*** 0.183*** 0.191*** 
  (0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) 
South East  0.144*** 0.137*** 0.133*** 0.127*** 
  (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) 
South West  0.096** 0.055 0.079** 0.042 
  (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
Wales  0.087** 0.042 0.072* 0.032 
  (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
Scotland  0.052 0.061 0.041 0.063 
  (0.045) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) 
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Table 4.4 Continued 
      
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Time dummies       
1995  -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.005 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
1996  0.027*** 0.022*** 0.025*** 0.017*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
1997  0.039*** 0.034*** 0.037*** 0.025*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
1998  0.045*** 0.037*** 0.042*** 0.026*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
1999  0.063*** 0.055*** 0.062*** 0.042*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
2000  0.083*** 0.074*** 0.081*** 0.059*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
2001  0.071*** 0.060*** 0.067*** 0.041*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
2002  0.159*** 0.147*** 0.154*** 0.124*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
2003  0.145*** 0.131*** 0.141*** 0.106*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) 
2004  0.148*** 0.133*** 0.144*** 0.105*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) 
2005  0.080*** 0.066*** 0.075*** 0.035*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) 
2006  0.061*** 0.048*** 0.054*** 0.013 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.010) 
2007  0.072*** 0.058*** 0.066*** 0.021** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) 
2008  -0.040*** -0.051*** -0.047*** -0.093*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.011) 
Constant 0.067*** -0.093*** -0.337*** -0.100*** -0.405*** 
 (0.001) (0.032) (0.034) (0.037) (0.040) 
Adjusted r2 0.053 0.090 0.105 0.090 0.105 
Observations 117303 117303 112958 110950 109160 
 
Overall, these estimates confirm the main hypothesis (1) and indicate that changes in 
self-reported house values are anchored on changes in house price index.  
4.5.2 Evidence using extended regression specifications and interaction terms  
To further examine the relationship between self-reported house values and change in 
house price index, I extend the final specification in Table 4.4, Column (5), to include 
additional independent variables and interaction terms. Table 4.5 presents the results for 
the extended specifications. In Column (1), I include the variable financial expectations 
in the fixed effects OLS regression. This variable represents respondents’ self-reported 
perceptions about their future financial situation. A similarly structured variable that 
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reflects future financial situation has been used in the literature to proxy for financial 
expectations (Disney et al., 2010a; Dawson and Henley, 2012). The idea is that, if the 
regional house price index is an indicator of the prevailing economic conditions and, by 
implication, individuals’ financial expectations, the inclusion of this variable should 
reduce the influence of the change in the house price index. When I enter this variable, 
Column (1), the coefficient for change in house price index remains unchanged from 
that reported in Table 4.4, Column (5), while the variable financial expectations is 
insignificant. However, when I interact the two variables, Column (2), the coefficient 
for change in house price index drops from 0.205 to 0.179; the variable financial 
expectations becomes negative and significant at the 10% level; and the coefficient 
estimate for the interaction term is positive and highly significant (0.085). This result 
indicates that financial expectations has a weak direct association with change in self-
reported house values; however, in line with Hypothesis (2), having favourable future 
financial expectations increases anchoring on the change in the house price index.  
In the second extended specification, I examine whether ownership through a mortgage 
or otherwise influences the self-reported house value. In Column (3) I enter the dummy 
variable under mortgage to our final baseline regression specification and interact the 
two variables in Column (4).  The results in Column (3) show that the variable under 
mortgage is positive and significant at the 5% level. In support of Hypothesis (3), 
however, the coefficient estimate for the interaction term (0.076), reported in Column 
(4), is positive and highly significant while the estimate for change in house price index 
drops to 0.152. In addition, the direct influence of the variable under mortgage becomes 
insignificant.  
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Table 4.5 Estimates using extended specifications and interaction terms 
Table reports the estimation results from OLS fixed effects regressions in which the dependent variable is log of change in self-reported house value. The independent 
variables include log of change in house price; a set of property attributes; a set of individual characteristics (some not shown); and time dummies (not shown). Additional 
independent variables include financial expectations; dummy for ownership through a mortgage; overvaluation dummy; and interaction terms of these variables with change 
in regional house price. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and the levels of significance are indicated by * (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Change in house price index 0.204*** 0.179*** 0.203*** 0.152*** 0.232*** 0.280*** 0.181*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010) (0.017) 
Financial expectations 0.003 -0.005*     -0.027** 
 (0.002) (0.003)     (0.012) 
Financial expectations *  ∆ House price index   0.085***     0.164*** 
  (0.013)     (0.061) 
Under mortgage   0.008** 0.002   0.005 
   (0.004) (0.004)   (0.007) 
Under mortgage * ∆ House price index    0.076***   0.121*** 
    (0.012)   (0.021) 
Overvalue     0.203*** 0.213*** 0.213*** 
     (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) 
Overvalue *  ∆ House price index      -0.076*** -0.020 
      (0.011) (0.020) 
Financial expectations * Under mortgage       0.018 
       (0.012) 
Financial expectations * Under mortgage  * ∆ House price index       -0.110* 
       (0.064) 
Financial expectations * Overvalue       0.033** 
       (0.013) 
Financial expectations * Overvalue * ∆ House price index       -0.075 
       (0.074) 
Under mortgage * Overvalue       -0.006 
       (0.008) 
Under mortgage * Overvalue *  ∆ House price index       -0.085*** 
       (0.025) 
Financial expectations * Under mortgage * Overvalue       -0.021 
       (0.015) 
Number or rooms 0.127*** 0.126*** 0.125*** 0.124*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.067*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Likes present neighbourhood 0.012** 0.012** 0.011** 0.011** 0.003 0.003 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
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Table 4.5 Continued 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Prefers to Move -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Detached 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.085*** 0.087*** 0.091*** 0.088*** 0.087*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Semi-detached 0.111*** 0.112*** 0.113*** 0.114*** 0.038*** 0.035*** 0.033*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Terraced 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.038*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Log of Income 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003* 0.003* 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age square 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Has Children -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Married 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.010** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Employed -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
First degree & above 0.019* 0.019* 0.020** 0.020** 0.022** 0.022** 0.020* 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Region dummies (Base=North East)        
North West 0.037 0.041 0.027 0.028 0.025 0.029 0.043 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) 
Yorkshire & Humber 0.073* 0.077** 0.059 0.060 0.046 0.049 0.068* 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.038) 
East Midlands 0.065* 0.067* 0.056 0.056 0.023 0.024 0.034 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.041) (0.040) (0.039) 
West Midlands 0.044 0.045 0.034 0.035 0.024 0.027 0.038 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) 
East of England 0.140*** 0.143*** 0.128*** 0.128*** 0.102*** 0.104*** 0.117*** 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) 
London 0.203*** 0.205*** 0.191*** 0.190*** 0.216*** 0.218*** 0.233*** 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) 
South East 0.140*** 0.140*** 0.127*** 0.127*** 0.128*** 0.128*** 0.140*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.036) 
South West 0.053 0.055 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.045 0.058 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) 
Wales 0.041 0.043 0.031 0.030 0.015 0.017 0.027 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) 
Scotland 0.075* 0.081* 0.063 0.063 0.059 0.064 0.081* 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) 
Anchoring bias, information asymmetries and house prices 
 
 250 
Table 4.5 Continued 
        
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Time dummies         
1995 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.008 -0.007 -0.006 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
1996 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.008 0.009* 0.011** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
1997 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
1998 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.026*** 0.028*** 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.027*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
1999 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.042*** 0.044*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.042*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
2000 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.059*** 0.061*** 0.048*** 0.050*** 0.056*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
2001 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.041*** 0.043*** 0.032*** 0.034*** 0.040*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
2002 0.126*** 0.127*** 0.124*** 0.127*** 0.108*** 0.110*** 0.116*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
2003 0.110*** 0.111*** 0.106*** 0.109*** 0.090*** 0.091*** 0.100*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
2004 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.106*** 0.109*** 0.086*** 0.087*** 0.096*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
2005 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.035*** 0.038*** 0.009 0.010 0.019* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
2006 0.019* 0.019* 0.013 0.016 -0.018* -0.016 -0.006 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
2007 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.022** 0.025** -0.014 -0.013 -0.002 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
2008 -0.084*** -0.085*** -0.092*** -0.090*** -0.132*** -0.131*** -0.120*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
Constant -0.404*** -0.403*** -0.411*** -0.403*** -0.447*** -0.458*** -0.454*** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) 
Adjusted r 2  0.105 0.106 0.105 0.106 0.148 0.149 0.151 
Observations 105121 105121 109160 109160 109160 109160 105121 
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In the third extended specification, I introduce the variable overvalue which represents 
the tendency of homeowners to either undervalue or overvalue their homes relative to 
regional house prices. Generally, as discussed in the data section, I find minimal 
transitions between the two states over the panel period; most homeowners consistently 
overvalue or undervalue their homes. Because I model change in self-reported house 
value as a function of change in regional house price, I expect that both property 
characteristics and individual characteristics should capture variation in self-reported 
house values with or without anchoring. This is difficult to model econometrically 
considering the few observable property characteristics in the survey. To circumvent 
this shortcoming, I include the variable overvalue and an interaction term with change 
in house price index in the final baseline regression specification. In so doing, I expect 
these adjustments to capture additional variation in the data and to isolate the effect of 
persistent overvaluation on our estimates that may influence the role of the change in 
the house price index both directly and interactively.  
The results in Column (5) show that the dummy captures additional variation as 
compared to the previous results; the r2 increases from 11% to 15%. The coefficient for 
the change in the house price index increases to 0.232. As expected, the results for 
property characteristics are mixed. While the coefficient estimates decline for the 
variables number of rooms, prefers to move and semi-detached house type, the 
coefficient estimates for the variable terraced house type increase and likes present 
neighbourhood become insignificant.  Another interesting finding is the influence of 
individual characteristics where the variables log of income and higher degree and 
above become significant at the 5% level.  Most importantly, when I interact the 
overvaluation dummy with the change in the house price index, the coefficient 
estimates increase sharply for change in house price index (0.280) and only slightly for 
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the overvaluation dummy. The interaction term is negative and significant suggesting 
that change in self-reported house value is low for homeowners who both anchor on 
changes in the house price index and who overvalue their homes.  
In Column (7), I bring these additional variables and interaction terms together in one 
regression. The coefficient estimate of change in house price index drops to 0.181 and 
remains significant at the 1% level; the coefficient estimate for the variable overvalue 
remains unchanged; the level of significance of financial expectations increases to the 
5% level; and the coefficient estimate of the variables under mortgage becomes 
insignificant. As for the interaction terms, I find that the interactions between change in 
house price index and the variable financial expectations is twice the magnitude 
reported in Column (2); that the interactions between change in house price index and 
the variable under mortgage increases to 0.121; that the interactions between change in 
house price index and overvalue becomes insignificant; and the interaction term for the 
variables change in house price index, under mortgage and overvalue is negative and 
highly significant.  In summary, these results show that conditional on changes in the 
house price index, homeownership through a mortgage and greater financial 
expectations, are positively associated with changes in the self-reported house values 
while the tendency to overvalue has an insignificant relationship with changes in the 
self-reported house value.  
4.5.3 Effect of mortgage refinancing 
In the previous section, holding a mortgage and financial expectations provided 
compelling evidence regarding their indirect relationships with changes in the self-
reported house value, when considered alongside changes in the house price index. An 
assumption that is made concerning the variable under mortgage is that all mortgage 
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holders receive the same set of information, which inclines them to anchor on the house 
price index. In this section, I relax this assumption and consider the behaviour of 
mortgage holders who also refinance their mortgages, the manner in which they use the 
raised funds and the influence of having greater financial expectations. Table 4.6 
reports the estimates from fixed effects OLS regressions for the whole sample of 
homeowners using a reduced form of the regression in Column (7) of Table 4.5, where I 
include all explanatory variables and a few interaction terms (those with 5% or below 
levels of significance). In Columns (1) to (6) of Table 4.6, I run separate regressions for 
the variables taken out extra loan, home investment, other consumption and the 
interactions among these variables with change in the house price index and bring them 
together in one regression in Column (7).  
In Column (1), I include the dummy variable taken out extra loan, which takes the 
value 1 for respondents who refinanced their mortgages during the panel period and 0 
otherwise. The results show that the variable is highly significant and is positively 
correlated with the change in the self-reported house value. The coefficient estimates 
for change in house price index and other explanatory variables in Table 4.6 are 
comparable with the results in Table 4.5, Column (7). However, the variable financial 
expectations becomes significant at the 1% level and the coefficient of its interaction 
with change in house price index drops in magnitude but remains highly significant. 
This result suggests that the decision to refinance a mortgage provides additional 
information about changes in self-reported housing wealth and future financial 
expectations. When I interact this variable with changes in the house price index, 
Column (2), the findings support Hypothesis (4a).  
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Table 4.6 Effect of refinancing through home improvement and consumption 
Table reports the estimation results from OLS fixed effects regressions in which the dependent variable is log of change in self-reported house value. The independent 
variables include log of change in house price; a set of property attributes; a set of individual characteristics (some not shown); and time dummies (not shown). Additional 
independent variables include mortgage refinancing dummy; home improvement dummy; other consumption dummy; and interaction terms of these variables with change in 
regional house price. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and the levels of significance are indicated by * (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Change in house price index 0.189*** 0.189*** 0.189*** 0.190*** 0.189*** 0.189*** 0.190*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Taken extra loan 0.020*** 0.028***      
 (0.004) (0.004)      
Taken out extra loan * ∆ House price index  -0.077***      
  (0.020)      
Extra loan – Home investment   0.035*** 0.043***   0.081*** 
   (0.004) (0.005)   (0.008) 
Home investment * ∆ House price index    -0.077***   -0.045 
    (0.024)   (0.032) 
Home investment * Financial expectations * ∆ House price index       -0.106*** 
       (0.041) 
Extra Loan – Other consumption     -0.011** -0.001 0.046*** 
     (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) 
Other consumption * ∆ House price index      -0.090*** -0.037 
      (0.029) (0.036) 
Other consumption * Financial expectations * ∆ House price index       -0.142*** 
       (0.050) 
Home investment * Other consumption       -0.115*** 
       (0.032) 
Home investment * overvalue       -0.049*** 
       (0.009) 
Other consumption * overvalue       -0.068*** 
       (0.011) 
Home investment * other consumption * overvalue       0.111*** 
       (0.035) 
Financial expectations -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Financial expectations * ∆ House price index 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.075*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
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Table 4.6 Continued 
        
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Under Mortgage 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Under mortgage * ∆ House price index 0.111*** 0.116*** 0.111*** 0.114*** 0.111*** 0.113*** 0.111*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Overvalue 0.209*** 0.209*** 0.209*** 0.209*** 0.210*** 0.210*** 0.212*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Overvalue * ∆ House price index -0.024 -0.024 -0.024 -0.024 -0.024 -0.024 -0.027 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Overvalue * Financial expectations 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Overvalue * Under mortgage * ∆ House price index -0.084*** -0.084*** -0.085*** -0.084*** -0.084*** -0.083*** -0.079*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Number or rooms 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.065*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Likes present neighbourhood 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Prefers to Move -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Detached 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.086*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Semi-detached 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Terraced 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Log of Income 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age square 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Has Children -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Married 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Employed -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
First degree & above 0.020* 0.020* 0.020* 0.020* 0.020* 0.020* 0.020** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
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Table 4.6 Continued 
        
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Region dummies (Base=North East)        
North West 0.044 0.046 0.045 0.045 0.043 0.045 0.046 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Yorkshire & Humber 0.069* 0.071* 0.070* 0.071* 0.069* 0.071* 0.071* 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
East Midlands 0.035 0.037 0.035 0.037 0.034 0.036 0.037 
 (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
West Midlands 0.040 0.041 0.040 0.041 0.039 0.041 0.041 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
East of England 0.118*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.120*** 0.117*** 0.119*** 0.121*** 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
London 0.234*** 0.234*** 0.234*** 0.235*** 0.233*** 0.234*** 0.234*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
South East 0.141*** 0.141*** 0.141*** 0.142*** 0.140*** 0.141*** 0.141*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) 
South West 0.059 0.060 0.060 0.061 0.058 0.060 0.060 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Wales 0.028 0.029 0.028 0.029 0.028 0.029 0.029 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Scotland 0.079* 0.081* 0.079* 0.081* 0.080* 0.082** 0.084** 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) 
Time dummies         
1995 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
1996 0.011** 0.011** 0.011** 0.011** 0.011** 0.011** 0.011** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
1997 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
1998 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
1999 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.042*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
2000 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.056*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
2001 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
2002 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.115*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
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Table 4.6 Continued 
        
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
2003 0.098*** 0.098*** 0.099*** 0.099*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 0.099*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
2004 0.095*** 0.095*** 0.095*** 0.095*** 0.097*** 0.097*** 0.096*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
2005 0.017* 0.017* 0.018* 0.018* 0.019* 0.019* 0.018* 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
2006 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
2007 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
2008 -0.121*** -0.121*** -0.120*** -0.120*** -0.120*** -0.120*** -0.120*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
 Constant -0.453*** -0.454*** -0.452*** -0.453*** -0.451*** -0.453*** -0.455*** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Adjusted r 2  0.152 0.152 0.152 0.152 0.151 0.151 0.153 
Observations 105121 105121 105121 105121 105121 105121 105121 
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The main effect of refinancing slightly increases in magnitude and the interaction term 
is negative and highly significant. The coefficient estimate for change in house price 
index, other explanatory variables and interaction terms remain unchanged.  
To examine whether the purpose for taking an extra loan influences change in self-
reported house value and whether it is also correlated with change in the house price 
index, I replace the variable taken out extra loan with the variable home investment in 
Column (3). The variable equals one for homeowners who use mortgage refinancing for 
home improvements or home extensions. The results show that the variable home 
investment is highly significant and larger in magnitude, when compared to taken out 
extra loan in Column (2). This result indicates that mortgage holders who refinance 
their mortgages and invest in their homes are able to incorporate the value of home 
improvements and extensions into their estimates of the self-reported house value. 
Next, I interact the variable home investment with the change in the house price index in 
Column (4). Independently, the variable home investment is still significant and the 
coefficient increases to 0.043 from 0.035. Although the coefficient for change in house 
price index increases marginally, the coefficient for the interaction term is large, 
negative, and highly significant, which confirms Hypothesis (4b). This implies that, 
among individuals who refinance their mortgages (when compared to those who do not) 
the anchoring effect reduces as they are able to adjust for new information from the 
professional valuation as well as the increase in their home value arising from the home 
improvements or extension.  
To confirm the results in Column (4), I now consider the alternative use of an extra loan 
using the variable other consumption, which equals 1 if a homeowner uses an extra loan 
for car purchase, other consumption, or any other specified reason, and the value 0 
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otherwise. Clearly, from the results reported in Column (5) and in line with Hypothesis 
(4b), the variable other consumption is negatively correlated with the change in the self-
reported house value and its inclusion in the regression has no impact on the coefficient 
estimate for change in house price index. Furthermore, when I interact the two 
variables, change in house price index and other consumption, in Column (6), the latter 
becomes insignificant but the interaction term is negative and highly significant. Again, 
this finding supports the argument that mortgage refinancing enables homeowners to 
learn more about the value of their homes. However, unlike using funds for home 
improvements or an extension, other uses of the extra loan provide no information that 
is of value in assessing the self-reported house value.  
In the final specification in Column (7) I include the two variables home investment and 
other consumption, and both two-way and three-way interaction terms for these 
variables with change in house price index and financial expectations. The objective in 
this regression is to see how the three variables are correlated and their interaction 
effects. The idea is that homeowners who refinance their mortgages may do so because 
they have favourable future financial expectations about economic conditions (say low 
interest rates) and this could also be associated with expected increase in house prices, 
as suggested by the results in Column (1). An implication of this is that we might 
expect homeowners who refinance and have greater financial expectations to be more 
anchored on changes in the house price index and possibly ignore professional 
valuations. When compared to the results in Columns (4) and (6), I find that the 
coefficients for the main effects of change in house price index increases slightly; that 
for home investment almost doubles; and for other consumption it is about four times 
larger. A Wald test of the hypothesis that the coefficient estimates for home investment 
and other consumption are not significantly different is rejected at the 1% level, which 
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implies that home investment has a greater effect on the change in self-reported house 
values relative to other consumption.  
Regarding the coefficients for the interaction terms, I find that the two-way interaction 
terms between change in house price index and both home investment and other 
consumption become insignificant while the interaction between home investment and 
other consumption is negative and highly significant. However, the three-way 
interaction terms for changes in the house price index and financial expectations with 
home investment or other consumption are negative and highly significant. In line with 
hypothesis (4c), a Wald test of the hypothesis that the two coefficient estimates are not 
significantly different is not rejected. This indicates that, irrespective of the purpose for 
which the funds raised are used, anchoring on changes in the house price index reduces 
among homeowners who refinance their mortgages and have greater financial 
expectations.  
Taken together, these results provide further support to our main conjecture and 
indicate that mortgage refinancing attenuates anchoring on regional house prices and is 
correlated with self-reported house values. Figure 4.4 displays marginal effects on the 
linear prediction of change in self-reported house value for the variables financial 
expectations and under mortgage in Panel A and the variables home investment and 
other consumption in Panel B. Panel A shows that, for homeowners who own their 
home through a mortgage, there is a positive and almost linear relationship between 
changes in the house price index and the predicted change in the self-reported house 
value. Conversely, Panel B shows that, for homeowners who refinance their mortgages, 
the predicted change in the self-reported house value has an opposite effect.
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Figure 4.4 Effect of financial expectations, mortgage holding and refinancing 
across change in house price index 
This figure plots marginal effects of the variables financial expectations, under mortgage, home 
investment and other consumption on change in self-reported house value against change in house price 
index. The average marginal effects are calculated using the estimates in Table 4.6, Column (8). The 
vertical lines represent 95% confidence level bands.   
 
 
   
4.5.4 Estimates using sub-samples 
In this section, I gather more evidence to test the robustness of the results using sub-
samples. So far, the evidence shows that ownership through a mortgage increases 
anchoring; home investment reduces anchoring; tendency to overvalue explains 
changes in the self-reported house value, and that regional effects are significant for 
London, the East of England and the South East. Thus, the aim is to investigate 
whether, across sub-samples, there are variations in both anchoring on the house price 
index and the interactive effects of mortgage refinancing. I first split the sample into 
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two sub-samples: households that undervalue their homes and those that overvalue 
relative to regional house prices. This is important because, relative to regional house 
prices, approximately 58% of homeowners tended to overvalue their homes and the 
overvalue dummy variable captures a lot of variation in the data (these results are 
reported in Table 4.5). I also split the sample further in two UK regions: rest of the 
United Kingdom; and the East of England, London and the South East.  Within these 
sub-samples I run regressions for the whole sample, outright owners and mortgage 
holders using the specification in Column (7) of Table 4.6. The estimates are reported in 
Table 4.7 and Table 4.8.  
Table 4.7 presents estimates for the sub-sample of homeowners who, relative to the 
house price index, undervalue their homes, Columns (1) to (3), and those who 
overvalue their homes, Columns (4) to (6); for each sub-sample the estimates are 
presented for the full sample, outright homeowners and mortgage holders. Generally, 
the coefficient estimate for our key variable, change in house price index, is high across 
the sub-samples of undervaluing homeowners as compared to the overvaluing owners. 
Furthermore, most of the other explanatory variables and interaction terms have varying 
effects across the sub-samples. Within each valuation sub-sample, the estimate for 
homeowners who own their homes through a mortgage is larger than the estimate for 
outright owners. Indeed the estimate of change in house price index for undervaluing 
mortgage holders is almost twice that for overvaluing mortgage holders, which is 
consistent with the interaction term for the variables, overvalue, under mortgage and 
change in house price index in Table 4.6. Regarding the use of the funds raised from 
mortgage refinancing, I find that for undervaluing homeowners the estimate for the 
variable home investment is about double the estimate for overvaluing homeowners. 
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Table 4.7 Estimates using sub-samples of both home valuation relative to house price index and housing tenure 
Table reports the estimation results from OLS fixed effects regressions in which the dependent variable is log of change in self-reported house value. The independent 
variables as described in Table 4.1are log of house price; a set of property attributes; a set of individual characteristics (some not shown); and time dummies (not shown). 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and the levels of significance are indicated by * (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 
Independent variables Undervalue relative to house price index  Overvalue relative to house price index 
 Full sample Outright owners Mortgage 
holders 
 Full sample Outright owners Mortgage 
holders 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Change in house price index 0.189*** 0.183*** 0.318***  0.148*** 0.138*** 0.175*** 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.016)  (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) 
Extra loan – Home investment 0.068***  0.069***  0.034***  0.033*** 
 (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Home investment * ∆ House price index -0.057  -0.063  -0.007  -0.006 
 (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.043)  (0.043) 
Home investment * Financial expectations * ∆ House price index -0.077  -0.078  -0.163***  -0.155*** 
 (0.070)  (0.072)  (0.055)  (0.055) 
Extra Loan – Other consumption 0.038***  0.039***  -0.017**  -0.013 
 (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Other consumption * ∆ House price index -0.044  -0.052  -0.054  -0.051 
 (0.059)  (0.063)  (0.047)  (0.047) 
Other consumption * Financial expectations * ∆ House price index -0.169**  -0.155**  -0.100  -0.091 
 (0.074)  (0.078)  (0.064)  (0.064) 
Home investment * Other consumption -0.052***  -0.058***  -0.001  -0.001 
 (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
Under Mortgage -0.014**    0.003   
 (0.006)    (0.005)   
Under mortgage * ∆ House price index 0.121***    0.036**   
 (0.022)    (0.016)   
Financial expectations -0.004 -0.008 -0.004  0.001 0.006 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.011) (0.005)  (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) 
Financial expectations * ∆ House price index 0.082*** 0.148** 0.074***  0.077*** 0.022 0.069*** 
 (0.024) (0.063) (0.026)  (0.019) (0.041) (0.020) 
Number or rooms 0.054*** -0.007 0.065***  0.087*** 0.069*** 0.084*** 
 (0.012) (0.025) (0.013)  (0.010) (0.021) (0.010) 
Likes present neighbourhood 0.007 0.004 0.006  0.003 -0.010 0.007 
 (0.007) (0.013) (0.009)  (0.008) (0.021) (0.008) 
Prefers to Move -0.003 0.012 -0.009**  -0.015*** 0.003 -0.022*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.004)  (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) 
  
Anchoring bias, information asymmetries and house prices 
 
 264 
Table 4.7 Continued 
        
Independent variables Undervalue relative to house price index  Overvalue relative to house price index 
 Full sample Outright owners Mortgage 
holders 
 Full sample Outright owners Mortgage 
holders 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Detached 0.077*** -0.003 0.052***  0.065*** 0.039 0.065*** 
 (0.016) (0.038) (0.018)  (0.016) (0.040) (0.016) 
Semi-detached 0.064*** 0.009 0.053***  0.029* 0.038 0.026* 
 (0.016) (0.040) (0.017)  (0.015) (0.038) (0.015) 
Terraced 0.025* -0.002 -0.004  -0.006 -0.016 0.005 
 (0.014) (0.033) (0.015)  (0.017) (0.044) (0.017) 
Log of Income 0.000 -0.001 0.000  0.004* 0.002 0.006** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) 
Age square -0.000 0.000 -0.000***  0.000*** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Has Children -0.006 0.007 -0.015***  -0.017*** -0.039** -0.020*** 
 (0.006) (0.021) (0.006)  (0.005) (0.019) (0.005) 
Married 0.020*** -0.002 0.026***  0.004 0.004 0.010 
 (0.007) (0.013) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.011) (0.008) 
Employed 0.001 0.014 -0.003  -0.005 -0.014* -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.006)  (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) 
First degree & above 0.008 0.031 0.012  0.045*** 0.094** 0.043*** 
 (0.017) (0.061) (0.019)  (0.013) (0.038) (0.014) 
Region dummies        
North East -0.126 0.379 0.012  -0.157** -0.147 0.068 
 (0.103) (0.241) (0.107)  (0.075) (0.168) (0.068) 
North West -0.105 0.277 0.076  -0.103* 0.017 0.074 
 (0.088) (0.351) (0.072)  (0.059) (0.082) (0.061) 
Yorkshire & Humber -0.057 0.380* 0.114  -0.059 0.153 0.108 
 (0.087) (0.227) (0.095)  (0.064) (0.093) (0.067) 
East Midlands 0.059 0.311* 0.302***  -0.178*** -0.096 -0.004 
 (0.086) (0.178) (0.085)  (0.061) (0.102) (0.067) 
West Midlands 0.135 0.735*** 0.226***  -0.166*** 0.035 -0.017 
 (0.089) (0.270) (0.086)  (0.058) (0.043) (0.061) 
East of England -0.093 0.220*** 0.298  -0.075 0.025 0.086 
 (0.153) (0.010) (0.196)  (0.056) (0.076) (0.061) 
London 0.331*** 1.099*** 0.304***  -0.006 0.107 0.173*** 
 (0.087) (0.340) (0.078)  (0.062) (0.088) (0.064) 
South East 0.166** 0.531** 0.311***  -0.054 0.074 0.105* 
 (0.081) (0.251) (0.080)  (0.056) (0.074) (0.062) 
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Table 4.7 Continued 
Independent variables Undervalue relative to house price index  Overvalue relative to house price index 
 Full sample Outright owners Mortgage 
holders 
 Full sample Outright owners Mortgage 
holders 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
South West 0.170** 0.648*** 0.348***  -0.129** 0.070 -0.016 
 (0.081) (0.244) (0.092)  (0.056) (0.079) (0.060) 
Wales 0.046 0.630** 0.246**  -0.131** 0.481*** 0.039 
 (0.101) (0.245) (0.106)  (0.059) (0.173) (0.061) 
Time dummies        
1994 0.020 -0.003 -0.101***  -0.188*** 0.134*** 0.169*** 
 (0.019) (0.045) (0.031)  (0.017) (0.044) (0.026) 
1995 0.008 0.014 -0.095***  -0.014* 0.136*** 0.146*** 
 (0.008) (0.043) (0.029)  (0.007) (0.040) (0.024) 
1996 0.033*** 0.040 -0.065**  -0.005 0.156*** 0.154*** 
 (0.008) (0.040) (0.027)  (0.007) (0.037) (0.023) 
1997 0.047*** 0.052 -0.043*  0.002 0.144*** 0.175*** 
 (0.008) (0.037) (0.025)  (0.007) (0.034) (0.021) 
1998 0.049*** 0.049 -0.032  0.012 0.164*** 0.184*** 
 (0.008) (0.034) (0.023)  (0.008) (0.031) (0.019) 
1999 0.070*** 0.080** -0.013  0.020** 0.183*** 0.191*** 
 (0.009) (0.031) (0.020)  (0.009) (0.029) (0.018) 
2000 0.076*** 0.082*** 0.004  0.052*** 0.214*** 0.223*** 
 (0.010) (0.029) (0.019)  (0.009) (0.026) (0.016) 
2001 0.082*** 0.080*** 0.015  0.018* 0.193*** 0.190*** 
 (0.011) (0.025) (0.016)  (0.010) (0.022) (0.014) 
2002 0.149*** 0.146*** 0.085***  0.103*** 0.271*** 0.281*** 
 (0.012) (0.024) (0.015)  (0.011) (0.020) (0.013) 
2003 0.171*** 0.168*** 0.111***  0.058*** 0.231*** 0.238*** 
 (0.013) (0.020) (0.014)  (0.013) (0.017) (0.011) 
2004 0.184*** 0.171*** 0.134***  0.047*** 0.221*** 0.231*** 
 (0.014) (0.019) (0.013)  (0.014) (0.016) (0.010) 
2005 0.136*** 0.147*** 0.077***  -0.042*** 0.145*** 0.136*** 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.010)  (0.014) (0.012) (0.008) 
2006 0.104*** 0.101*** 0.057***  -0.053*** 0.137*** 0.129*** 
 (0.017) (0.013) (0.009)  (0.015) (0.010) (0.007) 
2007 0.110*** 0.104*** 0.070***  -0.055*** 0.140*** 0.125*** 
 (0.018) (0.011) (0.008)  (0.017) (0.009) (0.007) 
Constant -0.236*** -0.525** -0.185**  -0.171*** -0.445*** -0.395*** 
 (0.067) (0.218) (0.082)  (0.060) (0.146) (0.082) 
Adjusted r 2  0.148 0.095 0.182  0.121 0.087 0.135 
Observations 44054 16540 27514  61067 22233 38834 
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The estimate for the variable other consumption is significant and positive among 
undervaluing homeowners and negative for the full sample of overvaluing homeowners.  
Further, the results for the other explanatory variables are mixed but consistent between 
the two groups. Notably, the coefficient estimate for the variable first degree and above 
is highly significant among overvaluing households. As for the interaction terms, the 
results also vary across sub-samples. The interaction term for change in house price 
index, financial expectations and home investment is insignificant among undervaluing 
homeowners and is negative and significant among overvaluing homeowners. In 
contrast, the interaction term for change in house price index, financial expectations 
and other consumption is negative and significant among undervaluing homeowners but 
is insignificant among overvaluing homeowners.   
The interaction term between home investment and other consumption is negative and 
significant among undervaluing homeowners but is insignificant among overvaluing 
homeowners, which is also consistent with the findings in Table 4.6. In sum, these 
results indicate that the dummy variable overvalue captures a lot of variations in 
homeowners characteristics and differentiates the influence of mortgage refinancing on 
changes in self-reported home house values. 
Second, as implied by the consistent pattern in regional dummies in which I find 
significant effects for London, the East of England and the South East and insignificant 
effects in other regions, it appears that anchoring bias varies across regions. For 
example, homeowners living in London, the East of England and the South East may be 
able to determine the true market value of their homes because the two regions have 
both a vibrant property market and a higher concentration of market information. This 
implies that homeowners in such regions are able to sufficiently adjust their price 
Anchoring bias, information asymmetries and house prices 
 
 267 
estimates for new information and are thus less reliant on house price information and 
have lower anchoring bias.  
To explore this idea, I split the sample into two: the rest of the UK; and London, the 
East of England, and the South East. Here, I examine whether the relationship between 
changes in self-reported house values and changes in the house price index in the rest of 
the UK is stronger than in London, the East of England, and the South East. The results 
reported in Table 4.8 are consistent with this conjecture.  
With regard to the use of the funds raised from mortgage refinancing, the results for 
both home investment and other consumption and their respective interaction terms are 
consistent with the results in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 for the rest of the UK sub-sample. 
However, for the London, the East of England and the South East sub-sample, none of 
the mortgage refinancing variables is significant apart from home investment, which 
has a low magnitude. Furthermore, the effects of financial expectations and its 
interaction with the change in the house price index are both insignificant while the year 
effects are high for mortgage holders and for the full sample among homeowners in 
London, the East of England and the South East.     
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Table 4.8 Estimates using sub-samples of both regional and housing tenure 
Table reports the estimation results from OLS fixed effects regressions in which the dependent variable is log of self-reported house value. The independent variables as 
described in Table 1 are log of house price; a set of property attributes; a set of individual characteristics (some not shown); and time dummies (not shown). Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses and the levels of significance are indicated by * (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
 
Independent variable Rest of the United Kingdom  London, South East & East of England 
 Full sample Outright owners Mortgage holders  Full sample Outright owners Mortgage holders 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Change in house price index 0.185*** 0.201*** 0.289***  0.144*** 0.163*** 0.261*** 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.016)  (0.031) (0.035) (0.022) 
Extra loan – Home investment 0.082***  0.079***  0.066***  0.062*** 
 (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.022)  (0.023) 
Home investment * ∆ House price index -0.057  -0.057  -0.019  -0.019 
 (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.049)  (0.051) 
Home investment * Financial expectations * ∆ House price index -0.103**  -0.094*  -0.123*  -0.112* 
 (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.066)  (0.067) 
Extra Loan – Other consumption 0.061***  0.058***  0.012  0.008 
 (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
Other consumption * ∆ House price index -0.011  -0.003  -0.049  -0.051 
 (0.044)  (0.045)  (0.060)  (0.061) 
Other consumption * Financial expectations * ∆ House price index -0.241***  -0.235***  -0.017  0.003 
 (0.063)  (0.064)  (0.079)  (0.079) 
Home investment * Other consumption -0.164***  -0.168***  -0.005  -0.005 
 (0.047)  (0.048)  (0.034)  (0.034) 
Home investment * Overvalue -0.047***  -0.044***  -0.048**  -0.045* 
 (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.023)  (0.024) 
Other consumption * Overvalue -0.069***  -0.062***  -0.058***  -0.052** 
 (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.021)  (0.021) 
Home investment * Other consumption * Overvalue 0.155***  0.159***  -0.009  -0.016 
 (0.049)  (0.050)  (0.041)  (0.041) 
Under Mortgage 0.003    -0.010   
 (0.005)    (0.007)   
Under mortgage * ∆ House price index 0.111***    0.124***   
 (0.021)    (0.034)   
Overvalue * Under mortgage * ∆ House price index -0.080***    -0.084**   
 (0.028)    (0.039)   
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Table 4.8 Continued 
        
Independent variable Rest of the United Kingdom  London, South East & East of England 
 Full sample Outright owners Mortgage holders  Full sample Outright owners Mortgage holders 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Financial expectations -0.015*** -0.017 -0.014***  -0.004 0.002 -0.007 
 (0.004) (0.011) (0.005)  (0.010) (0.025) (0.011) 
Financial expectations * ∆ House price index 0.093*** 0.071* 0.085***  0.040* 0.079 0.025 
 (0.018) (0.041) (0.019)  (0.024) (0.058) (0.025) 
Overvalue 0.202*** 0.218*** 0.193***  0.233*** 0.284*** 0.206*** 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.007)  (0.013) (0.026) (0.015) 
Overvalue * ∆ House price index -0.007 -0.029 -0.086***  -0.044 -0.086** -0.121*** 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.017)  (0.035) (0.036) (0.024) 
Overvalue * Financial expectations 0.019*** 0.033*** 0.019***  0.006 0.001 0.014 
 (0.005) (0.013) (0.006)  (0.011) (0.027) (0.012) 
Number or rooms 0.061*** 0.052*** 0.062***  0.075*** 0.075** 0.076*** 
 (0.008) (0.017) (0.009)  (0.013) (0.031) (0.013) 
Likes present neighbourhood 0.004 -0.018 0.008  -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.006) (0.015) (0.007)  (0.010) (0.022) (0.011) 
Prefers to Move -0.014*** -0.003 -0.019***  0.002 0.015 -0.005 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)  (0.005) (0.010) (0.006) 
Detached 0.083*** 0.036 0.077***  0.093*** 0.100*** 0.079*** 
 (0.012) (0.030) (0.012)  (0.016) (0.034) (0.017) 
Semi-detached 0.035*** 0.011 0.028**  0.018 0.027 0.021 
 (0.011) (0.028) (0.011)  (0.015) (0.032) (0.015) 
Terraced 0.037*** 0.017 0.029***  0.044*** 0.070** 0.037** 
 (0.011) (0.030) (0.011)  (0.014) (0.033) (0.015) 
Log of Income 0.003 0.003 0.002  0.001 -0.003 0.004 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
Age square 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000  0.000 0.000 -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Has Children -0.008** -0.038** -0.014***  -0.011** -0.005 -0.019*** 
 (0.004) (0.018) (0.004)  (0.006) (0.018) (0.007) 
Married 0.006 -0.001 0.008  0.013* -0.006 0.018* 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.006)  (0.008) (0.015) (0.010) 
Employed -0.002 0.001 -0.006  -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.004)  (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) 
First degree & above 0.009 0.097** 0.006  0.041* 0.049 0.032 
 (0.012) (0.039) (0.012)  (0.021) (0.067) (0.021) 
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Table 4.8 Continued 
        
Independent variable Rest of the United Kingdom  London, South East & East of England 
 Full sample Outright owners Mortgage holders  Full sample Outright owners Mortgage holders 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Time dummies         
1995 -0.017** 0.100*** -0.022**  0.122*** 0.025 0.004 
 (0.008) (0.032) (0.010)  (0.021) (0.023) (0.013) 
1996 -0.014** 0.109*** -0.014*  0.165*** 0.075*** 0.048*** 
 (0.006) (0.030) (0.008)  (0.019) (0.019) (0.011) 
1997 -0.014** 0.101*** -0.005  0.199*** 0.083*** 0.099*** 
 (0.006) (0.027) (0.009)  (0.018) (0.019) (0.012) 
1998 0.000 0.123*** 0.010  0.195*** 0.073*** 0.104*** 
 (0.007) (0.025) (0.009)  (0.017) (0.022) (0.013) 
1999 0.010 0.126*** 0.027***  0.218*** 0.132*** 0.117*** 
 (0.008) (0.023) (0.010)  (0.015) (0.024) (0.015) 
2000 0.023*** 0.154*** 0.039***  0.260*** 0.152*** 0.173*** 
 (0.008) (0.021) (0.011)  (0.014) (0.028) (0.018) 
2001 0.014* 0.146*** 0.036***  0.214*** 0.102*** 0.134*** 
 (0.009) (0.018) (0.012)  (0.013) (0.029) (0.020) 
2002 0.092*** 0.218*** 0.122***  0.289*** 0.180*** 0.212*** 
 (0.009) (0.017) (0.014)  (0.013) (0.033) (0.022) 
2003 0.096*** 0.233*** 0.121***  0.192*** 0.058 0.139*** 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.015)  (0.012) (0.036) (0.025) 
2004 0.100*** 0.227*** 0.136***  0.166*** 0.052 0.103*** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.017)  (0.012) (0.041) (0.027) 
2005 0.013 0.164*** 0.041**  0.116*** 0.021 0.051* 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.018)  (0.011) (0.043) (0.029) 
2006 -0.021* 0.115*** 0.021  0.129*** 0.027 0.073** 
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.019)  (0.009) (0.045) (0.030) 
2007 -0.025* 0.111*** 0.022  0.163*** 0.073 0.103*** 
 (0.013) (0.008) (0.020)  (0.009) (0.048) (0.033) 
2008 -0.134*** -0.101*** -0.084***  -0.116*** -0.105** -0.039 
 (0.014) (0.035) (0.021)  (0.022) (0.050) (0.035) 
Constant -0.372*** -0.598*** -0.246***  -0.523*** -0.422*** -0.283*** 
 (0.040) (0.137) (0.053)  (0.064) (0.113) (0.052) 
Adjusted r 2  0.167 0.128 0.185  0.140 0.114 0.151 
Observations 78027 28902 49125  27094 9871 17223 
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4.5.5 Quantile regression estimates 
From the summary statistics discussed earlier it is evident that self-reported house 
values are widely distributed with a mean of £ 139,000 and a median of £ 100,000 
while the minimum and maximum values are £ 10,000 and £ 7.5 million respectively. 
This distribution could imply that our estimates are biased by the presence of outliers 
and/or that there are heterogeneous relationships among our variables. Figure 4.5 
demonstrates the plausibility of our concern. Graph A plots the ordered values of 
change in self-reported house values against the quantiles of a uniform distribution of 
the variable. From this graph, the distribution of change in self-reported house values is 
further from the reference line as you move downwards and upwards from the median. 
Graph B plots the quantiles of change in self-reported house values against the quantiles 
of change in house price index. The relationship between change in self-reported house 
values and change in house price index is not linear below the 10th quantile and above 
the 75th quantile.  As suggested in the literature (see for example Buchinsky, 1998; 
Koenker and Hallock, 2001), I test whether the coefficient estimates for change in 
house price index varies across quantiles by conditioning the regressions on the 10th, 
25th, 50th, 75th and 95th  quantiles.  The results are reported in Table 4.9 and are based 
on the specifications in Column (7) of Table 4.6.  
The results for our key independent variable change in house price index, increases 
from the 10th quantile regression (0.106) through to the 95th quantile regression (0.286) 
apart from the 25th quantile regression where it drops to 0.056 and thereafter increases. 
The variable home investment is positive and significant across all the quantile 
regressions while other consumption is only significant at the median quantile 
regression and below.  
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Figure 4.5 Quantile distribution plots 
This figure plots quantiles of self-reported house value in Graph A, and the quantiles on quantiles of self-
reported house value against house price index during 1993-2008. The straight line is the reference line  
The self-reported house values are from the BHSP and house price index is from the Nationwide house 
price index series. 
 
 
 
 
 
The interaction term between home investment and change in house price index is 
negative and significant at the median and 95th quanitle regressions; the interaction of 
the two variables with financial expectation is significant for the median and 75th 
quantile regressions. This contrasts with the interaction term between other 
consumption and change in house price index, which is barely significant at the 10% 
level for the 25th and 75th quantile regressions while the interaction term that includes 
financial expectations is negative and significant in all quantiles apart from the 75th 
quantile regression.  
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Table 4.9 Quantile regressions estimates 
Table presents quantile regression estimates at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 95th quantiles. The dependent 
variable is log of change in self-reported house value. The independent variables as described in Table 
4.1are log of change in regional house price; a set of property attributes; a set of individual characteristics 
(some not shown); region dummies and time dummies (not shown).  Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses and the levels of significance are indicated by * (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
Independent variable 10th 
Quantile 
25th 
Quantile 
Median 75th 
Quantile 
95th 
Quantile 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Change in house price index 0.106*** 0.056*** 0.070*** 0.130*** 0.286*** 
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.020) 
Extra loan – Home investment 0.056*** 0.030*** 0.033*** 0.060*** 0.094*** 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.017) 
Home investment * ∆ House price index -0.021 0.018* 0.058*** -0.025 -0.104** 
 (0.020) (0.011) (0.012) (0.017) (0.050) 
Home investment * Financial expectations * ∆ House price 
index 
-0.017 -0.022 -0.069*** -0.056** -0.060 
 (0.031) (0.017) (0.019) (0.026) (0.078) 
Extra Loan – Other consumption 0.028*** 0.013*** 0.013** 0.003 0.029 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.021) 
Other consumption * ∆ House price index -0.013 0.026* 0.004 -0.040* -0.010 
 (0.025) (0.014) (0.015) (0.021) (0.062) 
Other consumption * Financial expectations * ∆ House 
price index 
-0.118*** -0.053*** -0.049** -0.034 -0.268*** 
 (0.036) (0.020) (0.022) (0.030) (0.090) 
Home investment * Other consumption -0.037** -0.027*** -0.036*** -0.029* -0.070 
 (0.018) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.046) 
Financial expectations -0.016*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.008*** -0.031*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) 
Financial expectations * ∆ House price index 0.026*** 0.036*** 0.063*** 0.111*** 0.187*** 
 (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.025) 
Under Mortgage 0.021*** 0.006*** -0.000 -0.011*** -0.015*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) 
Under mortgage * ∆ House price index 0.008 0.015*** 0.046*** 0.093*** 0.173*** 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.023) 
Under mortgage * Financial expectations * ∆ House price 
index 
-0.024** -0.015** -0.044*** -0.084*** -0.131*** 
 (0.011) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.029) 
Home investment * Overvalue -0.029*** 0.003 0.013*** -0.018*** -0.115*** 
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.020) 
Other consumption * Overvalue -0.035*** -0.013** -0.014** -0.014* -0.092*** 
 (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.025) 
Overvalue 0.063*** 0.032*** 0.042*** 0.061*** 0.141*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) 
Overvalue * ∆ House price -0.006 0.002 -0.002 -0.039*** -0.074*** 
 (0.010) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.025) 
Financial expectations * Overvalue 0.011*** 0.003* 0.006*** 0.016*** 0.079*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.008) 
Financial expectations * Overvalue * ∆ House price index 0.029** -0.002 -0.028*** -0.067*** -0.106*** 
 (0.013) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.032) 
Number or rooms -0.022*** -0.012*** -0.005*** -0.001 0.053*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) 
Likes present neighbourhood 0.011*** 0.006*** -0.001 -0.008*** -0.023*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.008) 
Prefers to Move 0.010*** 0.001 -0.003*** -0.010*** -0.046*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
Detached 0.046*** 0.015*** 0.009*** 0.002 -0.031*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.008) 
Semi-detached 0.042*** 0.011*** -0.001 -0.013*** -0.063*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) 
Terraced 0.053*** 0.020*** 0.016*** 0.012*** -0.022*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) 
Log of Income -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
Age square -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sex 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.003 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Cohort -0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.001*** 0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
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Table 4.9 Continued 
      
Independent variable 10th 
Quantile 
25th 
Quantile 
Median 75th 
Quantile 
95th 
Quantile 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Has Children 0.007*** 0.002** 0.002 0.006*** -0.005 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
Married 0.017*** 0.006*** 0.001 -0.006*** -0.025*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
Employed 0.005*** 0.002** 0.001 -0.004*** -0.016*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
First degree & above -0.010*** -0.002** -0.003** -0.004*** 0.020*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) 
Region dummies (Base=North East)      
North West 0.005 0.005** 0.008*** 0.012*** -0.004 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.010) 
Yorkshire & Humber 0.007* 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.018*** 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.010) 
East Midlands 0.009** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.017*** -0.022** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.011) 
West Midlands 0.007* 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.014*** -0.031*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.010) 
East of England 0.003 0.008*** 0.015*** 0.020*** -0.023** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) 
London 0.016*** 0.021*** 0.034*** 0.056*** 0.052*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.011) 
South East 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.023*** 0.036*** 0.013 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.010) 
South West 0.009** 0.013*** 0.018*** 0.024*** -0.008 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) 
Wales 0.004 0.007*** 0.016*** 0.030*** 0.012 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.010) 
Scotland 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.013*** 0.027*** 0.036*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.010) 
Time dummies      
1994 0.038*** 0.061*** 0.043*** 0.047*** 0.119*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.013) 
1995 0.042*** 0.052*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.126*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.012) 
1996 0.087*** 0.095*** 0.056*** 0.048*** 0.113*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.012) 
1997 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.073*** 0.077*** 0.109*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.011) 
1998 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.073*** 0.079*** 0.112*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.011) 
1999 0.130*** 0.121*** 0.096*** 0.106*** 0.148*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.011) 
2000 0.139*** 0.129*** 0.116*** 0.142*** 0.186*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.010) 
2001 0.133*** 0.126*** 0.104*** 0.117*** 0.155*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) 
2002 0.184*** 0.182*** 0.201*** 0.236*** 0.275*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) 
2003 0.160*** 0.164*** 0.186*** 0.228*** 0.286*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) 
2004 0.156*** 0.166*** 0.188*** 0.245*** 0.326*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) 
2005 0.104*** 0.110*** 0.095*** 0.128*** 0.216*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) 
2006 0.124*** 0.115*** 0.094*** 0.103*** 0.145*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) 
2007 0.128*** 0.120*** 0.101*** 0.114*** 0.129*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) 
2008 0.484 -0.181 -0.371 -1.930*** -
12.529*** 
 (0.448) (0.248) (0.279) (0.379) (1.128) 
Adjusted r2      
Observations 105111 105111 105111 105111 105111 
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Figure 4.6 Quantile plots of key variables  
The coloured solid line plots the coefficient estimates in Table 4.9 across the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 95th 
quantiles for the variables change in house price index, financial expectations, under mortgage, home 
investment, other consumption and their interaction terms. The shaded area represents 95% confidence 
bands. The parallel lines represent coefficients from OLS regressions (solid line) and their corresponding 
95% confidence bands (dotted lines).  
 
 
 
 
In addition, the coefficient estimates for financial expectations (positive) and its 
interaction with change in house price index (negative) are significant and their 
magnitudes increase across all quantile regressions. In general, the control variables 
have mixed results; the coefficient estimates are positive (negative) and increase 
(decrease) across quantiles.   
Figure 4.6, maps the coefficients from the quantile regressions in Table 4.9 for the 
variables change in house price index, financial expectations, under mortgage, home 
investment, other consumption and their interaction terms. The coloured solid lines 
represent the quantile coefficients and the shaded area represents the 95% confidence 
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bands. The parallel dark solid line lines represent the coefficients using OLS 
regressions and the dotted lines are the 95% confidence level bands.  The graphs 
confirm our concern. For example, the coefficients for change in house price index are 
significant across quantiles and the line drops below the 25th quantile but steadily 
increases thereafter.   
The influence of financial expectations is significant between the 25th and 75th quantiles 
while its interaction with changes in the house price index is significant and increases 
for quantiles below the 75th quantile. In sum, these results indicate that anchoring bias 
persists in the quantile regressions as well as in the linear regression model, though the 
latter model underestimates the effects of the independent variables. 
4.5.6 Social Factors and anchoring 
In the next stage of the empirical analysis, I investigate the influence of social factors. 
As observed earlier, the literature suggests that homeowners are more likely to be 
socially engaged compared to renters (DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999). Considering that 
it could be through such activities that homeowners learn, discuss and exchange 
opinions about house market trends, I would expect to see varying effects on anchoring 
depending on the channel of engagement. These are important social factors that may 
influence anchoring, as observed by Epley and Gilovich (2010).  In Table 4.10 I interact 
the variables religious, trusting, tenancy group member and computer use with changes 
in the house price index using the final specifications in Column (7) of Table 4.6 for 
comparison.  
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Table 4.10 Anchoring and social moderators 
Table reports the estimation results from OLS fixed effects regressions in which the dependent variable is 
log of change in self-reported house value. The independent variables include log of change in house 
price; a set of property attributes; a set of individual characteristics (some not shown); and time dummies 
(not shown). Additional independent variables include mortgage refinancing dummy; home improvement 
dummy; other consumption dummy; and interaction terms of these variables with change in regional 
house price. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and the levels of significance are indicated by * 
(* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Change in house price index 0.214*** 0.188*** 0.197*** 0.172*** 0.197*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) 
Religious * ∆ House price index -0.039***    -0.037*** 
 (0.011)    (0.012) 
Trusting * ∆ House price index  0.009   0.010 
  (0.012)   (0.012) 
Tenancy group member * ∆ House price index   -0.030*  -0.022 
   (0.016)  (0.016) 
Computer use    -0.001 -0.001 
    (0.003) (0.003) 
Computer use * ∆ House price index    0.059*** 0.056*** 
    (0.012) (0.012) 
Extra loan – Home investment 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Home investment * ∆ House price index -0.047 -0.045 -0.045 -0.045 -0.046 
 (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Home investment * Financial expectations * ∆ House price 
index 
-0.104** -0.109*** -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.106*** 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
Extra Loan – Other consumption 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.047*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Other consumption * ∆ House price index -0.041 -0.042 -0.036 -0.045 -0.053 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) 
Other consumption * Financial expectations * ∆ House 
price index 
-0.139*** -0.139*** -0.142*** -0.141*** -0.134*** 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) 
Home investment * Other consumption -0.115*** -0.115*** -0.115*** -0.113*** -0.114*** 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Home investment * overvalue -0.049*** -0.048*** -0.049*** -0.048*** -0.048*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Other consumption * overvalue -0.068*** -0.069*** -0.068*** -0.067*** -0.067*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Home investment * other consumption * overvalue 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.111*** 0.109*** 0.110*** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Financial expectations -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Financial expectations * ∆ House price index 0.073*** 0.075*** 0.074*** 0.071*** 0.069*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Under Mortgage 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Under mortgage * ∆ House price index 0.105*** 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.094*** 0.085*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) 
Overvalue 0.211*** 0.210*** 0.211*** 0.211*** 0.210*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Overvalue * ∆ House price index -0.025 -0.031 -0.026 -0.035* -0.035* 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) 
Overvalue * Financial expectations 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Overvalue * Under mortgage * ∆ House price index -0.078*** -0.075*** -0.079*** -0.074*** -0.070*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Number or rooms 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.065*** 0.066*** 0.065*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Likes present neighbourhood 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Prefers to Move -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Detached 0.087*** 0.086*** 0.087*** 0.084*** 0.084*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Semi-detached 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
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Table 4.10 Continued 
      
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Terraced 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Log of Income 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age square 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Has Children -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Married 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Employed -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
First degree & above 0.020** 0.019* 0.020** 0.020** 0.019* 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Region dummies (Base=North East)      
North West 0.045 0.046 0.046 0.047 0.047 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Yorkshire & Humber 0.071* 0.072* 0.071* 0.073* 0.073* 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
East Midlands 0.037 0.037 0.036 0.039 0.039 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
West Midlands 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
East of England 0.120*** 0.121*** 0.120*** 0.120*** 0.120*** 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
London 0.234*** 0.233*** 0.234*** 0.231*** 0.231*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
South East 0.140*** 0.141*** 0.141*** 0.140*** 0.140*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
South West 0.060 0.060 0.059 0.060 0.060 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Wales 0.030 0.031 0.030 0.031 0.031 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Scotland 0.084** 0.083** 0.084** 0.085** 0.085** 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) 
Time dummies       
1995 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
1996 0.010** 0.011** 0.010** 0.010** 0.010* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
1997 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
1998 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
1999 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
2000 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
2001 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.038*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
2002 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.114*** 0.113*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
2003 0.099*** 0.098*** 0.099*** 0.097*** 0.097*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
2004 0.095*** 0.095*** 0.095*** 0.094*** 0.093*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
2005 0.018* 0.018* 0.018* 0.018* 0.018* 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
2006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
2007 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
2008 -0.120*** -0.120*** -0.120*** -0.118*** -0.118*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Constant -0.456*** -0.455*** -0.455*** -0.454*** -0.454*** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Adjusted r 2  0.153 0.153 0.153 0.153 0.154 
Observations 104783 103630 105101 105099 103486 
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Overall, the results show that the variables computer use and religious influence 
anchoring and are not directly correlated with changes in self-reported housing wealth. 
The coefficient estimate for the interaction between religious and change in house price 
index is negative and highly significant. This finding suggests that through religious 
activities homeowners learn about local house prices and other market information and 
are thus less anchored. The variable trusting is insignificant while tenancy group 
membership is significant in the separate regressions in Columns (2) and (3) 
respectively; however both variables are insignificant in the combined regression in 
Column (5). An interesting finding is that computer use reduces the coefficient for the 
change in house price index and has no direct effect on the self-reported house value 
but has a positive effect through the change in the house price index.  This implies that 
online information sources are biased towards house price indices. For example, most 
mortgage providers have online tools which enable homeowners to calculate an 
estimated value of their homes based on house price indices. However, homeowners are 
cautioned that they should consult professional assessors in order for them to get the 
true value of their homes. 
4.6 Robustness checks 
In this section, I check for the consistency of the results by re-estimating the results 
using two-way clustered standard errors, and by using the regional Halifax house price 
index and both the Nationwide and the Halifax national house price indices. In 
addition, I use GMM estimators to address possible endogeneity issues.  
4.6.1 Estimates using two-way clustered standard errors 
I begin by examining whether the results are robust when I use regional level one-way 
clustering and two-way clustering of standard errors. This is because individual level 
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clustering and one-way clustered standard errors may bias my estimates downwards in 
two ways. First, the regional house price index is reported at regional level and by 
house type, which suggests that standard errors clustered at individual level ignore 
correlations among observations at regional level and by house type. However, the 
regional level clusters (eleven UK regions) or house types (four types) are less than the 
parameters estimated and are thereby insufficient to calculate a robust covariance 
matrix.  To circumvent this problem and to allow observations in the same region or 
house type to be correlated, I generate a unique value for each pair of region-house 
types which provides 44 non-nested region-house type clusters. In addition, I generate a 
unique value for each pair of region-year to allow observations in the same region or 
year to be correlated.  
Second, although regional level clusters account for within region clustering, it is also 
important to account for household-level clustering to allow for correlations in 
household observations over time. Following the literature (e.g. Acemoglu and Pischke, 
2003; Cameron et al., 2008; Cameron et al., 2011), I use two-way clustered standard 
errors at household level and at both region-housetype and region-year clusters. Table 
4.11 reports comparative results based on the final model in Table 4.6, Column (7) – 
replayed in Column (1) with the standard errors clustered at household level. In Column 
(2), the standard errors are calculated using household and region-house type clusters 
while household and region-year clusters are used in Column (3).40  
  
                                                 
40 To implement this, I use the Stata command, xtivreg2, which provides for two-way clustering and 
supports simple fixed effects models (Schuffer, 2010).  
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Table 4.11 Estimates using two-way clustered standard errors 
Table reports OLS fixed effects regressions based on the full model in Table 4.6 with one-way clustered 
standard errors (column (1)); two-way clustered standard errors at the individual level and at both region 
and house type level; and two-way clustered standard errors at the individual level and at both region and 
year level. The dependent variable is log of change in self-reported house value. The independent 
variables include log of change in house price; a set of property attributes; a set of individual 
characteristics (some not shown); and time dummies (not shown). Additional independent variables 
include mortgage refinancing dummy; home improvement dummy; other consumption dummy; and 
interaction terms of these variables with change in regional house price. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses and the levels of significance are indicated by * (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Independent variables One-way 
clustering 
(individual level) 
Two-way 
clustering 
(individual and 
region-house 
type) 
Two-way 
clustering 
(individual and 
region-year) 
Change in house price index 0.190*** 0.190*** 0.190*** 
 (0.016) (0.023) (0.022) 
Extra loan – Home investment 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) 
Home investment * ∆ House price index -0.045 -0.045 -0.045 
 (0.032) (0.040) (0.037) 
Home investment * Financial expectations * ∆ House price index -0.106*** -0.106** -0.106** 
 (0.041) (0.047) (0.050) 
Extra Loan – Other consumption 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) 
Other consumption * ∆ House price index -0.037 -0.037 -0.037 
 (0.036) (0.038) (0.042) 
Other consumption * Financial expectations * ∆ House price index -0.142*** -0.142*** -0.142** 
 (0.050) (0.055) (0.056) 
Home investment * Other consumption -0.115*** -0.115** -0.115** 
 (0.032) (0.054) (0.049) 
Home investment * overvalue -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.049*** 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.014) 
Other consumption * overvalue -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.068*** 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) 
Home investment * other consumption * overvalue 0.111*** 0.111** 0.111** 
 (0.035) (0.055) (0.052) 
Financial expectations -0.011*** -0.011** -0.011*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Financial expectations * ∆ House price index 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.075*** 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.016) 
Under Mortgage 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Under mortgage * ∆ House price index 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.111*** 
 (0.018) (0.024) (0.023) 
Under mortgage * Overvalue * ∆ House price index -0.079*** -0.079*** -0.079*** 
 (0.023) (0.030) (0.029) 
Overvalue 0.212*** 0.212*** 0.212*** 
 (0.005) (0.011) (0.008) 
Overvalue * ∆ House price index -0.027 -0.027 -0.027 
 (0.019) (0.031) (0.025) 
Overvalue * Financial expectations 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Number or rooms 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) 
Likes present neighbourhood 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Prefers to Move -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Detached 0.086*** 0.086*** 0.086*** 
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 (1) (2) (3) 
Independent variables One-way 
clustering 
(individual level) 
Two-way 
clustering 
(individual and 
region-house 
type) 
Two-way 
clustering 
(individual and 
region-year) 
 (0.010) (0.016) (0.013) 
Semi-detached 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) 
Terraced 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) 
Log of Income 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Age square 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Has Children -0.010*** -0.010** -0.010*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Married 0.010** 0.010* 0.010** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Employed -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
First degree & above 0.020* 0.020 0.020** 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.008) 
Region dummies (Base=North East)    
North West 0.046  0.046 
 (0.033)  (0.038) 
Yorkshire & Humber 0.071*  0.071 
 (0.038)  (0.047) 
East Midlands 0.037  0.037 
 (0.039)  (0.044) 
West Midlands 0.041  0.041 
 (0.037)  (0.041) 
East of England 0.120***  0.120*** 
 (0.038)  (0.044) 
London 0.234***  0.234*** 
 (0.037)  (0.047) 
South East 0.141***  0.141*** 
 (0.037)  (0.042) 
South West 0.060  0.060 
 (0.037)  (0.044) 
Wales 0.030  0.030 
 (0.037)  (0.042) 
Scotland 0.084**  0.084* 
 (0.042)  (0.047) 
Time dummies     
1995 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
 (0.007) (0.014) (0.013) 
1996 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.009) (0.017) (0.016) 
1997 0.008 0.008 0.008 
 (0.012) (0.020) (0.021) 
1998 0.012 0.012 0.012 
 (0.016) (0.023) (0.024) 
1999 0.023 0.023 0.023 
 (0.020) (0.029) (0.030) 
2000 0.034 0.034 0.034 
 (0.023) (0.034) (0.035) 
2001 0.012 0.012 0.012 
 (0.027) (0.040) (0.038) 
2002 0.085*** 0.085* 0.085* 
 (0.031) (0.048) (0.046) 
2003 0.064* 0.064 0.064 
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 (1) (2) (3) 
Independent variables One-way 
clustering 
(individual level) 
Two-way 
clustering 
(individual and 
region-house 
type) 
Two-way 
clustering 
(individual and 
region-year) 
 (0.035) (0.049) (0.050) 
2004 0.057 0.057 0.057 
 (0.039) (0.055) (0.056) 
2005 -0.024 -0.024 -0.024 
 (0.043) (0.055) (0.059) 
2006 -0.053 -0.053 -0.053 
 (0.047) (0.061) (0.063) 
2007 -0.053 -0.053 -0.053 
 (0.050) (0.063) (0.067) 
2008 -0.174*** -0.174** -0.174** 
 (0.054) (0.068) (0.074) 
Constant -0.612***   
 (0.159)   
r2_a 0.153 0.152 0.153 
r2c  0.152 0.153 
Number of clusters (individuals)  12854 12854 
Number of clusters (region-house type or region-year)  44 165 
Observations 105121 103259 103259 
 
Overall, the results are consistent with the results in section 4.5. The standard errors 
reported in both Columns (2) and (3) are largely 50% higher than those in Column (1) 
but the coefficient estimates remain highly significant and only drop to the 5% level for 
a few covariates including the variables financial expectations and its interaction with 
change in house price index and both home investment and other consumption.  
4.6.2 Evidence using the Nationwide national house price index  
Next, I examine whether the results are robust when I use the Nationwide national level 
house price index. National house price indices might be more apparent to homeowners 
than local indices because, as suggested by Shiller (2007), most homeowners observe 
trends in national house prices and may also be influenced by perceptions about world 
house prices. Moreover, as we saw in Section 4.3, the correlation between changes in 
the self-reported house value and the Nationwide national house price index is higher 
than that with the Nationwide regional house price index.   
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This approach provides a further and stronger test of anchoring since aggregate national 
house price indices conceal important regional variations in house prices (Case and 
Shiller, 2003; Himmelberg et al., 2005).  In the data, house prices vary considerably 
across regions and ignoring these differences could bias self-reported housing wealth. 
In other words, if individuals anchor their self-reported housing wealth on aggregate 
national house prices I would expect to see a higher anchoring bias because of the 
mistaken notion that national indices reveal trends in house prices more accurately. This 
is supported by the significant regional effects that I find in the baseline regression and 
the graphical analysis depicted in Figure 4.2. If, in general, house price changes tend to 
move in one direction, I should expect to see large coefficient estimates when I use 
national data.  
The Nationwide house price data sets contain aggregate national house prices, which I 
use for my investigations. Table 4.12 presents the results using the specifications in 
Table 4.6. The results show that our key variable, change in house price index, remains 
virtually unchanged from the results in Table 4.6. Similarly, the main effects of home 
investment and other consumption are consistent with the results in Table 4.6. However, 
the interaction terms for home investment and other consumption with both the change 
in the house price index and financial expectations decline in significance, suggesting a 
weak association with changes in self-reported home house values. This result may be 
associated with the increased importance of financial expectations and its interaction 
with changes in the house price index on self-reported home house values. In other 
words, there is a strong correlation between the national house price index and future 
financial expectations. This is also reflected in the interaction between under mortgage 
and the change in the house price index, which increases in magnitude.
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Table 4.12 Estimates using Nationwide UK aggregate house price data 
Table reports the estimation results from OLS fixed effects regressions in which the dependent variable is log of change in self-reported house value. The independent 
variables as described in Table 4.1are: in all columns, log of regional change in house price index; column (2, 3, 4 &5), time dummies; column (3), property attributes; 
column (4), socio-economic and demographic variables; and column (5), combination of the three sets of variables in column (2), (3) and (4), and dummy variables for 
respondents who have taken additional loan and who have a comfortable financial situation. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and the levels of significance are 
indicated by * (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Change in house price index 0.180*** 0.180*** 0.180*** 0.180*** 0.180*** 0.179*** 0.181*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Taken extra loan 0.020*** 0.032***      
 (0.004) (0.005)      
Taken out extra loan * ∆ House price index  -0.121***      
  (0.030)      
Extra loan – Home investment   0.034*** 0.046***   0.089*** 
   (0.004) (0.006)   (0.008) 
Home investment * ∆ House price index    -0.117***   -0.072 
    (0.037)   (0.048) 
Home investment * Financial expectations * ∆ House price index       -0.131** 
       (0.055) 
Extra Loan – Other consumption     -0.010* 0.005 0.056*** 
     (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) 
Other consumption * ∆ House price index      -0.145*** -0.086* 
      (0.042) (0.049) 
Other consumption * Financial expectations * ∆ House price index       -0.141* 
       (0.072) 
Home investment * Other consumption       -0.132*** 
       (0.032) 
Home investment * overvalue       -0.060*** 
       (0.009) 
Other consumption * overvalue       -0.077*** 
       (0.011) 
Home investment * other consumption * overvalue       0.142*** 
       (0.035) 
Financial expectations -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Financial expectations * ∆ House price index 0.112*** 0.113*** 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.113*** 0.120*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) 
Under Mortgage 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
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Table 4.12 Continued 
        
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Under mortgage * ∆ House price index 0.149*** 0.156*** 0.149*** 0.154*** 0.149*** 0.152*** 0.151*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Overvalue 0.188*** 0.188*** 0.187*** 0.187*** 0.188*** 0.188*** 0.190*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Overvalue * ∆ House price index 0.043* 0.043* 0.043* 0.043* 0.043* 0.043* 0.040 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Overvalue * Financial expectations 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Overvalue * Under mortgage * ∆ House price index -0.074** -0.074** -0.074** -0.074** -0.073** -0.072** -0.068** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Number or rooms 0.072*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.071*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Likes present neighbourhood 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Prefers to Move -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Detached 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.083*** 0.082*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Semi-detached 0.070*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Terraced 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Log of Income 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age square 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Has Children -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Married 0.010** 0.010** 0.009** 0.009** 0.010** 0.010** 0.009** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Employed -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
First degree & above 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
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Table 4.12 Continued 
        
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Region dummies (Base=North East)        
North West 0.040 0.042 0.041 0.041 0.039 0.041 0.042 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Yorkshire & Humber 0.062 0.063 0.062 0.063 0.061 0.064 0.064 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
East Midlands 0.032 0.033 0.032 0.033 0.031 0.033 0.034 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
West Midlands 0.038 0.039 0.038 0.039 0.037 0.038 0.039 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
East of England 0.115*** 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.117*** 0.115*** 0.116*** 0.118*** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) 
London 0.190*** 0.190*** 0.190*** 0.191*** 0.189*** 0.191*** 0.190*** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) 
South East 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.114*** 0.112*** 0.114*** 0.114*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
South West 0.042 0.043 0.043 0.044 0.041 0.043 0.043 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Wales 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.038 0.037 0.039 0.039 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
Scotland 0.067 0.069 0.067 0.068 0.067 0.070 0.071 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
Time dummies         
1995 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
1996 0.011** 0.011** 0.011** 0.011** 0.011** 0.012** 0.011** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
1997 0.011** 0.010* 0.011** 0.010** 0.011** 0.011** 0.011** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
1998 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
1999 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
2000 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.067*** 0.066*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
2001 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
2002 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.121*** 0.121*** 0.121*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
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Table 4.12 Continued 
        
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
2003 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.118*** 0.118*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.118*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
2004 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.103*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
2005 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
2006 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.004 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
2007 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.013 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
2008 -0.087*** -0.087*** -0.086*** -0.087*** -0.085*** -0.086*** -0.086*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Constant -0.430*** -0.431*** -0.429*** -0.430*** -0.429*** -0.431*** -0.433*** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Adjusted  r 2  0.150 0.150 0.150 0.151 0.150 0.150 0.151 
Observations 105498 105498 105498 105498 105498 105498 105498 
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4.6.3 Evidence using the Halifax house price index 
So far, I have used Nationwide house price information in the analysis as the main 
proxy for anchoring on trends in house prices. However, other indices exist, including 
Halifax and Office of National Statistics house price data sets. I use the Halifax house 
price data because the constructed index uses a methodology that is similar to that used 
by the Nationwide; the indices are derived using regression estimates of actual market 
prices based on agreed mortgage contracts against property characteristics.  However, 
the samples used by the two mortgage providers vary and the Halifax house price data 
that I use are not standardised to take into account quarterly changes in sample 
composition.  This notwithstanding, I find a 0.217 correlation between the regional 
house price indices for the Halifax and the Nationwide while the correlations between 
the self-reported house value and the two data sets are 0.119 and 0.233 respectively. 
However, using the national level house price indices, the correlation between the two 
indices is 0.713, which is three times higher. Table 4.13 reports the estimates using the 
specifications in Table 4.6. In Panel A, I report estimates for the Halifax regional house 
price index and in Panel B I use the Halifax national house price index.    
Consistent with the results obtained using the Nationwide house price data, I find that 
the coefficient for the regional house price in Panel A is positive and highly significant; 
however, the coefficient estimate is about four times smaller. The main effects of the 
variables home investment and other consumption are consistent with the results in 
Table 4.6 but their interactions with both the change in the house price index and 
financial expectations are barely significant at the 10% level for the interaction with 
home investment and insignificant for the interaction with other consumption. 
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Table 4.13 Estimates using Halifax UK aggregate house price data 
Table reports the estimation results from OLS fixed effects regressions in which the dependent variable is log of change in self-reported house value. The independent 
variables include log of change in house price; a set of property attributes; a set of socio-economic and demographic variables; and time dummies. Additional independent 
variables include financial expectations; dummy for ownership through a mortgage; overvaluation dummy; and interaction terms of these variables with change in regional 
house price. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and the levels of significance are indicated by * (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel A: Regional house price index        
Change in house price index 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.047*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Taken extra loan 0.019*** 0.022***      
 (0.004) (0.004)      
Taken out extra loan * ∆ House price index  -0.022***      
  (0.006)      
Extra loan – Home investment   0.034*** 0.036***   0.069*** 
   (0.004) (0.004)   (0.006) 
Home investment * ∆ House price index    -0.012   -0.005 
    (0.008)   (0.011) 
Home investment * Financial expectations * ∆ House price index       -0.031* 
       (0.016) 
Extra Loan – Other consumption     -0.010* -0.005 0.039*** 
     (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) 
Other consumption * ∆ House price index      -0.043*** -0.051*** 
      (0.009) (0.012) 
Other consumption * Financial expectations * ∆ House price index       -0.015 
       (0.017) 
Home investment * Other consumption       -0.097*** 
       (0.027) 
Home investment * overvalue       -0.051*** 
       (0.009) 
Other consumption * overvalue       -0.070*** 
       (0.012) 
Home investment * other consumption * overvalue       0.110*** 
       (0.031) 
Financial expectations -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Financial expectations * ∆ House price index 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
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Table 4.13 Continued 
        
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel A: Regional house price index        
Under Mortgage 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.007* 0.007* 0.006 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Under mortgage * ∆ House price index 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Overvalue 0.140*** 0.140*** 0.140*** 0.140*** 0.140*** 0.140*** 0.143*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Overvalue * ∆ House price index 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Overvalue * Financial expectations 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Overvalue * Under mortgage * ∆ House price index 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Number or rooms 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.083*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Likes present neighbourhood 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Prefers to Move -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Detached 0.152*** 0.152*** 0.152*** 0.152*** 0.152*** 0.152*** 0.152*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Semi-detached 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Terraced 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Log of Income 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age square 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Has Children -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Married 0.007* 0.007* 0.007 0.007 0.007* 0.007* 0.007 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Employed 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
First degree & above 0.023** 0.023** 0.023** 0.023** 0.023** 0.023** 0.024** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
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Table 4.13 Continued 
        
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel A: Regional house price index        
Region dummies (Base=North East)        
North West 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.017 0.018 0.019 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Yorkshire & Humber 0.060 0.060 0.061 0.061 0.060 0.060 0.061 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
East Midlands 0.033 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.032 0.033 0.034 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
West Midlands 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.016 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
East of England 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.109*** 0.109*** 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.108*** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
London 0.203*** 0.203*** 0.203*** 0.203*** 0.202*** 0.202*** 0.203*** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
South East 0.117*** 0.118*** 0.118*** 0.118*** 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.118*** 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
South West 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.026 0.026 0.027 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
Wales 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.007 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
Scotland 0.041 0.042 0.041 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.043 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Time dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant -0.445*** -0.445*** -0.445*** -0.444*** -0.444*** -0.444*** -0.446*** 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
Adjusted r 2  0.117 0.117 0.117 0.117 0.117 0.117 0.118 
Observations 105443 105443 105443 105443 105443 105443 105443 
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Table 4.13 Continued 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel B: National aggregate house price index        
Change in house price index 0.350*** 0.349*** 0.350*** 0.350*** 0.349*** 0.349*** 0.350*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) 
Taken extra loan 0.018*** 0.035***      
 (0.004) (0.005)      
Taken out extra loan * ∆ House price index  -0.178***      
  (0.033)      
Extra loan – Home investment   0.032*** 0.048***   0.078*** 
   (0.004) (0.006)   (0.007) 
Home investment * ∆ House price index    -0.155***   -0.113** 
    (0.040)   (0.050) 
Home investment * Financial expectations * ∆ House price index       -0.103* 
       (0.058) 
Extra Loan – Other consumption     -0.012** 0.009 0.054*** 
     (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) 
Other consumption * ∆ House price index      -0.215*** -0.172*** 
      (0.044) (0.053) 
Other consumption * Financial expectations * ∆ House price index       -0.086 
       (0.074) 
Home investment * Other consumption       -0.104*** 
       (0.023) 
Home investment * overvalue       -0.054*** 
       (0.009) 
Other consumption * overvalue       -0.086*** 
       (0.011) 
Home investment * other consumption * overvalue       0.130*** 
       (0.029) 
Financial expectations -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Financial expectations * ∆ House price index 0.132*** 0.133*** 0.132*** 0.132*** 0.132*** 0.134*** 0.140*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) 
Under Mortgage -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Under mortgage * ∆ House price index 0.170*** 0.181*** 0.170*** 0.176*** 0.171*** 0.176*** 0.175*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Overvalue 0.192*** 0.192*** 0.192*** 0.192*** 0.192*** 0.192*** 0.195*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
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Table 4.13 Continued 
        
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel B: National aggregate house price index        
Overvalue * ∆ House price index 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.142*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Overvalue * Financial expectations 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Overvalue * Under mortgage * ∆ House price index -0.041 -0.040 -0.041 -0.041 -0.040 -0.039 -0.030 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Number or rooms 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.071*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Likes present neighbourhood 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Prefers to Move -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Detached 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Semi-detached 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Terraced 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Log of Income 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age square 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Has Children -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.010*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Married 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Employed -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
First degree & above 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.015 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Region dummies (Base=North East)        
North West 0.042 0.043 0.042 0.043 0.041 0.042 0.044 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) 
Yorkshire & Humber 0.073* 0.073* 0.073* 0.073* 0.072* 0.074* 0.075* 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) 
East Midlands 0.069* 0.070* 0.069* 0.070* 0.068* 0.070* 0.071* 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
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Table 4.13 Continued 
        
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel B: National aggregate house price index        
West Midlands 0.048 0.047 0.048 0.048 0.047 0.048 0.049 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) 
East of England 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.115*** 0.117*** 0.117*** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
London 0.159*** 0.159*** 0.159*** 0.159*** 0.158*** 0.159*** 0.159*** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
South East 0.111*** 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.111*** 0.112*** 0.113*** 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
South West 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.059 0.060 0.060 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Wales 0.043 0.042 0.044 0.043 0.043 0.045 0.044 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) 
Scotland 0.068 0.069 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.070 0.071 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Time dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant -0.378*** -0.379*** -0.378*** -0.378*** -0.377*** -0.379*** -0.380*** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Adjusted r 2  0.168 0.168 0.168 0.168 0.168 0.168 0.169 
Observations 105498 105498 105498 105498 105498 105498 105498 
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Unlike the results in Table 4.6, greater financial expectations has no effect on changes 
in self-reported house values and the magnitude of its interaction with the change in the 
house price index declines. Similarly, the variable under mortgage remains insignificant 
and, for its interaction with the change in the house price index, the magnitude of the 
coefficient estimate is more than six times smaller. In addition, the coefficient estimates 
for property characteristics increase and holding a first degree and above qualification 
becomes significant. Overall, when compared to the results in Table 4.6, the 
explanatory power of these regressions as captured by the pseudo R2 drops to 12% from 
15%. These findings suggest that there is less anchoring on the Halifax house price 
index. 
In Panel B, I replace the regional Halifax house price index with the Halifax national 
house price index. Surprisingly, this variable enters with a large coefficient and the 
explanatory power of the regressions rises to 16%. This result is consistent with the 
high correlation between the aggregate self-reported housing wealth and the Halifax 
aggregate national house price index displayed in Table 4.3 and Figure 4.1. The results 
for the main effects of the variables home investment and other consumption are 
consistent with the previous results. However, the two-way interactions of these 
variables with the change in the house price index become significant while the three-
way interactions with both the change in house price index and financial expectations 
become insignificant. 
Consistent with the results where I use the Nationwide national house price index 
reported in Table 4.12, the main effects of the variables financial expectations is 
significant, under mortgage is insignificant and the interaction terms of both variables 
with the change in the house price index are significant. The results clearly show the 
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important roles played by greater financial expectations, ownership through a mortgage, 
and overvaluation relative to regional house prices, home investment, and other 
consumption. I also observe that the Halifax regional house price index has weaker 
explanatory power (11%) than the national house price index (16%).    
4.6.4 Instrumental variables regression estimates 
In the previous analyses, identification of anchoring bias was based on the assumption 
that fixed effects OLS regressions and modelling changes in both house price indices 
and self-reported house values eliminates omitted variable bias and unobserved 
individual effects. However, as I discuss below, there are also endogeneity issues that 
may bias our fixed effects coefficient estimates and could also imply that there is no 
causal relationship. The concern about, and the need to account for, endogenous 
explanatory variables is raised in many fields in the finance literature, including 
empirical studies in household finance (e.g. Brown et al., 2008; Georgarakos and 
Pasini, 2011) and corporate finance (e.g. Bennedsen et al., 2007; Wintoki et al., 2012). 
In this section I address possible endogeneity issues using both difference and system 
GMM (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1988; Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995; 
Blundell and Bond, 1998).   
Endogeneity could occur because, first, both self-reported house prices and house price 
indices are simultaneously affected by property attributes, individual characteristics, 
and regional factors. These are key explanatory variables in hedonic regression 
estimates that are used for calculating house price indices and are also important 
determinants of self-reported house values. Given that both house price indices and 
self-reported house values are jointly determined by property characteristics, there may 
be no causal relationship between the two variables. Second, it may also be the case that 
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current observations of self-reported house values could be influenced by their past 
values. In other words, homeowners may rely on past values as reference points in 
determining and updating their estimation of current house values. Thus, in a dynamic 
OLS regression, I would expect that past changes in self-reported house values will 
explain a lot of variation in current change in self-reported house values and may also 
be correlated with the explanatory variables. Third, current values of changes in the 
house price index (among other explanatory variables) may be influenced by past 
observations of self-reported house values. If homeowners estimate their house values 
using local property listing prices (Goodman and Ittner, 1992) and house price 
movements are driven by investor psychology (Shiller, 2007) then there is reason to 
expect that past changes in self-reported house values may influence the current change 
in house price index.  
In the results reported in Table 4.14 I demonstrate the potential endogenous relationship 
and use both difference and system GMM to test the consistency of our OLS regression 
results. In all the regressions reported, I use a balanced panel from the BHPS 
homeowners’ sample and standard errors are clustered at the individual level. For the 
GMM regressions, lagged values of one period and two periods are used as instruments. 
To eliminate individual effects while minimizing loss of data, I use a forward 
orthogonal deviations transformation (Arellano and Bover, 1995) rather than first-
differencing. 
In Column (1), I report the original fixed effects OLS regression using a balanced panel 
for comparison purposes. The first evidence of endogeneity is seen in Column (2), 
where I include a one period lag of the dependent variable.  
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Table 4.14 Instrumental variables regression estimates 
Table reports the instrumental variables (IV) estimates. The results are based on a balanced panel of 450 
respondents in the BHPS and Nationwide house price index both covering the period 1993 to 2008. The 
individual characteristics come from the BHPS and include log of change in house price; a set of property 
attributes; a set of socio-economic and demographic variables; and region and time dummies. Regional 
house price index is from the Nationwide. AR(1) and AR(2) are the Arellano and Bond tests for first-
order and  second-order serial correlation under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen test of over-
identification is under the null that all instruments are valid. P-values are based on robust, individual level 
clustered standard errors and are reported in parentheses. The levels of significance are indicated by * (* 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).  
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Static OLS Dynamic 
OLS 
Difference 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
     
Change in house price index 0.309*** 0.217*** 0.254*** 0.189*** 
 (0.045) (0.042) (0.068) (0.041) 
Lagged change in self-reported housing wealth  -0.248*** -0.184*** -0.185*** 
  (0.031) (0.032) (0.035) 
Extra loan – Home investment 0.036 0.042* 0.036 0.079** 
 (0.029) (0.022) (0.042) (0.035) 
Home investment * Financial expectations * ∆ House 
price index 
-0.305*** -0.258*** -0.245** -0.335*** 
 (0.092) (0.090) (0.123) (0.090) 
Extra Loan – Other Consumption 0.031 0.058* 0.048 0.152*** 
 (0.035) (0.030) (0.072) (0.053) 
Other consumption * Financial expectations * ∆ House 
price index 
0.042 -0.111 -0.083 -0.108 
 (0.172) (0.096) (0.173) (0.138) 
Home investment * Other consumption 0.040 0.016 0.129 0.022 
 (0.060) (0.062) (0.191) (0.107) 
Home investment * overvalue -0.006 -0.012 -0.019 -0.065 
 (0.034) (0.026) (0.069) (0.053) 
Other consumption * overvalue -0.037 -0.077** -0.023 -0.192*** 
 (0.044) (0.037) (0.102) (0.073) 
Home investment * other consumption * overvalue -0.115 -0.062 -0.269 -0.100 
 (0.072) (0.073) (0.240) (0.134) 
Financial expectations -0.011 -0.024 -0.025 -0.012 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.030) (0.023) 
Financial expectations * ∆ House price index 0.091 0.078 0.022 0.087 
 (0.060) (0.067) (0.078) (0.072) 
Under Mortgage 0.026 0.001 0.044 -0.063** 
 (0.019) (0.022) (0.091) (0.028) 
Under mortgage * ∆ House price index -0.095* -0.084 -0.196** -0.081 
 (0.055) (0.054) (0.079) (0.056) 
Overvalue 0.179*** 0.166*** 0.439*** 0.214*** 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.071) (0.029) 
Overvalue * Financial expectations 0.032 0.034 0.041 0.031 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.030) (0.026) 
Number or rooms 0.084*** 0.086*** -0.062 -0.082 
 (0.026) (0.030) (0.124) (0.051) 
Likes present neighbourhood 0.065** 0.045 -0.019 0.038 
 (0.033) (0.028) (0.138) (0.059) 
Prefers to Move 0.017 0.008 0.004 -0.033 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.041) (0.028) 
Detached 0.124*** 0.128*** 0.091 0.224*** 
 (0.039) (0.046) (0.191) (0.076) 
Semi-detached 0.096** 0.084* -0.171 0.164** 
 (0.037) (0.043) (0.200) (0.070) 
Terraced 0.105*** 0.093** 0.089 0.262*** 
 (0.037) (0.046) (0.190) (0.077) 
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Table 4.14 Continued 
     
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Static OLS Dynamic 
OLS 
Difference 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
Log of Income 0.001 -0.006 -0.046* -0.011 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.026) (0.012) 
Age square 0.000 0.000** -0.000 -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Has Children 0.004 0.017 -0.072 -0.019 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.062) (0.025) 
Married 0.000 0.020 0.099 0.021 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.076) (0.029) 
Employed -0.014 -0.005 0.118 -0.005 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.081) (0.031) 
First degree & above 0.051 0.058 0.089 0.019 
 (0.034) (0.041) (0.200) (0.029) 
Region dummies     
North East -0.001 0.050 0.767 -0.033 
 (0.107) (0.136) (1.086) (0.046) 
North West 0.028 0.014 0.251 0.004 
 (0.108) (0.142) (1.125) (0.042) 
Yorkshire & Humber 0.409** 0.419** 1.298 0.021 
 (0.170) (0.167) (1.100) (0.047) 
East Midlands 0.040 -0.148 0.753 -0.075 
 (0.133) (0.138) (1.189) (0.056) 
West Midlands -0.003 -0.102 0.076 -0.014 
 (0.108) (0.127) (1.102) (0.063) 
East of England 0.170** 0.136 0.614 -0.028 
 (0.085) (0.101) (1.059) (0.045) 
London 0.244*** 0.255** 0.700 0.085 
 (0.093) (0.111) (1.134) (0.055) 
South East 0.118 0.066 0.098 0.040 
 (0.102) (0.118) (1.040) (0.038) 
South West 0.123 0.072 0.468 0.057 
 (0.101) (0.119) (1.066) (0.055) 
Wales 0.089 -0.014 0.087 0.076* 
 (0.107) (0.134) (1.139) (0.046) 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes 
Constant -0.631*** -0.644***  -0.084 
 (0.160) (0.181)  (0.157) 
Adjusted r 2 0.194 0.228   
Instruments   310 475 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) (p value)   0.000 0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p value)   0.339 0.319 
Hansen test of over- identification  (p value)   0.453 0.875 
Observations 4504 3798 3211 3798 
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Strikingly, not only does the explanatory power, r2, increase from 19% to 23% but the 
magnitude for change in house price index declines from 0.309 to 0.217 and remains 
significant at the 1% level. This finding implies that past self-reported house values 
variations in current values and are correlated with the explanatory variables; the lagged 
dependent variable is negative and highly significant. Column (3) reports results from 
difference GMM with the full set of instruments. The regional house price index 
remains virtually unchanged and is significant at the 1% level. However, the coefficient 
estimates for property characteristics decline or become insignificant and their effects 
appear to be captured by the dummy variable overvalue, which increases by more than 
two and half times.   The specification tests show that, for AR(2) I cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation; for the Hansen J test, I cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid.  
In Column (5), I replicate the specifications in Columns (3) using system GMM. The 
coefficient estimate for change in house price index drops to 0.189 and this finding is 
consistent with the results reported in Table 4.13. The lagged dependent variable 
remains unchanged from the results in Column (3). The variables home investment and 
other consumption become significant while the three-way interaction term for the 
variables home investment, financial expectations and change in house price index 
increases in magnitude. Although, the dummy variable overvalue declines in 
magnitude, property characteristics (house type) become significant. Again, the 
statistical tests for specification show that, for AR(2) the null hypothesis of no second-
order serial correlation cannot be rejected; for the Hansen J test, the null hypothesis that 
our instruments are valid also cannot be rejected. In sum, the results are consistent and 
suggest that self-reported house values are anchored on house price indices and that 
mortgage refinancing mitigates anchoring effects.        
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4.7 Conclusion 
The literature concerning house prices dwells mainly on how households respond to 
changes in house prices and shows mixed results for the impact of house price changes 
on consumption, indebtedness and saving behaviour. A strand of the literature explores 
the relationship between house prices and behavioural biases such as money illusion 
and loss aversion, and the role of psychological expectations on market sentiments and 
momentum in house prices. However, little attention is devoted to how households 
derive their self-reported housing wealth and the relationship with house price indices.  
This study examines whether homeowners anchor their self-reported housing wealth on 
hedonic predictions of house prices and their ability (or otherwise) to sufficiently adjust 
for new information and variations in the exposure to different sets of information. 
First, I investigate whether changes in house price indices can explain changes in self-
reported house values over and above the influence of property and individual 
characteristics. Second, given that housing is the most talked about investment and that 
most homeowners actively engage in house price watching, I examine the direct and 
interactive influence of greater financial expectations and ownership type (outright or 
under a mortgage). Third, I investigate whether anchoring on changes in house price 
indices is mitigated by additional information acquired during mortgage refinancing and 
whether the use of money raised for home investment or other consumption has direct 
and interactive influences on changes in self-reported housing wealth. Finally, I 
examine whether social factors such as religion, trust, social group involvement and 
computer use also influence anchoring bias.   
Using published house price indices and BHPS household data between 1993 and 2008, 
I find evidence of anchoring bias among homeowners, which is mitigated by exposure 
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to additional information. In particular, I find that a 10% change in the Nationwide 
house price index leads to a 2% change in the self-reported house value. This result is 
robust whether I control for property attributes, individual characteristics, or both, in the 
OLS fixed effects regressions. Having greater financial expectations or holding a 
mortgage increases anchoring effects and leads to 8% and 11% increases in change in 
self-reported housing wealth, respectively. However, homeowners who refinance their 
mortgages and have greater financial expectations are less anchored on changes in 
house price indices; those who use funds raised for home investment report housing 
wealth that are 10% lower while those who use the money for other consumption report 
14% lower self-reported housing wealth. Further, I find that the combined effect of 
computer use and changes in the house price index leads to a 5% change in self-
reported house values while the combined effect of religion and changes in house price 
index leads to a 4% decline in self-reported housing wealth. I therefore conclude that 
homeowners are anchored on changes in house price indices and that the level of 
anchoring is influenced by ownership type, financial expectations, mortgage 
refinancing, and social factors. 
Further, the estimates from quantile regressions show that the effects of change in the 
house price index, greater financial expectations and holding a mortgage increase along 
quantiles. Anchoring effect increases above the 75th quantile and decline below the 
10th quantile. The results are also consistent for the influence of mortgage refinancing 
and the use of the money raised for home investment and other consumption. Further 
robustness checks using national house prices and an alternative price index (the 
Halifax index) demonstrate that anchoring bias persists regardless of the data used. 
Moreover, the results using GMM estimators are also consistent and I conclude that 
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there is a causal relationship. That is, changes in house price indices lead to changes in 
self-reported housing wealth.   
The main implication of these findings is that, while house price indices may provide a 
general indication of trends in house prices, homeowners should be aware that the 
values of their homes may vary substantially from the index. In particular, those who 
own their homes through a mortgage and do not refinance, should be encouraged to 
regularly seek a professional valuation as this will help eliminate the illusion of 
perceived increased housing wealth, which may impact on other financial decisions.  
This is even more important considering that anchoring effects dominate other 
individual characteristics known to influence financial decisions. Another implication 
concerns the interactive influence of computer use which may be linked with online 
house valuation tools provided by mortgage providers and estate agents. Again 
homeowners should be warned about this because online valuation tools rely heavily on 
indices and other arbitrary assumptions in deriving estimates of house values. 
Moreover, the findings in this Chapter suggest the need for governments and regulators 
to provide more information to homeowners about indices and local house prices.  
Anchoring on price indices and mortgage refinancing also have important implications 
for the housing market and the economy at large. The finding that greater future 
financial expectations increases anchoring on house price indices suggests a link with 
housing market booms and busts, which could be amplified by the contagion effect of 
market psychology (Shiller, 1990; Case and Shiller, 2003). Furthermore, because 
homeowners speculate on future increase in house prices (Choi et al., 2013), favourable 
future financial expectations might also encourage investment in home extensions or 
improvement and other non-housing consumption. In addition, evidence suggests that 
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an increase in house price increases the marginal propensity of consumption for both 
housing and non-housing goods (Aoki et al., 2004). Anchoring on a house price index 
might therefore exacerbate this effect and can explain cyclical movements in 
consumption.          
The findings in this Chapter provide a variety of future research opportunities. First, it 
is arguable that regional and national house price indices may fail to capture variations 
at smaller regional levels; thus, future research exploring the influence of house price 
indices at county or district levels will provide further robustness check to these results. 
Second, given that previous studies link housing wealth shocks to financial decisions 
(e.g. Campbell and Cocco, 2007) future research should investigate whether this 
relationship is also associated with anchoring. The finding that anchoring increases 
across quantiles, with the 95th quantile regression having a coefficient that is twice that 
calculated at the 75th quantile, suggests that anchoring may determine investment 
decisions among homeowners with large housing wealth.  Moreover, as we saw in 
Chapter Three, housing increases the impact of mental accounting on portfolio choice 
and this provides further support for a possible link between portfolio choice and 
anchoring on house price indices.   
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
In this thesis, I investigate the roles of two behavioural biases on household financial 
decisions and a key factor influencing both of these biases and household financial 
decisions, namely social engagement. The study documents the influence of mental 
accounting on portfolio choice, how homeowners anchor their self-reported housing 
wealth on a published house price index and how social engagement affects a key 
household financial decision, namely stock market participation.   
Chapter Two examines the influence of five social engagement mechanisms on stock 
market participation. I posit that weak ties are more productive channels of social 
interaction than strong ties and that the variety and intensity of social engagement 
mechanisms increase the probability of participating in the stock market. The evidence 
shows that the effect of a strong tie is captured by other social engagement mechanisms 
and that people who engage in social groups, who are more trusting, and who identify 
themselves with a right-wing political party are more likely to participate in the stock 
market. Those for whom religion makes a difference in their lives and those who shift 
their political affiliation to a right-wing political party are less likely to participate in the 
stock market.  In this analysis, I use a short panel consisting of three waves in the BHPS 
and I find little variation in the transition between participation and non-participation in 
the stock market. For these reasons, I only use pooled probit regressions, as a 
consequence of which it is difficult to establish causality and to overrule the existence 
of endogeneity. Nevertheless, I test the consistency of the results using a lagged 
dependent variable, an alternative definition of stock market participation and poisson 
regressions - and the conclusions remain unchanged.  
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Given that I examine the probability of ownership of a financial asset, namely stocks, 
future research examining the effects of social engagement on the portfolio share in 
financial assets based on WAS data can provide a further test of the consistency of 
these results. It would also be useful to examine whether the trading behaviour of 
socially engaged investors differs from that of socially disengaged investors and 
whether they make investment mistakes. Barber and Odean (2002), for example, find 
that US stock market participants who switch from phone-based to online trading, when 
compared to those who do not switch, tend to trade more frequently and that their post-
switch performance is worse.  They argue that such investors are overconfident about 
their abilities. In the context of this study, because socially engaged investors are more 
informed about financial markets, I might expect them to trade more frequently and 
thus to make errors.  
In Chapter Three, I investigate the roles of mental accounting together with financial 
advice and housing tenure on both ownership and portfolio share in three asset classes: 
risky assets, fairly safe assets and safe assets. The conjecture is that mental accounting 
can explain variations in the ownership of, and portfolio share in, the three asset classes 
and that the effect of mental accounting is also influenced by the provision of financial 
advice and housing tenure. I find that households that exhibit single mental accounts, 
when compared to households that exhibit no mental account, or those that exhibit 
multiple mental accounts, are less likely to own a risky asset and have low portfolio 
share in risky assets. When compared to households that exhibit no mental accounts, 
households that exhibit a single mental account and those that exhibit multiple mental 
accounts are more likely to own a fairly safe asset and to have a high portfolio share in 
fairly safe assets; however, they have a low portfolio share in safe assets. Among 
households that exhibit single and multiple mental accounts, financial advice and 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
A
p
pen
dice
s 
308 
housing tenure reduce portfolio share in fairly safe assets and increase the share in safe 
assets. These results are consistent across sub-samples, reparameterized variables and 
when poisson regressions are used. 
By using a panel period that coincides with the global economic crisis, the results 
provide evidence of its impact: a positive impact on ownership of and portfolio share in 
a fairly safe asset and a negative impact on ownership of and portfolio share in a risky 
asset. Using only two panel periods is a limitation of the study because, first, it is hard 
to control for unobserved individual effects and to address the problem of endogenous 
regressors. Although I use multivariate regressions to control for correlations in the 
error terms across the three asset classes, the error terms in individual regressions may 
still be correlated with the explanatory variables. Thus, my conclusions should be 
interpreted as associations and do not suggest causality. Second, it is not known how 
these households would otherwise behave during normal economic conditions. This can 
be the subject of future research as more waves of the WAS become available. It would 
also be interesting to examine the trading behaviour of households across mental 
accounts. As suggested by Shefrin and Thaler (1988), the urge to spend money from a 
‘current income’ mental account is high relative to a ‘future income’ mental account 
and this might apply to households that exhibit multiple mental accounts as compared 
to those that exhibit a single mental account.  
Chapter Four investigates whether changes in self-reported housing wealth are anchored 
on a published house price index and whether anchoring is mediated by housing tenure, 
mortgage refinancing and how money raised from refinancing is used. The idea is that, 
given the prevalence of house price indices, the perception that housing is an 
investment, and the substantial share of housing wealth as a proportion of total 
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household wealth, homeowners might be anchored on house price indices at the 
expense of other market information. In support of this conjecture, I find that 
homeowners who own a home through a mortgage are more likely to be anchored on 
published house price indices and this effect is net of the interactive effects of house 
price indices with financial expectations and the tendency to overvalue house prices. 
However, among mortgage holders, those who refinance their mortgages are less 
anchored and refinancing has a direct effect on the change in self-reported housing 
wealth. Moreover, those who use the money raised from refinancing to invest in home 
improvements and extensions are less likely to be anchored and this has a direct 
positive influence on self-reported housing wealth. Computer use has a negative effect 
on the change in self-reported housing wealth and increases anchoring, while religion 
reduces anchoring.  
An important concern in identifying anchoring effects is that both self-reported housing 
wealth and the house price index may be simultaneously determined by individual 
characteristics and property characteristics. Although I take advantage of the long panel 
and use a fixed effects OLS model, this could still be problematic. I therefore address 
this problem by using GMM estimators and my conclusions remain unchanged. One 
limitation of this study provides an opportunity for future research. Because I use 
regional house price indices, the study does not capture variations in the index within 
smaller geographical regions such as county level and district level. Future research can 
strengthen these results by using alternative house price indices reported at the county 
and district levels. Furthermore, the question as to whether anchoring on house price 
indices is also reflected in homeowners investment decisions is worthy of investigation. 
This is a plausible argument given that studies that use published house prices to proxy 
for increases in housing wealth find a positive relationship between consumption and 
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house prices (Campbell and Cocco, 2007). Indeed, the finding in Chapter Three 
concerning the interactive effects of housing and mental accounting on portfolio choice 
supports a possible relationship between portfolio choice and anchoring on house price 
indices.  
Overall, the findings in this thesis will be of interest to investors, financial advisors and 
policy makers. The finding that the variety and intensity of social engagement enhances 
stock market participation indicates that policy makers and financial institutions should 
put more effort into providing information about both financial markets and financial 
products to those who are less socially engaged. The evidence that trust compensates 
for left-wing political party identity suggests that building trust about financial markets 
may encourage people who hold ‘anti-market’ political views to participate in the stock 
market. Regarding the influence of mental accounting, investors should be aware of the 
benefits and pitfalls of mental accounts. For example, the finding that households that 
exhibit single mental accounts and those that exhibit both multiple mental accounts and 
have access to multiple sources of financial advice are less likely to own risky assets, 
and have a low share of risky assets, suggests that these households hold sub-optimal 
portfolios.  Therefore, as suggested by Baptista (2012), both investors and financial 
advisors should be aware of the implications of mental accounting when constructing 
portfolios.  
Concerning anchoring on published house price indices, homeowners should be aware 
that house price indices only provide a broad picture about trends in the housing market 
and are not necessarily precise measures of changes in the value of their own homes. 
The finding that mortgage holders who refinance, when compared to those who do not 
refinance, are less likely to be anchored on house prices indices suggests that 
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homeowners should consult, for example, chartered valuers to obtain professionally 
estimated house values. This is particularly important when reviewing and considering 
investment plans as this will ensure realistic assessment of total household wealth and 
portfolio rebalancing. In addition, the finding that homeowners who use a computer are 
more anchored highlights the importance of warning homeowners about the dangers of 
relying on online information and home value calculators that are usually provided on 
the websites of mortgage companies and estate agencies.   
The findings also have important implications for the operations of both financial 
markets and housing markets. Regarding financial markets, although few individual 
investors participate directly in the stock market, as seen in both Chapters Two and 
Three, and although their participation might not have a substantial impact on the 
market, the observed increase in and a shift towards indirect stock market participation 
suggests a possible impact on market volatility due to greater reliance on investment 
intermediaries. This conclusion is supported by previous evidence which shows a 
tendency for fund managers to exhibit herding behaviour (Dennis and Strickland, 2002) 
and for asset allocation decisions concerning indexed funds to follow market trends 
(Griffin et al., 2011).  On the other hand, the finding that homeowners who have greater 
financial expectations are more anchored on house price indices, both of which are 
associated with growth in self-reported house values, implies that the housing market is 
likely to be more volatile during economic booms or downturns; positive (negative) 
stories about expected price increases (decreases) rapidly spread among homeowners 
through word-of-mouth (Shiller, 1990; Case and Shiller, 2003). This could in turn 
exacerbate booms and busts in the market because of the contagion effect of market 
psychology.   
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